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This book is based upon my thesis presented in 1981 dealing with the Royal Hungarian Army in World War II. It was much shorter, had no maps or diagrams, and was heavily footnoted. The original title as suggested for the thesis was to have been “Germany’s Last Ally”. But once the subject was examined in detail, I kept finding more material and deemed title as inappropriate. There was much more to Hungary than a mere listing as the final satellite of the ill-fated German Third Reich. My mentor agreed, and the title was changed.

After the granting of my Ph.D., more data appeared, and material was added to the manuscript. I originally wanted to present a completely impartial documentation of the organization and order of battle of the Royal Hungarian Army in World War II. (My interest in orders of battle and military organizations will be apparent throughout this book.) While doing further research, I became fascinated by the background of the Army before the war, which in turn lead to finding out why the Hungarians got involved in World War II in the first place. This in turn lead to World War I, from which Hungary emerged as by far the biggest loser of all the powers involved.

The Royal Hungarian Army is a subject about which little has been written in English. Sources are basically in Hungarian and German. The major exception to this are the aircraft of the Hungarians, which have been well documented in English, and, strangely enough, virtually ignored in German and, until recently, even in Hungarian.

While operations and strategies were available to the researcher without having to dig very deep, the actual organization and locations of the Royal Hungarian Army proved to be much more difficult to determine.

“`A Short Review of Hungarian History” in the section before Part I is based on the continued research into the history and motivation of the Hungarians, and goes well beyond the main subject matter of this book. However, as all countries are the result of their history, I have included it as providing an interesting background about Hungary’s situation in 1920 and the motives that drove Hungarians then and now. Besides covering the political and military events between 1918 and 1920, it also reveals many facets of Hungarian social development and political traditions as well as the background for much of their drive, which apply even today.

With one exception, (published in Germany during the 1970s in Hungarian), no complete or continuous source about the efforts and defeats of the Hungarians in WWII exists. This book is a compilation of over one hundred different sources. These can be divided into original documents, the memories of the participants, and published works. The latter tend to be in the majority. Most books, usually and unfortunately, and even sometimes without ulterior motives, distort the events. I have tried to extract the facts and eliminate any bias. Hopefully, I have succeeded.

Although I have attempted to keep this document impartial, it will be obvious to many readers that sympathy for the Hungarians and their plight in the wake of WWI has crept into this presentation. Even so, interestingly enough, some informed Hungarians who have read this manuscript find my presentation of Hungary’s motives and of the Royal Hungarian Army as not positive enough and my point of view as “too western”, by which they usually mean German. (Which I am not). Knowing I will never satisfy all points of view, I have chosen to present the events as I see them.

A major problem is that I don’t speak or read Hungarian. Over the last twenty-two years, many Hungarians, both veterans of WWII and other persons have provided much information and translations.

The author apologizes for any mistakes that have crept in over the years, (they are only my own), and welcomes critical comments and suggestions. Should any reader possess more founded information, or the original documents thereto, I would appreciate hearing from them, so that in a future edition, the corresponding corrections can be inserted for the benefit of all.

During these last twenty-odd years, many people have been of assistance to me, all contributing their part to the whole. Some were of such assistance, that without their intervention, this book would never have been written at all. In particular, I would like to gratefully mention Mr. Brün Meyer, formerly of the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg; Captain Pál Darnóy, formerly of the Royal Hungarian General Staff; and to Major Dr. Attila Bonhardt, of the Military History Archives in Budapest. To them, and those many others, my heartfelt thanks.

A future volume will deal with the other aspects of the Royal Hungarian Army, including vehicles, aircraft, vessels, equipment, arms, and uniforms.

Dates are indicated as follows: Day.Month.Year (Thus 11.07.1941 is the 11th day of July, 1941).

The order of battle and organizational diagrams are based on the original documents, and use the same Hungarian organizational symbols of the period as found on them.

*German units and ranks are indicated in italics.*
HUNGARIAN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hornwood Civilian Agency</th>
<th>Light Machine Gun Company</th>
<th>Infantry Company</th>
<th>Telephone Company</th>
<th>Air Force Headquarters</th>
<th>Train</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hornwood Supreme Headquarters</td>
<td>Medium Machine Gun Company</td>
<td>Motorised Infantry Company</td>
<td>Signal Company</td>
<td>Air Force Brigade Headquarters</td>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Train (40mm)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Headquarters</td>
<td>Heavy Machine Gun Company</td>
<td>Bicycle Infantry Company</td>
<td>Mixed Radio/Telephone Company</td>
<td>Air Force Wing Headquarters</td>
<td>Armored Train</td>
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<td>Corps Headquarters</td>
<td>Anti-Tank Rifle Company</td>
<td>Motorcycle Infantry Company</td>
<td>Radio Company</td>
<td>Air Force Regimental Headquarters</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Headquarters</td>
<td>Anti-Tank Gun (37mm – 47mm) Company</td>
<td>Parachute Infantry Company</td>
<td>Radio Interception Company</td>
<td>Air Force Group Headquarters</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade Headquarters</td>
<td>Anti-Tank Gun (75mm) Company</td>
<td>Cavalry Company</td>
<td>Telephone Company</td>
<td>Air Force Airport</td>
<td>Topographic Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regiment or Group Headquarters</td>
<td>Light Mortar (96mm) Company</td>
<td>Tankette Company</td>
<td>Wire Construction Company</td>
<td>Air Force Airfield</td>
<td>Forward Collection Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Headquarters</td>
<td>Medium Mortar (81mm) Company</td>
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<td>Air Force Weather Station</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Mountain Gun (75mm) Battery (Pack)</td>
<td>Heavy Tank Company</td>
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<td>Short-Range Reconnaissance Squadron</td>
<td>War Correspondent Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Platoon or Detachment</td>
<td>Mountain Gun (75mm) Baisery (Flora-Dracon)</td>
<td>Assault Gun Company</td>
<td>Supply Column (P.O.L.)</td>
<td>Long-Range Reconnaissance Squadron</td>
<td>Cavalry Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Company, Battery, or Column</td>
<td>Field Gun (76.5mm/80mm) Battery</td>
<td>Assault Howitzer Company</td>
<td>Supply Administration Unit (P.O.L.)</td>
<td>Fighter Squadron</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foot or Horse-Drawn</td>
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<td>Headquarters Company</td>
<td>Supply Column (Rations)</td>
<td>Bomber Squadron</td>
<td>Bird</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Light Howitzer (100mm/105mm) Battery</td>
<td>Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Company</td>
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<td>Light Bomber Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>Horse-Drawn Cart Column</td>
<td>Mountain Howitzer (105mm) Battery (Pack)</td>
<td>Armored Car Reconnaissance Company</td>
<td>Motor Maintenance Company</td>
<td>Heavy Bomber Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>Horse-Drawn Wagon Column</td>
<td>Medium Howitzer (149mm) Battery</td>
<td>Commer Engineer Company</td>
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<td>Motorized</td>
<td>Heavy Howitzer (200mm – 289mm) Battery</td>
<td>Pioneer Company</td>
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<td>Headquarters (motorized)</td>
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<td>Motorized Amphibious Column</td>
<td>Super Heavy Howitzer (305mm) Battery</td>
<td>Motorboat Columns (motorized)</td>
<td>Bakery Company</td>
<td>River Pločica Regimental Headquarters</td>
<td>Headquarters (motorized) (cross-country)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cross-Country Motorized</td>
<td>Artillery Observation Battery</td>
<td>Assault Boat Columns (motorized)</td>
<td>Medical Company (partially motorized)</td>
<td>River Pločica Group Headquarters</td>
<td>Cavalry Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motorized Tractor-Towed</td>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Machine-Gun Battery</td>
<td>Engineer Chemical (Smoke) Company</td>
<td>Ambulance Columns (motorized)</td>
<td>River Pločica Independent Unit</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Heavy Anti-Aircraft Gun (40mm) Battery</td>
<td>Heavy Combat Bridge Column</td>
<td>Field Hospital Unit</td>
<td>River Guard Regimental Headquarters</td>
<td>Medical Services Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Heavy Anti-Aircraft Gun (165mm) Battery</td>
<td>Assault Bridge Equipment Column</td>
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The Origins of the Hungarian People

The need to organize the horse-cultures and the magyarization of the region were the most important in the formation of a new trans-Scythian people, the Magyárs, or Hungarian people. Ancient influences of Indo-European tribes such as the Avars and the Huns, who already existed in the area, had to be integrated with a Finno-Ugric aspect. It should be noted that the Magyars who moved to Hungary came to a region that already had a long history of civilizations. The essence of this horse-culture was Turkic. So were many Old Magyár names. (Much research still has to be done in Transoxania, between the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers). Some cities have been excavated, and there are clear military ties with the Avars in Hungary. A settled life is not known, but is the subject of spirited debate in Hungary.

The culture included a highly-disciplined military organization based on clan ties. Much evidence indicates that the steppe people had a “decimal” system of military organization, still reflected in modern Hungarian ranks, which have no direct counterparts in the West.

The essence of this horse-culture was Turkic. So were many Old Magyár names. (Much research still has to be done in Transoxania, between the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers). Some cities have been excavated, and there are clear military ties with the Avars in Hungary. A settled life is not known, but is the subject of spirited debate in Hungary.

A Chronology of Hungarian History

In the year 896 A.D., seven Magyár tribes, comprising 108 clans and numbering an estimated 500 000 people, came from the region of the Prut, Seret and Dnyester Rivers. They had diplomatic contacts with Byzantium, as well as with Arnulf, king of the East Franks. They defeated the Bulgars who ruled Transylvania and the rest of the Eastern Carpathian Basin. They further defeated the petty Avar, Hun and other local people, and proceeded to conquer and occupy the land. (Note, none of these were Slavic or Rumanian, with the exception of Zwontibolt/Svatoipluk I, a Moravian).

They initiated a policy of destabilization of the two Great Powers, the German-Roman Empire and Byzantium, which could threaten their conquest. Then, due to internal changes, in A.D. 970, (no doubt influenced by their defeat at the Lech), they changed their policy to one of integration with Western Christianity. The tribal alliance was in need of reform, and in this period, Géza Fejedelem chose Western Christianity. His son, who was baptized as Stephen (István) rebuilt the Seven Hungarian Lands into a strongly-centralized Christian Kingdom in A.D. 1000. (The administrative districts he set up lasted until the Treaty of Trianon smashed them).

Then began a long period of peace during which the laws (up till then, orally transmitted) were written down, more towns were founded, people with special skills (such as Germans and Cumanians) were settled and given land. Croatia, an ancient Christian Kingdom, asked King Kálmán to rule there, and after that Croatia formed part of the Hungarian Kingdom for many centuries. The two peoples respected each other from this time. Hungary was, for many centuries, the most advanced country in Europe in many respects. E.g., Hungarian King Kálmán banned the burning of witches in A.D. 1100. Also, the oral Hungarian Constitution (Blood Alliance) was written down and improved, (the Arany Bulla), around the same time as the English Magna Carta. Minority rights were protected. A special “Bulla” was issued for the protection of the Jews. (They were few, as most Hungarian moneylenders were at this time Muslim Bulgars from the Volga). They are referred to in Hungarian as Böszörményi, while the old name for the other Bulgars was Nándor.

The main army of the Tartars invaded Hungary in 1241, and killed an estimated one-third of the Hungarian population. However, by 1266, the Hungarians had defeated a Tartar army.

Around 1350, the Seljuk (and later Ottoman) Turks began harassing the eastern border region. (i.e., the Carpathians). At first, Hungary easily dealt with the Turkish threat, but it was a growing power, which Hungary kept at bay for 150 years.

A large Turkish army under the Sultan Murad I invaded the Balkans in the 1390’s. After the Turks defeated a combined army of Balkan nations, King Zsigmond (Sigismund) of Hungary (who was also the Holy Roman Emperor) organized a crusade against the Turks. At the battle of Nikopolis in 1396, an army composed of Hungarian, French, German and Italian knights was defeated and destroyed, because of the Turk’s superior tactical maneuverability. However the Turks were defeated by Timurlaine so Hungary was spared. The following year, the Hungarian Assembly, (more accurately, Parliament), which met at Temesvár, drew the logical conclusion and decided that for every 20 plots of land, each noble had to provide one mounted archer for the King’s army. This later was revised to 30 plots, (but the original name, húsz: 20 and ár: price), became the standard Hungarian name for cavalry, húszár, “the price of twenty”.

In 1456, the Hungarian Regent, János Hunyadi, defended the key frontier fortress of Nándorfehérvár (Bulgarian-White-Town: Belgrade). Europe was so happy that the Pope ordered the bells throughout all Christi-anity to be rung at noon to remember this great victory. (This is the Roman Catholic “Angelus”).

King Mattias Corvinus, of the House of Hunyadi (1458-1490) was, after St. Stephen and Louis the Great, Hungary’s greatest king. He was one of the first European rulers to have a standing army (The Black Army) and kept the Turks at bay. He was a great patron of the arts and introduced the Renaissance into Hungary. However, he had no heir so his achievements did not remain permanent.

In 1514 György Dózsa (a Székyheuszár captain) lead a nationwide uprising of the serfs. The nobility crushed the peasants with excessive and unnecessary violence. And so, when a few years the Turks attacked, they found Hungary a divided nation augmented by the new doctrine of Protestantism. At Mohács, in 1526, the Hungarians were utterly defeated. The remaining leaders withdrew the government to Pozsony (Pressburg). (There were very few Slovaks (if any) there at the time, as they lived in the mountains). The Hungarian nobles split at this time. Those in the north and east voted for János Zápolyai, while those in the remaining western part of the country elected Ferdinand of Hapsburg. Hungary at this time fell prey to its own nobility’s avarice and shortsightedness and the empire-building efforts of the Hapsburgs and those of the Turks.

However, this period was the Golden Age of Transylvania, which was autonomous under Turkish rule, and became a centre of religious freedom, art and trade under such, mainly Hungarian Protestant Duke (Fejedelem) as the Bocskay, Bethlen and Báthori families.

The Kingdom of Hungary, as founded by St. Stephen, was divided up into three areas. The Hapsburg part in the north and west, the autonomous Turkish protectorate of Transylvania and the Turkish-occu-
Hungary and the House of Hapsburg

In 1686, the Turks were driven out by a combined Christian army. Unfortunately, the Hapsburgs dealt with Hungary not as a country with a centuries-old history, but as a “newly-won territory”. This aggravated the “nationalities question” because the Austrians (especially Leopold I) encouraged the Serbs, Slovaks, Walloons and other people to go to Hungary as “settlers”. (At this time, the “Voivodina”, the Bánát of Temesvár and other territories became ethnically mixed. This would have serious consequences later, for instance, in the period between WWI and WWII).

The Hungarian nobility called on the Austrian Emperors to obey the Hungarian Constitution as they had sworn to do. The Austrian Emperors called on the Hungarians to acknowledge their Divine Right to rule, causing a rift that would never heal between Austria and Hungary that would cause many wars and uprisings.

In 1701, the Duke of Transylvania, Fransiscus Rákóczi II declared war on the Austrians, Pro Patria et Libertate. (For Nation and Liberty). He was ultimately defeated because the Hungarian nobility could not agree among themselves to preserve its privileges at the expense of the serfs (peasants). Although tentative steps were taken to free them, and many of Rákóczi’s leaders were in favor of peasant origins. - This period is therefore greatly romanticized in Hungary.

Maria Theresia of Austria was elected Queen of Hungary in 1741. She understood the Hungarian nobility and their constitution, and tried to rebuild Hungary. For this, the nobles helped her greatly in the War of the Austrian Succession. She also tried to improve the lot of the poor. This war saw the first use of Hungarian huszars in the West (against Prussia) and the unique form – if not the expertise and elan – of these cavalrymen spread throughout Europe. Unfortunately, after 1780, the rise of Absolutism brought back the rift between the King and the nobles, and all the while the poor classes became poorer and poorer.

In the 1830’s, many Hungarian nobles, like János Bolyai, Count István Széchenyi, Miklós Wessélényi and others inaugurated the “Reform Age”, where they tried to bring Hungary, which once was in the forefront of European development, but due to all the wars was now very backward in line with advanced European countries, especially England. (They especially liked the English Constitution, which they felt they could use as a model to help reform their own one.)

In 1848, mainly due to the impact of the Reform Age, the Hungarians – again calling for their ancient constitutional rights – rose up against Austrian Absolutism to regain national independence. They defeated the combined Austrian-Croat armies of Jellacic, the Austrian regular forces of Windisch-Graetz, but in 1849 were crushed by a huge Russian army. It was at this time that the “nationalities” began to want autonomy within the Hungarian kingdom. The Hungarians, meanwhile, were preoccupied with regaining their political freedom, and overlooked the important nationalities question.

The Ausgleich with Austria in 1867 created the Dual Monarchy. By this time, minorities had developed a new way of looking at the world, inherited from 1848, “nationalism”, i.e., the idea that a nation must consist of people of the same ethnic group and speak the same language. The Historical Hungary was a political state, not an ethnic nation-state. After many provocative acts, the Serbs murdered the Austrian heir to the throne Franz Ferdinand in 1914. At this time, the various ministers (Austrians, Czechs etc.), all demanded war. The only exception was the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza. Nevertheless, he was blamed for the war by the Allied propaganda machine.

The Nationalities and the Hungarians

Serbs:
Traditional name: Rác. (From “Rascia”, the medieval name of Serbia). Their first state was founded in 1217. Their independence was crushed by the Turks at the battle of Kossovo (1389). As a result, the Serb people generally migrated towards the North and West to try to escape the harsh rule of the Turks. Many fled into Hungary, and founded towns there (Ráckeve, Rácalmás and Szentendre.) As mentioned earlier, large numbers of Serbs were settled in the late 1600’s/early 1700’s by Leopold I in what would become the Voivodina, (Vajdaság, also known as the Bácsk). They were also settled in the Croat frontier area, or Krajina.

Croats:
Traditional name: Horváth. (From Hrvat). The Croats elected to join the medieval Hungary, and remained under Austrian rule. The Croats had an advanced culture of their own, but are best known in their connection with the Hungarian kingdom as soldiers. And indeed, they produced some excellent ones, some even becoming Hungarian national heroes. The two nations generally respect each other, the only real clash being when the Croat “Bán” or leader, Jellacic, invaded Hungary in the service of the Austrian Emperor.

Ruthenics:
Traditional name: Rotén or Kisorosz. The real victims of Trianon, never receiving their own state. Stalin ethnically cleaned many of them and then imported large numbers of Ukrainians. (The ethnic situation in Ruthenia is today hopelessly confused). They were traditionally woodsmen.

Rumanians:
Traditional name: Oláh. (From Vlach). Relations between the Hungarian and Rumanian people are strained. The Vlachs were herdsmen (usually shepherds). Their origins are a matter of debate. The first recorded instance of Rumanians in the Carpathian mountains is in the second half of the 12th Century. Their numbers in Transylvania increased with the Tatar and Turkish invasions. The Rumanians claim to have originated in Transylvania as descendants from the Romans. (Hence the country is sometimes called “Romania”). Another theory is that the Turks called them “Rum” because they lived in the Turkish Sultanate of Rumelia. Vlachs are well-documented as nomadic herdsmen on the Balkans and in Anatolia during the early middle ages. As used in this book, the name Rumanian is a shortened version of Roumelian, which was the original (written) name of their country.

Slovenes:
Traditional name: Tóth. Most Hungarians seem to have got along well with them, but there was little respect for them, which the Slovaks resent. The Slovaks were traditionally woodsmen or tinkers or miners, along with their Hungarian counterparts. The miners were well respected.
**Jews:** Traditional name: Izraelita or Zsidó. Jews were already present in medieval Hungary and it is speculated that possibly one or two of the 108 Magyar clans were Jewish. During the 18th Century a large number of Jews emigrated to Hungary from Polish Galicia where they were being persecuted. They found a liberal reception in Hungary although they provoked some jealousy by their monopolizing of certain sectors of the economy. In 1919, Béla Kun’s communist regime inspired anti-Semitic reactions, which played a large part in the racist Jewish Laws and the views of the Hungarian Fascists, such as the Nyilas Party.

**Germans:** Traditional name: Sváb (Swabian) in Hungary, and Szász (Saxon) in Transylvania. The Germans came to Hungary upon the invitation of various Monarchs. They were valued as tradesmen, and soon formed their own guilds. They generally lived in the towns. Many Germans also came as farmers in the 1700’s. Relations between the Magyár and German people was usually good, although the Germans tended to support the Austrian Emperor (or the Empress), whereas the Hungarians supported national independence, although this must be seen as an oversimplification of the matter. As a result of this immigration and the close relationship with the Empire, most Hungarian cities and regions also had German names. In German Pécs is “Fünfkirchen”, Pozsony is Pressburg, Kassa is Kassa, Transylvania is “Siebenbürgen”, and so on.

**Extinct/Absorbed Minorities:**

- **Jews:** They were even some groups of Slav and Avars. All these peoples settled in Hungary between 600 and 1300 A.D., and were of Turkic origins. They eventually were assimilated into the Hungarian people. When the Hungarians occupied Hungary, there were also some groups of Slav peoples, especially in the West, who also became assimilated. Another group who should be mentioned are the ancient Jazig people, who are mentioned by the Romans. They were part of the people the Greeks dubbed Sarmatae (cattle-herders) and called Sarmatians by modern historians. Their descendants live in north-central Hungary in the “jászág”. Towns named after them include Jázsberény etc. The Rumanian town of Jassy bears their name as well. Also, during the medieval period, many Flemings fled to Hungary for protection from religious persecution and there were even some Italian immigrants.

Most of the above traditional names are no longer used as they are considered to be pejorative or in other ways unacceptable.

### Overview of Hungarian Constitutional History

The Hungarian constitutional tradition is based on a tradition that reaches back to the cultural heritage of the Steppe, going back as far as the Scythians, of whom similar traditions are recorded by Herodotus c. 480 B.C. This was the so-called “Blood Treaty” (Vérszerzúdés), in which each of the seven leaders (vezér) of the Magyar Alliance) cut himself and poured a few drops of blood into a bowl of wine. Then they all ceremonially drank from it. There were four “stations” (statis) of the alliance. (There is no exact date for this event, but it is believed to be around 840 A.D.). This placed the Family of Arpád, son of Almos at the head of the alliance.

The Seven-Magýar tribal alliance proceeded to conquer Hungary in 896 AD.

When Géza Fejedelem (which is difficult to translate but means something like High King) ascended to the throne in 970 A.D., he moved towards the Holy Roman Empire politically and tried to minimize the cultural, religious and political power of the Byzantines. As part of this move, his son, Vajk, was sent to the West to be Christianized. Vajk, baptized Stephanus (István) would become known as the founder of the Hungarian state. He put great emphasis on centralization and broke the power of the traditional (pagan) nobles. He wrote “Admonitions” (Intemlek) to his son between 1001 and 1030 A.D., which would be a kind of “Bible” for all the Arpád House kings. They are remarkably enlightened.

An example, from the Fourth Admonition: “... always keep in mind that every man is born to the same condition, and that nothing raises anyone, save humility, and nothing casts anyone down, save pride and hatred.” (Free translation). The Arany Buła was brought in 1222 A.D. to check the power of the king. The nobility wanted to limit the power of the king, at a time when the “Divine Right” of kings in the rest of Europe was being asserted, (excluding Poland and England).

The system had elements which are modern and democratic and were more advanced than in many parts of Europe. It had one fatal flaw: The masses of people were not given any political rights. As a result, only four “Estates” had political power, or rights. These were the Leading Nobility (Főnemes); the Clergy; the Merchants and the “Common Nobility” (Köznomes).

Most clerical positions were appointed by the King, (not the Pope), so these already were nobles. (Although there are examples of commoners becoming bishops, etc.). The Kings would grant Royal Privileges to deserving towns, which then became known as Royal Free Towns. (szabad királyi városok), and were allowed to send representatives to the országgéls, the “assembling of the Nation” (országgyűlés) and it is still the Hungarian name for Parliament), as well as write their own charters for the running of their own affairs. (Effectively local government). This was especially important as – unlike in Western Europe – the local baron could collect pay taxes. These Estates had a right and a duty to call on the King to convene the országgéls in a particular place, and thus they are remembered as the Parliament of Rákós, or Onód, etc.

During the time of the Angevin Kings, (1300 – 1400 A.D.), the nobility was already defining the “political nation”.

It should be noted here that most European countries were still inventing themselves, and therefore Hungary (and Poland) were often ahead of Europe politically, contrary to the “backwardness” one constantly hears.
about in the West. The nobility’s definition of a “political nation” was surprisingly modern, but it was not destined to stand the tests of history and time. It was this “political nation” for which the various Hungarian leaders would rise against Turkey and Austria, and it was this ancient definition of Hungary which was smashed at Trianon in 1920.

It is not hard to see why Hungarians are so against this Diktat! Also, while Hungary was de facto occupied by foreign powers, (Turks or Austrians), the nobility kept the idea of the nation alive through the concept of the “political nation”. The definition of the “political nation” was as follows: The common law authority which belongs to the landed nobility, the Chief of the Army and the king is referred to as the “communitás”. This community or common power is gained from the Blood Treaty. This means that the first Fejedelem got his power to rule the others from them. It follows that St. Stephen inherited this right from his fathers. As a result, the king rules not by God’s Favor, but by the assent of the communitas. The common-law practice placed the “Divine” element not in the king, but in the Holy Crown of St. Stephen. This is referred to as early as Stephen himself as the “Corona Sacra”.

It is generally held by Hungarian historians that in Old Magyar society, one of the kings – there were two – was “persona sacra”. It is quite probable that the idea of the “Holy King” was moved onto the Holy Crown in the Christian era. Hungary has a unique tradition of numerous kings who were made saints by the Catholic Church, and many place names reflect this ancient tradition. E.g. Szentkirály-szabadja, which means the Freedom [or Free Place] of the Holy King.) This common law concept of the rule of the “nation”, (zemét), was called the Doctrine of the Holy Crown. (Szentkorona Tan).

Another important aspect of the ongoing constitutional development was the concept of equality of the nobles. (i.e., the nobles) were equal to each other. It is important because it tried to prevent the growth of a baronial class who would lord over the other nobility. (Although this was not totally successful).

The concept of equality of the nobles was first made into law by Louis the Great (i.e., 1351 A.D.) It should be noted that, at least on paper, this legislation succeeded. Theoretically, at least, only a few people were given the Hungarian title Fűnemes (High Noble), owing to their important position in the land. The other title carried had was that of “Zászlós ur”, or Flag-holding Lord. This meant they were entitled to raise armies.

During the period of Austrian rule, the Hungarian nobility adopted foreign names and titles. Thus German titles like Baron (bátyó) Count (gróf).

The continuing weakness of the system was the growth of the serf class, and political power remaining in the hands of a few. This power was often abused. (As elsewhere in Europe). By the time of Matthias Corvinus, (1458 – 1490), the nation was in a constitutional crisis in that the nobles (magnates) had taken so much power for themselves that they became “little kings”. King Matthias tried to restore the balance and instituted a large number of reforms aimed at alleviating the lot of the peasants.

Matthias would often travel incognito and personally check how the reforms were progressing. A common saying in Hungary reflects the common man’s view of him: “Mehalt Mátys, meghalt az igazság”. Or, “Matthias has died and so has justice”. After his death, his reforms were, for the most part, reversed.

In 1504, the “Chief Justice” (országbíró) István Werbiczky, started writing the Tripartitum, or Triple Book, which he completed in 1514. This was the first compilation of all of Hungary’s common laws. In this work, he states the concept of the “political nation” and restates the equality of all nobles, based on “membership in the Holy Crown”. The “national idea” was that with equality of all nobles, the State and the Nation would coalesce. The fact that Werbiczky was asked to write the book in 1504 is no accident, as it was in this year that, to quote a Hungarian political observer, “the fully-developed right of the Nation to elect a king first found expression in the election of King Ulászló (Wladislaus) the First. His election to the throne ... was a victory for the ... concept of Idoneitas (suitability to rule) over legitimas, or hereditary, bloodline-related, or dynastic principle.”

It is interesting to speculate that a logical development of “political nation” (the Body Politic) would have been to widen the scope of the law to give rights to other classes. This could have led to the modern “nation state” being a Hungarian idea. This was not to be, however, because of the enormous numbers of Turkish assaults and the ensuing disruption of life in Hungary, which prevented its development.

In 1514, the constitutional system suffered a spectacular failure when the Peasants’ Revolt erupted. The nobles were too shortsighted to extend their political rights to the peasants, and Hungary was weakened at a crucial time. In 1526, the Hungarian Royal Army was crushed by Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent at Mohács (26 000 Hungarians vs 70-80 000 Turks). Unfortunately for Hungary, it was effectively “beheaded” in this battle, with the King and a large number of those with political power (The Body Politic) dying on the battlefield.

Austria and the German states were ever-ready to take advantage, and even invaded Hungary in 1541.

Under Turkish Rule

The Turks reacted, so Hungary was occupied by Turkey for 150 years. This period (excluding Transylvania) prevented any healthy development of the constitution (or anything else, such as art or industry or trade) as people were forced to try and survive the Turkish oppression, which occasionally was made worse by the Austrians. One of the few steps forward during this dark period was the introduction of the so-called “hajduszabadság”. A “Hajdú” was a hired soldier (this being Hungary, they were mostly cavalry) and this concept meant that a man who had been a soldier for a certain time was accorded the title “vitéz” and was accepted as being a noble (i.e., was freed). Unlike the higher nobility, many hajdus received their coats-of-arms as a group, e.g., a coat-of-arms for a company, etc.

Transylvania, meanwhile, became the hold out for Hungarian national freedom, under the various “Fejedelem” or Dukes. The region became one of the (possibly the most) liberal in Europe. It was the first (together with Poland) to recognize freedom of conscience (In June, 1568) trade was carried out from Turkey to Belgium, literature flourished. The first Western laws to recognize religious liberty came at least a century later). Also, the nationalities were given equal treatment (there were three, the Hungarians, the Germans (Saxons) and the Székely. However, the Romanians were not included. (There were too few of them to have any impact yet, much like the Gypsies. However, the first Romanian books were printed here by German and Hungarian tradesmen.

Hungary and the House of Hapsburg

During 1686 – 1699, Hungary was freed from the Turks by a combined European army (including large numbers of Hungarians, of course) headed by Prince Eugene of Savoy. Unfortunately, the hope of the Hungarian nobles that their political powers (and lands) would be restored was in vain. Instead, the House of Hapsburg took control of Hungary and ruled it as if it was new territory, such as America or Africa.
The situation was made worse by the fact that the Hungarian Parliament in 1687 recognized the hereditary right of the Hapsburgs to the Hungarian throne. This, although done out of gratitude for the deliverance from the Turks, was a step backwards constitutionally, which would have serious negative consequences in future. The situation became consistently worse as new people, (Serbs, Rumanians, Slovaks, Germans and others), were brought in as “settlers” and took the lands that the “natives” had owned for centuries, which they could prove with documents (e.g. [Hungarian] Royal Grants, Coats-of-Arms etc.).

The “natives” were being abused like never before and something had to break. Conditions were so bad that peasants (and many nobles, too) began to flee to the mountains and forests and were called “bujdosó” or “hiders”. Tragically, many of the Hungarian nobles were only interested in regaining lands lost to the Turks and neglected their responsibilities to their peasants. As a result, the split between the peasantry and nobility remained.

Francis Rákóczi II, one of the most romantic figures in Hungarian history, came to the rescue of the serfs. He was the grandson of Peter Zrínyi, (executed for Jacobite political activity in 1671), and the son of Ilona Zrínyi, (who led the defence of the castle of Munkács against the Austrians). He was an enlightened man who wanted, (like Miklós Zrínyi, the grandson of the hero of Szegetvár), to reform Hungary’s constitution, to include more groups of people, and to reestablish the nation’s independence. He lived in exile in Poland, but in 1701 – as the legitimate Duke of Transylvania – called on the nation to rise against the Austrian absolutist oppression. He raised Hungary’s first regular infantry unit, led by a peasant, and many of his cavalry commanders, including General “Vák” (Blind) Bottyán, were noblemen. His soldiers called themselves “kuruc”, a Hungarianized word for “crusader” (from the German “kreuz”). Rákóczi lost the war eventually because of international politics, which were not favorable to the return of independence for Hungary. However, he left behind a legacy of chivalry, honor and courage which lives on to this day.

In 1848, Hungary was going through a reform age. By 1843, Hungary had demanded freedoms from the Viennese Court which were considered “revolutionary”. Louis Kossuth championed the rights of the peasants to own land, and the European political climate brought matters to a head in 1848. By this time, the Hungarian constitution looked like this: The King had to issue an edict to protect the peasants (“Urbarium”).

Maria Theresia promised to return Transylvania to Hungary instead of administering it as a separate “new” territory. Sadly, her son, Joseph II did not comply, refused to recognize the constitution, or to have himself crowned as prescribed by the laws of Hungary. He is referred to disdainfully as the “kalahos király” (“King in a hat”). The negative impact of the Absolutist tendency in Hungarian life was showing itself.

The key person in the Reform Age was Count István Széchenyi. He had travelled widely and perceived that Hungary was very backward. His way of uplifting the country was not constitutional reform, but economic reform. It is worthwhile to mention a few people from this age. Józef Katona (playwright), Sándor Csoma-Kúrösi (explorer), János Bolyai (mathematician, incidentally the first to reject Euclidean geometry), Miklós Wesselényi (politician and publicist), Ferenc Kökösey (politician and poet, who wrote Hungary’s national anthem). It should be noted that all of them were nobles, and even aristocrats.

In 1848, Hungary was the emancipation of the peasants to own land, and the European political climate brought matters to a head in 1848. This was unacceptable to the Absolutist powers of the time, notably Austria, Prussia – who offered troops against Hungary – Russia, who sent 200 000. The Hungarian Revolution of 1848 never had a chance against the combined might of Austria and Russia. (The 1848 Revolution gave rise to the name Honvéd, which literally means Home Defender, or Home Guard). However, the constitution had done something very important. It had reformed itself from a feudal basis to one based on modern liberal concepts. This is interesting, in that the constitution – instead of having been thrown out – was extended to include everyone, not just the old “political nation”. This meant, in effect, that everyone in Hungary became a member in equal standing of the Holy Crown. The continuity from St. Stephen remained. The Revolution’s emancipation of the serfs was finally accepted throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and it achieved most of its goals in the Ausgleich of 1867, when the Empire became Austria-Hungary.

There was a problem, however:

The Kingdom of Hungary faced a great crisis when the new “nationalisms” based on the French model, hit Europe. Old Hungary was a kingdom based on a “body politic”, or “political nation”, that was not defined by race or language. The new 19th century idea of Nationalism entailed that people who spoke the same language should live in a “home of their own” i.e., the nation-state. People who had previously been defined by class, for instance, peasants in Transylvania, suddenly wanted to be called Slovaks, or Rumanians, etc. By the 1848 Revolution, the Croats wanted their independence back, later the Slovaks wanted to be recognized as a nation, as did the Ruthenians, the Rumanians and the Serbs. This led to the final crisis of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Before, all written correspondence, official documents, etc., were in Latin, and it did not matter who spoke what at home. This all changed when the various nationalities began developing their own languages. By 1866, Rumelia (Rumania) was independent, and the Rumanians in Transylvania wanted to join them.

In 1918 Austria-Hungary collapsed and the Western Allies aided the Czechs, Rumanians and Serbs in invading and ransacking Hungary. The way in which Historical Hungary was destroyed still angers...
many Hungarians today, not made any better by bad treatment the Hungarian “minorities” receive, especially in Serbia, Rumania and Slovakia.

In the Wake of World War I

Defeated along with the other Central Powers in the Autumn of 1918, the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated. The collapse brought political chaos and economic breakdown to the Balkans. On 31.10.1918, with this collapse imminent, Count Mihály Károlyi was appointed by the Austrian Emperor Charles IV as prime minister of Hungary at the head of an improvised administration based on a left-wing National Council, (progressive bourgeoisie and intelligentsia revolutionary bodies).

The Hungarian troops engaged on the Italian Front and in the Ukraine were ordered back to Hungary.

While withdrawing to Hungary, the Balkan Army of the Entente Powers, under the French General Franchet d’Espéray (also spelt as Esperey), reached the southern borders of Hungary.

The National Council General Diaz signed an armistice at Padua on 3.11.1918. This was signed by on the Italian side by General Diaz.

On 6.11.1918, Károlyi lead a delegation to Belgrade to meet the French Marshal General Franchet d’Espéray, commander of the Allied Balkan Army. The agreement laid down demarcation lines, but did entail the loss of Croatia, which even in dualist Hungary, had enjoyed a separate status. This demarcation line, however, was not to last long.

The events now occurring in Hungary would have a drastic effect on the country for the next twenty years.

The 6.11.1918 Agreement provisionally fixed the size of the Hungarian Army at six infantry and two cavalry divisions. Based on this armistice, all Hungarian units and troops arriving at the national borders were disarmed, demobilized, and sent home, the Károlyi government relying naively on the Allied Powers to defend Hungary’s territorial integrity.

Although the victorious small allies of the Entente in the Danube region were assured of a sympathetic hearing and they knew that they would receive large territories at the expense of Hungary, they did not know to what extent their maximum demands would be met. To be on the safe side, all three neighbors (Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslav, and Rumanian), initiated military actions against Hungary in order to be in possession of territories they desired by the time the peace conference began. It is hard to see what the Allied foreign ministries could have done to prevent these invasions, short of sending troops to protect the former enemy against their own allies.

On 16.11.1918 Count Károlyi dissolved Parliament and proclaimed Hungary as an independent republic.

On 8.11.1918, Czechoslovak troops advanced into Upper Hungary in order to claim “Slovakia” as its own. After a few minor battles, the Hungarians withdrew, whereupon General Ferdinand Foch as sent to a further advance of the Czechoslovak troops in accordance with Czechoslovak territorial claims. In December 1918 Károlyi was informed of the Czechoslovak–Hungarian demarcation line, which largely coincided with the borders later dictated by the Peace Treaty of Trianon.

The Rumanian government was most unhappy with the demarcation line established by the November 1919 armistice agreement. Rumanian claims, based on secret agreements with the Entente made in 1916, were far more far-reaching. The border between the two countries would have been at the Tisza River, in the heart of Hungary. In addition to Entente promises, Rumania was also in possession of a “declaration of union” with Transylvania issued by self-appointed representatives of Transylvanian Rumanians in case territorial claims based on the secret wartime treaties were declared null and void.

Unfortunately, secret treaties signed during the war between the Entente and various representatives of ethnic groups and exile governments obliged the Allies (not unwillingly) to consent to the demands of the Rumanians, Serbians, Croats, and Czechs. Accordingly, Károlyi was instructed by the Allied Powers on 2.12.1918 to evacuate Transylvania, Slovakia and Ruthenia. Not having any significant military force at hand – because of their unilateral disarmament – the Károlyi government was unable to oppose these orders by force.

Following this instruction, the Rumanian forces, encouraged by General Franchet d’Espéray, crossed the demarcation line in December 1919 and by February 1920 had reached a line running through Máramorszeg (Sighet), Nagybanya (Banja Mare), Zilah (Zilau), and Cscusa, well beyond the historic boundaries of Transylvania. The Allies were finally forced to send French troops to Arad after bloody encounters took place there between Rumanians and Hungarians.

Yugoslavia was less aggressive. It had already been awarded Croatia, and neither the size nor the political weight of the other territories it desired were comparable to those of Transylvania or Upper Hungary. Yugoslavia’s aspirations clashed with those of both Rumania and Italy, since the Bánát had earlier been promised to both Rumania and Serbia, so that both Yugoslavia and Rumania claimed the Bánát, resulting in a bloody armed confrontation between the two countries, only stopped by French troops. The Paris peacemakers eventually decided to partition the Bánát between Rumania and Yugoslavia.) Yugoslavia would have liked to obtain the city of Pécs and the valuable coal mines nearby from Hungary. Although not awarded to her, both remained under Yugoslavian occupation through the summer of 1921.

The Rumanian and Czechoslovak forces took over public administration and began to integrate the occupied areas into their respective countries despite the explicit stipulation of the armistice agreement that administration would remain in Hungarian hands until the final decisions over the fate of these territories were determined by the peace conference. Hundreds of thousands of Hungarians fled to Budapest from the occupied territories.

Count Károlyi’s government found itself in a very difficult position and popular support for his administration was severely diminished. The occupation of the rich industrial and mineral-producing territories, as well as the southern grain producing districts of Hungary, fanned the economic crisis to great proportions and increased civil unrest. Further difficulties were based on Hungary’s exclusion from the aid programs of the Supreme Economic Council and the American Relief Administration. All these factors, according even to Allied reports, tended to strengthen the extreme left. The Bolshevik revolution in Russia spread like wildfire, fanning the flames of hatred against the rich and the victorious Western democracies.

The Entente’s hostile actions against Hungry continued relentlessly. On 20.03.1919 General Vyx presented the Allied demands to Károlyi, indicating that the Allied troops would occupy additional Hungarian territories “with a view to preventing the spread of Bolshevism, which was prevalent in Hungary”. The Vyx note proved the failure of Károlyi’s policies in preventing the Western powers from dismembering Hungary. It also ordered the formation of a Hungarian–Rumanian neutral zone whose western line bore a suspicious resemblance to the promised border of the 1916 secret agreement between Rumania and the Allies. Károlyi, supported unanimously by his government, was not prepared to concede further territories. On 21.03.1919, deciding that he was obviously not able to pro-
The Royal Hungarian Army 1920 - 1945

Colonel Aurel Stromfeld, a professional general staff officer, was appointed as Chief of Staff of the Eastern Army. He was a good organizer, a good strategist, and was a commander who enjoyed the confidence and loyalty of his soldiers.

His plan was to defend in the south and southeast, generally along the Drava and Tisza Rivers, with inferior forces (one division and two mixed brigades), while the bulk of the army (one army corps and supporting artillery), was to attack along the Tisza River in a northerly direction to split the Czech and Rumanian forces. The attack started on 30.05.1919 and by 10.06.1919 the units of the Hungarian Army had reached border in the northeastern Carpathians. In the northwest, the campaign reoccupied important industrial regions around Miskolc, Salgotarjan and Selmecbanya. The Allied forces outnumbered the Hungarian troops three to one. In the south, there were 20,000 – 30,000 Yugoslavian troops. In the east, 20–30,000 Rumanians. (There were also 20–30,000 French in the east); in the north 20–25,000 Czechs. As long as supplies reached them, Hungarians were able to counter the advancing hostile invaders. But the Bolshevik government in Budapest continually sabotaged the logistic arrangements.

During this period, when the patriotism of the Hungarian officers and soldiers produced military victories, the communist dictatorship of the proletariat created more and more dissatisfaction in the different segments of the Hungarian population. In many places, civilians and soldiers in the countryside and in the army began to organize an uprising to overthrow the repressive government.

Georges Clemenceau sent two telegrams in the first half of June, demanding that the Bolshevik government withdraw its troops from the reoccupied territories. The government complied with Clemenceau’s demand and ordered the army to withdraw to the line of demarcation. The retreat undermined the morale of the army and desertion began to decimate the troops. The Hungarian forces in Transylvania were forced to capitulate on 26.06.1919. The entire Székely Division went into Rumanian captivity around Brasso (Kronstadt) and were interned there.

Colonel Stromfeld, the organizer and leader of the successful military campaign, resigned on 1.07.1919 and was replaced by Ferenc Julier in the position of Chief of Staff. He launched an attack over the Tisza River against the Rumanian forces, but this attack had no chance. The patriotic officers and soldiers, who only a few weeks before had fought heroically for the reoccupation of the Hungarian territories, now turned against the purposeless bloodshed. In the absence of leadership, discipline broke down and the army rushed back toward Budapest without offering any resistance to the Rumanian troops. The patriotic soldiers of the Red Army also withdrew their loyalty from Béla Kun’s regime. After hardly more than four months, the Bolshevik Party lost the support of the Hungarian people.

The Rumanians proceeded to occupy two-thirds of the country. It was only after the intervention of the Entente Powers that the Székels were released.

After the leaders of the Bolshevik government had escaped to Austria, the Workers’ Council of Budapest elected a new government at its 31.07.1919 meeting, under the leadership of Gyula Példi. He, as well as the members of his government, belonged to the Social Democratic Party and were stamped by the Bolsheviks as “right wing” socialists. On 1.08.1919, the Bolshevik government resigned. Béla Kun and several of leads of the Hungarian Soviet Republic and their families fled to Austria.

Példi’s government annulled many regulations of the Bolshevik dictatorship. Political prisoners were released, revolutionary tribunals dismissed, the Red Guard dissolved. The former police organizations were entrusted with the maintenance of law and order. Confiscated properties were given back to their rightful owners.

The Rumanian troops occupied Budapest on 3.08.1919. An Interallied Military Mission with British, French, American and Italian members arrived in the capital on 5.08.1919. The next day, a few anticommunist soldiers, under the leadership of István Friedrich, invaded the council of ministers and dismissed the social-democratic government, recognizing Joseph of Hapsburg as Regent of Hungary. He abdicated after strong pressure from the Allies. (After all, they had just fought a major war to get rid of the Hapsburgs).

On 9.06.1919, a National Army was formed by Rear-Admiral Nicholas Horthy, who took charge as Commander-in-Chief of all Hungarian forces that remained intact. The core of this army were officer units. (Owning a great influx of officers, units were created that consisted mainly of junior officers.) These units were later joined by Székel Division troops after their release in July 1919.

These anti-Communist officer units had been created at Feldbach (Austria) and in the south and in the west of Hungary after the demise of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. They had little or no sympathy for those officers who had fought in the Hungarian Red Army. They could not under-
stand that the great majority had seen it as their patriotic duty to save the nation, and not to engage in politics at a time of grave national emergency as had been a tradition in the Imperial Army, which was that officers did not interfere or even interest themselves in politics.

As indicated, many former K.u.K senior officers and General Staff members had joined the Hungarian Red Army out of patriotic duty, amongst them József Bajnóczy, Alajos Bélydi, Károly Beregy, Elemér Gorondy-Novák, Sándor Győrgy-Bengyel, Gusztáv Hennyez, Gusztáv Jágy, Géza Lakatos, András Littay, Béla Mikó, Vilmos Nagy, Hugo Sőnyi, Ferenc Szombathyeli, Hendrik Werth. The list is included, because a large part of postwar literature has indicated that these officers were persecuted for their joining the Red Army.

Shortly thereafter, the Rumanians advanced into Transdanubia and occupied Győr. They began to plunder the country, taking away every moveable piece of military equipment. The MARTA factory at Arad had been plundered in November 1918. In September 1919, the Rumanians dismantled and removed the entire armaments factory at Győr. The same fate befell most of the factories they encountered in Hungary.

Anticommunist forces were organizing also in other parts of the country. In April of 1919, Count Julius Károlyi attempted to reach Arad and from there Szeged, where the French commanders promised him support for the formation of an anticommunist government. However, because of the interference of Rumanian occupational troops, Károlyi arrived at Szeged only in June 1919. There he found – instead of support – opposition on the part of the French representatives. By 12.07.1919, Károlyi gave in to the French demands to withdraw from Budapest on 13.11.1919, (although only after thoroughly looting the capital), and to retire east behind the Tisza River by 14.11.1919.

The Allied Peace Commission ordered the Rumanians to leave Transdanubia by 11.10.1919 and was able to induce the Rumanians – with great difficulties – to withdraw from Budapest on 13.11.1919, (although only after thoroughly looting the capital), and to retire east behind the Tisza River by 14.11.1919.

The Allied Peace Commission allowed Horthy’s National Army to enter Budapest on 16.11.1919. After long negotiations, a new coalition government was formed under the premiership of Károly Huszár. It was recognized by the Allied missions and prepared for parliamentary elections. The elections, held on 25–26.01.1920, produced victory for the Smallholder’s Party and for the Christian National Union Party. Both parties were made up of a cross section of society; thus the parties did not represent the interest of any particular social class. On the basis of these elections, Hungary now had a responsible government, and the victorious Allied Powers began peace negotiations with Hungary.

The new government was designated as the “Provisional National Assembly” and voted into power on 1.03.1920. Hungary was once again a monarchy. The Assembly, desiring a monarchy, but wishing to avoid the embarrassing decision of who should be the monarch, turned over to Horthy, as Regent, all powers of Head-of-State and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Admiral Horthy was accorded the right to appoint and remove the premier and all the individual ministers. Furthermore, he could convene or dissolve parliament, and to propose legislation. Declarations of war and conclusions of peace, however, needed the consent of parliament.

The new Hungarian government, having achieved independent and political stability for Hungary, now faced the task of righting the damage and destruction caused by the war, ensuing disorders, and invasions. It had to face up to the harsh fact that the Allied and Associated Powers considered the Hungary as one of the official successors of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, and that now-defunct empire had sued for peace. Hungary now had to accept a harsh peace treaty imposed by them.

The Rumanian forces gradually evacuated Hungary. The general looting and the confiscation of public and private property carried out by the Rumanians during the occupation of large parts of Hungary was on a monumental scale that was unprecedented in modern history. By the time the Rumanians finally quit Hungary in April 1920, they had stolen 1,292 locomotives with 54,130 railway wagons full of loot.

Owing to the disastrous military and the unstable political situation within Hungary, the presentation of a final draft treaty for Hungary by the Entente and Associated Powers to end World War I was delayed until 16.01.1920. Although Hungary protested many points, the treaty was eventually signed in the Grand Trianon at Versailles on 4.06.1920.

**Treaty of Trianon in 1920.**

The brutal treaty broke up a political and economic system, which had been based on logic, common sense and law, and created new states, which, in spite of Allied promises, were not nation-states. The Ruthenians never got their own country, the Slavs were pushed into “Yugoslavia”, while the Slovaks, who wanted independence from the Hungarians, were placed under Czech rule.

Transylvania and most of the Bánát were ceded to Rumania; the rest of the Bánát, the Bácska, Prekmurje (Prekomurje), and Croatia-Slovenia to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Coats, and Slovenes (the future Yugoslavia); Slovakia (including Spiš and Orawa) and Ruthenia to Czechoslovakia; part of western Hungary (Burgenland) to Austria; and Fiume (Rijeka) to the Allied and Associated Powers pending a decision on its fate.

The reparations amount was left pending.

The size of the army was limited to 35,000 professional volunteers. The infantry was to be a pre-world war type, without heavy equipment such as machine guns, grenade throwers, mortars or cannons. The artillery’s heaviest pieces were 105 howitzers, with 105mm caliber and 70 light and medium mortars. The organization of tank,
The Royal Hungarian Army 1920 - 1945

Air force, and antiaircraft units was forbidden. To police the international traffic on the Danube River, a flotilla was organized, but restricted to a maximum of eight patrol boats and two heavy motorboats. The customs officer corps (Vámörség) numbering 7,000, was strictly separated from the armed forces. Its duty was to control traffic across the frontiers and preferably also prevent smuggling. The treaty emphasized that the primary duty of the army was the maintenance of internal order. Only in case of an open military invasion could the Hungarian army react, even in such case only defensively. To paralyze the army completely, the general staff, as an institution, was dissolved, the organization of strategic military units forbidden, organization and training of reserves was not permitted, and mobilization plans could not be drawn up. General military service was forbidden. The purpose of these limitations was also to prevent Hungary from trying to pursue the revision of the peace Diktat with the use of arms.

The borders dictated by the Treaty of Trianon left a densely populated rural plain, with a predominantly agrarian economy. Unfortunately, remaining population was so dense that the national production of food was insufficient to meet the needs of the Hungarian people. The new government, although handicapped by this poor supply of natural resources and a dearth of financial means, was forced to adopt steps to push the country along the road to industrialization.

The Treaty of Trianon took away Hungary’s principle natural resources, iron and other ores, coal, lumber. It was made dependent upon imports to satisfy its industrial needs.

### Treaty of Trianon Facts and Figures

<table>
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<th>Hungary lost</th>
<th>of its population</th>
<th>of its raw materials</th>
<th>and 70% of its land.</th>
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<td>64%</td>
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The Kingdom of Hungary (with 325,411 square kilometers) as part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, only had 92,963 square kilometers left, having lost Transylvania (103,093 square kilometers) to Rumania; Croatia and Bácska (63,093 square kilometers) to Yugoslavia; Slovakia and Ruthenia (61,633 square kilometers) to Czechoslovakia, and Burgenland (about 4,000 square kilometers) to Austria. Even Poland and Italy got fragments.

Hungary had had a population of 20,886,487 in 1910. After Trianon this was reduced to 7,615,117, (i.e. by 64%). Of the remaining population, (that which had not perished in World War I and the disorders following it), 5,257,467 went to Rumania; 3,517,568 to Czechoslovakia; 2,091,249 to Yugoslavia; and 291,168 to Austria.

The military limitations were imposed, as “part of the general disarmament program” of Europe and the observation of disarmament rules was supervised by an Allied military commission.

The Treaty of Trianon took away Hungary’s principle natural resources, (iron and other ores, coal, lumber). It was made dependent upon imports to satisfy its industrial needs.

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Part I

The Royal Hungarian Army
1920 - 1941
CHAPTER 1

HUNGARY BETWEEN THE WARS

Domestic and Foreign Politics

The beginning of the history of the new Hungary can be set at 1.03.1920, when the “Provisional National Assembly” was voted into power. One of the first tasks of this government was to apply to and, after great difficulties, be finally admitted to the League of Nations in September 1922.

In the search for assistance in recovering from its economic chaos, the Hungarian government made overtures to both the victorious and the defeated nations. The depression of the 20’s and 30’s made the democratic countries reluctant to engage in speculative business with the new Hungarian nation.

The newly-emerged governments of Italy and Germany, on the other hand, were eager to obtain recognition and support wherever they could find it, and willing to do something for it. The first step on the road to recovery was initiated by a treaty of friendship with Italy in 1927.

The world financial and economic crisis of the early 1930s shattered the barely recovering Hungarian economy. Creditors called in their debts in 1931. Hungary was unable to meet their demands, as the world crisis had destroyed the trade balance which depended on the price of wheat. The government – under the conservative premier Count István Bethen – appealed to the League of Nations in June 1931 for a loan. The conditions for granting the loan were very strict. Industrial unemployment increased, the rural population was virtually driven into poverty, government employees were dismissed in droves, and those that retained their jobs were forced to take heavy cuts in salary to balance the budget.

Count István Bethen resigned in August 1931. He was succeeded by Count Gyula Károlyi, who was also unable to rectify the situation.

On 1.10.1932, Horthy appointed as prime minister the leader of the “Right Radicals” Gyula Gömbös.

Premier Gömbös was allowed by Horthy to hold elections in 1936, and those had brought into parliament a strong Right Radical element, from which Hungary could never thereafter free itself and which would heavily influence the Hungarian political life.

In addition, Hungary’s more or less unwilling entry into the Axis camp pulled it unwillingly but inextricably into a similar stance regarding ideology and anti-Semitism as Germany was propagating. The Right Radicals and even elements of the middle classes welcomed the heavy influence Germany had on Hungarian politics. They considered that Germany as an enemy was dangerous, and could easily crush Hungary if it so desired. On the other hand, Germany could be a power friend.

The right wing elements, (and almost all of the army officers) thought that Hitler’s policies would lead to war, Germany win that war and then Hungary’s revisionary aims would be supported by Germany after the victory.

The opposition consisted of elements opposed to the Nazi doctrines including Jews, the Legitimists, the traditionalist “Liberal Conservatives”, and the Social Democrats. This combination of forces did not believe that Germany would win an eventual war, and that close involvement with Germany would lead to catastrophe. Horthy sympathized with this group.

Hungary signed the Rome Protocols on 17.03.35, whereby Italy, Austria and Hungary came to an agreement regarding Hungarian wheat. Italy and Austria agreed to buy Hungarian wheat at twice the going price. This enabled Hungary to buy Austrian and particularly Italian goods, goods also including weapons and armaments forbidden by the Treaty of Trianon.

The treaty was also directed against Germany. Hitler then informed the Hungarians that he would support Hungary against Czechoslovakia, but not against Rumania or Yugoslavia.

This was a severe blow, as during the time after World War I in which Hungary was rebuilding its shattered state, it had never forgotten the fact that it had lost great portions of its land, population, and natural resources. Its diplomatic endeavors were primarily directed towards rectifying this situation. This policy was known as “Revisionism”, i.e. revision of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon.

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Gömbös died in October 1936. He was succeeded by Kálmán Darányi, who was more a conservative than a right wing radical. The appointment was ill received by Germany.

When Italy joined Hitler, Hungary found itself in the Axis camp. The fascist nations were more or less eager to be of assistance.

On the other hand, if Germany had applied economic or political pressure, Hungary would have been for all intents and purposes, helpless.

In 1937 Hungary obtained the tacit consent of the Small Entente to rearm, although it was still woefully short of armaments.

In May 1938 Horthy replaced Darányi with Béla Imry who introduced a largely token “Jewish Law” to appease the Germans, although he was definitely pro West and not necessarily anti-Jewish. This helped Hungary during the Munich Crisis in 1938.

Further developments in the normalization process took place when Hungary was invited to attend Small Entente Council Conference at Bled in Yugoslavia between 22. and 23.08.1938 at what was to be the last session of that institution.

The Small Entente released Hungary from the disarmament clauses of the Trianon Treaty and acknowledged it’s right to rearm itself as necessary. In return, Hungary pledged not to reclaim any of the ceded territories by force of arms.

The Munich Agreement of 2.09.1938 – which in Neville Chamberlain’s words was to assure “peace in our time” – had just been signed. In accordance with the Agreement, German troops began the occupation of the regions of Czechoslovakia known as the Sudetenland. Abandoned by the Western Democracies, the Czechoslovakian government’s only hope was that part of the Munich Agreement which promised that Germany, Italy, France, and England would guarantee the new borders once the Czechoslovakian government had reached agreement with its Polish and Hungarian minorities. However, Czechoslovakia neighbors were placing a more liberal interpretation upon what these “agreements” were to be.

At the time, Hungary did not feel itself strong enough to enforce its demands by military action. The opposite was true. In a meeting of the Hungarian Supreme Defence Council on 20.09.1938, Lajos Keresztes Fischer said that “in case of a German offensive, Czechoslovakia might attack Budapest, and the Hungarian Army was not strong enough to resist this”. The Hungarian Army only had enough ammunition to fight for 36 hours. It was therefore decided to take only defensive measures.

On 1.10.1938 German troops marched into the Sudetenland. On the same day, the
Polish government demanded of Czechoslovakia some 750 square kilometers of territory, including the cities of Morovská-Ostrava and Tescen. This region had been in dispute since 1920, when the Paris Peace Conference divided the old Duchy of Tescen between Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Prague government had to accede to the Polish demands, and the territory was handed over on 1.11.1938.

Hungary seized the opportunity, and demanded the return of the provinces of Ruthenia and Slovakia — demands so excessive that the Prague government could not possibly acquiesce. Consequently, Czechoslovakia moved troops up to reinforce her common border with Hungary, and began to occupy the bunker systems there. At several points along this border armed clashes took place between Hungarian border forces and Czechoslovakian troops. Meanwhile, destructive forces had been at work in Czechoslovakia. The German-backed and Hungarian-supported nationalist elements in both Slovakia and Ruthenia pushed for a greater degree of self-determination, and before October 1938 ended, both provinces had been granted autonomy by the harassed Prague government. The Republic of Czechoslovakia had become Czech-Slovakia epitomized in both name and fact.

Not long after the German occupation, the Hungarian government sought to test the will of the “Czecho-Slovaks” to resist further territorial loss. On the morning of 5.10.1938, an armed band of 500 men of the Hungarian “Ragged Guard” attacked the railway station at Borzava and killed a railway man. The invaders then confidently pitched a tent camp in the nearby woods. The Czech troops reacted quickly. They surrounded the Hungarian camp and after a fierce fight forced its surrender. The Hungarians lost 80 men dead, and some 400 were captured.

The Hungarians were naturally in great haste to get the talks started, as the Czechs had not demobilized, as agreed to in the Munich Agreement. Realizing that the Ragged Guard incident was only an opening move on the part of the Hungarians, the Prague government began to reinforce the troops in the Slovakian region. These consisted of the reliable troops. But although these reinforcements were fully capable of dealing with the weak Hungarian forces, the Czechs suggested that Rumanians occupy Ruthenia. The Rumanians responded positively, on the condition that they be asked officially by the Czech government.

The strength of the Czech troops in eastern part of the country comprised the 3rd Czech Army, “with 3 Army Corps, and 7 infantry divisions as well as one cavalry division (consisting of one cavalry and one tank brigade), as well as a regiment of aircraft. There were also 10 battalions of miscellaneous border guards, composed of gendarmes, customs police, and selected reservists, which had been mobilized ‘sur place’ some time before”. (General Prchal, Commander 3rd Czech Army).

Consequently, a further meeting took place at Komárom on the Danube River. During this meeting, Hungary demanded minor territorial adjustments: the city of Ipolyșap, on the Ipel River; the railway station of the city of Čsap, both of which were still under Czech control, although they had actually been ceded to the Hungarians. The transfer took place on 11.10.1938. The Czechs refused to consider any further Hungarian claims on their country, although they were apparently ready to negotiate Csalikösz (the Great Schütt Island) in the Danube River in return for the waiving of all further claims by Hungary. The Hungarians were not satisfied with this stand, and turned to the great powers once again for judgement.

Hungary presented its claims on Czechoslovakia, limiting them to what they thought would be acceptable to the Western powers, whose endorsement they made every effort to obtain. The West ignored them. Hungary had to turn to Germany and Italy. Germany and Italy were quite pleased and willing to be consulted, and were only too willing to intervene.

The 1st Vienna Award

Joachim von Ribbentrop (the German Foreign-Minister) and Count Galeazzo Ciano (his Italian opposite number) met at Verona on 2.11.1938, and, in the name of the Four Powers, (Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and France) awarded Hungary those parts of Slovakia and Ruthenia inhabited predominantly by Magyars, as well as the northeastern Carpathian Mountains, including the important cities of Kassa and Ungvár.

The territories awarded to Hungary had approximately 12,103 square kilometers, and some 1,060,000 inhabitants. This regained region of Hungary did not to much to change the structure of the kingdom, as the new regions were comprised mainly of low farm land, on which large quantities of barley, corn, potatoes, and sugar beets were grown. Of the greatest value were the mines, which supplied over half of the Hungarian economy’s demand for ores from the date of the takeover.

Hungarian troops started taking possession of the regained territories on 5.11.1938. On 6.11.1938, with the Regent Admiral Horthy at its head, the Hungarian Army marched into the city of Kamarom, to the jubilant welcome of its citizens. On the same day, Hungarian troops also crossed over the Danube River at Esztergom to take possession of Csalikösz, (the Great Schütt Island).

By 8.11.1938, the city of Rozsnyo was reached. On 9.11.1938, Beregszasz was officially transferred to Hungary. By 10.11.1938, the border towns of Munkács, Ungvár, Kassa, and Léva were reached, thus terminating the first military mission, (albeit peaceful) of the new Hungarian Army.

Evacuation of the Ruthenian provincial government from their ceded capital at Ungvár to the mountain village of Huszt was aided by the Czecho-Slovak Army.

The Annexation of Ruthenia

Conditions in the remaining part of Ruthenia now became extremely difficult for the Czecho-Slovak central government. The loss of Ungvár had effectively severed all railway transport into Ruthenia. The provincial government, encouraged by the German Foreign Office, continued to make trouble for Prague. The central government was still responsible for the defense of Ruthenia, and troops repeatedly fought irregular marauders from both Hungary and Poland.

On 1.01.1939, the autonomous Ruthenian regime adopted a decree changing the name of the province to Carpatho-Ukraine. In this action they were again strongly encouraged by the German Foreign Office which was planning to use this government as a rallying point for anti-Soviet sentiment in the Ukraine.

The uneasy peace was soon broken again, when the Sic (Sîtch) Guards (a group of badly organized Carpatho-Ukrainian terrorists) attacked the city of Munkács on 6.01.1939.

The German Army had been disagreeably surprised by the Czech defenses in the Sudentenland, and was worried that, were the Czechs to remain strong, they could become a threat to the German southern flank when the time came to attack Poland. In addition, Germany reasoned that the
forthcoming campaign would be much easier if Poland were attacked from a third side as well.

It was therefore decided that an independent Slovakian State under German control would be much better than to have Slovakia ceded to Hungary. On the other hand, since the Carpatho-Ukraine government was proving too incompetent to be of much help against Russia, Germany decided that this province be given to Hungary at least as partial compensation for not regaining Slovakia.

Premier Imrédy resigned in February 1939. He was replaced by Pál Teleki, again a pro-West politician.

By mid-March 1939, the Germans were ready for the final step in the dismemberment of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. On 14.03.1939, both the Slovak independent movement (under the leadership of Joseph Tiso) and Carpatho-Ukraine, acting on cue from Berlin, declared their complete independence from the central government and placed themselves under Hitler’s protection.

On 15.03.39 Hitler declared that the unrest in Czecho-Slovakia was a threat to German security, and sent his troops into Prague.

The declaration of independence by Slovak independent movement caused law and order to break down immediately. Sic Guards staged terroristic attacks against the Czech Army, as well as against the pro-Slovak or pro-Hungarian population. On the same day, Hungary had learned that the Germans would not object to a Hungarian take over of the Carpatho-Ukraine.

The Carpatho-Ukraine declaration of independence as well as the actions of the Sic Guards was taken as the cue for the Hungarians to demand that the Czech government evacuate its troops and civil servants from the area of the Wooded Carpathians immediately, as they were obviously not capable of guaranteeing the security of the population in the area.

The Czech government did not deign to respond to this outrageous statement or the demands, and instead ordered its troops to attack the city of Munkács on the morning of 14.03.1939.

The available Hungarian forces consisted of one infantry regiment, two cavalry regiments, three infantry battalions on bicycles, one motorized battalion, two Border Guard battalions, one artillery battalion, two armored trains. These forces numbered not more than two World War II divisions. They were supported by fighter planes amounting to one regiment. Furthermore, the units consisted of 70% – 80% recruits who had hardly finished their basic training. The weather in mid-March of 1939 was not very cooperative, with savage snowstorms recurring in the Carpathians. The troops had no mountain training and little special winter clothing and equipment. But morale was high!

The Hungarian Border Guard units stationed around Munkács, after throwing back the attacking Czechs on 14.03.1939, pressed forward in turn, and took the town of Orhegyalja. On the same day, the Sic Guards and Czech nationalist units initiated large scale partisan operations.

Given this welcome excuse, the Hungarian Army regular troops again crossed into Czecho-Slovakia on 15.03.1939. They reached Szolva before nightfall. The Carpatho-Ukrainian irregulars, without support from either Prague or their friends in Berlin, were quickly routed. Czech resistance in Ruthenia was negligible, and the advancing Hungarian troops did not have to count on a well-organized and centralized resistance. The Hungarian Army also had the advantage of the Vienna Award, which made it possible for the Hungarians to take possession of the area where the Czechs built their permanent fortifications against Hungary.

On 16.03.1939, Hungary formally annexed the territory.

The Hungarian troops continued their advance, pushing forward at top speed and reached the northern border on 17.03.1939. Here they met the Polish troops, who were welcomed with great joy, which, according to C.A. Macartney, was “... probably due to seeing their friends on the frontier and not south of it.” This pretty well completed the occupation of Ruthenia. The Hungarian Army’s role had been confined to rounding up the Sic Guards. Most of which it executed right away, although some were rescued by the Germans.

After the first couple of days of fighting, Czech resistance collapsed and the Hungarian troops reached the ridge of the Carpathians on 18.03.1939

Although the campaign was successful, it proved that the Hungarian Army had yet a long way to go to overcome the handicaps imposed by the Trianon Treaty. On the other hand, it also proved that the military morale and nationalist spirit were high, not only among the troops but in the population at large. Thus an additional impetus was given to those who wanted to build a strong national army.

The western provinces of Czechoslovakia were proclaimed as the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The Republic of Czecho-Slovakia had been formally dissolved. Hostilities ceased on 18.03.1939, with Hungary in possession of the Wooded Carpathians.

Hungary was still not satisfied with her border with Slovakia. Also, the Hungarian Government was well aware that on 23.03.1939, Germany and Slovakia were signing an agreement in which Germany promised to guarantee the Slovak borders. Apparently hoping that the Germans would not feel duly obliged to worry about any territorial changes that took place before this agreement became effective, Hungarian troops – supported by light tankettes – crossed the eastern border of Slovakia early on 23.03.1939, having give the Germans 30 minutes’ notice.

The Air Force had relocated parts of its forces to the airfields at Debrecen, Ungvár, Miskolc, and Keckskemét. The Hungarian Air Force proved to be superior to that of the Slovak Air Force and quickly achieved air superiority.

The demoralized Slovaks did not put up much resistance, but the German reaction was not what the Hungarians presumed. The Budapest Government was notified that if the Hungarians persisted, German troops would be sent into Slovakia to protect its borders. Consequently, the Hungarians came to a rather sudden halt after advancing some 20 – 30 kilometers into Slovakia, and pretended that they had never intended to do anything else except occupy a few towns to straighten out the borders in the first place.

On 31.03.1939, under strong German pressure, a Hungarian-Slovak commission legalized the Hungarian occupation by granting parts of the west banks of the River Uh to Hungary. This outright annexation of the eastern part of Slovakia gained Hungary 697,788 people, and an area of 12,171 square kilometers. Hungarian losses during operations against the Slovaks were 72 dead, 144 wounded, and 3 missing.

When Germany invaded Poland on 1.09.1939, Hungary refused permission for German forces to cross Hungarian territory.

During 1940 the Germans considered invading Rumania. They did not discuss this with the Hungarians, as they were (rightly) sure that the Hungarians would pass this information on to the Western Allies.

Permission to pass through Hungary was also not discussed by the Germans for the same reason. Instead, evidence exists that the Germans had contemplated marching through Hungary even without that nation’s consent. However, agreements were made with the Hungarians, which later allowed the Germans to cross Hungarian territory into southern Rumania.
In the course of May and June 1940, five corps (I, II, IV, VI, VIII) and the Mobile Corps were inconspicuously mobilized. The VIII Corps, the Mobile Corps and the Mountain Brigade formed the Second Army, stationed in Ruthenia and around Kassa, in case the Russians should attack across the Carpathians. The First Army, (I, II, IV, VI Corps) under General Nagy was to enter Transylvania. In order not to alarm the Rumanians, or perhaps worse still, the Germans, these units were provisionally left in their peace time garrisons.

On 22.06.1940, an order was issued freezing all stocks in Hungary of a wide range of materials, principally those useful to military purposes, such as iron and metal articles, petroleum products, chemical and pharmaceutical goods, articles made of leather, rubber or wood, paper, textile goods, and building materials.

The rather involved population structure and ethnic minorities in Transylvania made a satisfactory solution impossible. There appeared to be no reason left except that of force. The troops released to gather in the harvest were recalled, and the remaining corps were mobilized (III, V, VII) as the Third Army, and placed next to the Second Army. Hungary had at this time some 450,000 men under arms. The First and Second Armies had been given orders to advance on 28.08.1940 if no Rumanian acceptance of Hungarian conditions had been received.

On 30.08.1940, the Second Vienna Award gave large parts of Transylvania to Hungary.

Owing to the political agreement there was no fighting, yet the subsequent move into Transylvania gave the Hungarian General Staff an opportunity to practice in a realistic way how to solve the problems of large troop movements and logistics. Unfortunately, the new borders were drawn without considerations being made regarding geography or ethnic structure. This unsatisfactory “solution” to the problem only served to further increased the tensions between Rumania and Hungary.

Germany was later to feel the results of its meddling when it turned against the Soviet Union, and was in need of allies. These allies were then, unfortunately, too occupied with each other to be inclined to send their full strength to the East, and were always preoccupied that the other did not have too strong an army along the mutual border.

The obvious Rumanian dissatisfaction with the solution was evident to the Hungarians. Hungary had ordered a general mobilization of its army even before the

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**The 2nd Vienna Award**

Hungary’s main foreign policy and diplomatic endeavors continued to be directed towards the reunion of the territories and peoples of the old Hungary as it had been in the times of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. This lead to a constant friction between Rumania and Hungary, as Rumania was in possession of Transylvania, which was considered by both the Hungarians and the Rumanians as an integral part of those two countries.

This conflict of interests lead to the gathering of representatives of the two nations under the supervision of Italy and Germany, at Turnu Severin (Dobreta); there, at the suggestion of Rumania, the respective countries agreed to meet in Vienna and settle the whole thing peaceably, Rumania was relying on its importance to Germany as a major source of oil, and Hungary was relying on its friendship with Italy.

In the meantime, during the Spring of 1940, the Soviet Union had approached Hungary with the suggestion that if Hungary demand Transylvania back, the USSR would support this. In return, Hungary would have to back the USSR in its moves against Rumania. The strong anticommunist feelings of the Hungarians made them decline. (The USSR did in fact annex Bessarabia and part of Bukovina in June 1940).
Award was concluded, and it was therefore able to send the army across the border into the new territories on 5.09.1940. One wonders if the Hungarians would not have crossed the border anyway, even if the award had not gone their way. All three armies of the Hungarians definitely primed and ready to do so.

The Second Vienna Award returned to the Hungarian nation an additional 2,500,000 of its people, and restored a further 113,000 square kilometers of its territory.

The solution provided by the Germans was to have even more fatal results in August 1944 after Rumania changed sides. This opened up the Southern Carpathians, (the Transylvanian Alps) to the Soviet Army, and lost the Germans two entire Armies (6th and 8th), as the Rumanians had been allowed to keep this mountain range and its vital passes.

The Second Vienna Award not only awarded northern Transylvania to Hungary, but also large tracts of land to the east. Hungary was hereby afforded new possibilities to improve its economy. These lands awarded to the Hungarians were rich in forests and pastures. Natural resources were not so abundantly present as in the part that remained in Rumanian possession, but there were traces of coal and iron ore. Salt and water power were abundantly present. There were also a few small gold and silver mines as well as a sprinkling of copper and lead deposits. The industrial potential of these territories was not very developed. The possibilities of developing this territory were hampered by the fact that all the rail connections had been severed by the tracing of the new frontier.

Hungary signed the Tripartite Pact in November 1940.

* * *
CHAPTER 2

MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND THE ARMED FORCES

First Steps Towards Rearmament

The parts of the Treaty of Trianon relevant to this study abolished general military service (conscription) and set the total strength of the Hungarian Army at no more than 35,000 volunteers of all ranks. This force was limited in its mission to the maintenance of internal order and the guarding of the national borders. Heavy armaments were limited to 105 light cannon and 140 trench mortars. Even these consisted of reserve stocks from the First World War, and were not of the best, being inferior material which the K.u.K. (Kaisereiche- und Königliche, i.e. the Imperial Austrian) Army had doled out to the second-line Hungarian Army.

The Treaty also proscribed the most minute organizational details:

- the officer corps was numerically fixed at 1,750 men;
- the armaments industry was totally dismantled;
- stockpiling for and equipment of the army was exactly described;
- the maintenance of an air force was forbidden;
- the creation of a tank force was also strictly forbidden;
- the production of antitank guns, antiaircraft guns, heavy artillery, etc. was not allowed;
- only the manufacture of light weapons such as pistols and rifles was allowed.

Hungary was allowed 12 armored cars used for internal security duties, consisting of several Italian Bianchi and Fiats, and German Erhardt M-17's. The rest were more modern Vickers, built especially in England for Hungary, which were added 1926.

An Allied Commission was established to watch over the compliance with the Treaty's terms. The 52 member Commission consisted of representatives from the U.S.A., England, France, and Italy.

As even the wear and tear of equipment was predetermined under the terms of the Treaty, it proved to be extremely difficult to establish and maintain an effective field force, let alone stockpile equipment for a larger army – which was exactly the object of the Treaty.

During the 1920's and 1930's, Hungary made consistent attempts and used ingenious means to circumvent the terms of the Treaty of Trianon. With regards to the military restrictions, she was only partially successful. Although officers and NCO's were kept on the active lists in far greater numbers than the small Hungarian Army warranted, Hungary was initially not able to overcome the arms and equipment limitations imposed by the Treaty. The newly created and enlarged nations in the Balkans were eager to keep Hungary weak, especially as they owed their present status to the parceling of Hungarian territories. They willingly and ably assisted the Control Commission to make certain that the Trianon Treaty was adhered to. A severe handicap was the very nature of Trianon Hungary itself. The flat countryside, as well as the concentration of nearly all the industry around Budapest made production of forbidden equipment next to impossible during the 1920's.

Early attempts to avoid the constricting terms of the treaty, therefore, were foiled by the group of nations known as the "Small Entente". This was the name given to the alliance between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, sponsored by France, with the object of maintaining the status quo in the Danube Basin, of preventing the resurrection of the House of Hapsburg Monarchy, and of warding off Hungarian claims relating to its one-time territories. Naturally, this interest extended to keeping the Hungarian Army weak. After 1926 the importance of the Small Entente diminished, and it virtually ceased to exist after 1928, as the Control Commission had been dissolved on 31.03.1927.

After control was relaxed somewhat, Hungary began in 1927 – surreptitiously – to experiment with new weapons, to expand her army and her armaments industry slightly, to prolong the basic training period for the lower ranks, and to perfect the training of the officers. In 1927 the army was reorganized. It still very much reflected the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Trianon.

There were now seven mixed brigades:
1. (Budapest),
2. (Székesfehérvár),
3. (Szombathely),
4. (Pécs),
5. (Szeged),
6. (Debrecen),
7. (Miskolc),

and two cavalry brigades:
1. (Budapest),
2. (Nylregyháza).

The armed forces now slowly began to expand. The infantry and cavalry were reorganized, some heavy artillery batteries were added to the artillery corps, and a few airplanes were bought from Italy in secret. The manufacture of airplane engines was also started on a small scale.

There was also a small force of Border Guards and the Danube Flotilla consisting of vessels awarded by the peace treaty. In spite of the prohibition against conscription, the able-bodied male population was called up on reaching military age and passed through a form of military basic training, while a thorough pre-military training scheme was enacted for all boys, known as the Youth Organization (Levente). All these expedients, however, still left Hungary in a state of vast military inferiority, both actual and potential, compared with her neighbors. At this time, Hungary had about 35,000 men under arms, as allowed for by the Treaty of Trianon.

After 1928, it was obvious that it might soon be possible to pay less attention to the limitations imposed on Hungary's armed forces by the Treaty of Trianon and the "Small Entente".

The Elöd Plan

After several minor reorganizations, it became clear that a long-range plan was called for. The first of these plans was known as the Elöd Plan of 24.10.1932.

The Elöd Plan provided for:

- the raising of 21 infantry divisions (each with 9 infantry battalions and 12 artillery batteries),
- the mobile units to be increased in quantity, combining them into larger units,
- Border Guard units to be increased and strengthened,
- the modernization of all equipment.

These objectives were only slowly achieved. The Small Entente was still a looming shadow, even if it no longer had a fierce bite.

Over the next six years the Hungarian Army was slowly built up again. Standardization of equipment and training was inadequate. Most equipment was still left over from World War I, and from various other sources.
armament and industrial expansion of Hungary, as well as an increase in the size of the armed forces.

The Huba Plan emphasized increasing the size of the armored and motorized units, expanding and strengthening the Border Guards, and generally modernizing the organization, administration and order of battle of the Hungarian Army itself.

Political and military events were to influence this timetable to some extent, but without drastically altering the aims of the Plan. Major stumbling blocks in the path of the Előd Plan were the equipping of all units with heavy weapons, the creation of the armored and motorized units, as well as acquiring of sufficient modern aircraft.

The Huba Plan emphasized increasing the size of the armored and motorized units troops, expanding and strengthening the Border Guards, and generally modernizing the organization, administration and order of battle of the Hungarian Army itself.
The Huba Army Expansion and Mobilization Plan foresaw the following order of battle for the Hungarian Army by 1943:

- 25 light infantry divisions
- 1 cavalry division
- 2 armored divisions
- 2 mountain brigades
- 1 border guard brigade
- 1 river brigade
- 2 air force brigades

In the spring of 1938 the organization of the Armed Forces was still governed by the Előd Plan, in which a Field Corps was supposed to have a mobilized strength of 36,000 men, and an infantry brigade 9,000 men. A study by the Honvéd Ministry regarding general mobilization, concluded that the personnel requirements for 266 infantry battalions could, in an emergency, only be fulfilled after December 1938. The material requirements would take longer.

The international situation in 1938 made it desirable to the Hungarian Government that the pace of rearmament be increased so that the organization of the Armed Forces correspond to the guidelines laid down by the Huba Plan.

To allow a relatively uninterrupted mobilization, the Huba Plan specified that the units of the Border Guard be the first to be strengthened to allow time for the mobilization within Hungary without exterior interruption. The mobile troops were also to be strengthened to have a highly mobile, rapid reaction force available in case the enemy broke through the Border Guard units. Accordingly, the 1st Mobile Brigade was quickly built up to full strength, and provided with almost its full complement of supply elements. (These were usually only provided to units upon mobilization). This would enable the 1st Mobile Brigade to be ready to move out within 12 hours of receiving mobilization orders.

The continuing tensions in the international situation caused the cadre of the 2nd Mobile Brigade to be raised in 1938, (also with its full complement of weapons, personnel, and support services), while the heavy infantry weapons allotted to the infantry brigades were further increased.

At this point in Hungarian history, the main military goal was to achieve a qualitative and quantitative parity with armies of the former “Small Entente” nations, (Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia). By 1940, this objective can be said to have been achieved.

Also in 1938, the Armed Forces Act was passed to provide the necessary manpower. The Act also entitled the Government to proclaim a state of national emergency, and upon doing so, could assume certain emergency powers, the more important of which were:

- to restrict the right of assembly and combination,
- to place under police supervision, or to intern, any person whose conduct rendered such measures desirable,
- to suspend provisionally the application of certain laws, in particular those restricting the output of labor,
- to control wages, profits, and prices,
- to block stocks of commodities.

On 1.10.1938, the seven mixed brigades, (created in 1927), were used as the basis for the expansion of the Hungarian Army. Each brigade had been located in a specific region of Hungary. This region was redesignated as a Corps, and received the number of the mixed brigade (I – VII). In these corps-sized administrative areas, the headquarters of each Corps was in the same location as that of the old mixed brigades. In effect, the brigades became corps. It was planned that each corps should have three brigades. Two brigades were to be based on the regular army regiments, while the third was to be raised from the Border Guard units within the Corps.

Although this was theoretically possible at the time from a future manpower point...
of view, there had been barely enough equipment to supply the original seven brigades, let alone 24 new ones. (A new VIII Corps headquarters was raised in 1938 at Kassa, after the recuperation of the territories awarded to Slovakia). What in fact happened, is that each Corps only set up two active brigades. The third brigade existed, but only on paper. In fact, this third Brigade became the infantry replacement unit of each Corps.

The mixed brigades, originally intended to be expanded only to divisional size, now became Corps (I – VIII), each with three independent brigades. When Hungary regained Transylvania, another (IX) Corps was organized at Kolozsvár in this new territory. The VIII and IX Corps, in addition to their normal three (i.e. two) brigade organization, had one active mountain brigade or one Border Guard brigade. (Later, the 8th Border Guard Brigade was converted into the 2nd Mountain Brigade).

The raising of the new Corps could only be at the cost of already existing units, and in no way increase the size of the Hungarian Army.

The Brigades were merely redesignated as Corps. Equipment was still in short supply, and no new material available to equip the new units, and the Hungarian Army was in no way stronger than it had been as an army of seven brigades. The nine Corps were probably weaker than the seven mixed brigades, due to the increase in manpower, administrative red tape, and the increased number of command echelons.

The active infantry brigades (as the subordinate units were now called), were supposed to have two full-strength infantry regiments. Each Brigade had six infantry battalions, four to five artillery batteries, one cavalry company, and one signal company. Without any antiaircraft or engineers, lacking heavy infantry weapon firepower, not motorized, the brigades could not by any stretch of the imagination be called modern combat units. In actual fact, both active brigades in the Corps maintained only one “peace time strength” regiment each. This situation, as indicated above, was the result of the scarcity of weapons and equipment that existed in the Hungarian Army. Mobilization indicated that these regiments were brought up to “enlarged peace mobilization” as indicated above, was the result of the scarcity of weapons and equipment that existed in the Hungarian Army. Mobilization indicated that these regiments were brought up to “enlarged peace mobilization” as indicated above, was the result of the scarcity of weapons and equipment that existed in the Hungarian Army.

The Hungarian border was controlled by Border Police, Customs Police, (both under the Minister of the Interior), and the Border Guards, (regular Hungarian Army units). The Carpathian Mountains were defended only at the passes. Each pass was occupied by a battalion of two or three Border Guard companies. Certain areas where there were several passes, or in sections where there were no mountains, battalions were placed under the command of group headquarters. Along hostile borders, especially the Rumanian one, these groups were reinforced by additional troops, in particular artillery, and designated as brigades. Border Guard brigades were stationed along and in the immediate vicinity of the Hungarian borders. The brigades were intended as defense forces.

As the Hungarian Army grew, only one of the two active brigades tended to acquire all the new equipment and the better troops, while the other infantry brigade merely got the remnants, or nothing at all. This practice led to there being only one first-rate infantry unit in each Corps, plus one “reserve”, and one “training” unit.

The nine (I – IX) Corps were assigned to three (First, Second, and Third) Army Headquarters, each with three corps.

The most noticeable change was the establishment of the Mobile Corps on 1.10.1940. Independent of the three Army Headquarters, it was directly subordinate to the GHQ. It had the 1st and 2nd motorized Infantry Brigades, as well as the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades.

Scarcity of equipment, especially of motor vehicles, was quite noticeable in these four units as about 40% of the infantry battalions were equipped with bicycles. Nevertheless, the Mobile Corps units, and in particular the cavalry, were considered to be the elite troops of the Hungarian Army.

Although peacetime housekeeping might justify the grouping of cavalry, motor vehicles and bicycles together, the different speeds alone indicated that the motorized brigades be joined into a mechanized division, and the cavalry brigades into a cavalry division.

Although the Mobile Corps was riddled with deficiencies, it was still the most modern and best equipped unit in the Hungarian Army.

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At the beginning of the war Border Guard troops were also considered to be elite troops, along with the Mobile Corps. Their equipment was good, units were filled up to strength, and the cream of the new recruits was assigned to them. As the war progressed, the Border Guard battalions, although still considered as elite troops, received replacements and equipment of lesser quality as the situation became more and more desperate.

By spring of 1940, a large proportion of the adult male population had undergone some sort of military training. The lack of officers and NCO’s was still felt, so that the lower ranks received only two years’ training as opposed to the three years provided for in the Act. On the other hand, all male youths received some form of military instruction through service in the Levente.

This meant that the manpower pool in Hungary of trained soldiers was adequate, as full mobilization would produce some 450,000 men. The major weakness was still, of course, equipment, and was to remain so although foreign suppliers were used to the limit. But these, mainly Germany, proved unreliable.

Germany had a tendency to withhold shipments of materials whenever she was at odds with Hungary over some political matter or other. Especially after the Hungarians refused to assist in the invasion of Poland, Hitler was reluctant to further assist the rearrangement of the Hungarian Army. Hungary’s efforts to become independent of foreign sources for equipment were very determined, but were often frustrated by her inability to manufacture certain essential items and products herself. Certain industries necessary to modern technology were totally lacking, e.g. Hungary had no capability for producing gasoline or fine oil, nor the industry to manufacture ball-bearings. For these critical items, she was utterly dependent on Germany. Other materials, in particular lead, copper, nickel, etc., also came from Germany.

As Germany was able to control the flow of these goods, Hungary was virtually at the mercy of the Germans for modern equipment, whether self-produced or imported. In addition, much of the Hungarian armaments industry was tied down with German production orders, and could not be delivered to Hungary itself on pain of having the very sanctions imposed that it would be trying to circumvent.

On the other side of the ledger, Hungary was able to produce its own explosives, cannon, (including antiaircraft guns), rifles and pistols, armored cars, light tanks, and ammunition.

On 1.10.1940, the Anti-Aircraft Corps, with the 101st – 105th Battalions, as well as the cadres of three new infantry brigades (25th, 26th, and 27th) of the new IX Corps were established. The formation of the new IX Corps, (with Headquarters at Kolozsvár), fol-
lowing the repossess of the territories to the East did not actually change the Hungarian Army too much, as personnel and equipment was provided initially at the expense of Border Guard and local border defense units. This had the advantage that it did not overly tax the military budget as the formation of the three brigades merely involved moving some units around and renaming them.

The peacetime organization of the 1 – IX Corps consisted of 3 infantry brigades with one infantry regiment each. In wartime, these regiments were expected to split (bud) into two. In addition, there was one horse-drawn artillery battalion, one cavalry company, one motorized artillery battalion, as well as supply and support units.

The II, VII, and VIII Corps had one bicycle battalion each. The VI Corps was assigned the 66th Border Guard Group; the IX Corps had the 9th Border Guard Brigade and the 69th Border Guard Group; and the VIII Corps had the 8th Border Guard Brigade.

The nine regular Army Corps had no armor or other mechanized troops. Corps troops were not sufficient to permit the corps to form concentrations or mass troops at critical points, nor to form effective reserves. The great majority of the supply and support trains were horse-drawn, which exposed the trains excessively to air attacks, impeded the proper supply function of the Corps, delayed rapid supply, lengthened the supply columns, and made them more vulnerable to partisan attacks.

The organizational measures described for the Mobile Corps and the other units in the Hungarian Army were obviously in advance of new equipment expected to become available, such as the Toldi light tanks, the Csaba armored cars, or the antitank guns to come from Germany.

Mobilization

The principle behind the Hungarian mobilization plan was based on the “twining” system, whereby all units, through use of the 1st and 2nd Reserves, budded another unit, identical, for all intents and purposes, to the first. Exceptions were the cavalry and motorized infantry brigades, the Air Force, as well as the Danube Flotilla.

This doubling of units was not possible right at the start. The program progressed slowly, with many problems and delays, handicapped by Hungary’s miserable financial and political situation.

Equipment for the “twin” units was stored in the mobilization depots. Vehicles and horses were to be provided by the local population and industry. Specialized trained troops, such as engineers, communications technicians, etc., had to come from the private industry and civilian government sectors.

The independent brigades had to be ready to move out within three days of mobilization, while the mobile troops were required to move out in a day and a half.

As training facilities were limited, mobilization had to be staggered. Mobilized troops consisted for the most part of those reservists called up for active duty and new recruits who had been called up by active duty orders from the corresponding Corps. The reservists were given refresher training, and the new recruits were started on their basic combat training.

By the spring of 1940, thanks to the Levente, a large proportion of the adult male population had undergone some sort of basic military training.

The lack of officers and NCO’s also allowed the Army to give recruits only two years’ training instead of the three years as foreseen in the Armed Forces Act. This meant that by 1940 the manpower pool in Hungary of trained soldiers enabled full mobilization of some 450,000 men.

To give the regular peacetime army enough time to “bud” into a war-strength army, five stages of mobilization had been established. This system was a leftover from the time when mobilization had been forbidden by the Treaty of Trianon. The stages were:

- Alert (készültség)
- General Alert (szigorn készültség)
- Reserve Call-up (felemelt állomány)
- Mobilization, partial (felriasztás)
- Mobilization, full (mozgósítás)

The system, which was maintained until 1943, was, of course, merely a theoretical exercise, as over 66% of the units were not combat ready even on paper owing to a lack of specialized personnel and equipment. It was hoped that time would ease the bottlenecks, so the entire system was left as it was.

It was only in the summer of 1942, after the dispatch of the Second Army to the East Front, that most units that could not be made combat ready were disbanded, with the personnel and equipment, (if any), reassigned to other units.

Personnel

At the start of World War II the Hungarian Army organization was based on a well thought out personnel concept, which had been encoded in the Armed Forces Act of 5.12.1938.

The Armed Forces Act of 5.12.1938

This act provided for compulsory military service for all ages between 18 and 60. Military service itself was to last three years. All Hungarian males were made liable for the Levente.

Besides military service, a Honvéd Labor obligation for all Hungarian citizens, including women, from the ages of 14 through 70 was imposed.

For militarily unfit youths, a three-month service in a labor unit was laid down.

The combat forces, (Army, Air Force, and River Flotilla), included all ethnic parts of the population except Jews. (It tuned out a bit arbitrary, but, for instance, the in the 1/1 Tank Regiment, there quite a few Rumanians and Gypsies). The Magyars made up approximately 81% of the population. The Germanic made up 4%.

However, the remaining ethnic groups – at first only those that were regarded as “politically reliable” – were admitted into the Military Labor units. The Military Labor forces were an integral part of the Hungarian Army, based on the national labor obligation.

Of those units that were actually dispatched to the East Front, it appears that the Honvéd Ministry included a somewhat – although not disproportionately – high number of those minorities that could be expected to fight at all. Such nationalities that were considered politically unreliable, or those whose “level of education was so low that they were not worth training, especially if they did not speak Magyar (Hungarian)”, were drafted into the Military Labor battalions. Interestingly enough, the latter excuse was alleged particularly in the case of the Rumanian units, but on the other hand, the Ruthenians were called up freely. By the summer of 1941, there were 37,200 persons serving in the Military Labor battalions. It was only after in 1942 that the Jewish citizens of Hungary were also drafted into the Military Labor battalions.
Huba Mobilization Plan for the I Corps

Higher Headquarters

(1) The Field Corps command (or Corps Headquarters) was a field unit and subordinate to the Hungarian Army General Staff. The commanding general of the peace time Corps, with his headquarters staff, the artillery, infantry, signal, engineer, etc. staff commanders formed the Field Corps. Under his command were field combat units.

(2) What remained behind was the administrative part: the Honvéd Military District, commanded by the deputy corps commander. It carried on the administrative, replacement, and training missions. It also organized the reception and processing of wounded or convalescents personnel. It dispatched replacement drafts, so-called “march” battalions to the Field Corps. (It was sometimes referred to as a depot command). The Honvéd Military District was now considered as part of the field forces, and remained subordinate to the Honvéd Ministry.

Infantry

(3) The brigade headquarters were known up to 1938 as peace time as “Infantry Commanders” (1./1., 1./2., 1./3., etc.) to hide their existence. [For this same reason, the Bicycle Brigade was known as the “Staff for Special Purposes”].

(4) The Brigades were the field command echelons. The entire peace time staff formed the brigade headquarters in the field.

(5) Each peace time Infantry Regiment formed a second Infantry Regiment. Battalions were the basis for mobilization. They were responsible for the preparation and carrying through of a carefully coordinated plan. Battalions were not necessarily mobilized as part of their regiments.

(6) Both Infantry Regiments were in all ways identical. The active service personnel was mixed evenly with called-up reserves amongst all the units.

(7) The new Infantry Regiments carried the number of their twin regiment plus thirty. (1. + 31, 2. + 32, 15. + 45).

(8) The reserve and training battalion staffs were formed by the peace time Infantry Regiments which provided the cadres. They were left behind when the Regiments went into the field. Besides the normal missions of training and administration, these replacement battalion staffs were also responsible for setting up the march battalions which would supply the field forces with replacement personnel.

Cavalry

(9) Each independent Cavalry Company formed two companies.

(10) The two new Cavalry Companies were assigned to the newly-mobilized 1st and 2nd brigades of each Field Corps.

(11) The Gendarmerie Cavalry Company existed under this designation to conceal its existence in peace time. Upon mobilization, it formed the Cavalry Company of the 3rd Brigade of each Field Corps.

(12) Each peace time independent Cavalry Company formed its own (third) company to continue the training program and to provide it with replacements.

Artillery

(13) The Artillery Regiment was known in peace time as an “artillery battalion”, and the three artillery battalions were known as (1st, 2nd, 3rd) “deputy artillery commanders”. In peace time, the regiment headquarters was charged with all administrative and training in the Corps. In the field, the artillery regiment headquarters was not a command echelon, but was a small staff assigned directly to the brigade headquarters. The heavy artillery battery (with two 149mm howitzers) and the calibration battery each formed a small training and replacement battery.

(14) The three “deputy artillery commanders” were mobilized into regular field Artillery Battalions. The “deputy artillery commander” formed three reserve battalion staffs with one training and reserve battery each, which were to provide replacement personnel as well as the cadre for additional future artillery battalions.

Anti-Aircraft

(15) Initially, (until 1939), each Corps Anti-Aircraft Battalion formed one Field Corps battalion, one replacement battalion (with only one battery), and various home air defense batteries.

(16) The Field Corps anti-aircraft battalion consisted of the combat elements of the peace time battalion.

(17) Although foreseen in the mobilization plan, it was only after 1939 that enough material was available to equip one medium anti-aircraft (40mm) battery for each independent brigade.

(18) Each Anti-Aircraft Battalion also raised various batteries and half-batteries for home defense. These units were not considered as part of the field forces.

Signals

(19) The peace time Signal Battalion was to raise signal companies for the independent brigades, Corps Troops, and GHQ Troops. It also raised a training and replacement battalion.

(20) Signal companies raised by the mobilization order were assigned to the Field Corps (one signal, two construction, and one operations company).

(21) Each brigade received a mixed signal company.

(22) The Signal Battalion also formed various GHQ signal companies.

Combat Engineers

Conversion from a peace time to a wartime organization was a major problem for the engineer forces. Although plans foresaw seven brigade Combat Engineer Battalions (1. – VII.) and three river forces Engineer Battalions (1. – 3.), in actual fact these ten units had not as yet been completely formed in 1938.

(23) Each peace time Engineer Battalion, (basically a training unit with various training companies), was to raise one Corps Engineer Battalion, three brigade Combat Engineer Companies, one company for the mobile forces, as well as two training and replacement battalion staffs.

(24) The Engineer Battalions raised independent Engineer Companies for the mobile forces. The companies were horse-drawn, bicycle mounted, or motorized. They also provided the cadre for the Military Labor units.

Logistics Services

The logistical services were all mobilization units. The field headquarters and field units of the supply and service formations were raised by the Support Commands. Mobilization of the logistics services was only possible by wholesale requisitioning from the civilian sector. Indeed, 90% of the authorized field organizational logistics equipment had to come from the civilian sector! Personnel requirements were filled by Reserve officers and NCO's; enlisted slots were filled overwhelmingly from the 3rd Reserve and even untrained older men.

Ammunition supply and ordnance units were largely filled up from ammunition and ordnance depots.

Medical units, (field hygiene, surgical, laboratory, ambulance, field hospitals, etc.), and religious services personnel, were raised by the military hospitals (1. – 11.).

Veterinary units were raised by the Corps, and spread out throughout Hungary.

Specialized logistics units, such as field bakeries, supply companies, supply columns, etc., were also raised by the Honvéd Military Districts. Some 95% of Hungary’s military logistics organization was horse-drawn.

The corresponding peace time organizations raised the specialized logistics services for the combat arms, necessary units. These specialized organizations existed only as depot units until well into 1939.

Military Labor units were also the responsibility of the Honvéd Military Districts.

Field/Military Police and Traffic Control units were raised by the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie (i.e., the State Police).

Miscellaneous specialized units were raised by the Royal Hungarian Railways, the Royal Hungarian Mail, state road construction departments, etc.
The Corps in peace time was both a command and an administrative headquarters, and concurrently the Honvéd Military District with the same number. It was subordinate to the Honvéd Ministry in peace time.

It called up reservists, organized recruiting and carried out training.

Upon mobilization, it split into the Corps Headquarters with its Artillery Command – subordinated to the Army General Staff – and the Honvéd Military District, which remained under the Honvéd Ministry.

(The mobilization plan for the I Corps in principle applied as well for the other seven, later eight, corps)
Levente

All boys from the age of 12 were enrolled in the youth organization known as the Levente. Upon reaching 18, a three-week military exercise was completed. Membership was compulsory for all males up to the age of 35. Although membership was only made compulsory by the Armed Forces Act of 1938, in effect the Levente had been secretly practiced for several year preceding this date. The Levente consisted of military training for 4 hours a week on Sundays for 10 months a year.

Training was given by reserve officers and NCO’s according to a schedule prepared by Corps headquarters and controlled by the Bureau of Pre-Military Training in the Honvéd Ministry. It consisted of basic infantry training including the manual of arms, close-order drill, marksmanship, customs and courtesies of the service, combat tactics for small units, maneuvers that usually lasted more than four hours, etc.

Conscription

The Levente organization kept very accurate records of all young men who drilled within it, and every year submitted to the Corps headquarters a listing of those young men who had attained the conscription age of 21. During the war, that age was gradually lowered to 19.

In the months of May, June, and July, draft boards met in each district of the counties. These draft boards consisted of two company-grade officers and one medical officer. The young men were interviewed and then assigned to a branch of service according to their qualifications and the needs of the service. The draftees then returned home and awaited the notice to report for duty. The notification usually arrived in October, after the harvest. At least two classes of conscripts were in active service, and sometimes, depending upon the degree of mobilization, more.

The Air Force and the River Forces, having elite status, were composed of specially selected volunteers, and never had to rely on the draft.

The active military service obligation for enlisted men was to last for three years in peace time. Owing to a lack of officers and NCO’s, the actual time spent by these men on active duty was often reduced to two years. Training took place during the annual training period of 20 weeks during the summer months. After this active duty period, soldiers were assigned to the 1st Reserve.

Replacement Training System

The replacement training system was based on two aspects:

- The permanent affiliation of the conscript with the brigade (and from 1942, with the division).
- The rotation of active duty amongst classes of reserves.

Men who had been trained in one formation were always called up to that same formation either with the rest of their class, or individually, for active duty when they were needed.

At the same time, men of other classes were usually released from that formation and returned to inactive status, (i.e., 1st Reserve). Replacements for combat units engaged on the East Front did not go directly to their “parent” formation, but were given refresher courses in training formations (from mid-1944 known as replacement divisions) in Hungary. As replacements were needed, these troops were gathered into “march” battalions and sent to the front. March battalions were poorly equipped. Officers and NCO’s had weapons, the troops usually did not. If a march battalion was to go through an area frequented by partisans, the troops were equipped with rifles and ammunition at the point just before this area, and the then disarmed after passing through it. These weapons were then issued there to other battalions going in the opposite direction.

After spending the required time at the front, soldiers were sent on extended leave to Hungary, or placed on the inactive list (1st Reserves).

Reserves

In the event of mobilization, conscripts were called up by classes or individually. The class of 1924, for example, was scheduled to be called up in 1943. Men in the 1st Reserve were called up as needed rather than by classes. There were four categories of troops:

- Active service personnel,
- 1st Reserve personnel, who had a military obligation until the age of 42, and were required to participate in a total of six military exercises by the time he reached that age. 1st Reserve personnel were also liable to be called up at any time for guard duty within their district,
- 2nd Reserve, containing all trained men between the ages of 42 and 48,
- 3rd Reserve, comprising all trained men older than 48, but yet 65.

In an emergency, men were called up for special service until the age of 70.

Non-Commissioned Officers and Enlisted Men

Because of budget problems, planning, and a general lack of insight, the Honvéd Ministry in 1932 decided to discharge many professional NCO’s and soldiers. This proved later to be a grave mistake, as the “backbone” that any army needs in the form of the “old-timers” was henceforth missing, and would be severely felt in the coming conflicts.

Professional sergeants were also trained to fulfill the duties of lower-rank officers in case of need, and had the skill to become officers. Yet, even if they studied in their spare time and obtained a high school diploma, they could not enter the officer corps. Instead, they were transferred to civil servant status and worked there as clerks. Thus, the troops lost the most talented, educated and ambitious sergeants.

Training of the lower ranks left much to be desired. The younger generation of officers attempted in vain to reform and modernize the Army. Unfortunately, the training received by the Hungarian soldier remained largely that of the soldier of World War I. Trench warfare remained the basic precept, with strong emphasis on close-combat training (bayonets). Modern mobile warfare with assault groups, strong points, all-round defense, attacking and retreat, were initially all unknown concepts for the troops, and were only learned in the bitter forge of combat.

Discipline was harsh and – by late 20th Century standards – could be cruel. Pilorying was a standard form of punishment, albeit only applicable to the lower ranks. This particular form of extreme punishment consisted of hoisting the culprit up on a tree with his hands bound behind his back, and leaving him to hang for up to two hours. This sort of punishment was supposed to be applied only to troops in combat areas.

The Hungarian soldier was taught that he fought for ideals, not for territorial gains, that he fought to avert the Communist catastrophe which had threatened to overwhelm his nation. Neither the Hungarian Government nor the military authorities thought to inform their troops about the real reasons for which Hungary went to war with Russia. Hence the general consensus amongst the troops at the front was that the war was a German one. The troops believed that they had been sent
to fight and die because Horthy had a contract with Hitler. Indeed, it was common to hear Hungarian soldiers say that Horthy had sold them to the Germans.

This feeling was reinforced because the Hungarian troops were issued German rations and equipment (the latter usually second-rate) upon their arrival on the East Front. The Hungarian soldier had quite different ideas regarding the type and consistency of the food that he should be have been issued. The Hungarian “Honvéd” – as the Hungarian soldier was known – coming literally from a land of milk and honey, (and he was often a farmer), did not relish the dried vegetables, herrings in tomato sauce, and other such standard rations that German troops were issued. In particular, marmalade was thought to be an insult. The Hungarian Army yearned for the accustomed fatty foods such as bacon and fresh meat to sustain him. In the Winter of 1942/43 the Hungarian Government was finally forced to ship out the Hungarian troops were issued German rations and equipment (the latter usually second-rate) upon their arrival on the East Front, consisting of fat, bacon, spices, and strong spirits in order to get any sort of decent effort from their troops at all, and, not too surprisingly, to avoid a general uprising!

Morale varied greatly. In some infantry units it was very high. It was generally high in the tank and Air Force units, but varied from time and place to place. The Hungarian soldier in the Second Army on the East Front between 1942 and 1943 had an extremely low state of morale. Real motivation was not offered to him, and he often asked of himself why he particularly had been selected to fight this war. (This attitude was heightened by the fact that Hungary did not completely mobilize until March/April 1944). The Hungarian Government attempted to rectify this situation by rotating battalions at the front. These attempts were often frustrated, as the relief troops were frequently thrown into the fray alongside those battalions they had been sent to replace.

Half starving, freezing in the winter, dressed in rags, equipped with obsolete foreign arms, frequently shattered by the appearance of Russian armor, to a large degree written off by their own country, and in many ways the dregs and sweepings of the Hungarian Army, it was close to a miracle that Second Hungarian Army units were able to fight, let alone on rare occasions soundly thrash larger tank-equipped Soviet units.

General F.W. von Mellenthin states in his ‘Panzer Battles’, that “the Hungarian troops were of a better quality than the Rumanians and the Italians”. One dreads to think about the state of the other Axis allies.

Soldiers who did not have a school-leaving certificate could not aspire to officer’s rank. Instead, they were trained at the NCO school at Jutas. The highest rank an NCO could reach was alhadnagy (Regimental Sergeant Major). Therefore the difference between a karp. NCO and a regular NCO was the “braided” NCO could apply and aspire to be an officer, while the others could not.

**Officers**

Before World War I, the Austrian-Hungarian Empire maintained three armies. The Landwehr of Austria and the Honvédseg of Hungary. The two national armies were to be used within the respective kingdoms, (a sort of national guard), and were considered as second-line forces.

The Imperial Austrian Army (Kaisereiche und Königliche = K.u.K.) was the first-line force. It was recruited and stationed in 15 military districts throughout the Austrian Empire. The K.u.K. had consisted of officers and men drawn from both kingdoms. Its official language was German and its military traditions Austrian.

After the collapse of the communist dictatorship of Béla Kun, many ex-officers of the Austrian Imperial Army enlisted in the new Hungarian Army in droves – civilian life had not agreed with them.

Many officers aspired to the 1,750 positions permitted by the Trianon Treaty. The majority of these officers were from the Hungarian part of the dual-monarchy. They were of Austrian-German descent, their forefathers had originally come from Germany and Austria. These German-speaking descendants formed the mainstay of the new Hungarian Army officers corps, while the remainder of the officer corps composed of Székels from Transylvania, as well as small portion of Serbs and Croats from the former Austrian-Hungarian military frontier in Krajina. The Krajina is in Croatia, and was first formed by Emperor Leopold II of Austria in the 1700’s.

The Honvédseg, (i.e. militia) of the de-funct dual monarchy, had been officered mostly by Hungarians of Magyár decent.
When the K.u.K. army was dissolved, those Hungarian officers — many of Germanic descent — who had been in the first line units of the K.u.K. drifted back to Hungary. Enhanced by the general political situation and the long years of Austrian rule, these officers brought with them the traditions and ideas of the Imperial Army, and contributed to the perpetuation of a Germanic influence within the Hungarian Army. These officers contributed greatly to the reconstruction and reorganization of the fledgling Hungarian Army.

The higher positions were entrusted to the higher-ranking officers of the former K.u.K. Army, most of whom were of Austrian-German nationality. The middle positions were awarded by and large to those who had served in the old Honvédseg and with graduates of the Ludovika Academy. Thus, it was impossible to create an officer corps with a unified spirit. Under such conditions professional achievements of the new Honvédseg were remarkable.

There were two sources for new officers for the Army:

- The officers’ academy, the Ludovika Academy in Budapest.
- The National War College (established as a covert operation in 1923 under the name “Course for the Study of Regulations (Szabalyzatismerteto Tanfolyam) No. 10”.

New officers were drawn mainly of the rural and urban intelligentsia. One of the more flagrant lies levelled against Hungarian after WWII was that the Army was in the hands of feudal lords. In fact, not a single member of the Hungarian aristocracy in the Army held a rank higher than Captain. The aristocracy and the major landowners were not a factor in Hungary’s post World War I army.

Premier Julius Gömbös, himself a former high officer, recognized the dangers of a tradition-bound system and attempted to reorganize the Hungarian Army into a modern fighting force with all means at his disposal. Unfortunately for the Hungarian Army, he died in 1936, his aspirations stillborn.

The border incidents with Czechoslovakia demonstrated that the new army needed good junior officers and NCO’s.

Suddenly, it became clear that things could not remain as they were and that a corps of qualified, solid officers must come into being that could be relied on in an emergency.

It should be mentioned here that the Hungarian officer, trained in the Imperial Austrian way of thinking, had little or no contact with the rank and file as such. He was educated to the fact that soldiers and officers did not intermingle. This viewpoint might have had its merits in the past, but in the World War II era, where small combat units predominated, this state of mind was a severe handicap.

Beginning in 1939, the Hungarian Army began desperately to seek new sources of officers. Particularly civil servants and intellectuals were recruited, (not only by appealing to their patriotism, but also by offering them higher salaries), and put through the shorter Army Reserve training periods. These officers were primarily assigned to the infantry and service arms. The Hussars (cavalry), artillery and mobile arms, as well as the Air Force were not particularly effected by these “lesser-quality” officers. An overly-large proportion of ex-K.u.K. colonels were found in the cavalry, and many had also found employment in rear area and administrative roles. Levente and the reserve organizations were also full of former K.u.K. officers.

During the war, the Hungarian Officer corps consisted of the following components:

The Regular Army (RA) officers. Graduates of one of the Military Academies. In addition, exceptional Army Reserve (AR) officers were offered the chance to become Regular Army. The Regular Army Officers were called — and still are — “hivatásos”. Which comes from the word “hivatás” —

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer Career and Training System</th>
<th>Notes for Chart</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AR = Army Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>AR officer candidates who failed the Office Training Course I were withdrawn from the candidate status, and received the rank of probationary squadron leader (karpaszomárnos szakasvezető) and could be promoted to Corporal after 12 months. If they so desired, they could re-apply to become AR officer candidates again at a later date.</td>
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<tr>
<td>After completing 12 months training, exceptionally gifted AR officer candidates could be sent to one of the military academies, where they started at the beginning of the second year.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AR officer candidates failing the Office Training Course II received the rank of Probationary Platoon Leader and could be promoted to Sergeant after 9 months. If they passed the Office Training Course II they were promoted to Candidate Officer-Sergeant (hadadprod örmester).</td>
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<td>AR 3rd Lieutenants had a 3 to 5 year military obligation.</td>
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<td>The rank which most AR officers normally could attain was that of 1st Lieutenant, exceptionally, Captain. Should they wish to advance further they had to change to RA status.</td>
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<td>If AR lieutenants chose at any time to change status to Regular Army, they were sent to special courses, and, providing they were suitably qualified, were inducted into the RA, thereby accepting a 30 to 35 year military commitment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RA = Regular Army</td>
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<td>RA 2nd Lieutenants had a 30 to 35 year military obligation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Only Company Grade RA officers with company command experience were eligible to take the qualifying exams for one of the military colleges. The rank held determined the time the officer had to attend the selected college.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The 1st year in the General Staff College consisted of on the job training in a General Staff position the troops.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engineer Staff 1st Lieutenants, (who had a degree approximately equivalent to a Masters in Engineering), after having passed their first engineer staff exam, could apply to be transferred to the General Staff College, where, upon being accepted, they joined at the beginning of the second year.</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Staff Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and Colonels could transfer to the Regular Army. Quartermaster and Engineer field grade officers could not.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promotion for all officers above the rank of 3rd Lieutenant was based on merit and other considerations, such as length of service.</td>
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3rd Lieutenants could interrupt their military careers for special training, in such subjects as:
Accounting, Law, Police, Engineering, Logistics, Agriculture, Forestry, etc.

Officer Career and Training System
The Army Reserve (AR) officers. These were men who had received military training after graduating from High School. It was possible to complete this training either as a continuing process, or by interspersing their military training with a civilian education or even occupation. The Hungarian equivalent of the Reserve Officers Training Corps, although the AR officer program also included young men not in university as well as those in university. They remained available for call up (in the reserves) until reaching the age of 35.

Reserve Officers were generally able to advance to 1st Lieutenant, more rarely to the rank of Captain. Although there was no formal limit to how far they could go, in practical terms, once they reached the position of Company Commander, they would have had to attend one of the Staff Officer’s courses, and in effect, would have had to go back to an Academy. In practice, this didn’t happen.

Reserve Officers were called “tartalékos”, (abbreviated to “tart.” or “t.”). A “tartalékos zászlós” (“t. zls.”) was a Reserve 3rd Lieutenant).

The Hostilities Only Officers. There was not really a category in the Royal Hungarian Army for Hostilities Only officers. An officer could only be a Regular Officer or a Reserve Officer. However, when an officer completed his military training, but had not yet attended or completed the Academy, he was offered a position in the Regular Army. Those who accepted this “short-term” Regular Officer status were called “továbbszolgáló” (lit., further-servers), and were promoted on merit and other considerations, such as length of service.

There were shortages in the officer corps (also in the General Staff). The esprit de corps declined, and the average standards and requirements for officers were lowered. These conditions, in light of the lack of modernization and armament, increasingly justified the frustrated and bitter exclamation from General Ferenc Szombathegyi: “But, we do not really have an army. To start a war with such a badly equipped, armed and trained army would be a crime”.

The prerequisites for entering the reserve officer corps were: a high school diploma and the successful completion of a four to six-month-long reserve officer course. The reserve officer candidates, (“paszmany”), who wore a special insignia on their sleeves, were targets of envy by the rank and file, and of jealousy on the part of the sergeants. This system secured (on paper) a great number of reserve officers for the army, but their training was too short to provide them with the necessary knowledge. In practice, they were inferior even to professional sergeants. At the same time the system openly recognized class distinctions and created class antagonism within the army.

Cadet academies were established in 1941, but obviously could not influence the officer situation during the war, as the first class was scheduled to graduate in 1946.

All soldiers who had a school-leaving certificate (equivalent of the US High School graduation) automatically received the “karpaszmány” (kar = arm, paszmany = braid) arm-braid. They did not have to become officers, and only those who had graduated from high school could apply for any kind of officer training. They were called “karp” for short.

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<tr>
<th>Officers and the Combat Arms – Distribution on 1.02.1944</th>
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<td>Arm</td>
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<tr>
<td>-infantry</td>
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<td>Motorized Infantry</td>
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<td>Bicycle Infantry</td>
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<td>General Staff</td>
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<td>Engineer Staff</td>
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<td>2130</td>
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<td>1304</td>
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All forms of high-schools (technical, academic, commercial, teacher’s training college) were accepted.

Only soldiers who had high school could apply for officer training, and soldiers who did not have a school-leaving certificate could not aspire to officer’s rank.

Those who failed the courses were normally designated as “Squad Leader”, (i.e., Corporal, szakaszvezető). Those with the “karp” designation, were called karpas-zományos szakaszvezető. (karp. szkv). There even were cases of soldiers who were “karp. honvéd”. It was possible to reapply for admission to the AR officer’s course after dropping out.

When the soldiers finished their Second Officer Training Course, they received the unique rank of hadapdó drmester. (“candidate officer-sergeant”).

Then, only after finishing the second probationary period with the troops in the field, did they get promoted to zász-lós, 3rd Lieutenant. (Although in many cases, this promotion did not happen immediately. Some officers were promoted later, at the front).

Military Academies

Students either went at the age of 12 to a Cadet Academy where they were trained to be soldiers, and on completion of their studies applied to one of the Military Academies. Or they graduated from a regular, recognized high school, applied to the Academy – and if accepted – did the same training as the reserves for the first year, i.e., basic combat training, Officer’s Course 1, and Squad leader. Once completed, the candidate then went on to 2nd year of the Academy.

Basic training in the Military Academies took place during the first year.

All Regular Army combat arms officers graduated from the Ludovika Academy, which was founded in 1808 and named after Queen Maria Ludovika (wife of King Francis I of Hungary and Emperor of Austria) because she gave a grant of 50,000 Gold Florins to the academy.

All Regular Army technical, engineer, signal, and river forces officers graduated from the Bolyai Technical Academy. All Regular Air Force officers graduated from the Horthy Air Force Academy.

During the war, the military academies shortened the duration of the courses from four years to three and later to two years, so that military education received by all two types of officers (RA, AR) was virtually identical.

In 1942, the War Academy was sent to the Second Army on the East Front to gather experience.

After graduating from the War Academy, all officers had to undergo a trial year with the troops. In war time, this trail period was reduced to six months. A fully trained General Staff Corps officer was expected to be qualified to assume any General Staff position he was assigned to. As it was desired that General Staff Corps officers not lose contact with the field forces, every fourth year they were posted to a field unit for practical experience.

Those General Staff officers detached to field duty wore the corresponding arms or service colors of that unit.

A specialization of General Staff Corps officers for different tasks was not possible owing to the small number of officers. The lack of qualified officers became ever greater with the increasing size of the wartime Hungarian Army.

Besides those officers directly in the Hungarian Army General Staff itself, the Chief-of-Staff positions in the Headquarters of the Armies (with the rank of Brigadier General) were also to be filled by General Staff officers.

General Staff Corps colonels assigned to command brigades and divisions, or artillery commands, were removed from the General Staff and placed on the roles of Regular Army colonels. However, the suffix of GS (i.e., General Staff) appended to their ranks was maintained.

Air Force General Staff Corps officers underwent the same training as ground forces officers. It was not until late 1941 that the War Academy opened a special department for Air Force. It offered a specialized curriculum for Air Force officers as of 1942.

Many General Staff Corps officers who were in the Air Force were basically regular General Staff officers who had completed an air observer course and then transferred to the Air Force. Most did not apply for flight training.

Staring on 1.10.1943, a specialized General Staff Corps course for Air Force officers was offered. Officers of the birth years 1933, 1934, and 1935 with at least seven years service with the Air Force were admitted.

The General Staff College courses were discontinued in October 1944, and the students were sent to the staffs of the brigades and divisions.
Engineer Staff Corps

The Engineer Staff Corps (Hadimûszaki Törzskar) consisted of specially selected and carefully trained professional officers, who had had at least four years time in service before being admitted to the Technical Institute. Before completing the Engineer Staff exam, they had already acquired the equivalent of a Masters Degree in a technical subject. After the successful completion of a two-year trial period they were admitted to the Engineer Staff Corps.

They were assigned to staff positions with the Quartermasters General of the Armies and Corps, and were responsible for weapons, ammunition, and equipment.

Engineer Staff Corps officers were also given other assignments, such as commanding specialized units, including technical troops, transport units, bridge construction, and heavy bridge construction battalions.

In 1938/1939, the Hungarian Army ordered that all Engineer Staff Corps candidates spend the first year in the War Academy before being admitted to the Technical Institute. The Engineer Staff Corps was based on the tradition of the former Imperial Austrian K.u.K. Genie- und Artillerie Stab, into which the Hungarian Engineer Corps had been absorbed in 1848/49. The Engineer Staff Corps was recreated secretly in 1930 by the establishment of the HTI (Haditchnilal Intezet – the Military Technical Institute) in Budapest.

The commandant of HTI was at the same time the Chief of the Engineer Staff. He was responsible for the training at the HTI, and being up to date on the latest military technology in all sectors of the national and foreign military industries. He made recommendations to the General Staff and the Honvéd Ministry; and converted the wishes and orders of these bodies into technical terms that could be understood by technical personnel and the industry.

One of his main duties was to test national and foreign equipment in close cooperation with the troops regarding field usability and practicality. He was responsible for the supervision of all weapons and military purchasing, (both foreign and national). He was furthermore charged with supervising and inspecting equipment produced by the Hungarian armaments industry for the Army.

The Hungarian Army also had other well qualified engineer officers who had acquired their expertise in civilian life, and had gone through the Army Reserve training. They were highly appreciated, but were not part of the Engineer Staff Corps.

Military Hierarchy

The Supreme Commander in both peace and war was the head of state. Since Hungary did not have a monarch, this position was assumed by the Regent, Admiral Horthy.

All awards, decorations, officer promotions and the allocating all command positions were carried out in his name.

In military matters, Admiral Horthy was advised by the Hungarian Military Chancellery of the Regent (Magyarország Kormányzójának Katonai Irodája).

Questions of grave national consequence were handled by the Crown Council (Korona Tanács), a non-military advisor group headed by the Regent. It consisted of leading members of government as well as several senior generals including the Chief of the General Staff.

According to the Hungarian Constitution, the Prime Minister had to be designated by Parliament and confirmed by Horthy.

Among the Prime Minister’s many responsibilities was national defense, complemented by the Honvéd Minister, who in turn was responsible for the purely military aspects of defense.

For the broader aspects of this subject (both civilian and military), the Prime Minister had the advice of the Supreme National Defense Council (legfelsőbb honvédelmi tanács – LHT), a body of military experts and politicians. (Even including representation from the opposition.) The Council also coordinated military and civilian defense measures. All decisions regarding either the declaration of war or its ending needed the approval of parliament.

Up to 1940, the Hungarian Army had a Supreme Command, headed by the Commander-In-Chief. On 1.03.1940, the Commander-In-Chief slot was eliminated as a separate position, and all its military authority was combined with that of the Chief-of-Staff of the General Staff.

 Hungarian Army Command Structure

The command structure for the defense of Hungary were clearly defined, based on the traditions carried forward from World War I and even from earlier traditions of the 19th Century.

The Regent – as Supreme Commander – was responsible for national defense in both war and peace and appointed the two highest military positions in the land:

- The Commander-In-Chief
- The Chief of the General Staff

In crisis situations, operational responsibility was handed over to the Chief of the General Staff. The Honvéd Ministry was solely responsible for organizational matters such as maneuvers, replacements, armaments, administration, etc.

As with all military institutions based on the Germanic tradition, the Hungarian Army considered itself above politics. During the years between the wars, Honvéd Ministers and Chiefs-of-Staff were able to prevent the Hungarian Army from becoming identified with any political party, and to avoid the appearance of any political leanings whatsoever. This neutrality was reinforced by the strict split roles that the Honvéd Ministry and the General Staff traditionally played in national defense.

The Honvéd Ministry (H.M.)

The Royal Hungarian Honvéd Minister (Magyar Király Honvédelmi Miniszter) (i.e., Minister of Defense / War), was designated by parliament and confirmed by Horthy. (During the war this procedure changed. Horthy’s appointment of General Lakatos was unconstitutional, but so were many other things necessary during the war!).

The Honvéd Ministry was bound by directives from the cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, who in turn was responsible to parliament.

The Honvéd Ministry administered the armed forces and formed policies dealing with possible war efforts of the country. The Honvéd Ministry was composed largely of active and retired officers, although some civilians were included. The Honvéd Minister himself was usually, (but not necessarily), a former senior General of considerable experience and popularity. Once appointed to his post, he was taken off the active roster of officers. The Deputy Honvéd Minister was always a serving senior General.

All legal and military matters related to national defense were the responsibility of the Honvéd Minister. The nine Military Districts, as well as the four major components of the Hungarian Army, namely the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the River Forces, and Military Labor Forces, as well as all commands and
Chapter 2 Military Organization and the Armed Forces

Command Structure until 1.03.1940

Command Structure from 1.03.1940
formations (Armies, Corps, Brigades, independent commands, Border Guards, etc.) were directly subordinated to the ministry until 1.03.1940. On this day, Group VI (Civil Defense) of the Ministry became the Royal Hungarian General Staff (until then “unofficial”), and all field commands and inspectorates were transferred to it. The Military Districts, on the other hand, remained under the Honvéd Ministry.

A dual structure for the Armed Forces by the creation of a separate Air Force was rejected as being too cumbersome for such a small army. However, the very nature of these two services precluded a complete non-differentiation, and the Honvéd Ministry had a separate Bureau for the air components of the Hungarian Army. However, the Air Force was considered an integral part of the Army, at least until 1943.

**Hungarian Army High Command (HFP)**

The Hungarian Army High Command (Honvédség Főparancsnokság — HFP) was the highest command echelon in the Hungarian Army. The designation Fővezérés (FÖV) was also used, but not as the formal designation. It was headed by the Commander-In-Chief (Magyar Király Honvéd Főparancsnoka – HFPK), who was responsible for assuring that the Hungarian Army was prepared to carry out its purpose in war. This included training, combat readiness, and discipline. For this purpose, it controlled the Court of Honor, the Arms Inspectorates, the military courts, as well as all military training institutions and schools.

In accordance with the Huna Plan, the Hungarian Army High Command was dissolved on 1.03.1940, and all authority, powers, and subordinated organizations were transferred from the Commander-In-Chief to the Chief-of-Staff of the Hungarian Army General Staff.

**The Hungarian General Staff**

The Royal Hungarian Army General Staff (Magyar Király Honvéd Vezérkar), planned, determined, implemented, and controlled all strategic and operational guidelines for the Hungarian Armed Forces. It was also charged with coordinating all military matters with the Hungarian Army and civilian authorities when they concerned national defense.

It was headed up by the Chief of the Royal Hungarian General Staff (Magyar Király Honvéd Vezérkar Főnöké), usually referred to as Vezér Kari Fönök (VKF), i.e. Chief-of-Staff for short). After 1.03.40, The Chief-of-Staff also assumed the title and powers of the Commander-In-Chief.

After March 1941, the Chief-of-Staff was the highest military commander in the Hungarian Army. As a member of the Supreme National Defense Council, the Chief-of-Staff advised the Prime Minister concerning all military aspects of national defense.

During the period between 1921 and 1939, Group I (Executive Staff) was hidden in the Honvéd Ministry as “Group VI”. On 1.03.1940, it was officially separated from the Ministry and now appeared openly as part of the General Staff. A new Group VI was formed to replace it in the Honvéd Ministry.

The Chief-of-Staff, as of 1.03.1940, was also the Inspector General of the Army, (which was one of the functions the Commander-In-Chief). The matter was somewhat simplified in that some of the Arms Inspectors were also the commanding generals of corresponding commands. For example, the Mobile Corps (and later the 1 Armored Corps) was the Inspector of the Mobile Troops; as of 1942, the Cavalry Inspector was also the commander of the Cavalry Division. The same applied for the Inspectors of the Rivers Forces and the Air Force.

Upon mobilization, the General Staff formed a new Hungarian Army High Command, which was manned by General Staff officers. For example, the Section 3. Chief became the Quartermaster General, Section 7./k Chief became the Chief of Transport (HFP), and the Section 7./k Chief became the Chief of Field Communications (HHF), etc.

**Logistics Commands**

The Chief of Transport’s authority was limited to the confines of the Hungarian borders. He was responsible only for river and railroad transportation.

All war plans the General Staff had prepared up to 1941 had only been conceived for use in greater Hungary, including the Carpathians. Operations outside of this region were not planned. Hence, the transport organizations were not set up for any operations outside of Hungary.

Movement on the Danube River was controlled by the Chief of Transport through the Royal Hungarian Danube Shipping Company. The Danube was a major factor in the transportation network. It was an important link between the Balkans and the Black Sea, as well as between the Rumanian oil fields and Germany.

Transport on the Tisza and the Drave Rivers was less important owing to the variable water level, although there were some units south of Szolnok along the Tisza River, and along the mouth of the Drave River at Eszék.

Air transport in Hungary was undeveloped and unimportant. There were a mere five cargo aircraft (Italian SM75) available before the war, and these belonged to MALERT, the Hungarian national airlines. In any case, these aircraft were transferred to the Air Force upon mobilization and out of the competence of the Chief of Transport. They were used to transport paratroopers, and later carried mail to and from the East Front.

Transport by road was the responsibility of the corresponding command echelon. For example, the corps adjutant was responsible for personnel transport, the quartermaster for supply movement, etc.

When portions of the Hungarian Army left Hungary, transport staffs accompanied them. They were responsible for liaison between the Hungarian Army and the German military and civilian transport authorities.

The geographical location of Budapest concentrated the major road and railroad networks at a central point. This and the relatively short distances within Hungary allowed central control of transport, its priorities, destinations, etc.

For operational and strategic transport, the Central Transport Department (KSZV) was responsible. It had a section of technical civil servants – formerly of the Royal Hungarian Railways and the Danube Shipping Company. Organization, planning, expansion of the transport network, administration of the transport sections, the transport troops, and purchasing was the responsibility of the General Staff 7./k Section Transport.

The Territorial Transport Offices (Vp) were the link between the corps, railroads and river departments. Their territories were identical with those of the railway departments with which they liaised. In case of mobilization, these civilian departments were placed directly under the Transport Section.

The mission of the Transport Offices, directed by the General Staff 7./k Section Transport, was to coordinate transport movements of strategic military
importance, as well as to prepare mobilization movements. The General Staff 7./k Section Transport also had Transport Sub-Offices which were already manned by General Staff Corps officers in peace time. These were placed within the staffs of the corps headquarters, and were responsible for maintaining direct contact to the various departments, as well as the safety – including air defense – of the transport facilities within their region, including bridges and tunnels. They had Transport Security units and Railroad Anti-Aircraft units to assist them with their mission.

The General Staff 7./k Section maintained its own communications network within Hungary along side those of the railway, river, and postal organizations. The Signal Officer of the Chief of Transport was responsible for its maintenance. For this purpose he had a Signal Battalion assigned.

The Royal Hungarian Railroad Engineers came into being in 1920. The Hungarian remnants of the Imperial Austrian Railroad and Telegraph Regiment were formed into bridge platoons at Szentendre on the Danube, equipped with heavy bridging and railroad bridging equipment (Roth-Wagner, Herbert, etc.), as well as portable railroad material that had been scavenged from the former Imperial Austrian Railways. In order to avoid the location by the members of the Allied Commission, much equipment was transferred to the civilian economy – mainly sugar beet and mining enterprises. It consisting mainly of narrow gauge and even cableway equipment. It was lent on the condition that it could be recalled in case of need by the Hungarian Army.

During 1923 through 1936, these units formed the basis for the “Transport Regiment”. They were disguised as emergency and catastrophe relief units, and were officially under the Chief of Transport (Ministry of the Interior) until 1938. Training took place under the guise of the building and reconstruction program subordinated to the Royal Hungarian Railways and the River Construction Department. Starting in 1938, these units were openly carried on the Hungarian Army order of battle as Railroad Construction Troops.

Since finances dictated that new, modern equipment had to come second place to the combat forces, railroad engineer equipment remained mostly World War I leftovers until the end of World War II. Personnel and equipment for the operation of field railroads were provided by the Royal Hungarian Railways upon mobilization. These civilians were reserve officers functioning as civil servants.

Personnel and equipment for the heavy engineers would be provided by the River Construction and the River Shipping Departments of the Traffic Ministry upon mobilization. NCO’s and officers were again mostly reserve personnel in civilian clothes. This close cooperation was beneficial, as these departments were engaged in harbor repair and maintenance, river security duties, etc.

Another group under the Chief of Transport were the River Security Troops (in actual fact riverine engineers) of the Royal Hungarian River Guard, who worked in close cooperation with the Central Transport Department (ZTL).

In peace time there was the 101st Railroad Regiment (three battalions with a total of seven companies). Upon mobilization, it raised 6 battalions with a total of 12 railroad construction, 12 railroad superstructure construction, and 5 equipment companies. In addition, 24 railroad labor companies were raised.

There were 18 railroad loading companies, equipped with special collapsible ramps of 50 meters length. There were 12 railroad operations companies, 2 harbor construction companies, and 2 harbor operations companies. The personnel of the Royal Hungarian Railways were "militarized", and hence subordinate to military authority while working for the Hungarian Army.

* * *
CHAPTER 3

The Ground Forces

Customs Police, Border Defence, Border Police, and Border Guards

The Customs Police (Vámörség) was raised in 1920. At that time, it had the strongest and best trained formations that existed in Hungary, consisting of regular soldiers transferred to civilian duty. The Customs Police was organized into seven Customs Police Districts, the boundaries of which corresponded exactly to those of the seven mixed brigades. The Customs Police was officially subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. However, the Inspector General of the Customs Police was unofficially subordinate to the Army and functioned as the Assistant Inspector General of the Infantry.

The Customs Police were supposedly only to patrol Hungary’s borders for smugglers and collected customs duties. However, the Customs Police had Border Defense (Határorzékh) units to protect and guard the borders. They were subdivided into patrol stations and patrol outposts along the borders. Patrol outposts were commanded either by NCO’s or junior officers. Behind this line of outposts and stations, there were so-called half battalions, (with two infantry and one machine gun company) which were initially disguised as small mobile reserve formations. In actual fact they were to become full-fledged infantry battalions. Their main purpose was to act as training units for future units and to act as reserves. These were battalions built up to regimental strength by 1930. They consisted only of infantry, and were assigned to a “Customs Police Assistant Commander” (Hök. Pkh.), who in all practicality functioned as a regimental commander. (Határor Kereleti Parancsnok Helyettes). The Customs Police Assistant Commander also raised the regimental units. By 1930 the Customs Police had 7 full Border Defense regiments consisting of three battalions and regimental units each.

In 1934, the Customs Police was redesignated as Border Police (Határorzség). The organization remained basically unchanged. The infantry units received further training. A Border Guard battalion was formed in each district. During this period, the “Border Police Assistant Commanders” were so strong that they were able to raise a second regiment upon mobilization and were the third brigades of the corps.

In 1938, the “Border Police Assistant Commanders” were officially transferred to the Army and was now openly incorporated into the corps, and renumbered as the 15th through 21st Infantry Regiments.

In some cases, units were switched back and forth between Customs Police and the Army. For example, in 1937 the 1/10 Infantry Battalion was redesignated as the II./5 Customs Police Battalion. The only difference to that of the Army Infantry was the arms colors, that of the Infantry being green only, whereas the Customs Police had green on red.

From 1938 through 1942 the organization and locations of the border defense units had to be constantly changed, as the new territories regained by the various awards and annexations had resulted in enormously lengthened borders.

In the Fall of 1938 seven Border Guard brigades were formed from the 29 Border Guard battalions. The brigades each had a signal platoon, and between 3 to 5 Border Guard battalions.

The reorganization of the corps areas on 1.03.1939 meant that the I Corps no longer had a border with a foreign country. The 7th and 8th Border Guards were assigned to the VIII Corps.

The Border Guard battalions (with signal, pioneer, antitank rifle, and mortars Platoons), were supposed to have three infantry and one MG companies, as well as a bicycle company and a mountain artillery battery. This organization could not be finalized, as in 1939 the 2nd Vienna Award brought further territories to be guarded, and five new battalions had to be raised.

Of the 34 battalions, only two (as of 1940 increased to four) in the VIII Corps territory could be raised to this organization and equipped as mountain troops. Seven Border Guard battalions only had two infantry companies, and the remaining 25 only had one infantry company. Only 11 battalions could be provided with mountain artillery batteries.

With the establishment of the IX Corps during 1940–1941, 18 Border Guard battalions were transferred to the Infantry and used to raise the 25th, 26th, and 27th Székely Infantry Regiments in that area. The bicycle companies of these battalions were used to raise the bicycle battalions (each with two bicycle infantry companies) of the II, VII, and VIII Corps.

The 1st through 7th Border Guard Brigades (II – VII Corps) were dissolved in 1940–1941. Sixteen Border Guard battal-
Mountains Troops

The raising of mountain troops was first begun after the return of the Transylvanian Carpathians in 1939/1940. On 1.10.1939 the 1st Mountain Brigade was raised under the VIII Corps. The battalions of the 7th and 8th Border Guard Brigades were mountain equipped.

The cadre for these units was based on experienced skiers, mountain climbers, as well as NCO and officer volunteers. The latter were sent to special mountain training courses.

The 1st Mountain Brigade was initially organized as follows:

- 3 Mountain Battalions
  - Battalion Headquarters
  - Field Telephone Platoon
  - Pioneer Platoon
  - Mortar Platoon (4x 81mm mortars)
  - Mountain Battery (4x 75mm Guns)
  - 3 Mountain Infantry Companies
  - 1 Machine Gun Company (12 HMG)
  - Mountain Cavalry Company
  - Motorized Anti-Tank Company
  - Armored Car Platoon
  - Motorcycle Platoon
  - Mountain Engineer Company
  - Mountain Bridge Column
  - Motorized Mountain Signal Company
  - Mountain Pack Mule Supply Company

The mountain Border Guard battalions had the same organization as the mountain infantry battalions.

In 1940 a fourth battalion was added to the organization of the 1st Mountain Brigade. A fifth battalion followed in late 1941. The equipment of all mountain companies was standardized at 12 light MG, 2 light mortars (50mm), and 1 antitank rifle (20mm). The mortar platoons were strengthened to 6 medium mortars (81mm). The battalion artillery batteries were subordinated to a newly-created brigade artillery command in battalion size, although the batteries stayed in the same garrisons as their battalions.

Cavalry

The official designation for cavalry regiments in the Hungarian Army was Huszár (Hussar). Large formations used “Cavalry” (Cavalry Brigades and later the Cavalry Division). Units of Huszár regiments were designated Saber companies. Independent companies as Huszás.

Although Hungary had a long and famous cavalry tradition, the Bolshevik Party only managed raised one unit: the Red Huszár Regiment. Interestingly enough, the troops of this regiment were apparently very anti-communist. The Red Army leaders considered the regiment so politically unreliable that they would not even use it against the invading Slovaks or Rumanians.

The Székel Division operating in Transylvania only had one cavalry company.

Horthy’s National Army took over the Red Huszár Regiment in August 1919. By the end of 1919, a second regiment was raised. The regiments consisted of two battalions of 3 saber and 1 MG companies each. There was also one pioneer and one field telephone platoon in each regiment. Officers and NCO’s comprised 25% of the total strength. The enlisted men were only present for shifts of six week at a time.

In 1920, a further two Huszár regiments were raised. The four regiments were formed into two independent brigades. The companies had a strength of 160 men. Owing to the lack of adequate recruitment, many of the troops were on foot. Equipment, clothing, and arms were scarce. A Cavalry Inspectorate was established.

In 1920, the Huszár regiments were organized as follows:

- Regiment Headquarters
- Mounted Telephone Platoon
- Mounted Pioneer Platoon

- 2 Saber Companies
- 1 Mounted MG Company (6 HMG)

During the forced reorganization imposed by the Entente of 1922–1923, the brigades were dissolved. One Saber company per regiment also had to be dissolved, and the total personnel strength reduced by half. The superfluous troops were in part used in covert organizations or discharged.

In order to avoid the sharp eyes of the Control Commission, two new covert cavalry brigades were raised, using the Huszár companies of the mixed brigades as well as the remnants of the Huszár regiments. The covert brigade commanders were carried on the roles of the mixed brigades as “Cavalry Staff Officer”. However, they had no staffs, and had no Inspection rights over the Huszár regiments. This privilege was reserved for the Cavalry Inspector, who also became the commander of a cavalry division (which then would consist of the two brigades) upon mobilization. The cavalry brigades were dependent upon the mixed brigade’s logistic services.

Of the men and material freed by the enforced disbanding of cavalry units during 1922 – 1923 and willing to enlist for 12 years, five – later seven – new independent Huszár companies were raised as Royal Gendarmerie Mounted Sections. They wore the uniforms of the Royal Gendarmerie, were moved to other garrisons, and placed under the Royal Gendarmerie Inspectorate. In actual fact, they remained the covert cavalry units of the mixed brigades.

Starting in 1928 two cavalry brigades were raised and carried openly on the order of battle. Personnel strengths were increased, thereby enabling the formation of the second saber companies in each battalion again.

The military service obligation for cavalrymen was reduced to six years, later to two years, thereby enabling the establishment of an adequate reserve pool of trained men. In 1931 the Army even experimented with a 5 month military obligation. Enough reserve officers were formed by retraining older officers and providing courses within the Huszár regiments themselves for new officers.

The remount problem was solved by the regiments buying the horses, training them, and then lending them rent-free to the agrarian economy, subject to inspection by the Army. The farmers were obliged to care for the horses and keep them in good condition. In case of mobilization, the horses were to be returned to the regiments without delay. After five years, the horses automatically became the property of the farmers.

Starting in 1932, the modernization of the cavalry arm was begun. Arms and equipment were updated. The telephone platoons, as well as the saber and mounted MG companies received modern radios. Machine guns was increased. Large scale maneuvers were held.

During the Fall of 1938, the Royal Gendarmerie Mounted Sections were openly
carried as the corps cavalry units, and would form the Huszár companies of the infantry brigades upon mobilization.

The modifications in accordance with the Huba Plan could only be begun as of 1.10.1939, but was still not finished by the target date of 1.04.1940, as events interrupted the reorganization, and the Huszár regiments were forced to mobilize again and again. On 11.11.1938 the reoccupation of northern Hungary; in Spring 1939 Ruthenia; in Fall 1939 and Spring 1940 Transylvania and the Székely Corner. Although reduced training and reorganization were carried out in the mobilized areas, the target dates could not be met.

The Huba Plan now incorporated bicycle and motorized elements into the former pure horse-mounted formations. A third saber company was added to the battalions. The saber companies were authorized 12 light MG, the mounted MG companies 12 heavy MG.

By the end of 1940, the planned antitank and tankette platoons were still missing. In short supply were the newly authorized machine guns. Reconnaissance battalions were completely missing.

On 1.10.1940, the cavalry brigades were assigned to the Mobile Corps (raised 1.03.1940) in Budapest.

Just prior to the 1941 Yugoslavian Campaign, some of the missing equipment and units were issued to the cavalry brigades. In was foreseen that each brigade receive a tank battalion, but this was not achieved.

The VIIIth independent Huszár company was formed for the newly-raised VIII Corps. A new mountain cavalry company was raised for the 1st Mountain Brigade.

The forming of a IXth independent Huszár company and an Székely independent Huszár company was postponed. In Spring 1941, there were 33 cavalry companies in the Army, which would expand (bud) to 49 companies upon mobilization.

**Bicycle Troops**

From 1922 through 1938, the bicycle troops were part of the infantry combat arm. They had been raised from the independent and light battalions of the former National Army, and were considered as elite troops.

The 1921/22 organization imposed by the Entente foresaw only seven bicycle battalions (1st – 7th), one for each mixed brigade. During the period between 1922 and 1928, various new units were raised at the expense of the bicycle battalions. By 1929 Bicycle Battalions had the following organization:

- Battalion Headquarters
  - Field Telephone Platoon
  - Pioneer Platoon
- 1 Bicycle Infantry Company
- 1 Infantry Company (on foot)
- 1 MG Company (6 HMG) (on foot)

The 5th Bicycle Battalion was organized slightly differently, as follows:

- Battalion Headquarters
  - Field Telephone Platoon
  - Pioneer Platoon
- 2 Bicycle Infantry Companies
- 2 Bicycle MG Companies (6 HMG)

By 1939, all companies had received bicycles, and a motorcycle platoon was incorporated into each battalion.

The subordination of the bicycle units under the brigades ceased in 1939, and the battalions were gathered under a “Bicycle Leader” (later redesignated as Bicycle Commandant). Upon mobilization, this command was to become an independent Bicycle Brigade.

During 1939/40, the bicycle battalions were renumbered:

- 1st became 14th
- 2nd became 16th
- 3rd became 10th
- 4th became 15th
- 5th split and became the 9th and 13th
- 6th became 12th
- 7th became 11th

In 1940 the bicycle units were thoroughly reorganized. Battalions were assigned to the Mobile Corps. The motorized and cavalry brigades received two bicycle battalions each, these being equipped with a platoon of 5 tankettes and a motorized 105mm field howitzer battery each. New companies were also raised and assigned to the Border Guard battalions. The corps were also supposed to receive a bicycle battalion albeit much smaller than those of the mobile brigades, (with one infantry and two bicycle companies), but this plan was not completed until 1941.

The bicycle troops, (popularly known as “Rubber Huszárs”), proved themselves in various maneuvers as well as the move into the Carpathian territories in 1939. But the biggest problem the bicycle troops had was keeping up with the motorcycle and motorized infantry, as they were virtually round-bound. When they moved cross-country, the bicycles had to be carried along, (or left behind), which severely hampered mobility. The immediate aim was to equip the bicycle troops with modern cross-country motor vehicles and tanks as soon as possible. Ultimately, the infantry was to be equipped with armored halftracks. This remained no more than a dream.

From 1939 to 1940, the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Brigades had independent bicycle companies instead of cavalry companies.

During 1941/42 most of the bicycle battalions were dissolved or converted. Many were used to raise tank battalions (the 1/1, 1/2, 1/3, 31st, 32nd, 1st Cavalry). Others were split up into independent companies and assigned to Border Guard battalions, while the rest were used to form the corps bicycle battalions, (II, VII, VIII in 1940; VI, V, IX in 1941). The 14th (until 1943) and the 15th (until the end of the war) remained equipped with bicycles.

The Corps bicycle battalions were dissolved in 1943, and the components were used to form the bicycle companies of the divisional reconnaissance battalions.

Smaller units mounted on bicycles, such as those raised within the infantry regiments as reconnaissance platoons, were not part of the Bicycle Troops.

**Mobile Troops**

The Treaty of Trianon had forbidden Hungary modern mobile troops and tank units. The Entente Control Mission prevented the raising an armored force of any kind until 1927, or even from owning armored vehicles except those expressly allowed in the Peace Treaty.

In 1920, the core of what was later to become the Hungarian armored force was formed under the cape of the police as the “Police Recruit School” (RUISK) in Budapest. The officers and NCO’s were taken over from the Army, but wore uniforms of the police. Enlisted men had to be recruited. This small unit had several Italian Bianchi and Fiat armored cars, as well as German Erhardt M-17 armored cars and a few German LK II tankettes, several armored trains and mock-up soft skinned tanks for training purposes.

During 1922 – 1924, a further 9 LK II were purchased from Germany, making a total of 14 of these tankettes.

On 1.07.1929 the Armored Vehicle Group (páncéljárműes osztály) set up in Budapest. It was the first “open” armored unit raised from the under cover RUISK and from the bicycle troops. The police reassigned 2036 men to the Army during the period of 1.07.1928 through 1.07.1930.
In 1936, the Hajmáskér Mobile Group was transferred to Hajmáskér, where the artillery training school offered better opportunities to create a real armored force.

In 1936, the Hajmáskér Mobile Group (Hajmáskéri gépkocsizó csoport) was raised there using the Armored Vehicle Group. It consisted of a motorized infantry battalion, a tank battalion, (with three companies of 16 Ansaldo CV3 tankettes each, bought from Italy in 1935), a motorized artillery battalion (with 3 batteries of light howitzers), a motorized pioneer company, a motorized signal platoon, and motorized logistic services.

In 1936 Hungary bought a further 100 CV3 tankettes from Italy, all delivered by 1937. It also bought more 105mm light field howitzers and corresponding 3-ton halftrack towing vehicles from Germany.

In 1937 the 1st Mobile Brigade was raised in Hajmáskér from the Motorized Group. It consisted of 3 motorized infantry battalions, 1 bicycle battalion, 1 artillery battalion, and 1 signal platoon.

In 1937/38, the 2nd Mobile Brigade was raised with the same organization. The two motorized brigades, the two cavalry brigades, and the bicycle brigade formed the heart of Hungary’s mobile reserve in case of mobilization. This call up to mobilization would also create the Mobile Corps, under the command of the Inspector of the Mobile Troops. The Italian CV3 were also issued in 5 tankette platoons to the brigade bicycle battalions.

During the time of increased tensions in Europe, the two mobile brigades were raised to 80% strength, i.e. some reserves were called up, and logistic services mobilized.

On 1.10.1939 they were redesignated as the 1st and 2nd Motorized Brigades.

In 1939 was a critical year for the budding Hungarian armored forces. In the beginning, Hungary was forced to rely on Italian armored vehicles, as the Germans showed no interest in selling either German tanks or the production licences there for. Although deliveries of German tanks were often discussed, and even vaguely promised at times, no tanks were received from this source. The Hungarian leadership decided to have its own industry build the desired armored vehicles. It was known that indigenous steel was inferior to that which Germany produced, but again armor plate would not be forthcoming from there.

The serious expansion of the mobile forces began in 1941, when the first tank production orders were issued to Hungarian motor vehicle factories. As discussed previously, the Huba Plan schedule foresaw two armored divisions and one mechanized division by 1943.

The Mobile Corps was raised on 1.03.1940 at Szolnok, and assigned all mobile formations available to the Army at the time. The commander of the Mobile Corps was simultaneously the Inspector of Mobile Troops, which included the Combat Arms Inspectors of the Bicycle Troops, the Motorized Infantry Troops, and the Cavalry Troops.

In the Spring of 1940, the first armored reconnaissance battalions were raised. They initially consisted of one armored car platoon (5 Csaba), one motorized infantry company (12 light MG and 2 antitank rifles), one tank company (with Italian CV3 tankettes).

The brigade had a regimental commander with a small staff to enable portions of the brigade to carry out special missions away from the brigade. The regimental commander functioned as the assistant brigade commander.

By early 1941, the motorized brigades had achieved their final form, participating in the 1941 Yugoslavian and 1941 Russian Campaigns with this organization.

Training was carried out on a broad basis. A tank training camp and a tank firing range were set up at Kenyérmező (near Esztergom) in 1940. By Fall 1942, this had been developed into a modern armored school. Officers and NCO’s were formed into training companies specializing in mobile troops tactics. The “Csaba Királyfi” military cadet academy in Marosvásárhely was opened to train upcoming generations of officers in mobile warfare.

The new organization under the Huba III Plan – to take effect on 1.03.1942 – scheduled the raising of the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions. Their establishment was planned for the Fall of 1941, using the various components of the two motorized brigades. By 1.03.1942, these two divisions should then have been combat ready.

During the first stage, one battalion per brigade was to be converted tanks to be equipped with Italian Ansaldo CV3 tankettes. The organization of these new tank battalions foresaw:

- Battalion Headquarters
  - 1 pioneer platoon
  - 1 signal platoon
  - 1 maintenance platoon
- 3 tank companies (light Toldi)
  - 1 tank company (medium Turán)
- 2 companies with Nimrod armored, self-propelled antiaircraft vehicles each.

The losses experienced by the two motorized brigades, (mainly due to natural causes and normal wear and tear) were irreplaceable. The promised German tanks were not sent to Hungary. The losses in motor vehicles could not be replaced. The Hungarian motor vehicle industry was overextended with building tanks for Hungary and armaments for Germany.

Personnel had been trained, but material was missing. This remained the unfortunate situation of the Hungarian armored forces until the end of the war.

By the end of December 1941 the Hungarian industry was behind in deliveries of equipment for 10 tank companies and 14 artillery batteries.

**Motorization**

The development of Hungary’s army into a modern force was consistently hampered by the lack of motor vehicles. This bottleneck was to accompany the Army throughout the war, and severely limited the mobility of the combat forces and their supportive logistic services.

The capacity of the automotive industry was limited by the wars, although the quality of the vehicles was above normal. To protect this small industry, the government imposed high import duties on foreign motor vehicles.
Those motor vehicles available to the Army in 1932 were mainly outdated, some even from World War I, and comprised a broad spectrum of makes and models.

Modest amounts of automobiles were purchased in 1932. The Army acquired Italian artillery prime movers from Pavesi and Breda. Limited license production of Pavesi tractors was also started in Hungary, designated as KV-40 and KV-50. (These looked like regular farm tractors, without a driver’s cab, with large wheels in the back and small wheels in the front, etc. – and had a single cylinder, diesel engine). Specially designed Csepel cross country trucks were bought for the signal troops. Other cross-country trucks bought were the Rába-Super and the MAVAG-Mercedes types. Cars acquired were of many different types, including Italian Fiats.

In 1936, Hungary bought 1000 civilian Ford 2½ ton trucks from the factory in Cologne, Germany. These were used to equip the Mobile Brigades, and were supposed to serve until Hungary could acquire German cross country trucks (such as the Krupp L2H-143) and Hungary could produce enough Csepel trucks.

The slow start in motorization was unable to catch up with the expansion of the Army which started in 1938. The possibility of acquiring motor vehicles from Italy or Germany was small, as these countries had begun their own military expansion. This meant that there less motor vehicles in all of Hungary in 1938 – including all civilian vehicles – then would be required by the Huba Plan for the Army by 1941.

The desolate situation of its motor vehicle park had already become abundantly clear to the Royal Hungarian Army in 1938 when it occupied the territories regained in the 1st Vienna Award, particularly in the supply services. The grave situation was further emphasized in 1940 after the 2nd Vienna Award, when the Army moved into northern Transylvania and the Széké1 Corner. Again, the supply situation became chaotic. Long columns of horse-drawn wagons as well as the rapid deterioration of the older motor vehicles provided many headaches for both the troops and the higher commands. This same situation was repeated when Hungary mobilized in early 1941.

Parallel to the Huba Plan, the General Staff had also implemented a motorization program designed to provide the Army with the needed motor vehicles. This was the Botond I Plan. Unfortunately, the Hungarian industry’s motor vehicle production capacity was still very limited. Furthermore, this sector was also engaged in the manufacturing of armored vehicles, which took up a great part of this limited capacity. Improvements in production techniques as well as joint efforts by various companies were hampered by limited possibilities.

From 1938, the Hungarian automotive industry, which included the manufacture of railroad equipment, was primarily engaged in the export of its products. The construction of trucks had a low priority, as there had been very little demand in Hungary until 1937. Some experiments were made with heavy cross-country trucks.

The Army had been a minor customer. Only 40 of the Csepel trucks were ordered for the signal troops. As indicated, Hofherr Schranz delivered 700 KV-40 and KV-50 tractors, (under license of Pavesi), for the air defense forces. For motorization of the local Home Air Defense they were adequate. For field use, however, these vehicles proved to be unsuitable, as they were too slow and technically obsolete.

The Györ Wagon Factory only received small orders for its license-built 1½ ton Rába-Austro-Fiat (AFI) model, namely 200 until 1943, and a further 100 in 1943. A similar situation existed for the license-built MAVAG-Mercedes 1½ ton truck and the Rába-Super 2½ ton truck, although the latter received government support to speed its introduction into the civilian economy.

In line with the Botond I Plan, the Army ordered 1,402 cross-country Rába-Botond trucks, designed to transport a section of 12 men. It could also tow the 40mm antiaircraft gun. Delivery was punctual. By July 1939, 150 had been accepted. The rest one year later. The Rába-Botond trucks proved to be a good design which performed well under field conditions.

On 1.12.1940, the Army had the following motor vehicles:

- 643 motorcycles
- 724 cars
- 953 trucks
- 362 ambulances
- 162 cross-country cars
- 1,882 cross-country trucks

These vehicles, assuming all were in condition to be used, were insufficient to fulfill the requirements of the Army upon mobilization.

One peacetime strength 1941 Motorized Brigade needed 67 motorcycles, 225 motorcycles with sidecars, 98 cars, 462 trucks (1½ ton), 135 trucks (3 ton), 28 signal trucks, and 24 artillery prime movers. These figures do not include the brigade staff and supply services.

No improvement in motorization had been achieved by early 1941. The Huba Plan III phase later that year did nothing to change the situation.

Upon mobilization, the Honvéd Ministry planned to requisition 2000 trucks from the civilian sector. The General Staff regarded this plan with great skepticism, commenting that so many trucks could not be taken without completely disrupting the economy, and doubting that many of them would be in any condition suitable for military use.

The mobilization of the 3 brigades of the Mobile Corps in 1941 caused enormous problems. Just barely enough motor vehicles could be found. In some cases, the brigade supply units were more than a week late in reaching their deployment areas owing to the delays encountered in first gathering and then servicing the necessary vehicles.

The Mobile Corps lost 1200 motor vehicles in the 1941 Russian campaign. This was a major setback for the motorization of the Army, as it was now further back than it had been in 1940.

In 1941, the Honvéd Ministry started the Botond II Plan. It ordered 1400 trucks from the Hungarian industry. These vehicles were delivered in 1942/43.

The Army had to requisition a large part of the vehicles it needed to fill its requirements from the civilian sector in case of mobilization. This occurred under the most difficult circumstances and caused grave friction between the military and the civilian authorities. The process severely interfered with the economy, and the results were not nearly as productive as the Army would have liked. The majority of civilian vehicles were not very modern and in rural areas quite worn if not unusable. They could only be used in Hungary. For field use, many of these requisitioned vehicles were worthless.

In 1938, there were 3,903 civilian trucks registered in Hungary. Of these, 524 Rába-Super and 414 MAVAG-Mercedes were of Hungarian production. Between 1938 and 1943 this number increased by about 4,000 trucks including some 50 foreign makes and models, although only 200 were of Hungarian manufacture.

Motorized vehicles could not be efficiently replaced by their horse-drawn counterparts. Supply columns became dangerously long, exposing them to par-
The Army had acquired only a few national and foreign light armored vehicles for limited use and testing.

The first armored vehicle to be acquired in large quantities was the Csaba medium 3-ton truck. It was introduced in April 1940 as the könnyű harckocsi 38 M. Toldi I. The next model was the Toldi II, (könnyű harckocsi 38 M. Toldi II) with a production run of 110. It had an additional 20mm of armor. Delivery took place from May 1941 through 1942.

Hungary also needed a medium tank. After lengthy, nonproductive negotiations with Italy and Germany, Hungary managed to acquire the production rights for the Skoda T-21 tank in August 1940 from the Czech Republic. Two mild-steel prototypes were demonstrated in July 1941.

In accordance with the Huba II Plan, the Army ordered 230 vehicles (70 to Manfréd Weiss, 70 to Magyár Vagon, 50 to Ganz, and 40 to MÁVAG). It was a medium tank equipped with a 40mm gun, and designated as the közepes harckocsi 40.M Turán I. The first 22 tanks arrived at the tank training school at Esztergom in June 1942. The last Turán I were accepted in 1943. An order for 215 vehicles under the designation of 124 vehicles was completed by June 1940. Twelve command versions – armed only with a machine gun – were built concurrently and designated as the pancelgépkocsi parancsnoki 39/40 M. Csaba. Under the Huba II Plan, a further 50 Csabas were ordered, 32 of which were accepted in 1942, and the remaining 18 in 1943.

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Hungary also needed a medium tank. After lengthy, nonproductive negotiations with Italy and Germany, Hungary managed to acquire the production rights for the Skoda T-21 tank in August 1940 from the Czech Republic. Two mild-steel prototypes were demonstrated in July 1941.

In accordance with the Huba II Plan, the Army ordered 230 vehicles (70 to Manfréd Weiss, 70 to Magyár Vagon, 50 to Ganz, and 40 to MÁVAG). It was a medium tank equipped with a 40mm gun, and designated as the közepes harckocsi 40.M Turán I. The first 22 tanks arrived at the tank training school at Esztergom in June 1942. The last Turán I were accepted in 1943. An order for 215 vehicles under the designation of 124 vehicles was completed by June 1940. Twelve command versions – armed only with a machine gun – were built concurrently and designated as the pancelgépkocsi parancsnoki 39/40 M. Csaba. Under the Huba II Plan, a further 50 Csabas were ordered, 32 of which were accepted in 1942, and the remaining 18 in 1943.

The field artillery battalions were organized into 3 batteries of 4 guns. The 1st battery had 75mm 15.M mountain pack guns, the 2nd battery had 76.5mm 18.M and 5/8.M field guns, and the 3rd battery had 100mm 14/a.M field howitzers.

The mortar companies had two platoons. The 1st platoon had 5 medium 90mm 17.M mortars, the 2nd platoon had 5 heavy 140mm 18.M mortars.

Starting in 1928, the Army began to improve and expand its artillery arm. The first step in the organizational process was on 22.04.1926 when the Artillery Group Hajmáskér was raised at Hajmáskér, (north of Lake Balaton), and redesignated as the Artillery Training Headquarters. The school taught artillery crews and trained ordnance specialist. It also provided courses for artillery officers and higher artillery commanders.

On 16.07.1928, the first horse artillery battalion was raised at the GHQ unit. It had two batteries of four 75mm 15/35.M horse-drawn mountain guns each. It was destined to support the two cavalry brigades.

In 1928 the battalion organization changed slightly, so that it had three double two-gun “half-batteries”, each with 75mm 15.M mountain pack guns, and 100mm 14/a.M light field howitzers. This enabled training within the batteries to prepare the creation of new batteries. The mortar companies were assigned to the field artillery battalions as the 4th battery. An artillery calibra-
artillery “battalions” were regimental size and until 1934 had two battalions, and after 1934 even three battalions. After 1938, these battalions became the artillery battalions of the mixed brigades (each with 5 batteries).

Hungary manufactured its own light field artillery, and although the industry had a low production capacity, improved equipment was steadily introduced. Between 1934 and 1935, forty batteries were re-equipped with 160 of the new 75mm 15/35.5M horse-drawn mountain guns.

The batteries were equipped with a variety of guns. The mortars were replaced with guns as soon as they became available, and disappeared from the artillery organizations after 1935.

During 1934 – 1938, the “battalions” had three battalions, and an artillery calibration battery. There was also a horse-drawn independent 149mm 14/M heavy field howitzer battery. The 14/M was replaced by the 14/35.5M or 14/39.5M.

In 1936 a motorized artillery group was raised at Hajmáskér. It consisted of a motorized artillery battalion (with 3 batteries of German 10.5cm le.F.H. 37) and several half-batteries for training purposes. The motorized artillery for the 1st Motorized Brigade was raised from this group in 1937, and for the 2nd Motorized Brigade in 1938.

In early 1938, the artillery had a peace time strength of 92½ batteries, of which only 15% were motorized. The corps had 63 horse-drawn light field gun batteries as well as 7 horse-drawn batteries with 149mm equipment. The two motorized brigades and the two cavalry brigades had 3 batteries each, for a total of 12 motorized batteries.

Starting with the Army reorganization in 1938, artillery battalions were no longer kept covert, and assumed their proper numbering within the peace time order of battle. GHQ artillery received numbers over 100. The batteries of the bicycle battalions were also converted to German 10.5cm le.F.H. 37. The Border Guard was reinforced by 11 batteries with four 75mm 15/M mountain guns each.

In 1939, the field artillery was further strengthened and standardized. The establishment of the VIII Corps meant that new headquarters and batteries had to be raised. Thus the new 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Artillery Battalions, as well as the VIIIth independent heavy artillery battery came into being. In addition, the 1st Mountain Brigade received one gun battery (with four 75mm 15/M mountain pack guns), for each of the four mountain infantry battalions.

Starting in 1939, the two-gun field gun, mountain gun, and light field howitzer half-batteries were filled up to full batteries with four guns each.

By 1940, the 24 artillery battalions of the corps had the 1st and 2nd Batteries with 100mm 14/a/M or 14/b/M light field howitzers. Conversion to the German 10.5cm le.F.H. 37 had begun. (The plan foresaw that the 2nd battery of all 24 battalions would have the German field howitzers). The 3rd Battery had 149mm 14/35.5M heavy field howitzers. The corps heavy independent artillery batteries were motorized.

The raising of the IX Corps in Transylvania, as well as various regrouping measures, meant that the planned complete standardization of equipment in all battalions could not be achieved. To facilitate the raising of further batteries upon mobilization, the 2nd batteries were authorized a strength of 6 guns in peace time. By 1941, there were 131 batteries in the Army, meaning that there was only one artillery battery for each infantry battalion, which the General Staff considered insufficient.

The artillery of the peace time infantry brigade as of 1941 was subordinate to an artillery regiment staff, the commander of which was also the brigade artillery officer. The 1st Battalion had three batteries. The 1st and 2nd batteries had four 75.5mm 5/8.M field guns, the 3rd Battery had 100mm 14/a/M light field howitzers. The IIInd Battalion had four batteries. The 4th Battery had four 100mm 14/M light field howitzers. The 5th Battery was supposed to have four German 10.5cm le.F.H. 37. The 6th and 7th Batteries had four 149mm 14/M (or 14/35.5M or 14/39.5M) heavy field howitzers. The corps artillery of the peace time army had two motorized independent batteries with four 149mm 15/31/M field howitzers.

General Headquarters Artillery

Although heavy artillery had been forbidden by the terms of the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary had managed to hide 4 super heavy 305mm howitzers left over from World War I.

Heavy artillery – traditionally known as GHQ artillery – as fixed by the Trianon organization was originally limited to four independent batteries. This was reduced to three in 1922.

The Entente Control Commission made it impossible to create heavy GHQ arti-
lery battalions. The antiaircraft batteries were used to form what would later become the air defense units of the air force.

This situation did not change until 1935, although, as mentioned before, the Artillery Group Hajmáskér had been raised on 22.04.1926. It had begun training the cadre of what was to be the basis for all GHQ artillery units. It was redesignated as the Artillery Training Grounds Command on 30.04.1928.

The development of the heavy GHQ motorized artillery was slow. Up to 1935 only three motorized batteries of two guns each had been raised. They were again used as further training cadres for future units. The guns were medium 105mm 31.M guns, 149mm 31.M field howitzers, (both introduced in 1938), and the outdated super heavy 305mm 11.M and 16.M howitzers. These three batteries were gathered under the Artillery Group Hajmáskér. An artillery ordnance workshop was also raised for the Group at Hajmáskér.

The terms of the Treaty of Trianon limited the number of antiaircraft guns to a total of four. This meant that Hungary had no air defense to speak of, although the neighboring countries of Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia all had aircraft.

The Army was also allowed two batteries of outdated 80mm 5/8.M antiaircraft guns. In addition, there were two antiaircraft batteries belonging to the River Forces, which had been raised by removing a number of guns carried on board of the ships. The four batteries had a total of 16 guns, and were located at Budapest, Hajmáskér, Miskolc, and Bája, respectively. There was also a searchlight platoon in Budapest-Tökökugrátó. This meagre force was used as a training cadre to form the basis of the air defense in later years.

In 1928 this task was taken over by the new Budapest Air Defense Command (Budapesti légvédelmi parancsnokság). The command had two independent batteries of four 80mm 5/8.M antiaircraft guns. One battery was in Budapest. One half-battery was in Miskolc, the other in Hajmáskér. The antiaircraft school was also based in this location.

The Air Defense Act of 1935 provided the basis for the air defense of Hungary and the raising of antiaircraft units. The Budapest Air Defense Command was expanded into the National Air Defense Command, and made responsible for all air defense units, measures, and institutions. An air defense officer was incorporated into the corps staffs. All over Hungary measures were taken to establish air defenses. The emphasis was on national defense against air attack.

By 1939, 8 antiaircraft battalions (Ist – VIIIth) with two batteries each had been raised and added to the corps organiza-
Civilian air defense was somewhat varied. Part of it was based on community authorities and voluntary organizations, being subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. On the other hand, the Air Defense League (Légaltalmi Liga) was a civilian organization supported by the community administrations and the industry, and was controlled by the Honvéd Ministry. Regulations came from the National Institute for Air Defense (Országos Légoltalmi Intézet). All authority for air defense measures was delegated to the Honvéd Ministry, which designated the National Air Defense Command (OLP) in Budapest to administer these activities.

As mentioned, the Armed Forces Act of 1938 subjected all Hungarian citizens to a military and labor obligation. It also enacted an air defense obligation, (even for female citizens), from 14 years of age through 70.

Besides fire departments, communal and other organizations, air defense also was based on air defense troops. The nine corps had antiaircraft battalions (a IXth which had been added since the recovery of Transylvania). Budapest at this time had an air defense regiment and a special battalion (kárelhárító).

Air observation, early warning, and communications systems were fitted with modern signal and alarm equipment. The warning and evaluation centers were located in bunkers, and had telephone and radio contact to a wide net of observation posts, especially in Transylvania, where the main enemy (Rumania) was presumed. Notwithstanding the national air defense obligation, most communal air defense services and even the postal communications network were manned by volunteers.

In the Fall of 1938, the 101st – 104th Air Defense Battalions were raised for home air defense. They had two (heavy) batteries with four 80mm antiaircraft guns. In 1939, a third (light) battery was added with four 40mm 36.M antiaircraft guns to each battalion. The 105th Air Defense Battalion was raised with three heavy and one light batteries.

Also in 1939, a light battery was added to the 1st – Vth Anti-Aircraft Battalions. The Vth Anti-Aircraft Battalion received two light batteries.

In 1940, each brigade received an independent antiaircraft battery. The organization of all antiaircraft battalions was standardized at one heavy and two light batteries. The home defense batteries were issued a fifth gun.

In March 1941, the Army had 43 antiaircraft batteries, of which 24 were equipped with 80mm guns.

In the Spring of 1941 the five home defense battalions were removed from the direct control of the General Staff and assigned to the newly created Air Defense Corps. The corps was subordinated the air force, and the five air defense battalions each formed a second battalion (201st – 205th), thereby giving the Air Defense Corps a strength of 10 battalions with about 30 batteries. A heavy battalion (206th) with four batteries was also raised. Only the two light batteries were equipped. Two other two batteries for 105mm antiaircraft guns were also formed, but these had no equipment for years, as Germany did not deliver the paid-for eight 10.5cm Flak 38 guns until March 1944.

The rapid increase of air defense units was based in part on the antiaircraft training battalions. (Each corps had one firing and one training antiaircraft battalion on its peace time establishment). But the main reason was that Hungary produced its own 40mm and 80mm antiaircraft guns, based on Bofors licenses. Nevertheless, the Army was unsatisfied with what it considered to be the weak air defense potential of Hungary as well as that of its combat formations.

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<tr>
<th>Ranks of the Hungarian Army</th>
<th>General of the Army</th>
<th>General (to 1919, and again from 1941)</th>
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<td>Tábornagy</td>
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These were the ranks taken over by the Honvéd from the Austro-Hungarian Imperial Army. After 1919, the new Hungarian Army dropped the rank of Vezérezredes (although Hungarian officers who had attained the rank in World War I kept this designation), until 1941, when the ranks of Gyalogsági Tábornok, Lovassági Tábornok, Tüzérségi Tábornok, and Tábornagy were upgraded to Vezérezredes. At the same time, the rank of Tábornok was renamed as Vezérőrnagy. The upgrade to Vezérezredes was probably done to strengthen the authority of senior Hungarian Generals in dealing with the Germans. Since there was no active Field Marshal in the Hungarian Army after 1918, they needed a rank higher than the German General der Infantrie for their highest commanders, as they were dealing with Germans with the rank of General der Infantrie and Generaloberst. Hence the reintroduction and upgrading to Vezérezredes. The insignia (3 stars) did not change with this modification of ranks, since the Gyalogsági Tábornok, Lovassági Tábornok, Tüzérségi Tábornok, and Tábornagy rank was dropped. The two stars remained the insignia of the Altábornagy, and one star for the Tábornok/Vezérőrnagy.
**Chapter 3**  
The Ground Forces

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### HUNGARIAN ARMY
**ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER OF BATTLE**
**(June 1941 – April 1942)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST ARMY [Budapest]</th>
<th>SECOND ARMY</th>
<th>THIRD ARMY</th>
<th>GHQ</th>
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**NOTES:**
Many of the units indicated in this Order of Battle were only training units; others existed only on paper, having neither men nor material. Many sub-units were only formed after mobilization.

**ARMIES:**
The three Army Headquarters were command echelons, and had no army troops of their own.

**CORPS:**
Corps troops had Roman numerals. Unless otherwise indicated, the corps sub-units bore the same number as their parent formation. E.g.: IXth Heavy Artillery Battalion = IX Corps

**BRIGADES:**
Brigade units had Arabic numbers. Unless otherwise indicated, the brigades sub-units bore the same number as their parent formation.
E.g.: 23rd Cavalry Company = 23rd Infantry Brigade
Infantry and artillery battalions, when part of a regiment, were identified by Roman numerals, preceded by the regimental identification. E.g.: 4th Cavalry Company = 4th Infantry Regiment/IInd Battalion

The 1st Motorized Expeditionary Corps had the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Motorized Battalions; the 2nd Motorized Expeditionary Corps had the 4th, 5th, and 6th Motorized Battalions.

**GHQ UNITS:**
GHQ units were attached directly to the General Staff. GHQ units had generally had numbers over 100. The identifying numbers of independent companies, batteries, and battalions were followed by an "ö".
Corps Headquarters
Corps Artillery Command
Bicycle Infantry Battalion
   Motorized Field Telephone Platoon
   Motorized Pioneer Platoon
   Motorized Anti-Tank Platoon (2 light motorized anti-tank guns)
   Motorized Machine Gun Platoon (2 heavy machine guns)
   2 Bicycle Infantry Companies (12 light machine guns + 2 light mortars, each)
   1 Infantry Company (12 light machine guns + 2 light mortars)
Motorized Artillery Battalion
   2 Motorized Artillery Batteries (2 tractor-towed 149mm field howitzers, each)
   1 Artillery Observation Battery
Motorized Anti-Aircraft Battalion
   1 Signal Platoon (motorized)
   1 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Company (4 tractor-towed 80mm anti-aircraft guns)
   1 Light Anti-Aircraft Company (6 tractor-towed 40mm anti-aircraft guns)
Motorized Signal Battalion
   1 Signal Company
   1 Signal Company (motorized)
   1 Wire Construction Company
Combat Engineer Battalion
   2 Combat Engineer Companies
   2 Smoke (Chemical) Companies
   1 Military Labor Company
Corps Trains Headquarters
   Anti-Aircraft Company (6 anti-aircraft machine guns)(horse-drawn/wagon-mounted)
   Supply Command
   Supply Command (motorized)
      1 Supply Administration Unit (ammunition) (motorized)
      1 Supply Administration Unit (rations)
      2 Field Bakery Companies (motorized)
      1 Motor Maintenance Company (motorized)
      1 Supply Column (P.O.L.) (motorized)
      2 Supply Columns (motorized)
      2 Field Hospital Companies
      2 Ambulance Columns (motorized)
      2 Forward Collection Points
      1 Forward Bridge Replacement Point
      2 Heavy Combat Bridge Columns
      1 Heavy Combat Bridge Column (Training)
      2 Assault Bridge Columns
      1 Engineer Equipment Company
      5 Supply Columns (ammunition)(horse-drawn)
      1 Veterinary Company
      1 Corps Hospital
      1 Forward Supply Point (rations)(horse-drawn)
Chapter 3  The Ground Forces

Brigade Headquarters

Infantry Regiments

Field Telephone Platoon
Pioneer Platoon
Anti-Tank Platoon (4 light horse-drawn anti-tank guns)
Mortar Platoon (4 medium mortars)
Machine Gun Company (8 horse-drawn/wagon-mounted heavy machine guns)

Infantry Battalions

Field Telephone Platoon
Anti-Tank Platoon (4 light horse-drawn anti-tank guns)
Mortar Platoon (4 medium mortars)
3 Infantry Companies (12 light machine guns + 2 light mortars + 1 anti-tank rifle 20mm Solothurn, each)
1 Machine Gun Company (9 heavy machine guns)

Artillery Regiment

I. Artillery Battalion
   1. Battery (4 horse-drawn 75mm mountain guns)
   2. Battery (4 horse-drawn 76.5mm field guns)
   3. Battery (4 horse-drawn 100mm field howitzers)

II. Artillery Battalion
   4. Battery (4 horse-drawn 100mm field howitzers)
   5. Battery (4 horse-drawn 105mm field howitzers)
   6. Battery (4 horse-drawn 149mm field howitzers)
   7. Battery (4 horse-drawn 149mm field howitzers)

Cavalry Company (12 light machine guns + 2 heavy machine guns)

Signal Company

Anti-Aircraft Company (6 motorized 40mm anti-aircraft guns)

Brigade Trains Headquarters

Anti-Aircraft Company (10 anti-aircraft machine guns)(horse-drawn/wagon-mounted)
Supply Command

4 Supply Columns (ammunition)(horse-drawn wagons)
1 Supply Column (rations)(horse-drawn wagons)
1 Supply Column (motorized)
1 Supply Administration Unit (ammunition)
1 Supply Administration Unit (rations)
1 Field Bakery Company
1 Field Hospital Company (partially motorized)
1 Ambulance Column (motorized)
1 Engineer Equipment Park
1 Band

Military Labor Headquarters

3 Military Labor Companies
Brigade Headquarters
Artillery Commander
Infantry Commander

Mountain Infantry Battalions
- Field Telephone Platoon
- Pioneer Platoon
- Reconnaissance Detachment
- Anti-Tank Platoon (4 light horse-drawn anti-tank guns)
- Mortar Platoon (4 medium mortars)
- Mountain Artillery Battery (4 horse-drawn 75mm mountain guns)
- 3 Infantry Companies (12 light machine guns + 2 light mortars + 1 anti-tank rifle 20mm Solothurn, each)
- 1 Machine Gun Company (9 heavy machine guns)

Mountain Artillery Battalion
- 5. Mountain Artillery Battery (4 horse-drawn 75mm mountain guns)
- 6. Mountain Artillery Battery (4 horse-drawn 75mm mountain guns)
- 1./4. Heavy Artillery Battery (2 horse-drawn 149mm field howitzers)

Cavalry Company (12 light machine guns + 2 heavy machine guns)

Armored Car Platoon (5 Csaba armored cars)

Motorcycle Infantry Platoon (3 light machine guns)

Motorized Anti-Tank Company (4 motorized light anti-tank guns)

Anti-Aircraft Company (6 motorized 40mm anti-aircraft guns)

Signal Company

Combat Engineer Company

Brigade Trains Headquarters
- Anti-Aircraft Company (10 anti-aircraft machine guns)(horse-drawn/wagon-mounted)
  - 1 Supply Administration Unit (ammunition)
  - 3 Supply Columns (cart)
  - 2 Supply Columns (pack animal)
  - 2 Supply Columns (horse-drawn wagons)
  - 1 Supply Column (rations/cart)
  - 1 Supply Column (rations/pack animal)
  - 1 Supply Column (rations/horse-drawn wagons)
  - 1 Field Hospital Company (partially motorized)
  - 1 Ambulance Column (motorized)
  - 1 Supply Administration Unit (rations)
  - 1 Field Bakery Company
Chapter 3 The Ground Forces

Brigade Headquarters

Border Guard and Mountain Border Guard Battalions

- Field Telephone Platoon
- Pioneer Platoon
- Reconnaissance Detachment
- Anti-Tank Platoon (4 light horse-drawn anti-tank guns)
- Mortar Platoon (4 medium mortars)
  
  either: Mountain Artillery Battery (4 horse-drawn 75mm mountain guns)
  or: Artillery Battery (4 pack 75mm mountain guns)

- 3 Infantry Companies (12 light machine guns + 2 light mortars + 1 anti-tank rifle 20mm Solothurn, each)
  - 1 Machine Gun Company (9 heavy machine guns)

Anti-Aircraft Company (6 motorized 40mm anti-aircraft guns)

Signal and Mountain Signal Company

Combat Engineer and Mountain Combat Engineer Company

Fortress Infantry Companies

1./3. Heavy Artillery Battery (2 horse-drawn 149mm field howitzers)

NOTES:

Border Police units (which were subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior) have not been indicated, although they were in part within the chain of command of the Border Guard Brigades.
1941 Motorised Brigade

Brigade Headquarters
Traffic Control Company (motorized)

Motorized Infantry Regiment
Motorized Field Telephone Platoon
Motorized Pioneer Platoon

Motorized Infantry Battalions
Motorized Field Telephone Platoon
Motorized Pioneer Platoon
Motorized Anti-Tank Platoon (4 light anti-tank guns)
3 Motorized Infantry Companies (12 light machine guns + 2 light mortars + 2 anti-tank rifles 20mm Solothurn, each)
1 Motorized Machine Gun Company (12 heavy machine guns + 4 medium mortars)

Bicycle Infantry Battalion
Motorized Field Telephone Platoon
Motorized Pioneer Platoon
Motorized Anti-Tank Platoon (4 light anti-tank guns)
Tankette Platoon (5 Ansald CV tankettes)
Motorized Artillery Battery (4 tractor-towed 105mm field howitzers)
3 Bicycle Infantry Companies (12 light machine guns + 2 light mortars + 2 anti-tank rifles 20mm Solothurn, each)
1 Motorized Machine Gun Company (12 heavy machine guns + 4 medium mortars)

Anti-Aircraft Company (6 motorized 40mm anti-aircraft guns)

Motorized Signal Company

Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (2 Csaba armored cars)
Motorized Field Telephone Platoon
Motorized Pioneer Platoon
Motorized Anti-Tank Platoon (4 light anti-tank guns)
Motorized Mortar Platoon (4 medium mortars)
Motorized Infantry Company (12 light machine guns + 2 light mortars + 3 anti-tank rifles 20mm Solothurn)
Tankette Company (20 Ansald CV tankettes)
Light Tank Company (20 Toldi light tanks)
Armored Car Company (10 Csaba armored cars)

Motorized Artillery Battalion
4 Motorized Artillery Batteries (4 tractor-towed 105mm field howitzers, each)

Motorized Combat Engineer Company Headquarters
1 Motorized Combat Engineer Company
1 Motorized Heavy Combat Bridge Column

Brigade Trains Headquarters
Motorized Anti-Aircraft Company (10 AA machine guns)
1 Supply Administration Unit (ammunition) (motorized)
3 Supply Columns (ammunition) (motorized)
2 Supply Columns (P.O.L.) (motorized)
1 Field Hospital Company (motorized)
1 Ambulance Column (motorized)
1 Motor Maintenance Company (motorized)
1 Engineer Equipment Company (motorized)
1 Supply Administration Unit (rations) (motorized)
1 Field Bakery Company (motorized)
Chapter 3 The Ground Forces

Brigade Headquarters

Hussar Regiments
- Mounted Field Telephone Platoon
- Mounted Pioneer Platoon
- Motorized Anti-Tank Platoon (4 light anti-tank guns)
- Tankette Platoon (5 Ansaldo CV)
- Mountain Artillery Battery (4 horse-drawn 75mm mountain guns)

Cavalry Battalions
- 3 Saber Companies (12 light machine guns + 3 anti-tank rifles 20mm Solothurn, each)
- 1 Mounted Machine Gun Company (12 heavy machine guns + 4 medium mortars)

Bicycle Infantry Battalion
- Mounted Field Telephone Platoon
- Mounted Pioneer Platoon
- Motorized Anti-Tank Platoon (4 light motorized anti-tank guns)
- Tankette Platoon (5 Ansaldo CV tankettes)
- Motorized Artillery Battery (4 tractor-towed 105mm light field howitzers)
- 3 Bicycle Infantry Companies (12 light machine guns + 2 light mortars + 2 anti-tank rifles 20mm Solothurn, each)
- 1 Motorized Machine Gun Company (12 heavy machine guns + 4 medium mortars)

Anti-Aircraft Company
- 6 Motorized 40mm anti-aircraft guns

Motorized Signal Company

Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
- Motorized Field Telephone Platoon
- Motorized Pioneer Platoon
- Motorized Anti-Tank Platoon (4 light anti-tank guns)
- Motorized Mortar Platoon (4 medium mortars)
- Motorized Infantry Company (12 light machine guns + 2 light mortars + 3 anti-tank rifles 20mm Solothurn)
- Tankette Company (20 Ansaldo CV tankettes)
- Light Tank Company (20 Toldi light tanks)
- Armored Car Company (10 Csaba armored cars)

Motorized Artillery Battalion
- 2 Motorized Artillery Batteries (4 tractor-towed 105mm field howitzers, each)

Motorized Artillery Battalion
- 2 Motorized Artillery Batteries (4 horse-drawn cavalry guns 76.5mm, each)

Cavalry Combat Engineer Company Headquarters
- 1 Motorized Combat Engineer Company
- 1 Motorized Heavy Combat Bridge Column

Brigade Trains Headquarters
- Anti-Aircraft Company (10 motorized 40mm anti-aircraft guns)
- 3 Supply Columns (ammunition) (motorized)
- 1 Supply Column (motorized)
- 1 Supply Column (rations) (motorized)
- 1 Supply Administration Unit (ammunition) (motorized)
- 1 Supply Administration Unit (rations) (motorized)
- 1 Field Bakery Company (motorized)
- 1 Field Maintenance Company (motorized)
- 1 Motor Maintenance Company (motorized)
- 1 Field Hospital Company (motorized)
- 1 Ambulance Column (motorized)
- 1 Engineer Equipment Company (motorized)
- 1 Veterinary Company (motorized)
The Hungarian Red Air Force

When the Communist government came to power on 1.08.1919, it established the Red Air Force (Vörös Légjárócsapat) to assist in the defence of Hungary.

There was no shortage of combat-experienced personnel, as the Hungarian contribution to the Austro-Hungarian K.u.K. Luftfahrtruppen (Imperial and Royal Aviation Troops) had been strong, 5,341 Hungarians having served with the Austrian Imperial Air Force during World War I. Over 600 aircraft were still available on Hungarian territory. These were mostly trainers of various types, but included some combat aircraft. The latter were not always in the best condition.

Hungarian aircraft manufactures, (the Ungarische Lloyd Flugzeug- und Motorenfabrik at Aszod, the Ungarische Allgemeine Maschinenfabrik at Budapest, and the Ungarische-Flugzeugfabrik at Albertfalva), resumed production for the Red Air Force, building the Phönix C I and UFAG C I two-seater reconnaissance biplanes, the Brandenburg W 29 two-seater float fighter, and the Fokker D VII single-seat fighter. Nine squadrons were formed.

The 1. – 7. Squadrons had five reconnaissance and five fighter aircraft each. (The reconnaissance aircraft were a mixture of Austro-Hungarian Aviatik (Berg) C I, Phönix C 1, UFAG C I and Lloyd C V aircraft, together with a handful of Fokker C I’s confiscated from the German Mackensen Army which was being sent home through Hungarian territory; the fighter aircraft were mostly Austro-Hungarian Aviatik (Berg) C I and the Fokker D VII).

The 8. Squadron, (with 18 Fokker D VII fighters), was manned by personnel mostly from the former K.u.K. J-Flik, which fought on the Italian front during WW I.

The 9. Squadron had floatplanes (Brandenburg W 29’s).

The Red Air Force quickly established partial aerial supremacy, (although serviceability left much to be desired), and together with the Hungarian Red Army temporarily brought the Rumanians to a halt at the Tisza River.

As described in Chapter 1, after three months of fighting the Communist government collapsed in August 1919, and with its demise, the Red Air Force was dissolved.

During its brief existence the Red Air Force lost about 100 aircraft. Some 120 aircraft having been delivered by the three Hungarian aircraft factories. Most of the surviving aircraft were taken away by the Rumanians and Czechs.

The Secret Air Force

After the fall of the Soviet Republic, the Hungarian National Army put together three air groups in 1920 with aircraft salvaged from the Szeged, (under French occupation in 1919), from aircraft hidden from the Allies, and from the remaining aircraft of the Red Air Force which had succeeded in escaping the Rumanian wholesale theft. The Aviation Department (Légüyi Hivatal – LüH) was formed secretly within the Ministry of Traffic in January 1920, and was allocated the responsibility for the creation of the new air arm which began its clandestine existence in August 1921.

Hungarian Air Force Bases, March 1941

![Map of Hungarian Air Force Bases, March 1941](image-url)
Modest aircraft production was continued by the industry, the new government trying to maintain the nucleus of an air arm under the guise of the Air Gendarmerie (Légi Csendőrség) with a few dozen aircraft (Fokker D VII, Phönix C I, and UFAG C I).

Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia immediately protested the formation of this paramilitary organization and forced its disbandment. Not to be out manoeuvred, the Hungarians used its personnel and equipment in 1920 to form the cadre of MAéFORT, (Magyar Légiforgalmi Társág, literally, the Hungarian Aero Company), the new airmail service. This company operated two scheduled services, between Budapest and Szeged, and between Budapest and Szombathely.

But the Treaty of Trianon had forbidden all forms aviation to Hungary, and in 1922, under the supervision of a control commission, 108 aircraft and 220 engines were scrapped. However the Hungarians continued to prepare the ground work for an air force in secret. The Entente Control Commission also closed down the civilian air-line MAéFORT, destroying all planes and even hangars (!) in Hungary. However, the Hungarians managed to save something from the disaster by hiding dissembled aircraft in farms and other locations.

Department II was formed within the Ministry of Trade and Transport in January 1920, and was responsible for the creation and training of the new air arm. Formation of the secret air force was begun in August 1921 as Department XI (Air). It was equipped with a very mixed assortment of aircraft, and manned by WWI veterans. It worked out training programs for both pilots and ground crews.

Colonel István Petróczy was the first chief of the Air Force. He had been the commanding officer of the Austro-Hungarian K.u.K. Luftschiffahrtabteilung.

When the restrictions on civil flying were lifted the autumn of 1922, four military aviation establishments were in existence and flying courses had already begun, despite the presence of the Allied Military Control Commission. The new establishments were not, of course, overtly military, bearing such designations as the Society for Aviation (AERO Szövetség), which was future experimental and testing group, the Meteorological Group (Időjelző Osztály), which was the cover name for the fighter component, the Airmail Group (Légiposta Osztály), which was to become the future bomber element, and the Air Gendarmerie (Légi Csendőrség). The Pilot Training School (Repülőgépvezető Iskola) formed at Szombathely, was also ostensibly a purely civil organization, established to train personnel for Hungarian Airlines Ltd., the new national civilian passenger and mail carrier, (Magyár Légiforgalmi R.t., or MALÉRT).

The Air Department (Légügyi Hivatal, or LüH), was revealed on 10.04.1924. Aircraft consisted of a handful of WWI aircraft that had been hidden successfully from the Control Commission, and a few Ansaldo A.300 and Bristol F.2B two-seaters that were obtained by the Air Force during 1922–23 for evaluation by the “Airmail Group”. Hungary’s depressed economic situation prevented substantial aircraft purchases for her clandestine air arm until 1925, when priority was given to the acquisition of a successor to the Hansa-Brandenburg B I trainer.

To provide replacement training aircraft quickly, the Air Force established secret production facilities at Székésfehérvár-Sósóti. This plant, designated as the Central Repair Workshops to hide its true function, built five or six examples of a improved version of the Hansa-Brandenburg B I known as the “Kis Brandi” (Little Brandis) in 1925. It also managed to produce a few modified Fokker D VII’s in 1926.

An Air Force purchasing commission narrowed its choice to the Bristol Type 83 and the Udet U 12 Flamingo as possible replacements for the B I. Five of the Type 83 trainers were delivered to Hungary in April 1926, but the U 12 Flamingo was finally selected. The Air Force decided to purchase 24 examples from Germany together with a manufacturing licence. Production was awarded to Manfréd Weiss. Manfréd Weiss in Budapest was one of the biggest industrial concerns in Hungary. It had started aircraft manufacturing on the instructions of the Air Force in 1927, and subsequently produced 40 U 12 Flamingos, the first of which flew in April 1929.
Prior to manufacturing the U 12, Manfréd Weiss had built 27 Heinkel HD 22 two-seat general-purpose biplanes, officially for use by new national carrier (Magyar Légiforgalmi Részvénytársaság – MALÉRT), but in actual fact serving with the Air Force’s embryo bomber component, the “Airmail Group”. Weiss also initiated licence production of the Fokker C VD, which had been selected by the Air Force as the standard tactical reconnaissance aircraft. Three Fokker C VE’s purchased in 1927 from the Netherlands flew on internal airmail routes for MALÉRT. Manfréd Weiss built some 50 C VD’s, which were delivered direct to the clandestine military units. The first Fokker C VD flew in December 1928. Manfréd Weiss also produced a few C VE’s for MALÉRT. The Central Repair Workshops produced a further nine C VD’s.

Throughout the late twenties emphasis was placed on training in order to create a substantial personnel reserve. In addition to a Pilot Training School at Szombathely, aero clubs (similar to those of the Germans), were established throughout the country, staffed by Air Force instructors and provided initial flying training for the pilots. The air crews came from the ranks of the regular and reserve officers and NCO’s.

When the Inter-Allied Control Commission ceased activities, and turned over its powers to the Hungarian government, Hungary joined the International Aeronautical Federation on 19.05.1927. The Aviation Department was then able to allowed officers to acquire their pilot’s license as of 1.08.1927, at least privately.


By 1930, the LüH had also managed to train some administrative staff, which were allowed to wear uniforms staring in 1930.

Aided by the improved economic situation during the 1930’s, the Air Force was expanded little by little. It was accelerated by the Miklos Horthy National Aviation Fund (The National Aviation Fund was a pseudo-civilian organization, in actuality staffed by Hungarian Air Force instructors and which was nonmilitary in name only), owed much to Hungarian aspirations of regaining by force of arms the territories ceded to the “Small Entente”. Nevertheless, although Hungary’s neighbors were perfectly well aware of the fact that an Hungarian air arm existed in defiance of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon, the service continued its twilight existence without any public admission on the part of the Hungarian government that it possessed an air arm.

During the early thirties Manfréd Weiss produced the WM 10 primary trainer for the clubs, and the Central Repair Workshops evolved an improved version of the Flamingo known as the Hungary, 80 examples being built for the Air Force. Until 1931, the Air Force possessed no aircraft intended specifically for the fighter or bomber role, but with the purchase from Italy of 21 single-seat Fiat Cr-20bis fighters and a few Cr-20B two-seaters the first fighter unit was formed as the 1st Meteorological Group (1. Időjelző Osztály). This was followed by a bomber unit, called the 1st Airmail Group (1. Légiposta Osztály), for which 20 Caproni Ca-101 trimotor bombers were bought.

To supplement the Fokker C VD in the tactical (short-range) reconnaissance role Manfréd Weiss produced two derivatives of the basic Fokker design, the WM 16A Budapest I (550 HP WM-built Gnôme-Rhône 9K Mistral) and the WM 16B Budapest II (860 HP WM-built Gnôme-Rhône 14K Mistral-Major), the prototypes flying in 1933 and 1934 respectively, and eight WM 16A Budapest I and four WM 16B Budapest II being built.

The other seven squadrons were known as:

- The Budapest Sports Society (BSE)
- The Technological University Sport Flying Society (MSE)
- The Experimental Flight Group (RKC)
- The National Aircraft Pilot School (REGVI)
- The Debrecen Aero Club (DAC)
- The Matra Aero Club (MAC)
- The Somogy Aero Club (SAC)

These nine squadrons of the MKHL were organized into three air groups of three squadrons each.

**Expansion and New Equipment**

Although all Air Force aircraft bore civil registrations, the clandestine existence of the MKHL, as the air arm was to be named, was coming to an end. By 1935 the Air Force had begun to seek more modern combat aircraft.

Dr. György Rákosi, the head of the LúH at this time, (who had himself commanded a WWI air force squadron), used Italian and German concepts to modernize Hungary’s air defense forces. He also laid the groundwork for improved training, logistics, and local aircraft components manufacture.

In an attempt to provide a standard fighter of superior performance to the Fiat Cr-20bis, the Central Repair Workshops, with the backing of Dr. Rákosi, had built a prototype fighter of indigenous design, the Avis I, but official trials conducted during 1933–34 had yielded disappointing results. Modified versions of this aircraft, the Avis II and III prototypes, were flown in 1935, but were also found to offer inferior performances to those of contemporary foreign designs. An attempt was made to purchase a manufacturing licence for the PZL P 24 fighter but this was refused by the Polish government.

The Air Force therefore approached the Ernst Heinkel concern in Germany with a view to the possibility of Hungarian licence manufacture of a version of the He 51 fighter powered by the Manfréd Weiss-built Gnôme-Rhône 14K radial. Accordingly, at the end of 1935, an He 51 re-engined with a Gnôme-Rhône 14K was secretly demonstrated to the Air Force at Budapest, but this fighter’s performance was found to be inadequate, and the Air Force elected to purchase the Fiat Cr-32.

The first of some 90 Cr-32 fighters, together with a small number of single- and two-seat Cr-30s for training, arrived in Hungary during 1936.

In 1937 the framework of the future fighter element of the Hungarian air arm was created with the establishment of the 1st Fighter Regiment (1. Vadász Ered).quickly followed by the 2nd Fighter Regiment. The fighter regiments were supposed to have two groups, (each with three 12-aircraft squadrons), but initially the fighter regiments had only enough aircraft to form one group each, (1./I Fighter Group (Vadász Osztály) at Börgönd and Veszprém, and the 2./I Fighter Group at Nitra)
was formed at Mátyásföld airfield, near Budapest, early in 1938 with two nine-aircraft squadrons.

Short-range reconnaissance squadron equipment consisted of 36 Gnôme-Rhône 14K-powered Heinkel He 46 monoplanes obtained from Germany after the few Italian Meridionali Ro 37bis reconnaissance biplanes acquired for evaluation had been being promptly rejected. Together with the Fokker C VD’s and the WM 16 Budapest, the He 46’s were operated by the short-range reconnaissance squadrons from 1937, one squadron being attached to each mixed brigade and each squadron being designated by the brigade numeral (e.g., 1., 2., 3. Közélfelderítő Század), and from 1938 the ageing C VD’s were progressively replaced by the Hungarian-produced WM 21 Sólyom.

To meet its bomber requirements the Air Force had, in 1936, finally opted for the Junkers Ju 86K-2 powered by the WM-built Gnôme-Rhône 14K, and successive orders were to result in a total of 66 bombers of this type being acquired. The first recipient of the Ju 86K-2 was the 3rd Bomber Regiment (3. Bombázó Ezred), its 1st Group (3./I Bombázó Osztály) starting to form on the type in 1937, its 2nd Group (3./II Bombázó Osztály) being equipped with the Caproni Ca 101 and still known officially as the 1st Airmail Group (1. Légiposta Osztály).

Hungary developed two important technical innovations in connection with the field of aviation between the world wars.

The first was the Gebauer machine gun, which was initially put into practice as early as 1921, but which the Allied Control Commission ordered destroyed. This was the standard “through the propeller” type machine gun interrupter for the Air Force throughout the Second World War.

The second invention was the Juhász-Gamma antiaircraft sight, which was used on the 40mm Bofors guns. It was acknowledged as the best in the world at the time.

**Further Progress**

The Austrian Anschluss on 13.03.1938 was seen with some trepidation in Hungary. It meant that Germany was now Hungary’s new neighbor, with the result that Hungary would probably fall within the German sphere of influence. Germany, anxious to strengthen its presence in the area, proposed that the Luftwaffe should help the Hungarian government with its expanding air arm and undertook to assist in the reorganization, modernization, and expansion of the Hungarian Air Force. The Hungarian government, attempting to force a rapid expansion of its military aviation, decided to accept the offer.

As matters stood, after the retirement of Colonel István Petróczy and until the appointment of his successor Valdemár Kenese, the clandestine air arm had been commanded by Army officers with little if any aviation experience. Of the seven commanders of the Air Force between 1920 and 1941, only three had an aviation background; the rest were regular army men because no senior Air Force officers were available to fill the position.

Generalmajor Alexander Löhr was sent to Hungary to head up this mission. He had been Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian Air Force (Österreichische Luftstreitkräfte) until the Anschluss, and was a highly experienced and energetic officer, and the seconding of General Löhr as an adviser to the Hungarian air force was of interest.

The small Luftwaffe mission sent to Hungary included flying and technical instructors, specialists in tactics and organization, as well as other personnel. It arrived in Hungary to direct and staff both the flying schools and the operational units.

The Luftwaffe mission recommended reorganizing existing training facilities and establishing new schools. The mission also acted as advisers to air staffs and individual operational units.

To cater for this considerably expanded training program 100 Bücker Bü 131 Jungmann primary trainers were ordered from Germany, followed by further orders for Focke Wulf Fw 56 Stosser, Messerschmitt Bf 108 Taifun, and Junkers Ju 86D and Heinkel He 70 bombers.

At Bled in Yugoslavia, on 23.08.1938, the Little Entente acknowledged at the Bled Conference Hungary’s right to rearm itself as necessary.

In 1938, two Hungarian pilots flew their plane “Justice for Hungary” across the Atlantic to emphasize Hungary’s feelings about the Trianon Treaty.

During this time, the assistance from Italy to Hungary also continued to grow.

The 3./4, 3./5 and 3./6 Bomber Squadrons bombed the Slovakian airfield at Igliš and the Slovakian positions in the vicinity of the Peresecen Valley on 24.03.1939. The 15 Ju 86K-2 bombers attacking Igliš were escorted by the Fiat Cr-32 fighters of the 1./2 Squadron. Although the effort was not an overwhelming success, ten enemy aircraft were damaged on the ground.

Opposition from the newly-established Slovakian air arm, (Slovenské vzdušné zbrane), was limited to a few attempts to intercept Hungarian formations with Avia B-534s. On 24.03.1939 the Cr-32’s of the 1./1 Squadron claimed nine Slovak B-534’s without loss. One of the B-534’s was forced down near Sobranice and

**The 1939 Slovakian Campaign**

After the Ruthenia declaration of independence, Hungarian forces launched a lightning attack on 15.03.1939 against the new Republic of Slovakia, and quickly overran Carpatho-Ruthenia in the eastern part of that country.

On 14.03.1939 the Air Force had deployed its forces as follows:

- The IInd Group/3rd Bomber Regiment at Debrecen: 3./3 Squadron (nine Ju 86K-2)
- 3./4 Squadron (nine Ju 86K-2)
- 3./5 Squadron (nine Ju 86K-2)

The 1st Group/1st Fighter Regiment 1./1 Squadron at Ungvár (nine Cr-32)
- 1./2 Squadron at Miskolc (nine Cr-32)
- 1./3 Squadron at Csap (nine Cr-32)

Unfortunately, the 1./3 Squadron was barely operational because of the waterlogged state of the airfield at Csap following a severe storm.

The 1st Independent Long-Range Reconnaissance Group (with nine He 170) was at Kecskemét.

The Hungarian air arm proved to be superior to its fledgling Slovak counterpart, and quickly established air superiority.

During the course of the brief conflict the He 170’s of the 1st Independent Long-Range Reconnaissance Group flew reconnaissance sorties from Kecskemét.

The Slovaks attempted to interfere with the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia by launching harassing raids against Hungarian towns along the border.

On 23.04.1939, Hungarian antiaircraft shot down three Letov S-328 and two Avia B-534 aircraft.

The 3./4, 3./5 and 3./6 Bomber Squadrons bombed the Slovakian airfield at Igliš and the Slovakian positions in the vicinity of the Peresecen Valley on 24.03.1939. The 15 Ju 86K-2 bombers attacking Igliš were escorted by the Fiat Cr-32 fighters of the 1./2 Squadron. Although the effort was not an overwhelming success, ten enemy aircraft were damaged on the ground.
captured by the Hungarians. In other encounters, the Hungarian Fiat Cr-32’s bested the Slovak Letov S-328’s and Avia B-334’s. Fortunately, the Slovaks carried out no air raids on Hungary.

The attack had the effect that the Slovaks ceased their air incursions against Hungarian towns.

**The Transylvanian Crisis**

The tensions between Hungary and Rumania lead to a partial mobilization of the Hungarian Army, including the Air Force.

On 2.07.1940, the 1st Air Force Brigade was alerted. The alert was called off a few days later. But suddenly, on 23.08.1940, total mobilization was ordered. All units of the Air Force were ready for the scheduled attack on 28.08.1940.

On 27.08.1940, a Rumanian He 112 fighter attacked a Hungarian Ca135 Bomber near Debrecen. The damaged bomber managed to land safely. On 28.08.1940, one Hungarian WM-21 observation aircraft dropped bombs on the Rumanian airfield at Szatmárnémeti, but was wrecked upon landing.

The Second Vienna Award signed on 30.08.1940 relieved the situation somewhat and the Hungarian Army was demobilized.

Although the Award was supposed to settle tensions, incidents continued to occur occasionally, and reconnaissance flights were continuously flown.

**The Royal Hungarian Air Force Emerges**

Having now fired its guns in anger the existence of the MKHL was at last officially revealed as a force in being, but the Carpatho-Ruthenia “coup” had served to heighten tension in the area still further, and relations with Rumania over the question of Transylvania continued to deteriorate.

The Hungarian government, envisaging the likelyhood of war with Rumania and possibly Yugoslavia, placed considerable impetus behind the expansion of the air force, and anxiously sought more modern combat aircraft.

At the same time an effort was made to expand the indigenous aircraft industry. The state-owned Győr Wagon Factory (Györi Vagongyár) began aircraft production in 1938 with the WM 21 Sólyom (Falcon) tactical reconnaissance biplanes, and the Hungarian State Wagon and Engineering Factory (Mágyar Allami Vaggon és Gépgyár), or MÁVAG, in Budapest also now began preparations to build aircraft.

Priority in the upgrading of the air force was given to the acquisition of a replacement for the Cr-32 fighter, and early in 1939 three Bf 109D-l and three He 112B-I fighters were obtained from Germany for competitive evaluation and possible licence manufacture to fulfil the longer-term requirement.

Still thinking in terms of a conflict with the remaining members of the “Little Entente”, the Hungarian government also began negotiations with Italy for the supply of the new Fiat Cr-42 Falco fighter biplane to fulfill the more immediate requirement of the air force. Although obsolescent in concept, the Cr-42 compared favorably in performance with the fighter equipment of Hungary’s neighbor states and the first deliveries could be made before the end of 1939, and therefore a contract was awarded for some 70 aircraft of this type.

Owing to the balance of trade, Italy was favored as an aircraft procurement source, and in addition to the Cr-42’s orders were placed for 12 Nardi FN 305 trainers, five single-seat and three two-seat Meridionali Ro 41 trainers, and 12 Caproni Ca 310 Libeccio light reconnaissance-bombers. Because of constant minor troubles, the last-mentioned type was relegated to ancillary tasks, such as target-towing, and most examples were eventually returned to Italy.

As a successor for the Ju 86K-2 with the air force’s bomber component Hungary ordered the Caproni Ca-135bis in 1939, successive batches delivered during 1940 totalling approximately 70 aircraft.

The Air Force had the following combat aircraft in December 1939:

- 69 Cr-32 fighters
- 71 Cr-42 fighters
- 62 Ju 86K bombers
- 16 He 110A long-range recon.
- 34 He 46 short-range recon.
- 51 WM 21 short-range recon.
The He 170 had been relegated to advanced trainer status by this time and had been replaced by the He 110A.

The air force commander was Colonel László Háry, a veteran pilot of WW I.

On 27.12.1939 a contract was placed with Caproni for 70 Reggiane Re 2000 “Falco I” fighters plus a small number of airframes to assist the MÁVAG in initiating production of the fighter, a manufacturing licence for which having been obtained simultaneously. The choice of the Re 2000 as the main combat fighter was determined by several factors, the most important being Germany’s unwillingness to permit the manufacture of modern license-built German fighters in Hungary and her reluctance to guarantee deliveries from German factories.

The German Foreign Office was anxious to avoid antagonizing Rumania, tension between that country and Hungary over Transylvania having reached a new height. The situation was continually being aggravated by frequent incursions over Transylvania of Hungarian photographic sorties with the He 170’s of the Long-Range Reconnaissance Group based at Kecskemét.

Hungary was well able to meet the projected HUBA I personnel requirements by the end of 1940, but equipment was a major stumbling block. The majority of its aircraft were obsolete, and it saw little chance of acquiring the needed number of aircraft, in particular bombers, from foreign sources. Even normal maintenance was a major problem because foreign ordnance and spare parts were not always available in sufficient numbers to guarantee proper service, let alone combat readiness. It also hampered flight and maintenance training. National aircraft production was completely insufficient to cover the needs of the Air Force.

The Hungarian government decided in 1940 that it could not rely any further on foreign aircraft deliveries. It therefore authorized the investment of 790 million Pengő over a four-year period. The sum was to be used to expand Hungarian aviation industry. It furthermore encouraged industry to negotiate contracts with German companies and acquire licenses to build German planes.

Up to the end of 1939, all Air Force units had existed basically as training formations, so that in case of an emergency, only five of the 30 squadrons could in reality be designated as “combat” squadrons. In mid-1940, the training mission was removed from combat units, and training was put under control of the Training Regiment.

The air force progressively phased out the Cr-32 fighter in favor of the Cr-42.

By the end of 1940, the 4/J Group had begun complete conversion to the Ca-135bis bomber. Training equipment was supplemented by the delivery from Germany of the first 35 Arado Ar 96Bs.

MALÉRT, (Magyár Légiforgalmi R.t. – the Hungarian national carrier), ceased operations on 16.01.1941 in accordance with the mobilization plans. Its five SIAI-Marchetti SM 75trimotor transports, staff and personnel, as well as all the equipment were transferred to the Air Force. Filled up with reservists, it formed the independent 1st Parachute Squadron (1. Ejtőernyős Század). Work began immediately to expand the parachute unit to battalion size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Number of Squadrons</th>
<th>Authorized Aircraft</th>
<th>Aircraft on Hand</th>
<th>Aircraft Sidenosed</th>
<th>Aircraft Ready</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Aircraft of the Royal Hungarian Air Force acquired before WWII**

- **Ansaldo A.300**: 1922–25
- **Bristol F.28**: 1922–25
- **Hansa-Brandenburg B I**: 1925–32
- **Bristol Type 183**: 1926–35
- **Udet U 12 Flamingo**: 1926–39
- **KRG Fokker D VII**: 1926–32
- **WM-Heinkel HD 22**: 1927–27
- **WM-Fokker C YD**: 1928–42
- **WM U 12 Flamingo**: 1929–39
- **Junakers A 35**: 1930–2
- **Junakers A 50**: 1930–3
- **KRG-Fokker C YD**: 1930–42
- **Fiat BR 90**: 1930–1
- **Caproni Ca 97**: 1932–35
- **Hungaria I-V**: 1930–39
- **Fiat Cr 20bis**: 1934–36
- **Fiat Cr 20B**: 1934–38
- **WM 16A Budapest I**: 1934–42
- **WM 16B Budapest II**: 1935–42
- **Caproni Ca 101**: 1935–43
- **Caproni Ca 102**: 1935–2
- **Fiat Cr 32**: 1936–42
- **Heinkel He 46**: 1937–43
- **Heinkel He 170A (70A)**: 1937–41
- **Meridionali Ro 37bis**: 1937–41
- **Heinkel He 45**: 1938–41
- **WM 21 Sólyom**: 1938–43
- **Breda 25**: 1938–39
- **Junkers Ju 86K-2**: 1938–43
- **Bücker Bu 131 Jungmann**: 1938–45
- **Messerschmitt Bf 108B Taifun**: 1939–44
- **Fock-Wulf Fw 56 Stösser**: 1939–44
- **Messerschmitt Bf 109D-1**: 1939–3
- **Heinkel He 112B-1**: 1939–3
- **Heinkel He 112 V9**: 1939–1
- **Klemm K125**: 1937–6
- **Klemm K131**: 1937–1
- **Klemm K13**: 1939–5
- **Fiat Cr 42 Falco**: 1939–43
- **Nardi FN 305**: 1939–12
- **Meridionali Ro 41**: 1939–41
- **Meridionali Ro 41B**: 1939–41
- **Caproni Ca 310 Libeccio**: 1939–41
- **Focke-Wulf Fw 55B Werhe**: 1939–6
- **Focke-Wulf Fw 55C Werhe**: 1939–3
- **Caproni Ca 135bis**: 1940–43
- **Dornier Do 23**: 1940–4
- **Arado Ar 79**: 1940–5
- **Arado Ar 96B**: 1940–44
- **SIAI-Marchetti SM 75**: 1940–44

Approximate Aircraft in Bold were produced in Hungary.
By the end of 1940, the Air Force had a strength of 5,734 professional and reserve soldiers.

On 24.12.1940, Colonel László Háry was retired.

The restructuring of the command structure of the Hungarian armed forces on 1.03.1941 meant that the MKHL ceased to exist as a separate service on this date and was integrated into the Army. General (GSC) András Littay was appointed as Chief, Bureau of the Air Force in the Honvéd Ministry.

The Italians tended to be more helpful. However, the problem was that their equipment was simply not as good as that of the Germans. The Hungarians were forced to abandon buying top-quality German aircraft and instead had to import the second-rate Italian equipment. The problem was that Italian airplanes had serious operational weaknesses. Unfortunately, these defects were not immediately obvious, and only tended to come to the fore during actual combat.

It is obvious that in 1941 Hungary lacked modern equipment and suffered from other deficiencies. The reasons, as have been examined in detail, were the poor economic state of the country after the war, the disadvantages of organizing secretly, the preference for Italian equipment, as well as the lack of knowhow in high positions.

Although Hungary had spent 78.5 million Pengő between 1938 and 1941 for importing German aircraft and another 113 million Pengő on Italian aircraft, it had not been able to acquire enough to meet its plans.

On the other hand, up to the beginning of World War II, the Hungarian Air Force had been built up for a limited purpose. It was never intended to play the role of major aggressive force such as those of the world powers. It was conceived basically as a weapon to defend Hungarian air space against its immediate enemies: the Rumanians, the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Yugoslavians. Its other mission was to provide support for the ground forces. In these, the Hungarian Air Force had achieved its goals, as the brief border spats with Czechoslovakia amply demonstrated.

Air Force personnel was well trained, morale was high, and in the upcoming operations the crews would manage to get the best out of their obsolete and semi-obsolete machines.

* * *

### Ranks of the Hungarian Air Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Translation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Altábornagy</td>
<td>Major General</td>
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<td>Tábornok</td>
<td>Brigadier General (to 1941)</td>
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<td>Vezérőrnagy</td>
<td>Brigadier General (from 1941)</td>
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<td>Alezredes</td>
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<td>Órnagy</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Captain</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Zászlós</td>
<td>Cadet / 3rd Lieutenant</td>
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<td>Hadapród Örmester</td>
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<td>Örvezető</td>
<td>Senior Private</td>
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<td>Honvéd</td>
<td>Private / Soldier</td>
</tr>
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CHAPTER 5

The Hungarian River Forces

The Hungarian River Forces

The Imperial Austrian-Hungarian Danube Flotilla

When the Austrian-Hungarian Empire collapsed in 1918, the Imperial Danube Flotilla (Kaiserliche- and Königliche-Donau-Flotilla) was stationed mainly in Hungary. By default, Hungary took over those vessels that were in her territory, which meant that she took over virtually the entire flotilla, consisting of eight armored gunboats, the Czuka, Wels, Stör, Viza, Lacha, Fogas, Barsch, Compó (although a ninth ship, the Bodrog, stayed in Austria), eight armored patrol boats, and 55 miscellaneous unarmored vessels. The nine gunboats were valued at the time at 17.5 million golden crowns, the patrol boats at 9 million, and the rest at a total of 4.5 million golden crowns. Personnel consisted of approximately 1000 officers and men.

As detailed in Chapter 1, Count Mihály Károlyi’s National Council took over the government on 30.10.1918, which then proceeded to turn over the powers of government to the Bolsheviks on 21.03.1919. The Bolsheviks established the Soviet government to the Bolsheviks on 30.10.1918, which then proceeded to turn over the powers of government to the Bolsheviks on 21.03.1919. The Bolsheviks established the Soviet Republic of Hungary. Unfortunately, the Flotilla was also used to fight against soldiers who had turned against the Reds. These were not in fact part of Horthy’s “counterrevolutionary center”.

In November 1919, the Allies transferred all of the fighting vessels in Hungary to the occupying Serbian army, leaving only some tugboats and motor boats in Hungarian hands.

The Treaty of Trianon

After the Serbs returned the ships given to them by the Allies, the Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920 divided the Danube Flotilla between Austria and Hungary. As one of the defeated powers, Hungary was only authorized to use some small force for police duties on the Danube to consist of eight patrol boats, two launches, and ten motorboats.

The Hungarians got the Czuka, Wels, Viza, and Lacha. The Austrians got the other five gunboats. Hungary also received three of the armored patrol boats, the Honvéd, Huszár, and Tüzér. The other vessels were more or less also proportionately divided between Hungary and Austria, although Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia also received a few smaller vessels. The terms allowed the Hungarian “navy” to expand, and the Hungarian ships allocated were four relatively modern patrol boats and four small minesweepers.

The Secret River Flotilla

In 1920 the headquarters for the newly designated River Flotilla was raised. Plans were immediately laid for raising several sunken ships. (Manka, Bácsha, Tanku, and even the ML343, a former British boat). It also proved necessary to repair the vessels returned by the Serbian army, as they had been plundered and severely damaged.

In January 1921, the Hungarians established the Royal Hungarian River Guard, and began training officers and sailors. This new organization was to have a mobilized strength of 5000 men. Peacetime strength was authorized at 1620 men and up to 1800 civilians. However, budgetary problems precluded this number being attained.

As with all other branches of the Hungarian military forces, the River Flotilla existed in secret. It was officially known the Royal Hungarian River Guard, (which supposedly consisted of only river and harbor police units). To maintain the pretense, the River Flotilla was even publicly subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior, and was featured in its budget. On the other hand, its organization, training, (all members received regular military training), and equipment were obviously military, including the vessels of the former Austrian-Hungarian Danube Flotilla. In reality it was part of the Hungarian Army, controlled by the Honvéd Ministry through the River Forces Inspectorate. The Ministry of the Interior, through the Inspectorate of the River Police, in fact only controlled the civilian river police and harbor police units.

In 1922, the Hungarian river forces consisted of the gunboats Szeged, Debrecen, Kecskemét, and Siofok (out of commission), all launched between 1915 and 1918. The Hungarians also operated a number of small auxiliary vessels, among them the armored patrol boats Honvéd, Huszár, and Tüzér; two minesweepers, the Maros and Baja; (the Baja was later renamed Hegyalja), equipped for mine laying and mine sweeping; the steamer Badacsonyi, which was used as a command ship during Flotilla exercises, but otherwise served as a supply ship; the supply ship Körös; the armored tug Csóbanacs; the training ship Csepel, the repair ship Valkán; and the tanker Bukk.

The river and harbor police used about 30 motorboats, four of which were of a larger type (8 to 10 men), armed with a machine gun each.

Reorganization and Expansion

By 1927, supervision by the Control Commission had ceased. The Hungarians proceeded to repair and rearm those hulls that were still available. Economic recovery enabled the purchase from Austria in 1927 of three sister-ships to the boats already in Hungary’s possessed, and renamed them as the Győr (ex Stör), Gödöllő (ex Fogas), and Sopron (ex Compó). In 1929, the Siofok (ex Czuka) was repaired. It was traded to the Austrians for their Barsch, which was promptly renamed Baja. [The original Baja having by then been redesignated as Hegyalja]. After its armor was removed it was converted to a minesweeper. After being repaired and rearmed, Sopron and Gödöllő were launched in 1930.

During period of 1928 – 1930, the River Flotilla was reorganized and expanded. Authorized personnel was increased by 20 percent. The planned number of armored ships was increased to 10, construction of new vessels was started, and a River Flotilla antiaircraft battalion was raised.

The motorized antiaircraft battalion had a headquarters and three batteries, with an authorized strength of 25 officers and 290 other ranks. It was equipped with twelve 80mm guns, 6 heavy machine guns, 15 motorcycles, 4 cars, and 27 trucks. The 1st and 2nd Batteries were stationed in Budapest, the 3rd Battery was at Szeged.

Hungary faced the prospect of defending herself against the combined forces of the members of the Small Entente (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania), who outnumbered her in combined ship strength. The River Flotilla’s mine laying capabilities were consequently emphasized, and the minelayer Máros was launched in 1928.

Starting in 1929, barracks, a supply depot, and a repair workshop were built at Csáky, near the end of the Pest docks.

By 1930, the River Flotilla had reached the strength it would maintain for the rest of its existence, namely 96 officers, 1524 NCOs, 225 ratings; the river police numbered 950, the harbor police 400, the river and harbor police used about 30 motorboats, four of which were of a larger type (8 to 10 men), armed with a machine gun each.
and sailors, 147 government service officials, as well as 128 civilian employees. Its strength at this time was 6 armored ships, 3 minelayers, and 3 armored patrol boats.

1932 – 1941

The national budget did not allow further expansion of the River Forces, so that during the period 1932 through 1938, it was concerned mainly with training.

During the occupation of southern Slovakia ceded by Czechoslovakia in accordance with the 1st Vienna Award of 1938, the Ist Battle Group screened the Army while it was crossing the Danube north of Medvedona. The IInd Group was stationed at Komáröm.

In 1939, a new series of fast, unarmored minelayers was developed by the Laczkovics shipyard in Budapest. A total of 11 boats of the AM type (AM-I – AM-11) were built from 1940 through 1941.

At the same time, Ganz Danuvius shipyard started development of PM type armored gunboats. These fast (36 km/h) boats were well armored (up to 40mm armor plate), and were equipped with two Csaba armored turrets each with one 40mm gun and two machine guns. They were the most modern ships of the Danube Flotilla.

* * *

Ranks from 1918 – 1921 were the old Autro-Hungarian Imperial ranks of ellenengernagy (rear-admiral), and altergernagy (vice-admiral), which were changed in 1921 to vezérkapitány and vézerfökapitány, respectively.

**Order of Battle River Forces**

**Ranks of the Hungarian River Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1921 – 1938</th>
<th>1939 – 1945</th>
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</table>

**River Forces Headquarters**

- Headquarters
- Maritime Administrative unit
- Technical unit
- Training unit
  - River Guard
  - Harbor Police
  - River Police
  - Anti-Aircraft Battalion

**Danube Flotilla**

- Headquarters
- Quartermaster unit
  - I Battle Group
  - II Battle Group
- Minelayer Group
- Auxiliary units
- Motorboat units
- 3 Training Battalions

**Ships of the Hungarian Army River Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.05.1930</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gun Boats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Szeged ... (ex Wels)</td>
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<td>Debrecen ... (ex Lachs)</td>
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<td>Sopron ... (ex Compó)</td>
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<td>Maros</td>
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<td>Baja ... (ex Barsch)</td>
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<td>Hegyalja ... (ex Baja)</td>
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<td>Auxiliary Ships</td>
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<td>Körös ... (ex Liselotte)</td>
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<td>Volán</td>
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<td>Steam Boats</td>
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<td>Gözsbárka I</td>
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<td>Gözsbárka II</td>
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<td>Motor Yachts</td>
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<td>Small Motor Boats</td>
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Part II

The Royal Hungarian Army
1941 – 1945
CHAPTER 6
THE 1941 YUGOSLAVIAN CAMPAIGN

Preliminaries

In his search for mutual security, premier Pál Teleki concluded a treaty of “Eternal Friendship” with the government of Yugoslavia on 12.12.1940. After the coup in Yugoslavia on 26.03.1941 which toppled its pro-German regime, Hitler decided to eliminate Yugoslavia as a potential military threat. During the next few days, an agreement between the German and the Hungarian military was hammered out which provided for the participation of Hungarian troops in the upcoming invasion of Yugoslavia.

The German 2. Armee was to debauch from the Klagenfurt – Graz area and the environs of Nagykamiza. The Hungarians were to take the center. One corps of three brigades was to operate west of the Danube “from a line running from the southwest extremity of Lake Balaton to Barcs on the Drave,” and four corps (three in front, one in reserve) were to advance into the Bácska. The River Flotilla was to cover the flanks, and the Air Force was to stand by for orders. Hungarian operational forces were to be under German command.

The 1st Mountain Brigade and the 8th Border Guard Brigade under the VIII Corps were to be mobilized along the Ruthenian border with Russia in case the Soviets decided to take sides with the Yugoslavians. The Mobile Corps was to be held in reserve.

When the Government met again on 1.04.1941, they were not pleased by Hungary’s deep military commitment. But, as the staff talks had been sanctioned by them, and all agreements had been made in good faith, there was little the Government could do. They did send a note to the Germans to the effect that they would not favor the use of German troops on Hungarian soil against Yugoslavia. The Germans replied that they had already set their troops in motion, and that it was now too late to change anything. They also insisted that the Hungarians join in the attack as arranged. To emphasize their point, they routed German units through Budapest. But, eager to reconcile the Hungarians, Hitler agreed that the Hungarians should retain command over their own troops in the upcoming campaign.

Upon learning of the agreement between the Hungarian and German General Staffs, Premier Count Teleki committed suicide in antonement on 2.04.1941. His suicide note to Horthy read:

Serenely Highness! We have broken our word – out of cowardice – in the face of the treaty of eternal peace, based on the Mohács speech. The nation feels it, and we have thrown away honor.

We have joined the side of the gangsters – not because of a word of the made-up atrocities is true! Not only against the Hungarians, but not even against the Germans! We will become robbers of a corpse! The lowest nation! I did not hold you back. I am guilty.

1941 April 3 Pál Teleki

Bowing to the dictates of the moment, (Count Teleki’s) suicide shocked the people and parliament, and probably secretly relieved by the turn of events, Horthy postponed Hungary’s attack for a few days.

Horthy explained to the very angry Germans that as long as Yugoslavia existed, or as long as the Croats did not proclaim their independence, (and thereby de facto dissolving the Yugoslavian Federation), it would be impossible for Hungary to attack Yugoslavia, or even to participate in any German military action against that country. Hitler indicated his understanding and agreed to the delay. He did insist, however, that the Hungarians prepare to fulfill their obligations when that day came.

So the Hungarians continued making preparations for the day when the Yugoslavian Federation would cease to exist. Strong Yugoslavian units were reportedly gathering in the Bácska, and this was thought by the Hungarians as rapidly becoming a threat to them. In addition, the flanks of the advancing German army would be open. Consequently, Horthy ordered the full mobilization of the Mobile Corps and the IV and V Corps on 5.04.1941. In addition, the Border Guards and the 1st Mountain Brigade were put on general alert. On 7.04.1941, the I and VII Corps were also mobilized.

By 7.04.1941 Hungarian mobilization was complete. Third Army Headquarters, commanded by General Gorody Novák, was designated to command the Hungarian forces, comprising four army corps and the Mobile Corps, (with a total of twelve infantry brigades, two motorized infantry brigades, and one cavalry brigade).

One Infantry Brigade (the 11th) was moved to the west bank of the Danube. Between the Danube and the Tisza a further six brigades were deployed, (instead of the

Order of Battle Yugoslavian Campaign (9.04.1941)

THIRD ARMY
(General vitéz Gorony Novák)
Headquarters: Kiskunhalas
Mobile Corps (Third Army Reserves)
(General vitéz Miklós)
1st Motorized Brigade (Csátalja, Gara)
(General vitéz Major)
2nd Motorized Brigade (Jánoshalma)
(Colonel vitéz Vörös)
1st Cavalry Brigade (Bácsalmás)
(Colonel Veress)
I Corps (Kiskunhalas, Kiskunmaja)
(General Decleva)
1st Infantry Brigade
(General Aggteleky)
13th Infantry Brigade
(General Graf Stomm)
15th Infantry Brigade
(General vitéz Csáthy)
IV Corps
(General vitéz Horváth)
2nd Infantry Brigade
(General vitéz Dömötör)
10th Infantry Brigade (Katymár, Bácsbokod)
(General vitéz Peterdy)
12th Infantry Brigade (Vaskút, Csátalja, Gara)
(General vitéz Torók)
V Corps (Szeged, Kiskunmaja)
(General vitéz Feketehalmy-Czeydner)
14th Infantry Brigade
(General Plathy)
19th Infantry Brigade
(General vitéz Asztalosy)
2nd Cavalry Brigade (Bácsalmás)
(Colonel Vattay)
Reserves:
9th Infantry Brigade
(General Székely)
11th Infantry Brigade (Mohács, Villány, Pécs)
(General vitéz Péchy)
1st Air Force Brigade
(Colonel Bánsfaly)
1st Independent Parachute Battalion
(Lieutenant-Colonel vitéz Bertalan)
16th Border Guard Battalion

River Flotilla (Székszard, Mohács)
(Captain vitéz Tasnády)
The strength of the Hungarian Army on this date was:
18,232 Officers
366,181 Men
99,000 Horses
32,182 Wagons
11,573 Motor Vehicles
The figures include Transport, Railroad Engineer, GbH Artillery, and the Air Defense Command anti-aircraft units.
promised twelve). The VI Corps had not been mobilized owing to the spring flooding in its corps area.

The Mobile Corps was force marched down from the north to stiffen the line, causing no end of problems for the inexperienced supply organizations of the participating units, but proved to be good practice for the next campaign.

After minor skirmishes on the previous day, the Germans invaded Yugoslavia in force on 10.04.1941. In response to the German invasion, the Croatians at once obligingly declared their independence on 10.04.1941, thereby dissolving the Yugoslavia Federation.

The Campaign

Since the Yugoslavian Federation had been officially dissolved, the Hungarians could attack the Serbian (i.e. no longer Yugoslavian) forces in the Baranya Triangle. The Hungarians felt and stated that they were not really invading Yugoslavia anyway, but merely recolonizing portions of Hungary that had been awarded to Yugoslavia by the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. Further, the political situation in the former Yugoslavia Federation prevented the authorities from protecting the Magyars there. The Hungarians viewed the Baranya Triangle as part of the Baranya County, which the Serbs had occupied in 1918. The Bácska was therefore considered historically part of Hungary proper and that the historical border with Serbia were the natural geographical boundaries comprising the Danube and Drave Rivers.

The Yugoslavians did not defend the exposed Baranya Triangle and withdrew the “Osijek” Division across the Drave River. The 11th Brigade occupied the entire area west of the Danube during the next two days, encountering almost no resistance.

At 14:00 hours on 11.04.1941, the Royal Hungarian Army crossed into Yugoslavia between the Danube and the Tisza Rivers. In Bácska, the Yugoslavian “Potiska” Division had left only light defensive forces along the border. These were rapidly withdrawn after initial contact with the Hungarians, but not before blowing up the major bridges in the area and otherwise destroying vital installations.

Hungarian forces spent the remainder of the first day of the campaign preparing for the next day’s advance, clearing small nests of resistance along the border, removing obstacles and repairing bridges.

On 12.04.1941 the 14th Infantry Brigade of the V Corps took Szabadka (Subotica). The same day the Mobile Corps crossed into Bácska and rapidly moved southwards. The Yugoslavians had a second defensive position was based on the Ferencz József Canal, which was held in more strength. The Hungarian paratroopers of the 1st Parachute Battalion landed behind these positions and took the bridges across the canal at Szenttamas and Verbász in preparation for crossing of the advancing Mobile Corps.
The Serbian forces again decided to retreat and the two cities fell to the Mobile Corps. Parts of the Yugoslav Army (mainly Croatians) surrendered at this time to the advancing Hungarian troops. The 10th and 12th Infantry Brigades of the IV Corps occupied Zombor, following upon (w)heels of the Mobile Corps, and also reached the Ferencz József Canal.

On 13. and 14.04.1941, the Mobile Corps advanced further south, but encountered virtually no opposition. A third defensive position in front of Újvidék and Titel was not manned. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade and parts of the 1st motorized Brigade captured Szabadka (Subotica), and advanced upon Topolya, Verbász, and Szenttámás. They then advanced on to Titel and completed the occupied the triangle between the Danube and Tisza Rivers.

Elements of the 1st motorized Brigade advanced along the route comprising Zombor, Kula, Liliomos, and Pincéd. They took part in the fighting at Petroc, and then advanced onto Újvidék/Novi Sad.

Other elements of the 1st motorized Brigade advanced through Bezdán, Monostorszeg (on the Ferencz Canal), and then south along the Danube through Apatin and Gömbös to Gálos.

A joint task force of the 1st and 2nd motorized Brigades started out from Bája, and through to Mohács, where they crossed the borders imposed by the Treaty of Trianon. It advanced to Dárda, crossed the bridge at Eszék, and on to Vinkovci,Sid, and Mitrova.

Units of the River Flotilla cleared the Danube and Tisza Rivers of several mine fields, reached Apatin on 13.04.1941, and sailed on to Újvidék on 14.04.1941. They continued on to Belgrade on 15.04.1941.

By 14.04.1941, the entire Bácska was in Hungarian hands, and the infantry brigades now proceeded to relieve the Mobile Corps. The advance had been rapid and met little or no resistance.

Since 13.04.1941, Hitler had been pressuring Horthy to order the Hungarian Mobile Corps to further assist the German forces by continuing its advance beyond the Drave River, the limit of the claims on territory the Hungarians had. Horthy agreed, thereby negating the initially stated aim of “reoccupying the former territories only for the protection of its Magyars.”

Arrangements were accordingly made to cross the motorized and bicycle troops of the Third Hungarian Army. The joint task force of the 1st and 2nd motorized Brigades crossed the Save River into Serbia and took Valjevo on 15.04.1941.

On 16.05.1941, the brigades advanced via Dárda through the Baranya Triangle. On 17.04.1941, the Mobile Corps crossed the Drave River, captured Eszék, and advanced southeastwards between the Danube and Save Rivers towards Belgrade, taking Vinkovci (Vinkovce), and Sabac enroute. By evening, Valjevo fell into Hungarian hands. Further action was precluded by the Yugoslavian capitulation.

Owing to the rapid and fairly easy conclusion to the Yugoslavian Campaign, neither the I nor the VII Corps were committed into the action.

The two motorized brigades only crossed into Serbia proper to a depth of about 50 kilometers, to Valjevo. The fact that they were used in this way proved that the Germans were able to put pressure on the Hungarians. Certainly, the move was a departure from what the Hungarians had as their stated aims. It was also a question of the Hungarian Army military leaders getting carried away by a chance to get back at the Serbs.

The Aftermath

During the next few days, units of the Border Guards and civilian police forces proceeded to peaceably occupy the one-time Hungarian territories of Muraköz (Medjumurje) and Muravidék in the upper part of Yugoslavia, situated north-east of the Drave River between Hungary and Yugoslavia.

Experiences with Hungarian armored vehicles, which were used for the first time in combat, were generally good; however, too many vehicles required repair after the force march down from the north and a mere five days of lightweight combat.

The Yugoslavian (western) half of the Bánát was not returned to Hungary. It was occupied by the German forces and stayed in German hands throughout the war, as Marshal Antonescu of Rumania had made no secret that he wanted to occupy both the Bánát and the Bécska. He stated that if Hungarian forces took part in taking Bánát, Rumania would attack. So the Germans held the region to prevent Hungary and Rumania from coming to blows.

The Yugoslav agreed to cede the surplus agrarian production of the Bécska to the Germans until the end of the war in return for the possession of that area, and thereby recovered a further 11,500 square kilometers. The 1,100,000 inhabitants of the regained areas increased Hungary’s population to 14,700,000 people.

\[ \begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{KIA} & \text{WIA} & \text{MIA} \\
\hline
\text{Officers} & 7 & 2 \\
\text{Men} & 113 & 223 & 11 \\
\text{Total} & 346 & \\
\hline
\end{array} \]

Resistance

Unlike the reoccupation of southern Czechoslovakia/northern Hungary and Transylvania/Rumania, there was partisan resistance to the Hungarian rule in this region. These partisans belonged to the still royalist Serbian “Chetnik” organizations. These actions started as soon as the reoccupation began. The Chetniks would, for example, shoot at the unsuspecting soldiers after dark who were walking around the town. The Hungarian soldiers, not used to ambushes, would shoot at random in sudden panic. Walking in the streets remained very unsafe for Hungarian soldiers garrisoned in some mostly Serbian towns in Bácска, always risk of becoming targets for snipers.

Under the circumstances, the number of partisans killed after the Hungarian occupation is low. According to Yugoslavian data, the total number of deaths during the Hungarian occupation between 1941 and 1945 was 2,142 persons. The majority of these people died in armed resistance during guerrilla fights, others, mostly Serbian Chetniks, and numerous Hungarian communists, were executed after due process of law.

In the first two weeks of January 1942, the Hungarian Army committed the only proven atrocity in its history. A group of Chetniks were encountered in the marshy areas north of the Danube at Újvidék/Novi Sad. The Hungarian commander, Colonel József Grassy and his superior, General Feketealmi-Czyzdyner overreacted. The Hungarians eventually arrested some 7,000 people, and executed an estimated 2,000 of them for alleged partisan involvement. When General Szombathelyi heard of the atrocities, he ordered an immediate stop to the killings. The Hungarian government began an immediate formal investigation into the matter which brought those responsible to trial on 12.01.1944. It also promised compensation for the victims.

The trial was interrupted by the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944. The same event apparently prevented the Hungarians from paying indemnities to the survivors. Interestingly enough, this was the first war crimes trial of the Second World War.
The 1941 Soviet Campaign

Chapter 7

The 1941 Soviet Campaign

As early as 2.05.1941, the Germans had decided not to give the Yugoslavian half of the Bánát to Hungary until after the Rumanians had achieved their aims in Bessarabia (Moldavia).

Meanwhile, the Hungarians were busily engaged in building roads and fortifications in the east, especially in the Carpathian Mountains. This lead to some rather abrupt confrontations between the Rumanians and the Hungarians, but these were smoothed over by the German Chief of Transport.

Relations between Berlin and Moscow had cooled perceptibly after the successful conclusion of the 1941 Balkan Campaign. On the contrary, political tension increased continually.

As the German invasion of the Soviet Union drew near, the Hungarians were undecided. The military and the politicians of the right wing were all for joining the Germans in the “glorious adventure in the East”, while the more moderate politicians were not really convinced that this was the right thing to do.

Although the Germans had not officially advised the Hungarian military regarding their plans against the Soviet Union, they had a good idea of the German intentions. Besides the fact that the Germans were pushing for improved roads along the border with the Soviet Union, there were, as usual, unofficial contacts between the two General Staffs. As it was, Germany decided not to officially inform the Hungarians of their plans regarding the Soviet Union until the middle of June 1941. Since the Hungarians would need at least twelve days to complete their total mobilization, this in fact meant that as far as the Germans were concerned, Hungary would not participate in the campaign until five or six days after the initial invasion at the earliest. There were serious doubts in Germany whether the Hungarians would participate at all.

Since the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in 1939, Hungary had had a common border with the Soviet Union in Ruthenia, including the area of the Uzok and the Tartar Passes in the northeastern Carpathians. North of this border, the Soviets maintained a strong force estimated at some eight to ten infantry divisions, five to six tank brigades, and one to two cavalry divisions. Consequently, the Hungarian Army kept Border Guard and Mountain units south of this common border at full war strength.

The Hungarians continued to build up forces and fortifications along the Soviet border. Some light antitank guns were also deployed in these new positions.

In conversations between General Franz Halder, the German Army C.O.S., and General Henrik Werth, the Hungarian Armed Forces C.O.S., the Hungarians were requested to further reinforce their military presence south of this common border. General Werth complied, and sent strong Hungarian forces into this area immediately. On 6.06.1941. The 1st Mountain Brigade was moved into the region around Körömzé. The greater part of the 8th Border Guard Brigade was deployed around Volócz, while detachments were dispatched to Uzok and Toronya.

After the German invasion of the Soviet Union began on 22.06.1941, both Hungarian brigades stationed south of the border occupied prepared defensive positions along the Soviet border. The Mobile Corps and the Air Defense Command were mobilized.

Hitler then demanded that Hungary declare war on the Soviet Union. But Hungary was not willing at that time to sever diplomatic relations with Moscow. The Hungarian government based its refusal on Article 3 of the Axis Pact, which Hungary had joined on 29.09.1940. According to this article, all signees pledged to assist each other over all their military, economic, and political might in case of an attack by a non-signer. Since Germany was the obvious aggressor, Hungary did not feel itself bound to assist in the attack against the Soviet Union.

The day after the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, General Halder, German Army C.O.S. summoned General Himer, (German liaison officer to the Hungarian Army), and told him to inform the Hungarians that the Germans would thankfully accept any help the Hungarians offered, as long as it did not interfere with communications to Rumania.

On 23.06.1941, the Hungarian C.O.S., General Werth appeared before the Cabinet and pushed for an immediate declaration of war against the Soviet Union. General Werth had found himself once again in the embarrassing position of having made agreements not in line with the official Hungarian policy, and this time without the implicit approval or consent of Horthy. This time, therefore, the proposal was turned down by the Cabinet. However, General Werth was able to persuade the Cabinet to terminate diplomatic relations with Moscow.

Having been notified of this decision, Viacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, stated that he could understand and sympathize with the pressures that Hungary was being subjected to by Germany, and that if Hungary would remain neutral in the forthcoming conflict, the Soviet Union would support Hungary’s claims in Transylvania versus Rumania. He extended the Hungarian ambassador and his staff all diplomatic privileges and rights for the next eight days.

On 26.06.1941, bombers of uncertain nationality bombed the Hungarian cities of Kassa and Munkács, and strafed a train at Rahó in the upper Tisza valley.

Casualties were said to be 37 dead and 283 wounded. Hungary claimed that heavy material damage had been inflicted. The remains of the bombs were examined. It was alleged that they bore the markings of a Leningrad factory.

It is impossible to determine to this day just what really happened at Munkács and Kassa.

Some sources say that the attack was in actual fact carried out by Soviet aircraft. This assertion is still being heatedly denied by the Soviets in modern times, (after all, the Soviet Union had absolutely no interest in involving another nation in the war against her).

Other sources claim that this raid was carried out by the Germans themselves, and thereby giving the reluctant Hungarian government their casus belli, and involving the Hungarians in the war with the Soviet Union.

There is also the version, current just after the war, that the raid was carried out by disgruntled Czech or Slovak pilots, who, having fled the German and Hungarian occupation, had enlisted in one of the Allied armies.

The latest allegation is that three former Polish PLZ-36 Los bombers, pretending to be Soviet planes, attacked Kassa, Munkács, and Rahó to cause Hungary to
join the war at German instigation. These medium bombers had escaped from Poland to Rumania in 1939 and had been taken over by the Rumanians.

No proof of any of the allegations has been found; the real origin or motivation of the attackers remains a mystery.

Given this provocation, the Hungarian government immediately ordered Hungarian territory and air space be defended with a maximum of force. The armed forces were ordered to fully cooperate with the Germans.

On the day of the bombing Admiral Horthy had gathered General Werth (Chief-of-Staff), Károly Bartha (the Honvéd Minister), and László Bárdossy, (the Prime Minister) to a conference. With their consent, an extraordinary meeting of the Ministers’ Council was then called, and the decision for war was made. The Hungarian government declared war on the Soviet Union on 27.06.1941.

The decision was greeted with great enthusiasm by the Hungarian population. The excesses of the Bolshevik regime in Hungary had left a great fear and hate of Communism, and the presence of Soviet troops in Galicia along the border on the Carpathian Mountains since autumn of 1939 was regarded as very threatening by the populace. And, in June 1941, air raids on undefended cities still evoked the deepest moral indignation.

**Fall Barbarossa**

Responsibility for the security of the Hungarian border where it skirted Soviet-occupied Poland was entrusted to General Ferenc Szombathelyi, the Commanding General of the VIIIth Corps, which had been upgraded to the Carpathian Army Group upon mobilization on 22.06.1941.

The 1st Mountain Brigade, (which had been mobilized on 6.06.1941), assembled its forces around Körösmézi, with detachments at Tiszabogdan and at the Pantyr Pass.

The 8th Border Guard Brigade, (also mobilized on 6.06.1941) with two attached infantry battalions (the IInd and the VIIIth Bicycle Battalions) reinforced by the IIfth/24th Artillery Regiment of the 24th Infantry Brigade (two horse-drawn artillery batteries). Its main body was at Volóc, with detachments guarding the Toronya and Uzok Passes.

The mission of the 1st Mountain and the 8th Border Guard Brigades was to guard the border against possible Soviet spoil-

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**Strength:**

- Officers: 5,550
- Enlisted Men: 89,460
- Horses: 21,265
- Horse-Drawn Vehicles: 3,308
- Motor Vehicles: 5,858

**Carpathian Army Group June - July 1941**
ing attacks. It was also to screen the deployment of the mobilizing Mobile Corps which was assembling in the area encompassed by the cities of Huszt – Tiszabarkut – Marmarossziget. The forces charged with the protection of Hungary’s borders were strengthened. As early as 21.06.1941 additional antitank defenses had been installed, (mainly 47mm antitank guns taken as spoils of war from the Yugoslavians).

The Inspector of the Military Labor Forces (KMOF) had three battalions with a total of twelve companies: 2 road construction companies, 6 mixed technical companies, and 4 mixed technical field companies.

General Belá Miklós, Commanding General of the Mobile Corps, was warned by General Werth that he should husband his armored vehicles, as no replacements would be available. This also applied to the rest of the equipment. Indeed, the Mobile Corps received almost no replacements during the 1941 Russian Campaign.

After mobilization of the VIII Corps, the air defense formations, and certain other units, a total of 215,000 men were under arms in 1941. It is not clear whether this number indicates the total called up or the actual number on active duty.

Hostilities began on 27.06.1941. Patrols in platoon and company strength were sent out. Naturally, clashes occurred, especially in the Tartar and the Verezcké Passes. These encounters were of a tactical nature, both sides feeling each other out. The Soviets, in addition, having an eye on the strong German attacks on Lvov, did not hazard a general engagement.

In retaliation for the supposed Soviet air raids, the Hungarian Air Force bombed the railroad stations at Stanislavov, Kolomea, Stryji, and Nadvorna.

On 28.06.1941, the Carpathian Army Group initiated offensive operations. The initial strategic aim of the Hungarians was to capture and occupy the region containing the cities of Zaleszcezyki, Kolomea, and Stanislavov.

Before these goals could be realized, it was, of course, necessary to first clear the passes in the northeastern Carpathian Mountains, and to capture the important centers of communication in Galicia. The 1st Mountain Brigade and the 8th Border Guard Brigade were therefore charged with the mission of taking these objectives, which included the highland towns of Delatyn, Nadvorna, Dolina, and Skole. Then, depending on the progress of the infantry units, the Mobile Corps’ brigades would be sent through the cleared passes and advance into the region laying south of the Dniester River, known as Zaleszcezyki, or southern Galicia.

The formations of the Carpathian Army Group were to gather, and, depending on the situation, advance on a united front in one of three directions: across the Dniester River upon Tembovja; across the Dniester River, and then follow the northern banks towards Kamenets-Podolisk; or, to advance south westwards between the Pruth and the Dniester Rivers.

The preparations for the deployment of the Carpathian Army Group passed without any significant incidents. The Soviet air force was noticeable in its absence. The infantry and the wheeled motor vehicles were moved by road, the rest, (tracked and tank units, bicycle battalions, mounted regiments, artillery batteries), went by rail to their respective destinations. The Mobile Corps arrived at its ready areas in stages:

- 1st Motorized Brigade, Marmarossziget – Huszt
- 2nd Motorized Brigade, Visovolgy – Raho – Körösmező
- 1st Cavalry Brigade, arrived on 30.06.1941 in the same area as the 2nd Motorized Brigade after this brigade had moved out.

The rapidly developing and successful German attack at Lvov meant that the Hungarian had to move quickly to keep up with the Germans.

The Carpathian Army Group initiated the attack on the morning of 28.06.1941 without waiting for the Mobile Corps to finish deploying.

The Mobile Corps started the campaign with 81 Toldi tanks, 60 CV L.3 Ansaldo tankettes, and three companies of Csaba armored cars. After the campaign was under way, and contrary to General Werth’s threat, a further 14 Toldi’s, 9 Csaba’s, and 5 Ansaldo’s were sent to the front to replace losses.

While the 1st Mountain Brigade secured the heights commanding the Tartar Pass, the 2nd Motorized Brigade advanced through the valley below. The Hungar-
ian made little headway at first in the face of the difficult terrain and the fierce Soviet resistance, which consisted of regimental sized infantry groups reinforced with artillery and mortars.

The Soviets had severely damaged the one and only route assigned to the Mobile Corps: the Körösmézö – Tatarov – Delatyn road. They had also extensively blocked the upper Pruth Valley with deep, wide consecutive mine belts, so that repair, let alone movement through the damaged sections was considerably hampered and delayed by explosions and the mine-clearing operations. Thorough destruction of all roads, railways, and even culverts was encountered for a depth of up to 40 to 50 kilometers inside the Soviet Union. Naturally, in this type of situation, the mobile character of the Mobile Corps could not be exploited; on the contrary, the vehicles proved to be more of a hindrance than a help.

Halder, the Germans C.O.S., in his war diaries, commented on 27.06.1941 that the Hungarian motorized units would not able to pass through the Carpathians without infantry support. He added that the Hungarians should therefore attack along the entire front to strain the Soviet defensive capabilities, and not limit themselves to one or two passes.

As a result of these Soviet activities, the Mobile Corps’ advance was limited to a mere 10 kilometers in four days. It finally reached the heavily defended city of Tatarov in the north east foothills of the Carpathians on 2.07.1941, which the 1st Mountain Brigade had just managed to take on the previous day.

After these initial difficulties, the Mobile Corps, spearheaded by the 2nd Motorized Brigade, was able to deploy onto the Stanislavov plains, and took Delatyn on 2.07.1941. As the Soviets were by now in full retreat, and more and more bridges were falling intact into Hungarian hands, the Mobile Corps could finally begin to prove its worth.

Halder comments in his diary, somewhat unfairly, that on 3.07.1941 the Hungarians were still fighting at the mountain pass exits, and had still not progressed very far eastwards. This was probable referring to the previous days’ events. The Carpathian Army Group had not formed until 30.06.1941. In any case, crossing the Carpathians in three days against hostile opposition is in no way slow.

Although the main body of the Mobile Corps encountered no actively resisting enemy after the fall of Tatarov, the weather continued to be atrocious. The unceasing rains had turned the already poor Soviet (or Polish) roads into virtual mud baths, and the streams into raging torrents. Although the roads and railway network was existent from the days of the Austrian-Hungarian hegemony, they had been sadly neglected since 1918, when Austria-Hungary was defeated by the Allied and Associate powers and this area had fallen into Polish hands.

These road conditions, and the lack of adequate transport caused by the dearth of motor vehicles, hampered supply operations right from the first day of the campaign. This problem was by no means ameliorated when the Hungarian forces advanced further away from the Hungarian border.

The Mobile Corps took Kolomea on 3.07.1941, and Horodenka was cleared of the last rear guards on 4.07.1941. The Dnyester River was reached between Zaleszyki and Michelicze on 5.07.1941.

Meanwhile, the northern arm of the Carpathian Army Group, the reinforced 8th Border Guard Brigade, had also advanced into the Soviet Union. Thanks to the quick advance of the infantry battalions through the Verecke Pass, the Hungarians were able to capture the railroad tunnel passing under the border intact, and to occupy most of Beskid on the first day of hostilities. Although the Soviets launched several strong counterattacks, the Border Guards were able to successfully hold these vital objectives.

The right wing of the 8th Border Guard Brigade, (reinforced IInd Bicycle Battalion), operating through the Toronya Pass, encountered strong Soviet resistance in front of Vyazkov, but was able to outflank the Soviet units there and forced their retreat, thereby allowing the attacking Hungarians to capture Vyazkov on 29.06.1941.

While this southern detachment was so engaged, the main body of the 8th Border Guard Brigade advanced down the Orava River valley, encountering strong Soviet resistance, but still occupying Skole on 30.06.1941.

On the same day the VIIth Bicycle Battalion, operating 50 kilometers to the
north of the main body, crossed the Uzok Pass, and made contact with the southern flank of the neighboring German forces of the German 17. Armee at Turka, after also encountering strong resistance there.

The right wing of the 8th Border Guard Brigade advanced to Dolina and met up with the VIIIth Bicycle Battalion. Both battalions then advanced on Stanislavov, which was occupied on 5.07.1941, reached the Dynezer River at Nizniov the same day. The next morning, the IInd Bicycle Battalion crossed the river and established a bridgehead on the other side. On 7.07.1941, the other bicycle battalion of the Border Guard Brigade crossed over into the bridgehead. The same day, both bicycle battalions advanced to Tuuste.

The occupation of Tuuste on 7.07.1941 with a halfway intact bridge was a fortunate stroke of luck. It enabled the 2nd Motorized Brigade, which had just arrived at the Dynezer River that day, to achieve a surprise crossing over the only partially destroyed bridge at Zaleszezyki.

The unexpected appearance of Hungarian bicycle troops to the rear distracted the Soviet soldiers long enough for the motorized brigade to make its crossing in strength, and to establish a bridgehead on 7.07.1941. The rapid advance of the bicycle battalions had brought them a long way from the 8th Border Guard Brigade, and consequently these two battalions were assigned to the Mobile Corps. The next day, the other two brigades of the Mobile Corps began to cross over into the bridgehead.

The 1st Motorized Brigade departed its peacetime garrisons in Budapest after completing mobilization on 30.06.1941.

Crossing through the Tartar Pass on 2.07.1941, and traversing the only partially repaired roads through Tatarov and Mikuliczyn, the 1st Motorized Brigade caught up with the Mobile Corps near Kolomea and Sniatyn on 5.07.1941. The 1st Motorized Brigade’s first mission was to provide cover for the southern flank of the 2nd Motorized Brigade, which was engaged in operations at Zaleszezyki and Horodenka. The 1st Motorized Brigade was in Mobile Corps reserve, and so not involved in any fighting during this phase.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade finished detaining in the area around Körösmező and Bokut on 2.07.1941, where its motorized and bicycle units were already waiting.

The 2nd Motorized Brigade crossed the river at Zaleszezyki on 7.07.1941 with noteworthy losses. The 1st Motorized Brigade followed a day later, and advanced as far as Tuuste on the Sereth River on the same day. On 9.07.1941, the 1st Motorized Brigade crossed the Zbrucz River at Skala, the old Polish border into the Soviet Union.

Although the other (foot and bicycle) units of the Carpathian Army Group had achieved magnificent examples of marching, and had proven their elite standing in the Hungarian Army by repeated feats of exemplary combat, the motorized and cavalry brigades were just so much faster once they got out into the open, that they were now far in advance of the slower leg units.

Although the meeting was peaceful, the large Rumanian forces during the campaign.

During the early morning hours the Soviet stronghold of Bersad, defended by two Soviet infantry divisions. The assault was supported to the north by the VII. Armeekorps and to the south by the advancing Rumanians. During the early morning hours the Soviet stronghold of Bersad, defended by two Soviet infantry divisions. The assault was supported to the north by the VII. Armeekorps and to the south by the advancing Rumanians.

The 8th Border Guard Brigade, being a unit designed only as a mobile reserve for the static border defenses, had no supply trains and was forced to rely on what support it could get from the Carpathian Army Group headquarters.

In view of this disparity in speeds, it was decided to dissolve the Carpathian Army Group on 9.07.1941. The less mobile infantry was assigned to clearing up the rear areas bypassed by the mobile elements of the Army Group, and to securing the lines of communication. The 1st Mountain and the 8th Border Guard Brigades were left behind the II Corps headquarters. The 8th Border Guard Brigade was assigned to the area around Kolomea and Horodenka. The 1st Mountain Brigade was assigned the area including Stanislavov and Buczacz.

The Mobile Corps was assigned to the 17. Arme of the Heeresgruppe Süd.

The 2nd Motorized Brigade occupied the town of Kamenets-Podolsk on 10.07.1941. On the same day, the 1st Motorized Brigade advanced into the region of Smorezy – Landskron – Balin.

The hard rains continued to be the main obstacle in the Hungarians’ two-week advance across the muddy Polish plains and the rough Ukrainian roads. The difficult supply situation was already beginning to take its toll of the motorized units. In the Ukraine, even the cavalry was relatively useless, and the sick quota for horses was starting to rise. The troops and animals could have used a pause, and the vehicles maintenance.

Instead, the German High Command decided that the Hungarian Mobile Corps would continue the advance, and was assigned to the 1. Panzer-Gruppe by the Heeresgruppe Süd.

To enable the Mobile Corps to recover a little, but yet still keep up the pressure, the Corps commander put the 1st Cavalry Brigade into the lead. The Hussars advanced with their traditional elan, and moved deep into the Soviet lines in the direction of Zwanczyc. Advance elements of this brigade entered that city on 13.07.1941, and on that same day occupied Kurilova.

The 1st Motorized Brigade arrived in Rogoza at the Bug River on 21.07.1941, and established a bridgehead on the east side of the river. Upon the arrival of the cavalry brigade, the 1st Motorized Brigade turned the bridgehead over to the Hussars, and then proceeded to destroy the Soviet troop concentrations around Pecsara during the period of 21. – 22.07.1941, and to capture the city. The 2nd Motorized Brigade entered Szikov late on 22.07.1941, and took Kopijevka on 23.07.1941.

On 23.07.1941, the rest of the Mobile Corps reached the Bug River. The Mobile Corps had achieved its first objective.

The 17. Armee ordered the Mobile Corps to advance along the Bug River to Gaiworon, then to follow the railway line as far as Olviopol. It was to take the latter city without delay, and to hold it until the 1. Panzer-Gruppe arrived from the north. This move would complete the encirclement of Soviet forces at Uman.

In accordance with these instructions, the motorized brigades took Tulcsin on 24.07.1941. The 1st Cavalry Brigade followed as the second wave. On 25.07.1941, the 1st Motorized Brigade took Trostianczyc, and the 2nd Motorized Brigade Gordijievka.

On 28.07.1941, all three brigades of the Mobile Corps were ordered to attack Bersad, defended by two Soviet infantry divisions. The assault was supported to the north by the VII. Armeekorps and to the south by the advancing Rumanians.

After the late evening hours the Soviets managed to make good their escape, and the city fell into Axis hands without a shot being fired. This was the first encounter between Hungarian and Rumanian forces during the campaign. Although the meeting was peaceful, the Germans quickly inserted a German division between the two uneasy allies.

By 30.07.1941, the Mobile Corps had reached the line Golovanevsk – Ladyshinka – Uman, and was therefore in position to complete the last portion of the encircling arms of the Axis around Uman. There remained a gap of 40 kilometers to the south of Uman.
On 1.08.1941, the 1st Motorized Brigade crossed the Bug River at Gajworon without encountering any enemy resistance. The Mobile Corps followed with the 1st Cavalry Brigade and the 2nd Motorized Brigade. By 2.08.1941, the 1st Motorized Brigade threw the last remnants of the Soviet rear guard out of Losovata. On 4.08.1941, the 1st Motorized Brigade took Olviopol.

On 5.08.1941, the 1st Motorized Brigade occupied the river crossings for a length of some 50 kilometers along the northern river bank of the Bug. It then faced north to block the Soviets retreating from Uman.

The 2nd Motorized Brigade was at Besad – Dzulinka as Corps reserve, with orders to advance upon Pervomajsk and assist the 1st Motorized Brigade if necessary.

To the north of Pervomajsk, the 101. Leichte Infanterie-Division and the 257. Infanterie-Division were providing flanking cover at Josefpol.

The Soviets retreating from the north were contained by the 1st Cavalry Brigade. The 2nd Motorized Brigade was quickly marched to Golovanevsk, and took the Soviets in the flank. At the same time, the VII. Armeekorps (100. and 101. Leichte Infanterie-Divisionen) set off westwards, providing the other half of the encircling pincers. The battle ended with the total defeat of the Soviets. The encirclement had held. The Hungarians had done their part well, and the Soviets at Uman were forced to surrender on

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**Losses of the Mobile Corps**

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<th>27.06. – 3.08.1941</th>
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<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Men</td>
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<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
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On 6.08.1941 the 1st Cavalry Brigade, occupied the river crossings for a length of some 50 kilometers along the northern river bank of the Bug.
8.08.1941. Coordination between the Hungarian and German armies was good, as most senior officers had started their careers in the Austrian-Hungarian Army, and therefore spoke German well.

On 9.08.1941, the 1st Motorized Brigade was ordered to cover the Bug River banks between Pervovajsk and Konstantinovka. Assigned to the XXXVIII. Armeekorps (mot.) on 9.08.1941, the brigade also took on the sector of the 16. Infanterie-Division (mot.), i.e. to secure the area between Alexandrovka and Woroneszersk. However, the very next day, the 1st Motorized Brigade was sent into the region southwest of Vosjatskoye.

The Battle for Nikolayev

On the evening of 10.08.1941, the German XXXVIII. Armeekorps (mot.) received orders to break off its southward course and turn the mission of capturing Nikolayev over to the Mobile Corps. The Mobile Corps thereupon assumed the mission of advancing upon, and taking, Nikolayev.

Unfortunately, the Mobile Corps’ lack of fuel marred an otherwise flawless operation. The Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler Brigade, and the rest of the Mobile Corps were attached to the XXXVIII. Armeekorps (mot.) for the duration of the mission. The corps was given the name Kampfruppe Kemf, the 16. Infanterie-Division (mot.), although also assigned to the XXXVIII. Armeekorps (mot.), was designated as OKH reserves and could therefore only be used with German OKH permission.

On the morning of 12.08.1941 the XXXVIII. Armeekorps (mot.) launched its attack. The 16. Panzer-Division and the LSSAH-Brigade moved east and then south, taking Novy Bug, Novo Poltavka, and Novo Georgiyevka by evening. The Mobile Corps advanced south between the Bug and Ingul Rivers.

But by early afternoon the Corps was halted. Owing to the delay caused by the changes in the Axis dispositions, the enemy had had one full day to regroup and receive reinforcements. The Soviets had about two full-strength divisions facing the Mobile Corps, and were well dug in and screened by large mine fields. They offered tough resistance. The 1st Motorized Brigade was forced to withdraw 5 kilometers to Suchoj Jelanez to regroup. The exact status of the Mobile Corps was not clear during the initial part of the operation. It appears that communications between the Mobile Corps and the Germans were not functioning as they should.

The Hungarians had only a few radios, and these operated on different frequencies than those of the Germans. Communications depended on motor-cycle messengers, mounted dispatch riders, and in some cases, even couriers on bicycles.

Several counterattacks against the 1st Motorized Brigade positions in Suchoj Jelanez were beaten back. The 2nd Motorized Brigade took Troyizkoye at dusk, but made no further gains that day.

On 13.08.1941, the 16. Panzer-Division and the LSSAH-Brigade advanced south along the flanks of the Soviet positions, taking the railroad station at Sasesleje, the airport of Nikolayev, and advancing up to the very outskirts of Nikolayev itself. The encircled Soviet forces offered tough resistance. The 2nd Motorized Brigade managed to take Hill 91 east of Kasinemovka, but the 1st Motorized Brigade was once again forced to withdraw to its positions at Suchoj Jelanez. It was the first time that the Hungarians encountered enemy tanks, and the Soviet armored thrusts coming from Petrosvoky were well supported by infantry and artillery.

The Mobile Corps attacked with both motorized brigades on the morning of 14.08.1941. By evening, the enemy had been driven back behind the Sebino – Petrosvoky line. The Soviets were gathering their forces at the Ingul River crossings in an attempt to break out eastwards. During the course of the 14.08.1941, elements of the XXXVIII. Armeekorps (mot.) attacked Nikolayev.

The rapid advance of the German XXXVIII. Armeekorps (mot.) had left both flanks unprotected. The east flank was particularly threatened by the enemy-held city of Cherson. On the west flank, the forces of the 16. Panzer-Division and the LSSAH-Brigade were hard pressed to cover all the gaps. This precarious situation forced the Mobile Corps to send in its reserve.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade was sent south to close the gap. The bicycle battalion occupied Balazkoye, while the cavalry secured Peski and Christosorovska to the west.

On the morning of 15.08.1941, the situation for the Mobile Corps had improved somewhat. The motorized brigades were able to make some progress southwards. The 1st Motorized Brigade reached Peski from the west by noon, while the 2nd Motorized Brigade was able to clear the region north and northwest of Sebino. The strongest resistance was encountered along the banks of the Ingul River, where the enemy had been squeezed into a narrow space by the Hungarian advance from the north and the German forces of the east banks. Naturally, the 1st motorized and 1st Cavalry Brigades were only able to advance slowly through this area. Towards evening, the 1st Motorized Brigade had reached the outskirts of Ingulka and Peresadovka. A determined attack by the entrapped Soviet forces at Dantzig was able to penetrate the thinly held Axis lines and portions were able to make their escape to the east.

The XXXVIII. Armeekorps (mot.) entered Nikolayev from the east on 16.08.1941, and the occupation of the city was virtually complete by the next day. The 2nd Motorized Brigade advanced from Sebino to the outskirts of Nikolayev. The 1st motorized Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Brigade were engaged during the early in heavy fighting through the streets of Ingulka and Peresadovka against morning the Soviet rear guards. Both towns were taken during the day.

During the period 17. – 24.08.1941, the Mobile Corps regrouped and rested.

The Last Phase

On 25.08.1941 the three Hungarian brigades were assigned the mission of guarding the southern flanks of the Heeresgruppe Süd. The 17. Armee was at this time approaching the Dnieper River, and secure flanks would enable the Germans to turn north and participate in the Battle of Kiev. The Mobile Corps set off towards the Dnieper some 450 kilometers east.

The positions assigned to the Hungarians along the Dnieper were some 200 kilometers wide. To defend this sector, the Mobile Corps had sixteen battalions, (of which some were only at 35% strength), and 20 artillery batteries. The three reconnaissance battalions were Mobile Corps reserve, and are not included in the above figures. This meant that the battalions each had approximately a front of 12.5 kilometers to defend.

While the 1st Motorized Brigade occupied positions on both sides of Nikopol, the 2nd Motorized Brigade defended the stretch opposite Saporosje. The 1st Cavalry Brigade in turn occupied the area between the two motorized brigades. The Mobile Corps was in its allotted positions by 30.08.1941.
The Mobile Corps fought suffered considerable personnel losses.

The losses of weapons and equipment had also been severe, ranging from 50% in some units to 80% in others.

During the ensuing six weeks the Hungarians beat back continuous attempts by the Soviets to establish bridgeheads back across the Dnieper.

On 06.09.1941 the Mobile Corps withdrew the 1st Motorized Brigade from around Nikopol. A German infantry unit replaced it. The 1st motorized Brigade’s removal from this sector reduced the Hungarian lines to 150 kilometers. The 1st Motorized Brigade was inserted north of the 2nd Motorized Brigade, and the latter unit in turn had now to defend a narrower section, reinforced by its sister unit. Facing the Hungarians, the Soviets had three divisions alone at Kamenka, (opposite Nikopol) – the 30th Cavalry, the 98th Rifle, and another rifle division. At Saporoshje, the Soviet forces were even stronger.

The successful defense of the Dnieper River by the Hungarians was a measurable contribution to the German victory at Kiev, and the Germans were not stinting of their praise.

By 10.10.1941, the Mobile Corps had taken an additional 700 casualties, bringing the total up to some 2700. The Mobile Corps had sent 700 sick back to Hungary. The same amount of sick still with the Corps also numbered about 700, meaning that the Corps was down to less than 50% of its effective strength. Although the Hungarians received almost no replacements for lost or destroyed equipment, captured boots was used extensively, so that the Hungarians did not suffer a loss in firepower.

The atrocious road conditions in the Soviet Union soon caused the bicycle batallions to dismount. These same conditions often resulted in these troops having to push their bicycles, so that they lagged behind even the regular infantry. On 19.08.1941, General Werth had recommended in a memorandum to the government that the Hungarian nation should increase its participation in the war, as now the time was obviously ripe to deal the final crushing blow to the Soviets. Premier Bárduossy, taking this as an unwarranted and unlawful usurpation of power by the military as a good excuse, (the military was supposed to stick to soldiering, and leave the decision-making to the politicians), demanded General Werth’s resignation: in lieu of which, he tendered his own to Horthy. Bárduossy considered it to be to the country’s disadvantage to contribute more than it was already contributing.

General Werth was replaced by General Szombathelyi as the new Hungarian Armed Forces C.O.S., the former commander of the now-disbanded Carpathian Army Group.

The replacement of the Chief-of-Staff of the Hungarian General Staff was accompanied by a change in policy. The Hungarian government became even more reluctant to contribute further to the war effort, and showed a tendency to be increasingly concerned with the withdrawal of those forces from the Soviet Union.

Apparently, Hungary’s government felt that her soldiers had done their bit towards the war against the USSR. Also, the war was considered virtually won, and the elite Mobile Corps was desired back in Hungary to carry out any possible military operations against the Romanians, who, at this point in time, were still considered the main enemy of Hungary.

The military attack on Budapest was approached on 3.09.1941 with a request for the recall of the Mobile Corps. Advised by the attaché of these wishes, General Halder dismissed this request on the grounds that the Hungarians were no worse off than many German units. He also backed his opposition on the grounds that there were sixteen Rumanian divisions on the East Front, and that the Rumanians were complaining about the small Hungarian contingent. The Rumanians had voiced the opinion that Hungary was reserving its strength for a different objective, such as the invasion of southern Transylvania.

Although the request for the recall of the Mobile Corps was rebuffed, the Regent received an invitation to visit Hitler at his headquarters in East Prussia.

Soon thereafter, Horthy arrived in the company of Premier Bárduossy and C.O.S. General Szombathelyi. During the discussions that followed at the Wolfschanze on 8. – 9.09.1941, the main theme harped on by the Hungarians concentrated on the presence of the Hungarian forces in the Soviet Union. In the walkthrough of the German General Staff Headquarters with Horthy and his retinue, there ensued a heated discussion regarding the Mobile Corps’ withdrawal. The new C.O.S. indicated that the Hungarian forces should be reserved for Hungary’s mission in the Balkans.

The Mobile Corps commander was of the opinion that it was high time for someone else to carry the burden, as the Mobile Corps had done enough. Halder agreed that the supply problem was a major cause for the Mobile Corps’ reluctance to continue on the front. It was suggested that the Corps be left at the front only until the campaign was finished.

Horthy rejoined with the argument that with some 50 – 80% equipment losses, the Mobile Corps was practically worthless for continued operations, and, as leg infantry would also be lost in the wastes of the Ukraine, it would be impractical to send any other sort of troops. The talks ended with a compromise suggested by Hitler: it would be agreed to let the 1st Cavalry Brigade, (the most affected), be withdrawn immediately. In return, the Hungarians were to provide four infantry brigades for occupation and security duties. After the arrival of these four brigades at their destinations, the remainder of the Mobile Corps, as well as the 1st Mountain and 8th Border Guard Brigades would be allowed to withdraw.

The Cavalry Brigade was no longer mounted. The horses could not be used as they suffered considerably from the cold weather and many animals had developed saddle sores. The main cause for this development was that only about a third of the horses in each squadron were cavalry mounts. The rest were farm animals conscripted upon mobilization into the Army in early 1941, and were not used to being ridden at all, let alone over 2000 kilometers within a period of three months. In addition, the strength of the squadrons was down to 70 to 80 on foot out of the original mounted 300 men. Most of the other men were spread out along the recently traversed 2000 kilometers, charged with the care of the sick horses which had had to be left behind.

Since Germany was still making progress on the East Front, and had all the confidence that it was about to win the war against the Soviet Union, no serious objections were raised by Halder to this proposal. He discussed the withdrawal as an accomplished fact after this time.

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<th>Losses of the Mobile Corps</th>
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<td>458</td>
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<td>Total: 1964 casualties</td>
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Chapter 7  The 1941 Soviet Campaign

The Mobile Corps after the September 1941 Reorganization
The Mobile Corps was reorganized in September 1941. The Cavalry Brigade was dispatched back to Hungary, taking with it the horesed elements (cavalry regiments and the horse artillery) with it. The non-equestrian units and remaining motor vehicles were left behind, enabling the two brigades to motorize their bicycle battalions. On the other hand, the personnel losses the brigades had suffered prevented the battalions from being full strength, so that they only had two infantry and one MG company each. The Mobile Corps took all the remaining tanks and put them under command of the 3rd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion.

On 12.10.1941, under heavy torrential rains, the Mobile Corps crossed the Dnieper River at Dnieperopetrovsk, and joined the German advance on Izium on the Dnese River. The 1st Motorized Brigade lead the advance, with orders to approach Rosdent-Venskoye on the Donez via Novo-Moskovsk. The 2nd Motorized Brigade was to advance on the Donez River south of Izium via Pavlovgrad. The Mobile Corps could only move slowly over the muddy, and in some cases, nonexistent roads. Only cross-country and tracked vehicles could use the roads effectively. Towards the end of the advance, even these vehicles got stuck, and the advance was continued on foot as far as Izium.

The Soviets had established two bridgeheads south of Izium, and these were destroyed during three days of hard fighting. (19 – 21.10.1941) This enabled the Mobile Corps to arrive at the Donez River as the first Axis unit on 28.10.1941. However, the Soviets still held Izium itself. Before the Soviets could be driven out of the city, winter set in. Overnight, the temperatures plunged to 18° Centigrade below zero. Both sides settled down to a sort of trench warfare.

General Miklos left his troops there, and flew back to Hungary. He felt it was his duty to inform the government in Budapest that the Soviet “adventure” had miscarried, and that the withdrawal of the Mobile Corps should have the highest priority. He returned to the Mobile Corps with orders and transportation clearances, (as well as the blessings from the Germans), for the return of the Mobile Corps to Hungary.

On 10.11.1941, both the motorized brigades were relieved and sent back to Dnieperopetrovsk. The German General Staff had bowed to the facts. After a four and a half month odyssey, the Mobile Corps was so far under strength that further commitment would have been folly, particularly as virtually no replacements were available in Hungary.

### Summing Up

By 15.11.1941, the Mobile Corps had suffered 3,000 casualties, while all the Hungarians in the Soviet Union had lost more than 8,000 men.

The Hungarian Mobile Corps advance into the Soviet Union proved only one point: that the sense of duty, discipline, comradeship and extraordinary courage of the Hungarian officer corps and soldiers could prevail over a much larger and better equipped enemy.

The Mobile Corps had travelled over 1800 kilometers from the Carpathian Mountains, reporting that equipment losses included 28 artillery pieces and 1200 motor vehicles. Attrition of armored fighting vehicles was heavy: 86 Toldi light tanks of the original 95 and all of the 65 Ansaldo CV tankettes were unserviceable. Over 90% of the Csaba armored cars had major defects.

All armored vehicles, (Ansaldo tankettes, Csaba armored cars and Toldi light tanks) were recovered, but their repair and re-fitting would take over a year.

The Mobile Corps took 17,000 prisoners. The 1st Motorized Brigade alone accounted for over 8,000.

Transportation back to Hungary began on 6.11.1941. The last train to arrive in Hungary reached Szolnok on 5.01.1942.

The German General Staff had high praise for the outstanding achievements and tactical victories of the mechanized corps which had fought for five months in a long campaign. Yet these victories were too costly not only to the Mobile Corps itself but also to the whole Hungarian nation. On 27.11.1941, during the Premier’s visit to Germany, Hitler told Bárdossy that the Mobile Corps had fought well, and that it had richly deserved the period of rest and recovery now allotted to it. He sent Horthy the Large Gold Cross of the Order of Holler as a token of Germany’s gratitude.

Upon only one occasion did the commander of the Mobile Corps, Major General Béla Miklos, have the opportunity to make an independent decision, (at the same time refusing to obey the instructions of von Runstedt). After the Battle of Kiev on 19.10.1941, the commander of the 17. Armee ordered the Mobile Corps (down to the strength of six battalions) to break through the Russian defenses, which had once before successfully repelled the attack of several German divisions. General Dalnoki-Miklos, instead of breaking through, planned and performed a maneuver which led to the encirclement of the superior Soviet forces and opened up the road for the continuation of the Axis advance.

The Hungarian Government’s will to participate in the Soviet “adventure” had been severely diminished. Initial expectations of a short, swift, and inexpensive campaign in the East had been crushed.

Participation in the campaign had been based on a combination of other factors as well. The Hungarians had wanted to believe German propaganda; they had a serious dislike of Communism (based on their own experiences in Hungary after WWI); and, they feared that Germany would favor Rumania politically after the war if they did not cooperate in the war against the Soviet Union, which would probably result in Hungary losing the territory regained from Rumania (Transylvania) and Yugoslavia (Bánát).

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<td>273</td>
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<td>Total:</td>
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CHAPTER 8
THE 1942/43 SOVIET CAMPAIGN

Preliminaries

In December 1941, Great Britain declared war on Hungary, thereby ending all Hungarian hopes of limiting its involvement in the war to the Soviet campaign. Great Britain also recognized the exile Czech government in London, and recalled its endorsement of the 1st Vienna Award.

Many Hungarians now believed that there was now nothing left but to fully commit themselves to the Axis cause and hope that they would win the war.

Horthy saw things differently. He firmly believed in the ultimate victory of the Western Allies. But he was convinced that they would not want a Communist-dominated East Europe after the war, and that Hungary could keep the West’s sympathy (if not outright support) although (or because) Hungary fought against the Soviet Union.

Horthy now openly and officially abandoned the policy of maximum military participation in the war which he had only been pretending to follow during the preceding months. He was resolved to implement a new policy to conserve forces, i.e., of minimum participation. His reasoning was based on the need to keep Hungary’s army intact, so that when the war ended, Hungary could “solve the problems of the Carpathian basin” (i.e. Rumania/Transylvania) and “undertake a leading role there”.

In a memorandum dated 4.01.1942 from Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, Chief-of-Staff of the OKW to von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister, the Germans outlined what was expected of Hungary in the future. In addition to the Mobile Corps, Hungary was expected to contribute the major part of her armed forces to the “great common cause”.

The German military attaché was ordered to keep Horthy posted of the situation on the Eastern Front, and also to influence him into participating in the 1942 Soviet Campaign.

Horthy, on the other hand, wrote to Hitler in a letter dated 10.01.1942 that Hungary could not send all her armed forces to the East Front as some of these units were needed for defensive purposes.

General Szombathelyi (the Hungarian Chief-of-Staff) supported the German request for fuller cooperation. In a memorandum to Parliament he suggested that it should not make an issue of how many units be sent, as otherwise Hungary would find itself at a disadvantage at the peace conference at the end of the war. Instead the equipment for those forces Hungary was to send to the East Front would be a better topic for discussion.

After the experience that the Hungarian Parliament had had with General Werth’s (the previous C.O.S.) suggestions, General Szombathelyi’s suggestions were given little heed.

Generalfeldmarschall Keitel demanded five army corps (with 15 light divisions), the Mobile Corps, the 1st Mountain Brigade, and a further seven divisions for security duties. This was rejected out of hand. The Royal Hungarian Army just did not have that many formations.

(A result of having units on paper that had no real or even possible existence. The Germans were apparently well informed about the Hungarian personnel potential, but had totally failed to consider the lack of equipment.)

Interim

On 1.10.1941, the Hungarian General Staff had devised a new concept for the structure of the Army. It called for the four mechanized brigades to be reorganized into two armored divisions and one mechanized cavalry division (the latter preferably organized with tanks and motor vehicles). The lessons learned from the combat experiences of the Mobile Corps during the 1941 Soviet Campaign had convinced the Hungarians to organize their armored formations more along German lines.

The armored vehicles required for this new plan were:

- 191 Turán medium tanks
- 204 Toldi light tanks
- 36 Nimrod antiaircraft vehicles
- 54 Csaba armored cars

Contracts for the vehicles were placed with the Hungarian industry.

In November 1941, the Hungarians began to make serious attempts to place orders for German equipment for the three mechanized divisions as foreseen by this plan.

The General Staff recommended the dissolution of the cavalry brigades, as the 1941 Soviet Campaign had clearly demonstrated that cavalry was no longer suited to modern warfare. All sabre companies were to be converted to bicycle units. Admiral Horthy vetoed this plan, pointing out that Hungary had a long cavalry tradition. On the contrary, he ordered the establishment of a cavalry division.

Delays in tank production, as well as the major problems encountered with the motorization of the Army forced the General Staff to abandon the idea of raising a mechanized cavalry division. Upon the insistence of Horthy, the creation of a horse cavalry division as of 1.10.1942 using the two cavalry brigades was ordered. The 6 infantry battalions and 6 artillery batteries of the II Corps earmarked for reorganization and integration into the mechanized division were told to stand down and resume normal training.

On 1.10.1941, the Army raised six tank battalions – the 31st and 32nd independent Tank Battalions, the 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, and 4/1 Tank Battalions – from bicycle battalions to be equipped with Hungarian-built Toldi and Turán tanks.

In Spring 1942, a seventh, (the 1st Cavalry Tank Battalion), was raised from the 16th Bicycle Battalion.

Only a few Toldi light, and no Turán medium tanks, were available, but the cadre could begin training. Personnel were drawn in the Spring of 1942 from all tank battalions to raise the 30th Tank Regiment for the 1st Armored Field Division.

All infantry brigades of the Hungarian Army were renamed as light infantry divisions on 17.02.1942. The redesignation did not entail any change in size or organization.

Upon the departure of the 1st Armored Field Division, the equipping of the 2nd Armored Division received priority. The skeleton of the 1st Armored Division that remained in Hungary could only be equipped with some training equipment and tanks.

On 1.10.1942, the mobile and armored formations of the Army underwent a major restructuring.

The Mobile Corps was reorganized as the 1 Armored Corps and assigned the two armored divisions.
The 1st Tank Regiment was raised at Esztergom and Kenyérmező, using the 2nd Infantry Regiment as a basis. It was assigned the 1/I, 31st, and 2/I Tank Battalions. The 31st was redesignated as the 1/I in 1942.

The 3rd Tank Regiment was raised at Cegléd. It was assigned the 3/I, 32nd, and 4/I Tank Battalions. The 32nd was redesignated as the 3/I in 1942.

Preparations

After lengthy discussions, much arm twisting, and outright blackmail, by such German heavies as the Reichs Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and the Wilhelm Keitel, the OKW Chief of Staff, the Hungarians were “persuaded” to send an expeditionary army of three corps and one armored division to support the German 1942 campaign in Soviet.

The three corps that were selected to go were the III Corps (Szombathelyi), the IV Corps (Fécs), and the VII Corps (Miskolc). But, in order to spread out the sacrifice, personnel and equipment were drawn from all parts of the country. Three of the Corps [V Corps (Szeged), VI Corps (Debrecen), and IX Corps (Kolozsvár)] were left untapped in order to leave an adequate force along what was considered the main threat to Hungarian security, the Rumanian border, particularly in the Székely Corner.

The first calling-up notices, applicable to all men between 19 and 30 years of age, went out on 24.03.1942. It was calculated that the troops would need about five weeks’ training with their new weapons and equipment before they would be combat ready.

As training facilities were limited, mobilization was staggered. This allowed the newly mobilized troops to be given refresher courses and training. Mobilized units consisted for the most part of reservists recalled to active duty, as well as new recruits who had been called to the colors by the mobilization orders from the different Corps Areas.

The sub units of the light divisions also came from all over the country. Because of this, the composition of these regiments is a headache for any researcher, as battalions did not belong to the regiments, but were instead assigned to them merely for the campaign. (E.g. the 51st Infantry Regiment had the III/31st Battalion, I/54th Battalion, and III/54th Battalion assigned to it, instead, as one would suppose, the I, II, and III/51st Battalions). The same applied to independent companies and logistics units.

Again, this was done so as not to upset the economy or interfere with the harvest, as would have been the case if whole divisions had been called up intact from within each Corps Area.

Obviously, commanders that had to provide the cadres and equipment from their regiments did not send their best. Then, of those cadres that were sent, Second Army headquarters weeded out those with special knowledge or skills, those excluded through age, those with social privileges, and sent them back to their own units or training facilities. This weeding out eliminated almost all the good, experienced troops, and left but the fragments to work with. Consequently, training and equipment, (to which the elimination principle had been applied in a similar manner), of the newly formed units were not of the highest quality.

Indeed, the divisions sent to the East Front were comprised of green troops, all with virtually no military experience. Considering that some of these divisions were fated to march to the front, (covering a distance of some 1000 kilometers), with a marching duration of over six weeks, it is amazing that these units arrived at all, let alone in any condition to fight.

The Germans remembered the outstanding performance of the Hungarians in World War I, and, more recently, of the Carpathian Army Group, and therefore proceeded to use these Hungarian “divisions” in accordance with this idea, with disastrous results.

The training received by the soldiers of the 1st Armored Field Division was also sparse. Indeed, there was no special inspectorate in Hungary for armored forces at this time. Field grade officers were not trained in armored, let alone combined arms tactics. The men assigned to the 1st Armored Field Division (with the exception of those from the units of the old 1st Motorized Brigade), had no idea of mobile combined arms tactics, so that the majority of the men were badly trained in armor tactics or combined arms concepts.

Hungary sent 38 junior officers and 120 enlisted men to Germany (Wunsdorf) for armor training. Only these few officers and NCO’s had any idea of what to do with tanks, and even their knowledge was based on a mere eight week course the use of tanks. This short training period barely allowed the men enough time to get to know each other and their new equipment. This small cadre would have to train the rest of the men in the field under combat conditions.

Neither maneuvers on any scale larger than battalion level nor combined-arms exercises ever took place. It is unfortunate that this conglomeration, in some cases of badly trained units, received the name “armored division”, as it was then thought of and used as one. In actual fact, it was a combination of a tank regiment, (without enough training in the tanks the crews received), and an infantry regiment, plus miscellaneous support units attached. The infantry was unarmored, the tanks, (when they were finally delivered) were totally outdated and completely inferior to Soviet armor. After its arrival at the east Front, the 1st Armored Field Division was reorganized.

The commander of the Second Army was a personal friend and trusted confident of the Regent Horthy, the one-time Chief of the Military Advisory Committee, General Gusztáv Jány.

Although an Air Force contingent had not been part of the discussions concerning Hungarian participation in the 1942 campaign, the Hungarians decided that some kind of aerial support would be needed, and organized the 2nd Field Air Force Brigade to accompany the Second Army into Soviet.

The first echelon of the Second Army, loaded on some 215 – 225 trains, consisted of the Second Army Headquarters, part of the 2nd Army supply trains, the III Corps Headquarters with corps troops, the 6th, 7th, and 9th light Infantry Divisions, and IV Corps troops. It began to leave Hungary on 11.04.1942. The first echelon was detrained mostly in Kursk, Orel, and some units were deposited at Vorosba Logov, to be marched 60 – 100 kilometers southeasterwards into their new positions between the German 2nd and 6th Armies, approximately 60 kilometers south of Kursk. The 6th light Infantry Division, however, was off-loaded 260 kilometers west of Kursk, to be used in anti-partisan operations.

On 30.05.1942, the second echelon departed from Hungary. In 315 – 325 trains, it comprised the IV Corps with the 10th, 12th, and 13th light Divisions, as well as VII Corps troops.

The upcoming offensive demanded enormous supply stocking by the Germans, so that transport capacity originally assigned to the Hungarians was allocated elsewhere and the Army units were detrained at Gomel. By the time they reached the new Hungarian positions along the Don River, the IV Corps with its three divisions had marched over 1000 kilometers.
The Second Army (as mobilized in April 1942)
The third echelon comprised the VII Corps, with the 19th, 20th, and 23rd light Divisions, the 1st Armored Field Division, the remaining Second Army troops, as well as the ground units of the Air Force components. It left Hungary on 19.06.1942, and detained at Kursk.

Railroad capacity bottlenecks caused all motorized elements of the 1st Armored Field Division to be detained far westwards of Kursk. The motor vehicles were forced to drive to the front, over 2000 kilometers away.

All in all, between 11.04. – 27.07.1942, the Hungarians sent some 215,000 men (including 32,000 in the military labor battalions) of the Second Army to the East Front, transported in 882 trains of 55 wagons each.

While the Hungarian Army was still arriving in dribs and drabs, the German 1942 Soviet Campaign (Fall Blau) got under way. The Hungarian units that had arrived were assigned to the 2. Armeekorps, which was redesignated as Armeegruppe Weichs, (after its commander, Generaloberst von Weichs). The Armeegruppe consisted of the Second Hungarian Army, the 2. Armeekorps, and the 4. Panzerarmee.

The Germans launched their ill-fated offensive against the Soviets on 28.06.1942.

At this time, the Hungarian contingent at the East Front consisted of the newly-arrived III Corps Headquarters, with the 7th and 9th light Divisions, some III Corps troops, as well as some elements of the armored division. These units were grouped with two German divisions under the VII. Armeekorps, with General Jány in command. Some time later, the 6th light Division also made its appearance on the scene. The III Corps had left Hungary equipped with Hungarian arms. Upon its arrival at the East Front, the men were issued German arms, but were given no time for familiarization or training. In addition, although Hitler had expressed concern, but had done nothing, about the Hungarian antitank capabilities, no such guns were issued.

The initial Hungarian advance through the but lightly held Soviet lines was slow. The green troops were exposed for the first time to strong enemy resistance, and they finally advanced after some difficulties, managing to take Tim in cooperation with the 16. Infanterie-Division (mot) on 2.07.1942. The city of Staryi Oskol fell into Hungarian hands on 4.07.1942.

The advance continued at a more brisk pace after this, and leading elements of the III Corps reached the Don River on 7.07.1942. There, the rest of the main body of the Second Army arrived at the river three days later, taking over security duties from the 19. Panzer-Division. In ten days, the Hungarians had advanced 160 kilometers.

The equipment promised by the Germans now began to arrive: for the armored divisions, Pz.-IV, Ausf. F1 (with short 75mm guns) and Pz.-38(t)’s, as well as some 47mm antitank guns captured from the Belgians. For the infantry, small quantities of light guns, trench mortars, and light antitank guns, (some of German manufacture, others captured French and Belgian material). For the latter, the stocks of ammunition were low. In order of their priorities, the Germans had given the best material to the Rumanians.

In due time, the other corps as well as the GHQ troops of the Second Army arrived, including the air support forces.

The Hungarians barely had enough time to establish adequate defensive positions behind the Don River before the Soviets counter attacked across the river. The Soviet forces were able to regain three bridgeheads across the Don on the west side of the river. These were at Uryv, Karotyak, and at Stutye. These bridgeheads were approximately 30 – 50 kilometers wide, and constituted a grave potential danger to the flanks of the German forces advancing south into the Caucasus.

1st Battle of Uryv

The initial attempt to clear the Uryv bridgehead started on 18.07.1942. The Hungarians, operating for the first time with elements of the newly-arrived 1st Armored Field Division, (wheeled vehicles having also arrived by this time), successfully cleared out the area around Uryv, and pushed the Soviets into the small bend of the Don River to the north of Uryv.

The Hungarian tankers were not in awe of the Soviet T-34 tanks, and had learned well from the German instructors. When the T-34’s stopped to fire, cannon smoke blinded the tank crew, so that the Hungarian tankers could attack from the sides and rear, and thereby managing to destroy 21 Soviet tanks without any losses of their own.

Unfortunately, the attack had to be discontinued, as the Germans had not yet resupplied the Hungarians with ammunition for their new tanks. A few days later, on 6.08.1942, the Soviets counter attacked and retook all the lost terrain.

After this setback, the III Corps was ordered to attempt a further assault on the Soviet bridgehead.

2nd Battle of Uryv

The Hungarian attack started early on the morning of 10.08.1942, but soon petered out in the face of well-organized and tough Soviet resistance. The Hungarians were again forced to return to their starting positions (after taking over 1400 casualties in the period of a few hours).

If there is any doubt about the willingness of the Hungarians to take losses, or to fight for an objective, this figure alone should ease such misgivings. It must in all fairness be said, however, that the Hungarians were for the first time encountering organized resistance, and were as yet barely blooded. The green troops consequently took higher casualties than a veteran unit in the same situation would have done. But, this does not disqualify bravery of the troops, the effort, or the conclusion to be drawn from the facts.
Chapter 8: The 1942/43 Soviet Campaign

Second Hungarian Army

Area of Operations 1942 – 1943
In September 1942, an additional 10 Pz-III and 10 Pz-IV, Ausf. F2 (with the long 75mm guns) were delivered to the Hungarians by the Germans.

Meanwhile, the Hungarians were making preparations to eliminate one of the other bridgeheads in the sector, namely Karotyak.

### 1st Battle of Karotyak

The first attempt to clear these bridgeheads took place at Karotyak. The Soviets had recently managed to penetrate the defenses of the 10th light Division at Karotyak forcing this division to withdraw. The IV Corps was assigned the mission of rectifying the situation, and, if possible, eliminating this pocket of Soviet resistance. The formations of the corps had just arrived after marching 1200 kilometers to the front and was just barely recovering. It was allocated the 1st Armored Field Division and the 12th light Division for this mission. In support was the IV Heavy Artillery Battalion.

At 06:00 hours on 7.08.1942 the IV Corps launched its attack. By evening the 1st Armored Field Division and elements of the 12th light Division had reached the Don River at the northern limits of the town, but the eastern part of the town, the elbow in the Don, and the railroad to the south of the river remained in Soviet hands. Soviet aircraft flew over the battlefield day and night in large numbers. They could initially only be countered by light infantry weapons, as the corps and divisional antiaircraft units had not yet arrived.

Meanwhile, the Soviets had also broken through the Hungarian lines in the III Corps sector on 8.08.1942 and the 1st Armored Field Division was withdrawn.

The departure of the 1st Armored Field Division meant that there now was a large gap on the left wing of the 12th light Division. This weakness was soon discovered by the Soviets who immediately began to move their troops forward through the breach against the Hungarian artillery positions. The Hungarians were forced to throw in most of the artillery crews of the battalion, leaving just enough men behind to fight, but not move, the guns. By dint of an enormous effort, the artillery men managed to halt the enemy before it reached their positions.

The arrival of the 12th Anti-Aircraft Battery of the second day and the IVth Anti-Aircraft Battalion on the fourth curtailed Soviet aerial activities to a large degree.

On 10.08.1942 Germans reinforcements arrived in the form of an infantry and an artillery battalion. The attack was halted momentarily.

The experience for the green troops proved to be of enormous value and the attack was probably initiated at this early date to give the divisions the needed taste of battle.

### 2nd Battle of Karotyak

The 2nd Battle of Karotyak lasted approximately three weeks, from 15.08. through 3.09.1942, and involved the 10th and 13th light Divisions, as well as the 1st Armored Field Division.

The three divisions were supported by numerous GHQ troops from both the German and Hungarian armies. After the final drive, supported by German artillery and a German infantry division, the Soviets were thrown out of the bridgehead.

### 3rd Battle of Uryv

Meanwhile, the third attempt to clear the Uryv bridgehead began on 9.09.1942. This third attempt against Uryv was to be planned and organized by the Germans.

The XXIV. Panzer-Korps, commanded by General von Langermann was put in charge of the operation, under the assumption that a German-lead attack could obviously only but succeed where a Hungarian one had failed. Hungarian units consisted of the 7th, 12th, 13, and 20th light Divisions supported by the 1st Armored Field Division and one German division. After initial gains, the advance stalled. Although the combined Hungarian and German forces battered at the Soviet defenses and the battle was pressed without letup, the attack failed to achieve its aims. Both sides took enormous casualties. On 13.09.1942 the attack was broken off. The Hungarians were left to fortify the area surrounding the bridgehead and seal off the Soviets.

### Stuty Bridgehead

The third bridgehead within the Hungarian positions was Stuty. Apparently, neither the Hungarians nor the Germans attached much importance to this area, as no major attacks were initiated against the Soviet positions within this bridgehead. This was to prove a fatal mistake in the future.

### Quiet before the Storm

By the middle of September 1942, the Second Army had assumed a defensive position all along the Don River, while the Hungarians began preparing their positions for a winter defense.
Second Army losses during 28.06. – 15.09.1942: 911 officers and 20,710 men.

From mid-September until January 1943 the Hungarian sector was quite. There were, of course, the usual small raids against enemy positions to gain information, and patrols to keep the troops on their toes, but otherwise the Hungarians settled in for a spell of trench warfare.

Losses for the Second Army from 24.04. – 1.10.1942 consisted of 1,100 officers and 29,000 men (15% of the total of 209,000 men). These casualties fell 89% on the infantry, 4% on the artillery, and 7% on the other arms. Officers made up 20% of the total casualties.

Logistics

Besides of keeping their expeditionary army of almost a quarter of a million men up to strength, the Hungarians also wanted to raise a force for “Home Defense”. This, according to an order issued by General Szombathyeli in July 1942, was to consist of “220,000 men, fully armed and equipped”. This twofold effort was beyond Hungarian capabilities, and resulted in a series of compromises which did not fulfill either objective properly.

The manpower problem as such could be mastered. Training them proved to be more difficult.

Originally, it had been planned to raise completely new units in Hungary, train them, equip them, and then send them out in so-called “march battalions” to the front. They were to relieve a like battalion there, which was to return to Hungary and form the backbone of the Home Defense Army.

It was possible to do this for those units that had been in the field since 1941, (i.e. the security divisions), which were rotated by this system by late spring 1942, and replace them with completely new units. But the Second Army wastage was much higher than had been anticipated (Officially, the figure was given as 14,500 up to 19.08.1942; another 13,332 became casualties by 9.01.1943). In addition, the Defense Ministry was finding it difficult to call up more men for military service without seriously disrupting the economy.

What remained to be done was done: the gaps were filled. No Second Army units were relieved. In October 1942, twelve march battalions (about 12,000 men) were sent to the front. As there were not enough rifles, they were marched off mostly un armed. (Officers were issued with pistols to ensure discipline. General Jány decided to train these men behind the line. They were only just being sent forward to the lines to carry out the relief when the Soviets broke through the Hungarian lines in January 1943, incidentally overwhelming these replacements along with the others.

German reports of masses of Hungarian troops fleeing to the rear without arms can in large part be attributed to these unfortunate troops arriving to relieve their comrades just at the moment that the Soviets were breaking through the Hungarian lines. That these unarmed and inexperienced troops were in panic cannot be doubted.

Two additional ad-hoc formations (the 1st and 201st Security Divisions) had to be sent east for the occupation forces, so that the Home Defense Army was still far below its targeted strength by the end of December 1942. Furthermore, no relief for the men at the front had been possible. The troops were exhausted and dispirited.

The situation in Hungary regarding equipment was no better. The barrel had been scraped to supply the Second Army. General Jány stated in 1943 that the Second Army had taken “three-quarters of all Hungary’s arms, motor-vehicles, and aircraft!”. Consequently, losses of arms and equipment proved to be a far heavier burden, militarily speaking, than that of manpower. Throughout the fall, Hungarian production was not able to do much more than replace the wastage of rifles, pistols, and ammunition. This left practically nothing for the Home Defense Army. Heavier equipment was not in production at all. The aircraft program was only just starting. In 1942, only prototypes were being produced.

The Germans could not be relied upon. They were prepared to replace the wastage of the Second Army at the front, as they had agreed to do; but, after Hungary’s refusal to their proposals of cooperative production, they flatly refused to supply any heavy equipment for the Home Defense Army.

Hence, by late Autumn the Home Defense Army was also badly under equipped. The antagonistic attitude of the Romanians (returned in full by the Hungarians), as well as a Soviet air raid on Budapest had awakened further interest in Home Defense. General Szombathyeli, under strong pressure at home, allegedly stated “not a nail for the Don”. This was later put more explicitly: “articles which are needed for the material outfitting of the Home Defense Army are not to be sent to the Second Army or to the occupation troops.” Even so, the Home Defense Army was “only half equipped” by late December 1942.

Logistics for the Hungarian forces on the East Front had been arranged with Field Marshal Keitel during the negotiations with the Hungarians in the Fall of 1941 and Spring of 1942 which resulted in the Second Army being sent to the East Front. Hungary was to send to Germany the same amount of supplies as the German army issued to the Second Army and the security forces. In addition, Hungary would send to Germany an equal amount of oil as the German fuel depots issued to the Hungarian forces in the field. The object of this exercise was to ensure that the supply situation would be standardized for all the forces in the field, and yet that Germany would not come out on the losing side of the exchange.

Owing to this agreement, neither the Hungarian General Staff nor the Second Army were able to exert any direct influence upon the supply situation at the front. Many changes had to go through channels from the Second Army via Hungary to the German General Staff, which then issued orders, if any, to the German transport and supply units in Soviet

Naturally, the further away the Hungarians got from Hungary, the more involved the logistics situation became. The main supply route was the Soviet railway system, operated and controlled by the Germans. This was a major handicap as the Soviet rail gauge was wider than that of the standard European one, (1.51 versus 1.43 meters). Tracks had to be relaid before the railway could be used by trains coming from Europe. In the beginning, most supplies had to be reloaded at transfer points. As the system was not very efficient, there were considerably more supplies coming in than going out of these points.

In addition, partisan activities were on the increase, attacks being made on the supply system, in particular the railway system between Kursk and Kiev, in the Briansk Woods.

Initially, the Second Army was supplied through the railhead at Staryi Oskol. The VII Corps began to receive its supplies via Ostrogosk by the fall 1942. By late 1942, owing to an increase in railway capacity, the IV Corps could also be supplied through Ostrogosk. However, the destruction left behind by the retreat of Soviets lowered the efficiency of this particular stretch to about 35 – 40% of its normal capacity. This still did not solve the problem of how much supplies were to get to the front, as 80% of Hungarian transport was horse-drawn. During the
summer months, this was a minor problem. Although the Second Army had repeatedly warned the Hungarian High Command that the reliance upon horse-drawn supply would lead to disaster in the fall and winter, the Second Army received no more motorized supply columns from Hungary.

After repeated requests from General Jány, the Germans finally provided one motorized transport column of a theoretical capacity of 250 metric tons. But the poor condition of the trucks provided by the Germans only allowed a capacity of about 130 tons.

This column operated mainly in the III Corps area. The initial condition of the trucks as handed over, as well as the Hungarians’ lack of maintenance units, (the 1st Armored Field Division had barely enough maintenance companies, the Second Army had only one GHQ company, and the Germans had not provided any), soon brought this limited capacity down even further. The burden of supplying the major portion of the Second Army soon took its toll, and the number of operational vehicles diminished steadily, so that by winter the same old problem existed as before. By Christmas 1942, 66% of the trucks provided initially were unserviceable for one reason or another: 10-20% were in Second Army workshops being repaired; and of the remaining vehicles, only half were available for service at any one time owing to the winter weather conditions.

Although the question of provisions had apparently been settled in the spring by both nations, as indicated, problems were encountered in the field.

The difficult situation regarding supplies soon led to the Hungarian troops acquiring their provisions locally – either through requisitioning or outright stealing.

General Jány was aware of the overall situation, and several times pleaded with the Hungarian Government to send supplies directly as well, as the Germans – although having promised to provide for the Hungarians – were themselves also hampered by the same transportation problem as the Hungarian forces. Especially after the initial Soviet attack on 19.11.1942 against the Rumanian and German forces in and flanking Stalingrad, and the subsequent breakthroughs in the sectors of the 3rd and 4th Rumanian Armies, the supply situation for the Hungarians deteriorated rapidly. The Germans were obviously using all available transport capacity to transfer troops and material to the endangered areas.

The Hungarian needs received secondary consideration.

During November 1942, only two of the promised sixteen supply trains arrived. To top off this critical situation, the Hungarian soldier had quite different ideas regarding the type and consistency of the food that he should be issued. General Jány demanded that the Hungarian government supply bacon, fat, spices, and strong spirits to supplement the German rations, as this was the only way to motivate the Army soldiers in winter.

After energetic efforts on the part of the Honvéd Minister Nagy, the supplementary rations finally started to arrive at the Staryi Oskol supply depots on 14.12.1942. By this time, the transport situation had deteriorated to such an extent, that these supplements could only be issued to combat troops; in addition, support troops had their rations cut drastically. This proved to be the only way to keep the combat forces in any condition to fight.

Towards the end of December 1942 and at the beginning of January 1943 the supply situation normalized to some extent. However, only the rear supply depots were filled as the lack of running motor vehicles prevented transportation to the front line units. The situation was deeply appreciated by the Soviets when they captured the depots a few weeks later.

In addition to the various ration problems, there existed the matter of horse fodder. As the Second Army had over 60,000 horses in the field, this in itself was a major requirement. Although hay could be gathered in some quantity during the fall around Alexeyevka, much of the sector assigned to the Hungarians was rough steppe, and not a bountiful source of hay. For winter fodder, such as oats, the Hungarians were completely dependent on the German supply system. What applied for the victualling deficiencies for the troops applied doubly for that of the horses. As late as December 1942, the Second Army had not received one single shipment of fodder. Horses died by the hundreds. Improvised fodder, such as wheat, had to be utilize instead.

The immediate area behind the front could not provide fodder. As late as December, the Second Army had to send the horses some 150 kilometers to the rear, west of the Oskol River. Naturally, when the Hungarians withdrew as a result of the Soviet offensive in January 1943, there were no teams to pull the artillery, the equipment wagons, the heavy weapons, or any other horse-drawn equipment.

The low number of motor vehicles meant that the scarcity of fuel that plagued the Germans was not particularly critical during the summer months. After reaching their positions along the Don River, the problem did arise. The 1st Armored Field Division needed more training. Major exercises were staged. Naturally, this type of endeavor required a lot of fuel. At the onslaught of winter, the cold was such that the motors of all vehicles had to be kept running when temperatures dropped below a certain point, as otherwise they could not be started and the armored division could not fulfill its reserve function.

The situation deteriorated to such an extent that there was insufficient fuel to stage a counterattack in case of a Soviet breakthrough. There was not even enough fuel at the beginning of December 1942 to transport the division’s requirements of fuel and ammunition to the front.

When this situation was reported to the Germans, they reacted for a change. Fuel supplies soon began to arrive, and by the first week of January 1943 there were 2 million liters of gasoline at the fuel depot at Ostrogosk. This would be enough for the armored division to mount a counterattack in case of a Soviet offensive.

The Hungarians were not prepared for the extraordinary cold, (as was the case with all Axis forces on the East Front for the first time). Although the Germans had agreed to supply the Second Army, the one exception had been clothing. Uniforms were to be supplied directly from Hungary.

As in most matters of supply from Hungary, winter clothing was not forthcoming. Even summer clothing was in short supply. On 11.09.1942, 30% of all summer clothing was due for replacement, 30% was badly worn, and 40% was not wearable at all. One can imagine what kind of appearance the average Army trooper must have provided at the time, and could have done nothing to help improve the image that the average German Landser had of his comrades-in-arms. To alleviate the dilemma somewhat, all summer clothing in good condition belonging to the wounded being sent to the rear was requisitioned and reissued to the combat troops.

Just before the Soviet offensive began, the Quartermaster General of the Second Army reported that no winter clothing had reached the troops at all. Furthermore, 75% of the tunics, 40% of the footwear, 50% of the trousers, and 75%
of the underwear actually being worn by the troops was in an (obviously theoretical) unusable state. Naturally, this state of affairs lead to an abnormally high rate of sickness and frostbite. Immediately after this report was sent off to Hungary, the first (and last) train with winter clothing arrived from Hungary. But again, this clothing was stored at a depot, and not distributed to the combat troops owing to the lack of transportation.

When the Soviets broke through later the same month, the depot was fired, but not before several freezing Hungarian soldiers had been executed for taking winter boots from this depot.

Both the German and the Hungarian governments begrudged the Second Army arms and equipment. The severe environmental conditions also imposed extraordinary difficulties. To the Hungarian soldier, the extremely inefficient supply services of both nations appeared to have as their primary mission that absolutely nothing arrived at the Hungarian front. A Hungarian colonel noted that the equipment and the clothing were of very poor quality, and that the supply system was disorganized. The rifles could not fire more than three or four times, and the mosquito nets were distributed in November 1942.

The result of this was that the troops had few weapons with which to defend themselves, and that even their clothing and equipment was miserable, totally inadequate to cope with the bitter Soviet winter. The troops at the outset had been anything but picked men, and by now were exhausted and dispirited. Every rank and file was untrained sappers, pioneers, or construction engineers. To assist the situation by sending the military construction engineers. To assist the situation by sending the military was moved into the line by an artillery battalion and some engineering troops, was moved into the same area. The jäger-Abteilung was attached to this division to provide the antitank support. In October 1942, the 168. Infanterie-Division was moved into the same area. The 559. Panzerjäger-Abteilung was attached to this division to provide the antitank support. The 429. Infanterie-Regiment, reinforced by an artillery battalion and some engineer troops, was moved into the line facing the Uryv bridgehead, between the 110. Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung; the 2. Panzer-Armee was to release the 26. Infanterie-Division, General der Schnellen Truppen Hans Cramer was appointed commander, and designated General-Kommando zu besondere Verwendung Cramer (“Corps Cramer for special purposes”). Corps Cramer was to be used as the reserve. It consisted of the 1. Armored Field Division, 168. Infanterie-Division and 26. Infanterie-Division (the latter still en route), the 559. Panzerjäger-Abteilung, the 700. Panzer-Verband, and the 190. Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung. It comprised some 30,000 men, and 110 Pz-38(t), 22 Pz-IV, 32 Sturmgeschütz III.

Defenses

A brief glance at the map shows that the Axis lines were situated behind what appears to be a formidable natural obstacle, i.e. the Don River. In actual fact, this was not the case. The Don is indeed a wide river, (100 – 150 meters wide in the Hungarian sector, with some places as wide as 400 meters), but it was wadeable at most places. The current was sluggish, and the river bed sandy. The arrival of freezing weather should have enhanced the defensive character of the Don greatly. The ice forming on the river could bear only the weight of infantry and light loads. Unfortunately the Axis forces had not been able to eliminate the two Soviet bridgeheads, so that the Soviets were able to cross the river at these points without due interference by the Axis forces.

The construction of defenses in the Second Army’s sector had been begun as soon as the first Hungarian troops had reached the Don River.

After the fighting for the two remaining bridgeheads had died down, this construction increased in pace. It had been obvious from the beginning that serious obstacles stood in the way of the fortification of the main line of resistance. The wood available in the area was soon all used up. Wood would have to have been then been brought up 150 kilometers from the Oskol River Valley. As the provisions situation was just barely being taken care of, the likelihood of using the scarce transport for hauling wood over this distance was exceedingly remote. In addition, there were not enough sappers and pioneers and little building equipment or supplies available.

General Jány stated that, since Heeres-Gruppe B expected the Second Army’s preparations for the defense to be ready soon, and since the actual work had just barely begun, it behooved the Hungarian leaders to do something about the situation. General Szombathelyi responded to the situation by sending the military labor battalions to the front. These forces were perfectly adequate for digging trenches and chopping wood, but they were not trained sappers, pioneers, or construction engineers. To assist the military labor forces and the punishment battalions to improve the meagre defenses, the local population was drafted. It proved impossible to house and feed these extra people, and this project was abandoned.

When the ground froze towards the end of October 1942, fortification work was still incomplete along most of the Hungarian front. Only those sectors facing the Soviet bridgeheads were completed. Such military luxuries as barbed wire, mines, and other technical materials were not available in any quantity, and their emplacement was to continue in short bursts of activity as small quantities infrequently arrived during the winter. The available guns had been dug in and sited for direct fire, but over 60% of them had no teams available to pull them. The horse-drawn divisional ammunition trains were 150 kilometers behind the front because of the sudden situation. For this and other reasons, batteries were limited to 3 – 5 rounds per day. In addition to the logistics worries the artillery faced, the Hungarian shell cases were made of iron, and frequently jammed the guns. German cases were made of brass, and were more flexible, enabling the cases to be loaded or ejected even if slightly damaged.

The result was that the Hungarians did not have a defense in depth. The infantry had no alternate trenches or fortifications to withdraw to or launch a counter-attack. (This was not because of a lack of training, but for a lack of manpower). The same applied to the artillery, which also lacked alternate prepared positions and had no means of moving back even if these positions had been available.

Axis Dispositions

In autumn 1942, the only reserves of the Second Army was the 1st Armored Field Division, located behind the center of the Hungarian front, west of Uryv.

In October 1942, Heeresgruppe B ordered the 1st Armored Field Division relocated to the area immediately behind the seam between the Second Hungarian and the 8th Italian Armies. Although General Jány protested vigorously, he was overruled. Jány maintained that the armored division’s Pz-38(t) tanks needed ample time to warm up their engines and hydraulic systems in the prevailing temperatures, and that their positioning immediately behind the front would be disastrous as the armored division could not get its fighting vehicles into action before being overrun in case of an attack.

In the 168. Infanterie-Division was moved into the same area. The 559. Panzerjäger-Abteilung was attached to this division to provide the antitank support. The 429. Infanterie-Regiment, reinforced by an artillery battalion and some engineer troops, was moved into the line facing the Uryv bridgehead, between the 110 and 114 Corps.
Second Hungarian Army
and its immediate neighbors 11.01.1943
During the lull following the Soviet attack on the southern sector of the 8th Italian Army, the 1st Armored Field Division and the 700. Panzer-Verband were able to repair most of their damaged and sidelined vehicles. The 1st Armored Field Division had also managed to accumulate a reserve of 2,000,000 liters of gasoline at Ostrogorsk.

The 30th Tank Regiment of the 1st Armored Field Division had the following combat ready armed fighting vehicle strength on 12.01.1943:

- 41 Pz-38(t)
- 16 Pz-IV [8 Pz-IV(F1) & 8 Pz-IV(F2)]
- 9 Toldi light tanks

On the same date, the 700. Panzer-Verband reported:

- 17 Pz-38(t) combat ready
- 8 Pz-38(t) in company repair shops
- 20 Pz-38(t) in rear area maintenance
- 5 Pz-38(t) not serviceable.

In addition, there were 18 armored cars in the 3rd Company.

The 190. Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung had 32 Sturmgeschütz III.

The 559. Panzerjäger-Abteilung had 12 self-propelled and 24 motor-towed heavy antitank guns (75 mm).

By 25.12.42 General Jány was no longer in any doubt that the Soviet sledgehammer would soon fall on his army. Reconnaissance flights proved fruitless, as the bad weather was hardly appropriate for flying, let alone for seeing anything on the ground.

General Cramer, after touring the Hungarian positions, concluded that the concept developed by Heeresgruppe B of moving the mobile reserve north from its present position was not practical, as the cold weather would hinder a rapid move. Unfortunately, the attempts at changing the situation were rejected by the OKH.

On 3.01.43, probing attacks were fended off in both the Second Hungarian and 8th Italian Army sectors.

On 5.01.43, a radio message was intercepted. It said that “the concert was about to begin”. And indeed, local Soviet patrols and operations ceased in preparation for the big attack.

Although the German Army High Command (OKH) was aware of the danger to the Hungarian and Italian Armies, in particular regarding the totally inadequate antitank defenses of the units in those sectors, Hitler was still mired in his “wait and see” and “hold on to the last man” attitudes. Although Hitler had decreed the immediate issue of 250 heavy anti-tank guns to the Hungarians, unfortunately, no orders were given for any action to be taken, nor provisions made to train the Hungarian gun crews in their use, even assuming that there had been time to do so. In any event, only a few antitank guns reached the Hungarians.

The war dairies of Heeresgruppe B indicate that it considered that the transportation situation, coupled with the imminent Soviet offensive – and a Hungarian withdrawal behind the Oskol River (as Jány wanted) – would lead to an even greater catastrophe than was supposedly being avoided.

Suddenly, on 9.01.43, Heeresgruppe B informed General Jány that he would only be receiving situation updates every four or five days instead of the daily reports he had been receiving up until then. No explanation was given for the restriction of vital information at this critical stage.

From 28.08.42 through 9.01.43, the Hungarians suffered of 13,332 casualties.

The first clear day of the new year was 11.01.43. General Jány immediately ordered the Air Force to reconnoitre the front, with particular attention to be paid to the two Soviet bridgeheads on the Hungarian side of the Don River. The flights brought back no positive information. German reconnaissance flights later that day did not change this result.

The dearth of information was the result of the Soviets having been deploying for months opposite the Hungarian and Italian positions, and incorporating a series of measures to maintain secrecy. They carefully camouflaged their vehicles and concealed their troops in underground quarters. (The death penalty threatened any Soviet troops in underground quarters. (The death penalty threatened any Soviet troops in underground quarters.) Bridges were secretly built underwater to hide them from observation. Movement of personnel, vehicles, and supplies was only allowed during the hours of darkness.

The Second Army on the Don had nine light divisions of 6 battalions each, covering a sector of about 200 kilometers. This gave each division a front of 20 to 30 kilometers to cover. It proved difficult to establish a decent reserve from these nine divisions. In fact, the light divisions had five battalions in the line with the sixth in reserve. (This gave each battalion a front of at least 5 kilometers).

The average front covered by the weapons of the Hungarian divisions are as follows:

- Heavy machine gun every 200 meters
- Mortar every 600 meters
- Light antitank gun every 600 meters
- Medium antitank gun every 2500 meters
- Howitzer battery every 2200 meters

Both the German and the Hungarian commands were well aware of the presence of large Soviet forces opposite the Hungarian sector through information gathered from deserters and patrols.

Unfortunately, the Heeresgruppe B preferred to believe the Luftwaffe, who could not find any trace of large Soviet concentrations. Even the XXIV. Panzerkorps (to the south of the Hungarian Army), reported that it had managed to establish the presence of the 3rd Tank Army through radio surveillance. By 11.01.43, the Luftwaffe once again sent up observation planes, and once again failed to find anything worth reporting. The Heeresgruppe therefore also refused to believe the XXIV. Panzerkorps.

By noon 11.01.43, Soviet deserters had further confirmed the concentration of large enemy forces in the Soviet bridgeheads. But although the Heeresgruppe knew that there were Soviet concentrations on both sides of the Don, it was still convinced that a retreat at this time would be totally disastrous. Reserves were not to be had. Everything the Germans had that could be spared was being sent south to break the Soviet stranglehold on Stalingrad, and to allow the Germans to withdraw their forces from the Caucasus.

It is interesting to note that the Second Army had in fact worked out the aims of a possible Soviet attack from the Oryuv, Svoroda, and Stutye bridgeheads as early as 20.12.1942.

It should be remembered, as has been explained elsewhere, that Hungarian units were in the process of being relieved at the time of the Soviet attack. The relief forces, owing to a scarcity of weapons, were normally unarmored until they could make contact with the troops at the front which they were to replace.

12.01.1943

The first day of the Soviet offensive against the Ostrogorsk – Rossoš Group.

The 40th Soviet Army commenced its preparatory artillery fire at 0955, and launched its tank-assisted infantry assault an hour later.

By 13.00, the 40th Army had smashed the 4th Infantry Regiment (7th light Division) and penetrated its positions. The 35th Infantry Regiment (7th light Division) and the 429. Infanterie-Regiment (168. Infanterie-Division) were able to
Soviet Plan of Attack

The Soviet Voronezh Front, commanded by General Golikov, was given the mission of destroying the “Ostrogosk – Rossoš Group”, consisting of all Axis forces between Voronezh and Kantemirovka, including the Second Hungarian Army, the XXIV. Panzerkorps, and the northern part of the 8th Italian Army. Secondary objectives were the capture of the railway lines between Voronezh and Rostov and to prepare the way for further planned operations against the Axis in Rostov and the Donez basin.

The Soviet plan proposed three thrusts. One started from the bridgehead at Uryv in the north and the other from the bridgehead at Kantemirovka to the south. The pinners were to turn towards each other and encircle the forces caught between them. At the same time the third thrust would break out from around the Stutye bridgehead in the center, splitting the encircled Axis forces in two, and then help mop up the remnants.

The northern group – comprising the 40th Army – was to attack in three prongs out of the Uryv bridgehead. One was to providing cover for the southern thrusts. The second, central thrust, was to advance west, then south via Prilepy in the direction of Ostrogosk, and meet up with the center group, (the 18th Rifle Corps). The third thrust was to be made further westwards via Repyevka upon Alexeyevka and meet the advancing 15th Tank Corps of the southern group (3rd Tank Army) and complete the planned encirclement.

The center group – consisting of the independent 18th Rifle Corps – was to break out of the Stutye bridgehead and defeat the Hungarians opposite it. Then, it was to send its right wing off north-westwards to meet the southern arm of the advancing 40th Army, as indicated above, at Ostrogosk. The left wing was to advance south-westwards in the direction of Karpenkovo, and meet up with the 12th Tank Corps of the southern group, the 3rd Tank Army.

The southern group – the 3rd Tank Army and the independent 7th Cavalry Corps – was to advance northwest of Kantemirovka through the XXIV. Panzerkorps and the northern Italian 8th Army and then to split into three separate thrusts:

- the 12th Tank Corps was to advance through Rossoš to Karpenkovo, to meet the left wing of the 18th Rifle Corps.
- the 15th Tank Corps was to advance west of Rossoš to take Alexeyevka in cooperation with the 40th Army advancing from the north.
- the 7th Cavalry Corps was to take Valuiky and in the process provide flank security for the other units of the 3rd Tank Army towards the south.

The entire attack was supported by the 2nd Air Army.

Soviet Order of Battle

the “Ostrogosk – Rossoš Group”
12.01.43

VORONEZH FRONT (Lt. Gen. Golikov)
Reserves earmarked for the offensive:
4th Tank Corps
309th Rifle Division
717th Tank Brigade
201st Tank Brigade
40th Army (Maj. Gen. Moskalenko)
1st Wave
25th Guards Rifle Division + 116th Tank Brigade
107th Rifle Division + 50th Tank Brigade
141st Rifle Division
2nd Wave
340th Rifle Division + 150th Tank Brigade

18th Rifle Corps (Maj. Gen. Zuikov)
1st Wave
129th Rifle Division
219th Rifle Division + ½ 96th Tank Brigade
309th Rifle Division + ½ 96th Tank Brigade
2nd Wave
161st Rifle Division

3rd Tank Army (Maj. Gen. Ribalko)
1st Wave
48th Rifle Division
111th Rifle Division
180th Rifle Division
184th Rifle Division
37th Rifle Brigade
2nd Wave
7th Cavalry Corps
12th Tank Corps
15th Tank Corps
Reserves
72nd Guards Rifle Division
160th Rifle Division
183rd Rifle Division
270th Rifle Division
Support
8th Artillery Division
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Author's note:
The following description of the destruction of the Second Army is based on four sources. Hungarian Second Army records, German records, the memoirs of General Golikov – commander of the Soviet 40th Army – and records in the Russian (formerly Soviet) military archives which have recently become available.

The Hungarians obviously knew very little of what the Russians were doing. The Germans knew little, if anything, of Soviet intentions or actions, or what was happening to the Hungarian units not assigned to Korps Cramer. General Golikov indicates Soviet units that were not present, and omitted others that were there – at least according to the official Soviet records of the time now available. The latter records were therefore used, for example, to compile the Soviet units engaged in the battle.

The facts do not always match. Those that correspond were used. Where the facts contradict each other, the ones that seem to match the flow of events are used, correlated by various, more or less detailed maps provided by the various parties.

As far as the author has been able to reconstruct them, the names have been used as found on maps. When absolutely no location was possible, German or Hungarian nomenclature has been used, converted into the English usage of transliterated Russian.

The 40th Soviet Army continued its attack all through the night of 12. – 13.01.43 against the 20th light Division.

By dawn, both corners of the bulge still held, and the Hungarians even managed to counter attack with the III Corps reserves, (four battalions withdrawn from other sectors of the front), supported by the 700. Panzer-Verband of Korps Cramer. But the Soviet forces, reinforced by tanks, were able to maintain their gains in the center and on their right. The Soviet left wing continued its advance virtually unopposed.

The obvious superiority of the Soviet armor was demonstrated by the fact that the 700. Heeres-Panzer-Verband had four Pz-38(t) tanks left by the end of the day.

Some Hungarian units of the IV Corps were forced to retreat south of the Putoran River.

13.01.1943

The 4th and 35th Infantry Regiments (7th light Division), as well as the 23rd Infantry Regiment (20th light Division) had been smashed. The IV Corps reserves and the 700. Heeres-Panzer-Verband had been virtually destroyed by the Soviet attack.

The Commander of the 429. Infanterie-Regiment (168. Infanterie-Division) – who himself had lead one of the unsuccessful counterattacks – stated in his after action report that: “the Hungarian troops had fought very well, and that the cause for the failure of the attempt lay with the helplessness of the Hungarian units against enemy armor and the freezing weather.”

The Soviet attack had ripped a gap in the Hungarian lines 10 kilometers wide and 12 kilometers deep.

14.01.1943

The first day of the main Soviet offensive.

In the early morning hours, the 40th Army pushed through the gap between the III and the IV Corps, virtually destroying the 7th light Division in the process. Elements of the 40th Army surrounded Storosevoye, which defeated by the 14th Regiment. The regiment retreated eastwards (!) across the frozen Don River. Recrossing the ice westwards south of Novovorenskoye, it reached the lines of the 6th light Division. The 20th light Division was pushed out of its positions. Engineers of the 4th Tank Corps built pontoon bridges across the Putoran River during the night, and the 4th Soviet Tank Corps crossed the river, establishing bridgeheads at Repevka and Prilepy.

In the center, the 18th Soviet Rifle Corps attacked in the early morning hours from its bridgehead at Stutyse aided by a thick fog. By noon, it had defeated the 12th light Division, and by nightfall had penetrated to a depth of eight kilometers.

To the south, 3rd Soviet Tank Army infantry formations in the first wave, supported by tanks, attacked the XXIV. Panzerkorps at Kantemirovka. The infantry attacks were repulsed, and the 3rd Army was forced to send in second wave consisting of the 7th and 15th Soviet Tank Corps. These only achieved a few local successes. The advance in the south was slowed, not halted.

Owing to the very cold weather, (–45°C), counterattacks were not effective since Hungarians weapons jammed owing to a lack of winter lubricants. The 7th and 12th Divisions had been beaten. The 20th was in the process of breaking apart, and the Hungarian reserves had been used up.

The 40th Army was within 40 kilometers of Alexeyevka, and 20 kilometers north of Ostrogosk. The 18th Rifle Corps was 23 kilometers east of this same city. The 3rd Tank Army had made slight progress. Although Korps Cramer had not been released, the 168. Infanterie-Division was sent towards Ostrogosk, without the OKH’s consent.

15.01.1943

During the night of 14. – 15.01.43 the temperature fell to –38°C. The 40th Soviet Army was not able to advance very far north, although the III Corps had been swung aside like a huge door and now faced south, its west flank open. The Soviets flooded through without end. All the Axis forces were gathered under Korpsgruppe Siebert, which included the just arriving German reinforcements and the remnants of the III Corps’ three divisions.

The southern thrust of the 40th Army broke through the last remnants of the IV Corps defenses and forced the 13th light Division to realign its positions along the Don at Karotyak. The release of the 168. Infanterie-Division, (and its arrival), stopped the Soviet advance at Ternovoye. By late evening, the 40th Army had widened the gap to 60 kilometers, and had advanced 30 kilometers. The Soviets were within 30 kilometers of Alexeyevka and 10 kilometers from Ostrogosk.
As the 18th Rifle Corps attack against the 12th light Division was held up, further Soviet forces attacked across the Don River east of Svoboda against the 10th light Division. The 18th Rifle Corps then advanced to a depth of 25 kilometers and a width of 40 kilometers.

The 7th and 12th Divisions had been destroyed. The 700. Panzer-Verband, the 20th, 13th, 10th, and the 19th Divisions were badly weakened, and the 168. Infanterie-Division was in trouble along the Potudan. Korps Cramer was finally released in the hope of saving the situation.

The 3rd Tank Army in the south continued its attack against the XXIV. Panzer-Korps. German counter attacks were foiled. The 12th Tank Corps crossed the Kaliva River west of Rossoš, followed by the 15th Tank Corps. The 7th Cavalry Corps struck west. The 3rd Tank Army had advanced 40 kilometers, and the gap was 60 kilometers wide.

16.01.1943

Units of the 40th Army attacked the 13th light Division at Karotyak, and the Hungarians were hard pressed to hold this area. By evening, the 10th light Division, the 168. Infanterie-Division as well as the remnants of the 13th light Division had been surrounded near Ostrogosk. During the early morning hours, the 18th Rifle Corps managed to push the 10th light Division west and capture all the divisional artillery.

The Heeresgruppe B reserve, Korps Cramer, launched its counterattack. The enemy was initially pushed back. Unfortunately, a flanking movement by the Soviets virtually destroyed the Hungarian 31st Infantry Regiment of the 13th light Division, leaving that flank open. The German unit on the other flank of the 1st Armored Field Division withdrew under heavy pressure, and the counter attacking units found themselves with open flanks. General Cramer called off the attack, and ordered the withdrawal of Korps Cramer. The counterattack had stemmed the 18th Rifle Corps’ advance in the center, but used up all the Second Army’s reserves, and had accomplished very little. Small advanced units of the 12th Tank Corps filtered in behind the VII Corps during the day via Potgornoye from Rossoš. By evening the situation of the VII Corps had become so precarious that the Second Army ordered it to retreat. The 18th Rifle Corps was able to consolidate its gains of the previous days.

Korpsgruppe Siebert was reassigned to the German 2. Armee, and ordered to protect its south flank. Further German units were sent to reinforce it.

The 12th Tank Corps’s main forces fought the entire day in and around Rossoš, taking heavy losses. It was unable to continue the advance until new tanks could be brought up. The 15th Tank Corps circumvented Rossoš to the north-west without encountering any major Axis resistance. The Italian Corpo Alpino began to retreat.

17.01.1943

The III Corps, with the 57. Infanterie-Division, was offering a vigorous defense against the northern thrust of the 40th Soviet Army. The 40th Army southern thrust broke through the 168. Infanterie-Division. The Soviets had taken heavy casualties, but they were through, enroute to Alexeyevka via Ilovskoye.

Ilovskoye was the key to the corridor that was to enable the Second Army to withdraw westwards in advance of the Soviet pincers. The advance columns of the 40th Army reached the village and the airport around noon, only to encounter the ground crews of the 2nd Air Force Brigade (approximately 600 men). After a heroic defense by the Hungarian air force personnel, the Soviets were forced to break off the engagement by evening.

The fighting in the outskirts of Ostrogosk began as advance elements of the 40th Army arrived. General Jáby ordered the withdrawal of the remnants of the IV Corps to Ostrogosk. The Soviets had occupied Karotyak. The 40th Army was now 8 kilometers from Alexeyevka.

Korps Cramer was ordered to retreat to Ostrogosk. Kamenka was occupied by the Soviets. By evening, the 40th Army and the 18th Rifle Corps had met on the banks of the Tihaya Sosua River.

To the south, the 12th Tank Corps was rapidly advancing on Karpenkovo. The 15th Tank Corps was rolling towards Alexeyevka. The feebly XXIV. Panzerkorps counter attacks were beaten off. The 7th Cavalry Corps continued its advance west.

By early evening, the Second Army headquarters had lost all forms of contact with its remaining two corps. Communications to Korps Cramer were still intact, but General Cramer was checking back with Heeresgruppe B after each order received from General Jáby, just to ensure that this order had the sanction of his German superiors. A few minutes before midnight, even this remaining thread was lost.

18.01.1943

During the night and early morning hours, Korpsgruppe Siebert closed the gap between the 2. Armee and the Second Hungarian Armies to a certain extent, limiting the Soviet advance.

The 40th Army surrounded Ostrogosk, and several divisions were clearing the suburbs. Hitler declared Ostrogosk to be a Festung (fortress), which meant that it had to be defended to the last man. Defending the encircled city were 7,000 combat and 8,000 support troops, remnants of one German and two Hungarian divisions, as well as III and IV Corps troops. They were designated Korpsgruppe Kraiss. Units of the IV Corps not in the beleaguered city were gathered in the Oskol River Valley.

The VII Corps encountered the left wing of the 18th Rifle Corps while withdrawing north-westwards. The Hungarian units lost their cohesions. The sudden appearance of tanks of the 12th Tank Corps to their south turned the retreat into a rout. The IV Corps ceased to exist.

In the early morning hours, the 15th Tank Corps occupied Alexeyevka. Both Armies were now sealed off. The 1st Armored Field Division (with a strength of 10 Pz-IV and 3 Pz-38(t) as well as 3 Nirods) arrived, and managed to push the 15th Tank Corps out of Alexeyevka by early evening. The tenaciously defended Ilovskoye was immediately reinforced by 1st Armored Field Division. The defense of Ilovskoye by the Air Force and the counterattack by the 1st Armored Field Division had saved the both armies from encirclement.

That evening, the 12th Tank Corps arrived at Tatrino and Karpenkovo. The 26. Infanterie-Division, supported by the 190. Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung managed to hold both towns, but the XXIV. Panzerkorps and the Corpo Alpino were now definitely cut off. Fortunately for the Hungarians, the 12th Tank Corps had outrun its supply columns, and was forced to halt its attack for lack of ammunition and fuel.

19.01.1943

By end of the first week of the attack, the Axis front showed a yawning 300 kilometer gap; the Soviet forces had taken 52,000 prisoners, and destroyed 170 tanks, 1700 guns, 2800 machine guns, 6000 motor vehicles, and 55,000 rifles.

The northern thrust of the 40th Army was stopped. Its southern thrust continued its attempts to eliminate the Ostrogosk pocket, but with diminished strength, as several divisions and the 4th Tank Corps had been sent to south. Here, the Ilovskoye – Alexeyevka – Budenny sector was under heavy attack by 40th Army in the north and by the 15th Tank Corps
in the south. Budyenny was defended by IV and VII Corps remnants, under by General Cramer. Alexeyevka was defended by the 1st Armored Field Division (with a dozen tanks) and 2/3 of the 26. Infanterie-Division. Ilovskoye was defended by the rest of the 26. Infanterie-Division and the remnants of the 2nd Air Force Brigade.

The 2. Arme to the north had stopped the 40th Army’s efforts to progress north. In the center, the strongpoints of Ostrogosk, Alexeyevka, and Budyenny were still in Axis hands.

The night in the 8th Italian Army sector was spent in preparations for a break-out by two groups. The northern group was the “Tridentina Group” (one German and one Italian division, Luftwaffe personnel and miscellaneous Corpo Alpino troops). The southern group was the “Divisionssgruppe Jahr”, (one German division and one brigade, three Italian divisions, and various remnants).

The Tridentina Group made its break-through towards the west, followed in the night by the Gruppe Jahr, both intending to break out to the north, (away from the two Soviet tank corps). The fall of Valuiki to the 7th Cavalry Corps (redesignated as 6th Guard Cavalry Corps) forced the two groups to move north west.

20.01.1943

The 40th Army attacked Ostrogosk throughout the day without notable success. The advance units of the Divisionssgruppe Kraiss fought their way westwards out of Ostrogosk late that afternoon. The improvised battle group managed to break through the Soviet 15th Tank Corps positions, and reached the Alexeyevka just before midnight. The last unit out of Ostrogosk was the 13th light Division. This unit acted as the rearguard all the way to Alexeyevka.

The remnants of the 8th Italian Army in the south, (the “Tridentina Group” and the Divisionssgruppe Jahr), were moving west through the 12th Tank Corps. The Soviets were not able to prevent the breakthrough of the two groups, and immediately set out in pursuit. The Divisionssgruppe Jahr was caught and was severely mauled. The German component was annihilated. The remnants of the Divisionssgruppe Jahr were able to join up with the “Tridentina Group”, which had reached the northern banks of the Olschovatka River intact.

Some 2000 men of the Hungarian 13th Infantry Regiment (19th light Division) had been captured by the Soviets. They ordered east without an escort, and instead had marched west, encountering the “Tridentina Group” later during the day. By the end of the day, the Axis had successfully gathered Korps Cramer around Alexeyevka, had avoided being defeated completely around Ostrogosk, and had prevented the encirclement of Alexeyevka. Although suffering heavy losses, the Axis retreat west to the Oskol Valley continued.

Seeing the initial aim of the offensive almost accomplished, the Voroneš Front ordered the 40th Army to regroup in the evening, and concentrate instead on the 2. Armei. It released 4th Tank Corps to the 40th Army for this purpose. The remnants of the Second Army were to be destroyed by the 3rd Tank Army and the 18th Rifle Corps.

21.01.1943

The 40th Army was busy regrouping, and there was no activity on this day against the 111 Corps on the southern flank of the 2. Armei.

During the night Divisionssgruppe Kraiss was dissolved and Korps Cramer assumed command of all German and Hungarian units in the Alexeyevka-Ostrogosk area.

In the early morning hours, a strong combat group of the 26. Infanterie-Division attacked the Soviet positions and by early afternoon managed to reestablished contact with the 1st Armored Division.

During the rest of the day, the evacuation of the remnants from Ostrogosk to Novyi Oskol was completed. The last units abandoned the city at 1800 hours. The Soviets, unable to stop the breakthrough, followed closely on the heels of the rearguard and wiped out the staff of the 26. Infanterie-Division as well as this division’s 77. Infanterie-Regiment.

The Battle for Alexeyevka continued all day. The 1st Armored Field Division prevented continuing attempts by the 15th Tank Corps to cross the river into the northern part of Alexeyevka. To the north, at Ilovskoye, the Germans were able to push the Soviets further back, and thereby gained an additional road for the escape of those units still within the threatened pocket.

The “Tridentina Group”, supported by German artillery and Sturmgeschütz, attacking the Soviet forces in the face of fierce fire, successfully broke through in the early morning hours, and began crossing the Olschovatka River. The “Tridentina Group” then marched through Novo Kharkovka and by evening, a column of 25,000 men, hundreds of horses, vehicles, and equipment stretched from Limaryev to Novy Georgiyevsk. Lead elements had progressed 20 kilometers towards their goal.

22.01.1943

Korps Cramer continued its withdrawal towards the Oskol River valley during the day under heavy Soviet pressure. Particularly heavy fighting occurred in the Alexeyevka-Ilovskoye-Budyenny area. The remnants of the 1st Armored Division were concentrated in Budyenny and southern Alexeyevka. The division withdrew its rearguards from Alexeyevka by evening. The mass of the Korps Cramer by now west of Budyenny.

Leading elements of the 7th Cavalry Corps were now advancing from Valuiki north along the east bank of the Oskol River and began worrying the flanks of the retreating columns. Leading elements managed to cut the road to Novy Oskol. After fierce fighting, the Soviet cavalry was thrown back, and the retreat could be continued.

A fierce Soviet attack cut the Tridentina Group into two isolated portions. The group still had no contact with their own lines, food and ammunition were low, and it had another 130 kilometers to go through enemy held territory.

The Hungarian IV and VII Corps had been destroyed. What remained of these two corps were being sorted in the Oskol River valley under Korps Cramer. The Hungarians wanted to form these remnants, (only some 17,000 lightly-armed men), into battle groups and throw them back into the fray.

On this same day, upon the recommendation of General von Weichs, the commanding general of Heeresgruppe B, Hitler decided that the Second Hungarian Army would be released from its command function and be used to organize the remaining Hungarian forces behind the front.

Those Hungarian units still able to fight would be placed under German command.

23. – 29.01.1943

In the last part of January the Voroneš Front shifted its offensive emphasis from the Hungarian/Italian sector to that of the now highly exposed 2. Armei. The 40th Soviet Army began moving its forces north. The 60th Soviet Army, to the northeast of the 40th Army, and facing Voroneš, was reinforced for its mission. The 3rd Tank Army and the independent 6th Guards Cavalry Corps were left to clear up the remnants of the Ostrogosk – Rossós Group.
West of Budyenny, Korps Cramer continued its slow withdrawal away from the encircling Soviets and into the Oskol River valley.

On 23.01.43, the remnants of the 168. Infanterie-Division reached Novyi Oskol without encountering any further enemy resistance, and took over the defense of that city. The 26. Infanterie-Division arrived there on 24.01.43. On that same day, the last Axis rearguard broke off contact with the Soviets following them and left Budyenny.

Further to the north, the weight of the 40th and 60th Armies was making itself felt, and the Germans began evacuating Voronež on 25.01.43, and the last unit out (the 88. Infanterie-Division) blew up the railway bridge across the Don as it withdrew. The withdrawal of the Second Hungarian Army had left it’s rear flank exposed on to Soviet attacks.

On 25.01.43, the 1st Armored Field Division also arrived from Budyenny at Novyi Oskol.

At this time all forces in the Oskol Valley were being sorted out. Those units still able to fight were used to build up a new defense line along the Oskol River. Those Hungarian units no longer able to fight were marched to Belgorod. On this day, Hungarian units no longer able to fight were used to build up a new defense line along the Oskol River. Those able to fight were moved to Novyi Oskol, the Loskay Group, also of about three battalions strength, was responsible for the defense of this sector of the front. The defense of Novyi Oskol was assumed by the 1st Armored Field Division, (strength: 11 tanks, 3 Nimrods, and 2 light howitzers); and the remnants of the 168. Infanterie-Division, (with about 400 combat troops and 2 light howitzers) behind Novyi Oskol the VII Corps fragments of were being gathered into groups under the command of the 23rd light Division, designated as Group Szugyi.

South of Novyi Oskol, Group Keseru was defending the right flank of Korps Cramer. The 26. Infanterie-Division had already been sent to Staryi Oskol as early as 25.01.43. This town was of great importance to the Hungarians, as their main supply depots were located there.

North of Chornianka, the 26. Infanterie-Division encountered heavy Soviet resistance. After fierce fighting, the German division reached Staryi Oskol on 28.01.43, and was immediately assigned to the 2nd German Army.

By 25.01.43 the general situation on the southern wing of Heeresgruppe B had more or less been stabilized. The remnants of the XXIV. Panzerkorps and the Corpo Alpino were still moving west in the area around Nikitovka.

Heeresgruppe B had been reinforced during the last days of January 1943 by the arrival of the Infanterie-Division (motorisierit) “Gross-Deutschland” and the SS-Generalkommando “Hausser”.

On 29.01.43 the weak Hungarian and German units still defending the Oskol were thrown out of Novyi Oskol, and forced to retreat to Korocha.

The remnants of the 8th Italian Army’s Corpo Alpino finally managed to reach the Axis lines on 30.01.43, at Bolstet-roiskoye, after a 350 kilometer odyssey. The Italians had only 13,580 men left, of which 8 – 9,000 and those Hungarians that had managed to gather behind this group numbered 6 – 7,000 men.

Conclusion

The STAVKA’s main objective in ordering the Voronézh Front to attack the Hungarian and Italian armies on 12.01.43 had been the destruction of the last Axis allies on the East Front. This it had achieved by the end of January 1943.

It is apparent that both the OKH and the Heeresgruppe B were not really surprised by the Soviet attack. On the other hand, the Germans had not expected the thrust penetrate so deeply and in such strength. The Germans also failed to correctly recognize the main thrust of the attack. This caused them to use Korps Cramer to little effect at the wrong time. It is obvious from the various sources that by 15.01.43, Heeresgruppe B was certain that the breakthrough could no longer be contained, and that the Oskol River positions were no longer tenable.

It is often mentioned by Hungarian sources that the Second Army was betrayed by the German’s refusal to use Korps Cramer in time. Since this was the only Axis reserve from the Sea of Azov to a point 700 kilometers to the north, the OKH was obviously not going to be too precipitous in using its only reserve anywhere.

Unfortunately Hitler refused to consider a retreat, resulting in the three Hungarian corps and the supporting German forces being encircled by the Soviets. In consequence, as of 17.01.43, the Second Army no longer was able to function as a military command, having lost all contact with its subordinate units. From then on the Second Army was limited to gathering and organizing the retreating units in the Oskol River valley. It was subsequently relieved of its command on 24.01.43 and withdrawn from the front.

General Warlimont’s postwar commentaries of the OKW War Diaries state that although the Heeresgruppe B knew very well that the attack was about to take place, it failed to take appropriate measures. Consequently, the Second Hungarian Army collapsed within a few days. He concludes that the Heeresgruppe B leadership was ineffectual.

Meanwhile, the Soviet offensive continued. The 2. Arme was stretched from Lgow to Sumy in the second half of February 1943. All units in this area, including retreating units, reinforcements, and Hungarian security units, were gathered under the command of the 2. Arme, and designated as Armeegruppe Weiss, (named after General der Infanterie Walter Weiss, the commanding general of that army). A new army was to gather behind this group. It was to reinforce Armeegruppe Weiss when ready, enabling it to go over to the offensive.

As the last remnants of the III Corps struggled in from Novyi Oskol, other Hungarian units were spread out along the Neshin – Nuchmats – Romni line. On 5.02.43, the 1st Armored Field Division gave its last remaining equipment to the Arme-Abteilung Lanz, and left the command of Korps Cramer. The 1st Armored Field Division and Group Vargyassy then marched back to the regrouping area. On 11.02.43, General Cramer transferred command of his corps to Generalleutnant Erhard Raus, and departed for Africa, there to assume command of the Deutsches Afrika Korps.
The Germans and the Hungarians could not reach an agreement as to what to do with the remnants of the Second Army. General der Artillerie Alfred Jodl suggested that they should be gathered into three divisions, and once again thrown into the battle. The rest should be used as armed construction battalions around Smolensk.

On 12.03.43 the Hungarian General Staff, with the approval of the Honvéd Ministry, ordered that:

The Second Army, which had been given command of all Hungarian units on the East Front, was to remain in the Soviet Union (with headquarters at Kiev) and take over the reorganization.

Two full-strength light divisions were to be raised from the remnants of the Second Army under command of the IV Corps.

From the remnants of the labor units, 12 Labor Battalions were to be formed. Magyár minorities (Ruthenians, Slovaks, and Rumanians) were to be used in the labor companies and in the horse-drawn supply trains as much as possible. The percentage of these non-Magyár minorities – which were considered as being incapable of carrying arms for Hungary – was set at 20%.

Excluded from these measures were:
- The 1st Armored Field Division.
- 3 regimental headquarters and 12 battalions which had already been foreseen for return to Hungary in the Fall of 1942. (Of these, however, 1 regiment headquarters and 6 battalions were to be temporarily used to relieve Occupation Army forces.
- 10 artillery batteries (4/1, 4/2, 11/1, 14/1, 16/1, 17/1, 18/1, 22/1, 26/1, 27/2), which had been assigned as escort batteries for infantry regiments and had been removed from their parent battalion headquarters in the process.
- Troops of the 2nd Reserve. (i.e., those over 42 years of age).
- Fathers with four or more children. (Magyár and German, only)
- Miners.
- Soldiers with more than 12 months service on the East Front.

The remains of the Second Army were to be transferred back to Hungary during the course of the spring and summer.

In May 1943, the IV Corps turned over its mission to the newly arrived VIII Corps, and returned to Hungary.

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The enormous casualties suffered by the Second Army during its twelve month ordeal on the East Front are made plain by the figures in the tables to the right.

Nagy, in his memoirs, indicates that there were some 70,000 survivors of the 200,000, for a total of 130,000 casualties. Included in this total are 35,000 in the military labor battalions (of which 20,000 Jews allegedly — and understandably — had gone over to the Russians).

According to Horthy in a conversation with Hitler at Schloss Klessheim near Salzburg, the Hungarian Army had had 148,000 killed, 32,000 wounded, including 32,000 either killed or missing Jews in the military labor battalions. This made for a total of 180,000 since the beginning of Hungary’s participation in the Russian campaign.

The exact number of casualties will never be known, but according to a report from the Second Army headquarters to C.O.S. Sombathelyi, the unwounded survivors totalled 2,913 officers and 61,110 men on 3.03.43. The remainder, more than half the original force, were either dead or missing. (15,000 wounded had been sent back to Hungary by this time.) This means that the Second Army’s losses in January and February 1943 amounted to 135,000, i.e., more than 60% casualties of the 211,000 present on 12.01.43.

The losses in equipment were, proportionately, even higher than those in manpower. Virtually all the armor was lost. (There were 6 armored vehicles left – including 3 Toldi light tanks – which were sent back to Budapest on 31.03.43). Almost all the artillery was gone. (There remained 5 light field howitzers). Some 80 – 90% of the heavy equipment of the infantry was missing; about 85% of the horses, practically all the stores, and a high proportion of the rifles were gone.

The destruction of the Second Army virtually eliminated all the modern military equipment that the Hungarian Army had.

The Hungarian Army never recovered completely – materially or psychologically – from the immense losses it suffered on the Don River.

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Political and Military Considerations

The news that the Second Hungarian Army had been destroyed on the Don was received in some Hungarian circles with measure of relief. Not because of the tragic loss of thousands of its soldiers, but because it was generally felt that Hungary now had done its part, and would henceforth be freed from further military obligations towards the war effort on the East Front.

The feeling was reinforced when Hungarian Government was informed of various occasions of misbehavior of German units towards the Hungarian troops. Examples were cited where German soldiers had offended and degraded their Hungarian comrades-in-arms, and had gone so far as to throw wounded off vehicles and seizing them for their own use. One particular case was when the VII. Armeekorps had ordered the 88. Infanterie-Division to retreat and heedlessly clear the way through Hungarian trains loaded with wounded.

The Hungarian Government took this report and many others as a further reason to send no more men, equipment, or units to the front.

Germany did not force the issue at first, as the OKW was under no illusions any more regarding the fitness of the Hungarian Army based on reports of German commanders on the East Front and from the military attache in Budapest.

Both sources reported that the possibility of using further Hungarian Army units on the East Front after the debacle of the Second Army was negit impossible, and that not until the Hungarians had undergone a complete refitting, and had their morale restored, would the Hungarian units be of any future use to the Germans as a combat force.

Towards the end of January 1943, General Szombathyeli went to the German headquarters to discuss the future of the Second Army. He engaged in a heated exchange with the Germans, including Hitler himself, who informed the Hungarian C.O.S. that it would have been better for all concerned if the Second Army had never existed. Szombathyeli replied that he agreed entirely, and that this had been his opinion all along. He indicated that the remnants of the Second Army should be brought home. The Germans, however, felt that the Hungarians must at least carry out security operations, for which they should provide six additional divisions from the remains of the Second Army, or from Hungary itself.

The German alternate proposal, after it had been established that the remnants of the Second Army were not equipped to carry out any form of military service, was that the Germans would outfit five Hungarian divisions, of which three would be sent to the Balkans, and two could remain in Hungary, “so that Hungary need not fear for her own safety.”

On 30.03.43, the question of the Second Army was brought to the Supreme Defense Council, which decided that:

- The entire Second Army, (what was left of it), would be brought home;
- excluded were troops amounting to three light divisions, which would be left in the Ukraine for security purposes only, in addition to the existing occupation divisions;
- No units were to be sent to the Balkans.

The decision was sent to the Germans.

Hitler’s feelings regarding the Hungarian forces were again expressed when Horthy visited Schloss Klessheim on 16.04.43. Hitler stated that the Hungarian units had fought badly in the previous campaign. Horthy defended his soldiers as best he could, by replying that an army that had taken so many casualties could hardly have run away from the enemy, and even less have shamed itself. He further indicated that in many cases Hungarian units had covered the retreat of German ones, and, as a sop to Hitler, that all the military labor battalions with some 32,000 men, (including all the Jews in them), had been wiped out. In addition, Hungary had lost all its weapons. He indicated that the Germans had not delivered the promised equipment, in particular effective antitank guns and modern tanks.

As Hitler was not inclined to rearm the Hungarian Army, nor particularly interested in a further Hungarian presence on the front, the question of Hungarian contributions above and beyond the security divisions to the war effort were temporarily shelved. The survivors of the Second Army, i.e. those which had not been assigned to the security forces, could be sent home without delay.

The dispatch of the Second Hungarian Army had left the forces remaining in Hungary very depleted. The Hungarian forces on the East Front at the middle of October 1942 had numbered 110 infantry battalions, 110 artillery batteries, and 15 cavalry companies. (Counting Second Army and the security forces.) What remained in Hungary amounted to 44 infantry battalions and 85 artillery batteries. A further 12 infantry battalions had been dispatched to the front, leaving a total of 32 infantry battalions in Hungary. The system of picking individual battalions from throughout Hungary to be assigned to the Second Army naturally left a checkered conglomerate of ill-equipped units behind.

The Army was 3,000 officers under strength. Of the younger officers, only 35% had two years’ training behind them. Only 33% of the needed 35,000 NCO’s were regulars. Of the remaining NCO’s, 48% were World War I veterans between the ages of 42 and 60 (3rd Reserve).

Of the enlisted personnel in the 2nd Reserve, (reservists under 42 years of age), only 30% had received adequate training; over 25% had a one year training period behind them, some 40% had received a mere eight months’ training, and of the remaining 5% had as little as six months.

The lack of rifles, (the Germans had failed to meet their promise to allocate 30,000 rifles a year from their production in Hungary), had grave results. The infantry could not be properly trained. Replacement units only had 25% of their rifle establishment. For every 1,000 men there was 1 medium mortar and 1 light antitank gun available.

The Hungarians hoped to receive 6 heavy antitank guns for training from the Germans by the end 1943. These did not materialize until 1944.

Uniforms at home, as they had been at the front with the Second Army, were scarce.
The condition of the units remaining in Hungary did not allow even the thought of raising more combat divisions. Indeed, after the Second Army had departed, many units existed only on paper, and were subsequently dissolved.

To counter the extreme weakness of the Home Defense Army, the Hungarian general staff had proposed in late 1942 that the Huba III Plan be advanced so that the units remaining in Hungary could be brought up at least to the level of the departed Second Army units by early 1944. In addition, another armored division was to be raised. The cavalry division was to be reformed. All mountain units were to be merged into two mountain brigades or integrated into Border Guard battalions.

At the same time, it was decided to change the light divisions into triangular divisions, with 3 infantry regiments and 12 artillery batteries in each division. A regiment would consist in peacetime of the three infantry battalions, one battalion of artillery, one troop of cavalry or cyclists, as well as regimental units. Its peacetime strength would be about 3,800 men and its war strength 4,900. A full division at war strength would have some 16,000 men.

The Hungarian general staff considered it important to gather the scattered units under their respective regiments. With this in mind, the replacement battalions sent to the front in November 1942 had been grouped so that the different units could go to their regiments.

The Szabolcs Plan of 1.10.1943

The Second Army catastrophe in 1943 had forced the Hungarians to throw out the Huba III Plan, and substitute the Szabolcs Plan for it. This plan was to be implemented by 1.10.43. It applied until the end of the war with minor modifications.

It can be said that Hungary had three military aims in 1943. They were:

1/ The withdrawal of the Occupation Command (as the Second Army headquarters was to be renamed) and all the security forces on the East Front back to Hungary;
2/ The complete reorganization of the Home Army and occupation forces into a modern military force;
3/ Time to carry out the two first aims, including a complete rearmament of all units in the Hungarian Army.

These aims were only partially achieved in 1943. Although the Second Army was returned to Hungary, and the transformation of the Home Army into a war army was initiated, the security forces in the Ukraine were not brought back from Russia. In addition, the Second Army had had to leave parts of itself behind to augment these forces. And, during the course of 1943, the Hungarians were forced to send another two divisions to the East Front.

The Hungarians had decided to put their faith in an army based on depth, not width. The plan was to form a two stage army, i.e. a regular division and a reserve division in each Corps, backed up by training units, (consolidated and designated on 1.05.1944 as "replacement" divisions). The old prewar budding system (i.e. a broad organizational structure, with many similar units being created by the doubling of the units and attempting to create the same unit in quantity and quality again), was phased out. In peacetime, the regular divisions would be at peace time strength, the reserve divisions would be cadre units only. The necessary gathering together of the security battalions (for the reserve divisions) was not finished until April – May 1944, throwing the plans of the Hungarians completely out of kilter.

The desire for a modern army, including the necessity of complete motorization of the mobile units, (the cavalry division, the two armored divisions as well as the artillery), was frustrated by the lack of vehicles. After the defeat of the Second Army at the Don, the level of mechanization of the Army was again back to that of 1940.

The training of the troops in modern warfare was not completed. Here again, the lack of German equipment deliveries was critical, as the Hungarian industry was delivering mostly to Germany.

All in all, the Szabolcs Plan was barely achieved from an organizational point of view. Little progress was made in obtaining equipment.

This meant that the light divisions had been transformed into triangular divisions. On the other hand, the second echelon units, the reserve divisions, had not finished reorganizing. This was because most of the light divisions intended to become reserve divisions were carrying out security duties in Russia. When a security division did achieve the three-regiment status, it was redesignated as a reserve division. The process of redesignation overtook that of reorganization, and reserve divisions encountered in late 1943 and early 1944 were still two-regiment, light divisions, and the security version at that, still as weak and under equipped as always.

Two of the reserve divisions, (the 15th and 26th Reserve Divisions), existed only on paper. The divisions of the H.O.F. were reorganized by dissolving a security (light) division and spreading the units out amongst two other divisions. The third regiment and the third artillery battalion, as well as the divisional support command, gave the old light security division the status of a reserve division.

The divisions of the H.O.F. had almost finalized their reorganization by March 1944, in particular those of the VIII Corps. The new reserve divisions were designated as the 5th, 9th, 12th, and 23rd Reserve Divisions. The formations under the VII Corps were also redesignated as the Reserve Divisions, but the process of reorganization these units was not completed until spring 1944. The headquarters of the dissolved divisions were returned to Hungary, there to be used to raise new divisions. The 1st and 201st Reserve Divisions were also renamed and reorganized, but this was a temporary measure, as it was intended to dissolve these units in the field or after returning to Hungary.

Honvéd Higher Commands and the Szabolcs Plan of 1943/44

When the Szabolcs Plan took effect on 1.10.1943, part of the idea included changing the concept of the higher commands. The peace time order of battle had three army headquarters (1st – 3rd) with nine corps headquarters (1 – IX) as well as the independent I Armored Corps.

In the peace time version army headquarters had a series of higher staffs to coordinate and control artillery, signals, and engineer services at the upper echelons. There were nine artillery command staffs (1 – IX). Three signal command staffs (I, VIII, and IX). (In peace time, the signal command staff was commanded by either the senior artillery colonel, or a specially assigned brigadier general). And three engineer command staffs (I, II, and V).

The mobilized and peace time orders of battle had a major difference. The home army institutions (the replacement units) as well as the logistics and support units were not activated until mobilization.

The new Szabolcs Plan was supposed to eliminate the corps as an operational level supply and support echelon. Consequently corps troops and corps supply units were transferred to General Headquarters Troops in the Fall of 1943, in part reorganized, and in some cases even deactivated or discontinued.
The new logistics system was based on the army (Army Quartermaster General) and division (or brigade) echelons. According to their mission, the General Staff assigned to the armies the necessary support troops and logistic services.

The divisions (or brigades) were to be the lowest level combined arms formation which would be capable of carrying out independent combat missions. They were accordingly equipped with their own logistic components, and had a permanent, fixed organization consisting of a mixture of combat arms and supply units.

The corps were conceived only to provide command headquarters echelons for tactical missions. They were not to become directly involved in providing logistics support, although they were supposed to act as the controlling element between division (or brigade) and the army.

Contrary to the peace time order of battle, only three army headquarters and three corps headquarters (VII, VIII, and IX) would be mobilized. These corps were assigned to armies, and given formations to carry out their designated missions.

Upon mobilization, the I – VI Corps remained as Military District Headquarters subordinate to the Honvéd Ministry.

The I, VIII, and IX Signal Command Staffs, the VII, VIII, and IX Artillery Command Staffs, as well as the I, II, and V Engineer Command Staffs were assigned to the armies or corps only as needed.

The I – VI Artillery Command Staffs were in part used to raise the 101st and 102nd Artillery Brigade Headquarters, which were assigned to higher commands to form main points of effort with the artillery units.

**Personnel and the Szabóes Plan of 1943/44**

The personnel requirements of the Szabóes Plan of 1943/1944 could basically be fulfilled. The Plan had, after all, been drawn up based on the potentially available trained men.

The poor equipment situation of Hungary at the end of 1943 changed the picture drastically. Only some 400,000 of the 700,000 men foreseen for the mobilized Field Army could be equipped. In addition, the plan also foresaw 350,000 men for the Home Army.

The Home Army included such organizations as the replacement units, the march battalions, the schools, and the military transport system. This discrepancy shows that the mobilization plan was overblown, and out of touch with reality. In addition, the effects on the country of what was an agrarian economy, (requiring a lot of manpower), had reached the very limits of practicality.

The Hungarian General Staff, well aware of its problem, requested the Honvéd Ministry to revise the authorized tables of organization and equipment. They reasoned that even small revision of them in the Air Defense Corps had netted 11,000 men.

In accordance with a study by the General Staff of 16.02.1944, at least 70,000, if not 100,000 men, could be combed out of the tables of organization and equipment, thereby reducing the actual required personnel strength to 600,000 men by 1.10.1944. The study also indicated that further savings in personnel could be achieved by a further motorization of the armed forces, in particular the horse-drawn parts of the logistic services.

Further points covered by the study showed that the number of 50 march battalions of the Szabóes Plan was proportionately too high as compared to the 130 combat battalions of the field army. In any respect, there was not enough material around to arm the men of the march battalions. This same lack of equipment, in particular heavy weapons, meant that basic training in the march battalions could not be completed.

The general staff study recommended:

1/ to dissolve the march battalions,
2/ to reduced the strength of the replacement personnel (both cadre and trainees) to the point that there would be enough equipment to arm them,
3/ to reduce the replacement battalions for the divisions to company strength.
4/ to revise the tables of organization and equipment of guard units to the absolute minimum need to maintain the security of the indicated objects,
5/ to reduce personnel in all military administrations, the depots, the training and research institutes, etc., of the Home Army.

These measures, the study advised, would free 150,000 men for the economy without decreasing the effectiveness of the Home Army.

By 1.05.1944, the Hungarian Army had a strength of 418,000 men. (Consisting of 271,000 in the Field Army, 36,000 in the Occupation Forces, and 111,000 in Hungary). There were still 930,000 men left in Hungary available for military service, of which about half had undergone some sort of basic training but had not yet been called up, and half of which — although they had received some military indoctrination in the Levente — still had to undergo basic training.

In addition, there were about 1,000,000 men available for other duties (mainly minority groups), of which about 500,000 had undergone training. These were mostly found in the Labor Battalions. This group of men was eventually to be used to form the Home Army and also to supply replacements for the front. In May 1944, 130,000 of these men were not in available, as they were being engaged in other work, or were away from Hungary.

30,000 under Hungarian command in the Carpathians for building fortification
11,000 with the Hungarian First Army in the Ukraine for railroad construction
34,000 at the request of Germany, these men had been placed under German labor commands, and were found both within Hungary or in the Ukraine
17,000 in Germany as grooms (horse holders)
4,000 under German command in Hungary for building airfields
3,000 in Bo, Yugoslavia as mine workers
10,000 in Germany as factory workers
20,000 earmarked by the Germans to be drafted into Waffen-SS formations

The lack of qualified, trained and experienced officers and NCO’s was grave. Although measures that had been instituted to increase the numbers, there were still inadequate to meet the required numbers.

The total number of officers on active duty in the Army in April 1944 was 36,604. Of these, 16,602 were regular army and 20,002 were reserve officers.

Incorrect planning and the budget cuts in the 1930’s meant that in April 1944 there only were 17,653 regular army NCO’s in the Army.

Numerous course and advanced training installations for staff officers, field grade officers, company grade officers, platoon leaders, and NCO’s had been set up. The number of officer candidates had been increased. In 1942, the military academies had reduced their curricula from three to two-and-a-half years. In 1943 they were even further reduced to two years. The same applied to the courses for reserve officers. There was not enough equipment or cadres available to train all of them properly. Many of the experi-
Peace Time Order of Battle in accordance with the Szabolcs Plan of 1.10.1943
Proposed Mobilization Order of Battle for 1944 in accordance with the Szabolcs Plan of 1.10.1943
enced and qualified troops had been sent to the Field Army units.

### Equipment and the Szabolcs Plan of 1943/44

Much equipment, as foreseen by the new Szabolcs 1943/1944 Plan, was not available. The number of weapons on hand was way under the planned number. The active formations (the 16th, 20th, 24th, 25th Infantry Divisions as well as the 1st and 2nd Mountain Brigades), had to be filled up at the expense of inactive formations, in particular those in the west of Hungary (Transdanubia). The training units had less than half of the needed arms and equipment.

The Hungarians were dependent on German deliveries for equipment. Not just heavy equipment, but even pistols and rifles. German contracts with the Hungarian industry meant that its output was virtually all being sent to Germany. Only small amounts were allowed to be delivered to the Hungarian Army.

The Bührle Contract was supposed to alleviate the problem of arming and equipping the active divisions. In addition, the Hungarian industrial base in and around Budapest had become the target of Allied air raids starting March 1944, which soon caused heavy destruction and the virtually cessation of production in many plants.

In March 1944, the Army was missing 80,000 rifles. Production was being sent to Germany. In July 1944, production ceased completely after an Allied bombing attack. The reserve divisions were sent 10,000 at the expenses of the inactive divisions. Nevertheless, the II Reserve Corps was still lacking 2700 rifles and 5000 sub machine guns in May 1944.

Hungary first started producing sub machine guns (SMG) in 1943. By February 1944, production had reached 4000 per month. But by the end of January 1944, only 7500 had been issued to the troops. The plan to increase the monthly output was thwarted in May 1944 by the destruction of the factory by an air raid. The missing 20,400 SMG could not be supplied. Attempts to buy these weapons from Italy failed. Only Germany was left.

Machine guns (MG) were also in short supply. By the end of 1943, Hungarian industry was behind in deliveries of 3500 MG. A further order of 5000 MG was issued in 1944, but only 350 were delivered. The promised German monthly deliver of 950 MG failed to materialize.

The 81mm mortar began production in 1942, the 120mm version in the Fall of 1943. Training on the 120mm mortar was carried out with captured Russian equipment. The replacement of the eight 81mm mortars in the regimental mortar companies with twelve 120mm weapons was supposed to be finished by the end of 1944. Again, production ceased after another air raid in July 1944. Instead, the 120mm mortars were gathered into batteries and placed under control of the divisional artillery.

Until the Spring of 1944, the Army had only medium (40mm, 47mm, 50mm) antitank guns (ATG), which were next to useless against the more modern Russian armor being encountered by then. Production switch over to the heavy 75mm ATG began mid-1943, but these guns were supposed to be for the new Zrínyi assault guns. By an agreement reached with Germany, Hungary would not produce 75mm ATG. The Germans were to provide 9 weapons per month. No heavy ATG were delivered from Germany until late March 1944. The first three-gun 75mm ATG platoons were issued to the reconnaissance battalions. By May 1944, heavy ATG began to be issued to the active infantry regiments. The 40mm ATG was delivered to the Army at a rate of 40 per month until July 1944. The 20mm antitank rifle continued in production, but was never available in sufficient numbers. Hand-held antitank weapons were only available from Germany, and these were issued only in limited amounts to units on the front.

Hungarian production capacity for artillery was minimal. In the first four months of 1944, only 80 light 105mm field howitzers were delivered. In April 1944, the factories in Budapest, Győr and Diósgyőr were bombed out and deliveries ceased.

Comparing authorized and available artillery in the Szabolcs Plan, the Army was short 90 batteries (360 guns). These batteries were carried on the roles as personnel units without equipment.

The Szabolcs Plan also foresaw 4 rocket launcher battalions, each with 8 launchers. Training of the first cadres was begun under the 150th Artillery Brigade at Rimásszombat. In fact, only the 101st Rocket Launchers was raised.

Light 40mm and heavy 80mm antiaircraft guns were manufactured in Hungary, and enough were produced to upgun the divisional antiaircraft batteries to 12 light guns each.

The Air Defense Corps had steadily increased in size since its creation, and would have four air defense brigades (Budapest, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd) upon mobilization to control all the units.

Both the Army antiaircraft forces and the Air Defense Command were continually supplied with equipment to raise further 40mm batteries.

On the other hand, heavy 88mm and 128mm equipment was in very short supply. Again, the Germans failed to deliver the contracted and partially paid for 152 heavy antiaircraft guns. The same applied to the 84 light 150cm searchlights ordered in 1941.

Clothing was available in just barely tolerable amounts. Owing to the lack of raw materials, stocking of reserves was not possible. Particularly winter clothing was in very short supply. Attempts to buy field blankets from Italy were only partially successful. The Labor Battalions were forced to wear civilian clothing, with only arm bands and field caps to indicate their military status.

(The scarcity of winter uniforms was one of the factors why the Hungarians were reluctant to mobilize in winter, as there was not enough winter clothing to go around).

Hungary had lost an enormous amount of horses, starting with the 1941 Russian Campaign and ending with the destruction of the Second Army in 1943. Hungary offered 20,000 horses in exchange for trucks to the Germans, but this offer was declined. The de-motorization of many units owing to a lack of motor vehicles seriously aggravated this situation and furthermore caused enormous difficulties in the agricultural sector.

### Motorization and the Szabolcs Plan of 1943/44

As discussed, even before the war the Army had had major problems finding enough motor vehicles to equip just the Motorized Brigades. The Hungarian aim of motorizing the supply elements of the infantry formations and the GHQ units, as well as raising one mechanized cavalry and two armored divisions in accordance with the Huba Plan was completely thwarted by the defeat on the Don in 1943 of the Second Army. All the motor vehicles of the 1st Armored Field Division were lost. Only by dint of large scale requisitioning from the civilian sector had it been possible to equip the Second Army in 1942 in the first place. The motor vehicle losses suffered by the Hungarians at the Don comprised more than 50% of all civilian and military motor vehicles available to Hungary.
Attempts to at least completely motorize the 2nd Armored and 1st Cavalry Division had still not been completed by early 1944. Up to 1943, only 33% of the motor vehicle requirements of the Huba III Plan could be covered by the vehicle park of the Army. The 1943 Botond III Plan could not be fulfilled, as the Hungarian motor vehicle factories were destroyed by Allied bombers in the Summer of 1944.

Hungarian motor vehicle manufacturing capacity was almost totally occupied with the production of armored vehicles in 1942 and 1943. Increased motor vehicle production started again in 1944, but a lack of raw materials and adequate production capacity seriously hampered plans of producing 1500 trucks in 1944. (As compared to the 24,000 motor vehicles authorized by the Szabolcs Plan).

Germany still owed Hungary 3000 paid-for trucks ordered since 1941. Of another 1000 trucks ordered from Italy in 1943, 500 were seized by the Germans before they reached the Hungarian border. Hungary also had ordered 1100 Skoda, 800 Renault, and 200 Ford trucks — again paid for — but never delivered.

To compensate for the lack of motor vehicles, draconic measures were enacted early 1944.

The Army was virtually de-motorized. The 1st Armored Division lost all of its few remaining vehicles. The Air Defense Corps lost 75% of its motor vehicles, including the tractor prime movers for the guns. Two field army antiaircraft battalions were also de-motorized. The motorized equipment columns of the combat engineers lost their vehicles. The 1st Huszár Division was exclusively equipped with horses. Even the bridge columns of the 2nd Armored Division became horse-drawn. The 2nd Armored Division’s authorized strength was reduced by 206 trucks, (from a total transport capacity of 615 tons to 260 tons). A large part of the motorized units of the GHQ logistic services (field bakeries, medical companies, etc.) had to give up their vehicles. The total sum of motor transport capacity of the GHQ supply units was reduced to 200 tons.

The transport columns of the mobilized infantry formations (16th, 20th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 1st and 2nd Mountain Brigades) could only be equipped with the minimum of trucks by depriving all other units in Hungary of their motorized transport capacity. At great sacrifice and a general denuding of non-mobilized units in Hungary, it was just barely possible to scrape enough motor vehicles to equip the First Army by April 1944 with a mere 200-ton motorized transport capacity.

When the 1st Cavalry Division was motorized on 26.04.1944, its supply columns could only be motorized by withdrawing trucks from the 2nd Armored Division. The heavy antitank guns delivered by the Germans in 1944 came without prime movers, so that more vehicles had to be taken from the 3rd motorized Infantry Regiment.

A perhaps extreme example of de-motorization demonstrates the length to which the Hungarian General Staff went. Even in September 1944, the heavy 210mm howitzer batteries were still being towed by oxen.

The Hungarians possessed no specialized vehicles, such as heavy 12-ton or 18-ton halftracks, tank trailers, etc.

Tires and rubber were also scarce. Even taking into consideration the lack of motor vehicles, the Hungarian Army was short 3000 tires.

Maintenance was difficult. The wide spectrum of vehicle models and types meant that spare parts were difficult to find. The desire uttered by the Germans in April 1944 that the Hungarians take over repairing German vehicles must have been shrugged off with laugh.

The one thing that Hungary did not have was a fuel problem. It needed 7,000 tons of fuel for its military and 5,000 tons for its civilian sectors. By early 1944, 40,000 tons of oil were being exported to Germany per month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hungarian Oil Production</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
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<tr>
<td>1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>1943</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944*</td>
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<td>(*) until September 1944</td>
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Armed Vehicles and the Szabolcs Plan of 1943/44

One of the main reasons cited for the Hungarian collapse on the Don was the lack of an effective antitank capability. The reorganization plan which took effect on 1.04.43 provided for modern tanks, as tanks were considered to be the most effective antitank weapon. These tanks would need at least 75mm guns. The infantry, on the other hand, would need the support of assault guns, again 75mm for antitank work, and 105mm for softening up enemy positions.

With a stroke of the pen, all armored vehicles produced and owned by the Hungarians were made obsolete. (They were anyway, but the Hungarians had not looked the facts in the eye for a while). It was fortunate that there were two prototypes in existence, one of a Turán armed with a 75mm gun, and one of a Zrínyi assault gun, armed with a 105mm howitzer. On the other hand, an appropriate assault gun equipped with a 75mm antitank gun still had to be designed from scratch. The production of Toldi light tanks and Turán I medium tanks was stopped, and orders for the new types were given out.

In 1942, Manfréd Weiss had proposed the construction of an assault gun, using a widened Turán tank chassis and a 105mm 40.M howitzer. The General Staff greeted this plan with alacrity, as the Army had been playing with the concept of creating assault gun battalions, but did not have such a vehicle, and it was certain that none would be forthcoming from Germany. The Army ordered a prototype in October 1942.

The first prototype assault gun was presented in December 1942. Testing lasted until February 1943. The results were highly successful, although the two-part howitzer ammunition was considered unsuitable for assault gun use. Even before the end of the tests, an initial order of 40 vehicles was placed with Manfréd Weiss in January 1943.

The General Staff decided in May 1943 to phase out the production of Turán tanks by Spring 1944 and switch the production to assault guns. Assault guns were made a priority of the new Szabolcs Plan, which foresaw an establishment of 240 assault guns (a 30 vehicle battalion for each regular infantry division).

Production started on time, but was slowed by problems. The 75mm armor plates from the steel mills in Ozd were behind schedule, as were the 105mm howitzers from MÁVAG at Diósgyőr.

The first of the 40 assault guns (roham-tarack Zrínyi II 43.M) with the 105mm howitzer began to come off the production lines in August 1943, 20 of which were accepted by the Army by the end of 1943. The rest were finished by May 1944. Notwithstanding the criticism by the General Staff, the two-piece ammunition was still used.

The second order for 100 vehicles was started by Manfréd Weiss and Ganz in May 1944, but only 26 could be deliv-
ered before production ceased on 27.07.1944, when Manfréd Weiss at Csépel was bombed. It is possible that six additional Zrínyi II were assembled from spare parts by Ganz in September and October 1944.

Starting June 1944, the assault guns were to be produced in a ratio of 7 Zrínyi I (75mm): 3 Zrínyi II (105mm). Development of the 75mm gun version (roham-ágyú Zrínyi I 44.M) dragged on for months. A mild steel prototype was finally demonstrated in February 1944, but the Allied bombing campaign destroyed the factory, only 4 production vehicles are known to have been built.

The 1st Assault Gun Battalion was formed with 10 Turán II tanks and 10 Toldi IIa light tanks, as the Zrínyi II were not available owing to the complications with the armor and the delays in the delivery of the armament. The first 5 Zrínyi II were finally delivered in August 1943. By April 1944 the battalion finally had its full complement of 30 Zrínyi assault guns.

On 1.10.1943 the 2nd through 8th Assault Gun Battalions were formed with 2 Turán II tanks each.

In 1944 the Zrínyi I 44.M was redesignated as the Zrínyi 75, and the Zrínyi II 43.M as the Zrínyi 105.

Parallel to the creation of the assault gun units, rebuilding of the tank battalions continued. The Turán I tanks were reclassified as medium tanks. The initial 40mm gun was upgraded to a short 75mm gun in late 1942.

Even at this date, it was already quite clear that with its short barrel it had only very limited use against enemy armor. (At the same time that the Germans were introducing the best tank of World War II, i.e. the Pz-V Panther). However, the Hungarians decided that a bad tank was better than no tank, so production continued.

The prototype of the short 75mm gun heavy tank had been demonstrated in January 1942. An initial order for 222 vehicles was placed. Manfréd Weiss was to produce 62, Magyár Vagon 68, and Ganz 92. The first four nehéz harckocsi (heavy tank) Turán II 41.M were delivered to the 3rd Tank Regiment in May 1943, although without their main armament as ballistic tests were running late. The first 28 Turán II finally received their main guns as well as optics in July 1943.

By the end of August 1943, the Army accepted 49 Turán II. In September 14

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armored Fighting Vehicles required for the Szabolcs Plan 1.10.1943</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Toldi</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>light tank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank Rgt. Hqs.</td>
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<td>I. Tank Bn. Hqs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Med. Co.</td>
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<td>2nd Med. Co.</td>
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<td>3rd Med. Co.</td>
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<td>4th Med. Co.</td>
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<td>SP'd AA Plt.</td>
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<td>II. Tank Bn. Hqs.</td>
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<td>5th Med. Co.</td>
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<td>6th Med. Co.</td>
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<td>7th Med. Co.</td>
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<td>8th Med. Co.</td>
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<td>SP'd AA Plt.</td>
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<td>III. Tank Bn. Hqs.</td>
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<td>10th Med. Co.</td>
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<td>11th Med. Co.</td>
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<td>12th Med. Co.</td>
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<td>SP'd AA Plt.</td>
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<td>Mot. Inf. Rgt.</td>
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<td>2nd Mot. Bn. AA Plt.</td>
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<td>3rd Mot. Bn. AA Plt.</td>
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<td>SP'd AA Bn. Hqs.</td>
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<td>3rd AA Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armd. Recon. Bn.</td>
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<td>Armd. Div. Total</td>
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<td>Cavalry Div.</td>
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<td>Cav. Tank Bn. Hqs.</td>
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<td>3rd Med. Co.</td>
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<td>4th Med. Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armd Recon. Bn.</td>
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<td>Armd Recon. Bn.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bicycle Bn. AA Plt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cavalry Div. Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile Divs. Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Assault Gun Bn. (30)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Infantry Divs. (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total AFV required</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

No distinction was made in the Szabolcs Plan between the Toldi with 20mm and Toldi with 40mm guns. Photographic evidence seems to suggest that the 40mm vehicles were in the tank companies, whereas the 20mm vehicles were used in scout platoons and as AA command vehicles.

The totals include command vehicles.
vehicles were assigned to the assault gun battalions. By the end of September 74 vehicles had been delivered. When production terminated in June 1944, a total of 139 vehicles had been taken over by the Army. (54 from Manfréd Weiss, 39 from Magyár Vagon, 36 from Ganz. Plus another 10 vehicles were from an undetermined source).

The next phase called for the upgunning of the Turán II tanks with a long 75mm gun, replacing or adding more armor, and adding “skirts” over the sides of the vehicles to protect them from the horse-nosed charges. The first prototype of the new tank (Turán III) was demonstrated in June 1944, but production was never initiated owing to the Allied bombing of the Hungarian heavy industry.

In 1944 the Turán I 40.M was redesignated as the Turán 40. The Turán II 41.M as the Turán 75.

About 40 Toldi I and 40 Toldi II were upgunned to 40mm in 1943, (könnyű harckocsi 38.M Toldi IIA).

The last version (könnyű harckocsi 38.M Toldi III) had a 40mm gun and thickened armor, but only 3 were built in 1943, and 9 in 1944. Several Toldi were also converted to armored ambulances (könnyű harckocsi 43.M Toldi egészségügyi).

Hungary had acquired the license for the Swedish L62 Landsverk antiaircraft vehicle in 1941. The first prototype was demonstrated in October 1941. Production began in 1942 with an order of 135 vehicles built by MÁVAG, of which 46 were built in 1942, 77 in 1943, and the last 12 in January and February 1944. It was introduced as the Nimrod 36/40.M. In 1943 and 1944, some vehicles were converted for combat engineer use (Lehel A), and as an armored ambulance (Lehel S).

The Nimrod mounted the 40mm 40.M gun. Although it was envisaged initially as a self-propelled antiaircraft gun, it was a useful dual-purpose vehicle. The Nimrod performed well in Russia, but by 1942 the 40mm gun had become too weak for antitank use. In its role as an antiaircraft weapon, the fully automatic 40mm provided a devastating rate of fire. It was still available in late 1943 in some quantity. Its main drawback was its thin armor.

The Csaba armored car was also available in quantity, and although satisfying the Army’s needs for a wheeled reconnaissance vehicle, it was technically too complicated to be mechanically reliable.

Under Huba III a further 70 Csabas were ordered – this number later reduced to 50 – of which 12 were delivered in 1943, and 20 more in 1944. Production ceased when the Manfréd Weiss factory was destroyed by an air raid on 27.07.1944. An unconfirmed report indicates that the remaining 18 Csabas were awaiting assembly in the factory at the time.

Although the 1943 Szabolcs Plan provided for one cavalry and two armored divisions, the bottleneck in production as well as training limitations decreed by the General Staff forced the Hungarians to establish priorities as to which units received the equipment. Accordingly, the 2nd Armored Division was first to be filled up; followed by the 1st Cavalry Division. The 1st Armored Division would be the last formation to be allocated new tanks.

Tank units trained extensively. It was estimated that drivers put in 3500 kilometers per tank by January 1943. This was too much for the tanks, which began to break down. The General Staff, alarmed by this development because the tanks belonged to the active strength of the fighting units, issued a directive that tanks should not be driven more than 1000 kilometers per year. The limited capacity of Hungarian industry did not permit production of tanks specifically for training purposes. Even with this limitation, the use of practically all of the divisional vehicles for training purposes caused numerous break downs.

Driver inexperience, (for example, 80% of the drivers in the 3/I Tank Battalion were new), insufficient maintenance, and the heavy training program only aggravated the situation.

From April through June 1943, the 3/I Tank Battalion had each of its 39 vehicles repaired at least once. The 1st Tank Regiment had 51 out of 89 repaired. The 3rd Tank Regiment had to have 27 of 120 repaired.

By the Fall of 1943, the number of tanks in the three divisions was almost at the authorized level. In September 1943, the 1st Tank Regiment had to transfer 29 of its tanks to the 1st Cavalry Tank Battalion.

The original plan of having four tank regiments with two battalions each was dropped in the face of the low tank production figures, and the numbering of
the 3rd battalions was changed in November 1943. The 4/I to 3/III and 2/I to 1/III. The 3rd Tank Regiment was first to be issued the Turán II tanks. By March 1944, each battalion in the 3rd Tank Regiment had 55 vehicles. (The planned 66 vehicles – 22 per company – were never reached). During the same period, the 1st Tank Regiment had also received Turán II vehicles, so that by the end of March 1944, the two regiments had a total of 107 Turán II.

Full field exercises at regimental and divisional were a major problem. The tank units could only carry out limited combined arms training in 1943 for lack of equipment and the limitations imposed by the General Staff on the use of their vehicles. By Spring 1944, there was no longer any time for these exercises owing to the military situation.

Hungarian Border Defense Forces and the Szabolics Plan of 1943/44

Conventional border police and the customs police patrolled the border, and were subordinate to the Minister of the Interior in “peace time”. Hungary did not fully mobilize until 1944, and considered itself at peace at least within its borders – administratively – until then. No changes were made in to the border forces’ organization and composition as long as the borders were quiet, although some tension was felt along the eastern and southern borders.

Border Guard units were also on hand to defend the borders, but belonged to the Army, not the Ministry of the Interior. These Border Guard units carried out their own patrols and also maintained fortress units for the defense of the strategic passes.

The II Corps sector along the Slovakian border along was covered by the 52nd Border Police Battalion.

The VII Corps sector of the Slovakian border was patrolled by the 53rd Border Police Battalion.

The III Corps covered the German-Austrian border and had the 53rd Border Police Battalion.

The IV Corps covered the Croatian border along the Mur-Drav River with the 54th Border Police Battalion.

The V Corps guarded the Serbian border along Danube River, between the mouth of the Drav and Titel, the Tisza River (between Titel and Széged), and the Máró (between Széged and Makó). It had the 55th Border Police Battalion and

### Mobilization of Border Police, Border Guard and Fortress Units 1.03.1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Peace time Unit</th>
<th>Mobilized Unit and/or New Mobilization Unit</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>IV</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>Croatia &amp; Serbia</td>
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<td>16 Border Guard Battalion (6) + 2 Border Police Companies</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2 Mountain Brigade ¹</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>63 Border Police Battalion (3)</td>
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**SZEKLER COMMAND**

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<tr>
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<th>Mobilized Unit and/or New Mobilization Unit</th>
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<td>32 Border Guard Battalion (1)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+ 3 Fortress Companies</td>
<td>+ 3 Fortress Companies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**

Only Border Police, Border Guards, and Fortress units are shown above.

The number of companies controlled by the battalion is indicated in brackets behind it. There were also some slight changes in the number of border police and fortress companies as new units were created upon mobilization.

1) The 2nd Mountain Brigade reassigned to the Field Army upon mobilization. It was replaced by the new 72nd Border Guard Group.

2) The 1st Mountain Brigade reassigned to the Field Army upon mobilization. It was replaced by the new 71st Border Guard Group.
Chapter 9

Reconstruction and Reorganization

the 16th Border Guard Battalion. The river itself was patrolled by elements of the River Forces.

The VI Corps covered the southwestern border, encompassing the area with the cities of Orosháza – Gyula – Battonya. It had the 66th Border Guard Group with the 20th Border Guard Battalion and the 31st Border Guard Battalion. All three units had been raised before the war.

The VIII Corps covered the Slovak border to the north and the Galician/Soviet border to the east, from Kassa to Rótea along the Carpathian Mountains. The 58th Border Police Battalion covered the Slovakian border.

The 2nd Mountain Brigade (the former 8th Border Guard Brigade) commanded all units east along the Galician border. It had the 63rd Border Police Battalion, the 64th Border Police battalion, and the 65th Border Police Battalion. Upon mobilization, the 2nd Mountain Brigade raised the 72nd Border Guard Group to replace it.

The IX Corps was responsible for two areas, namely the Rumanian border to the south east and the Székel Corner.

In the south east sector it had the 60th Border Police Battalion and the 61st Border Police Battalion. Both battalions were reinforced by an engineer company. (60th and 61st). These two companies had been already been raised in peace time, and were to mine the border in case of hostilities with Rumania.

The Székel Corner was defended by units under the Székel Command which had been incorporated into the order of battle during 1943. It consisting of civilian border police, regular army border guard, and militia frontier defense units. The militia was not a border defense force. It was equipped to defend those Carpathian passes and routes which permitted enemy armor passage. In the peacetime order of battle, the 27th Light Division only had one (27th) infantry regiment. The 28th (originally the 57th) Infantry Regiment was to be raised from border units upon mobilization.

The Székel Command organization was based on the consideration that only part of Transylvania had been returned to Hungary in 1940 by the 2nd Vienna Award. This haphazard and unnatural partition of the Transylvania meant that the Székel Corner projected out into Rumania like a sore thumb. It lacked any natural geographical features along its borders for defense, making it difficult to defend or integrate into the natural defensive structure offered by the geography of the rest of Hungary.

An additional burden was the fact that the south east Carpathian Mountains and their vital passes remained in Rumanian hands.

The area awarded by the partition had no railroad communications with the rest of Hungary, and only by dint of hard work were the railroad engineers able to construct a railway line connecting it to Hungary (Százslekeence – Szerezifalva), which was finally finished in 1942.

The Hungarian High Command considered and planned for the fact that Transylvania might be cut off from Hungary proper, and would probably have to defend itself for a period of time.

This meant that the Székel Corner would have to cope without depending on support from Hungary. Hence, the Székel Corner was supplied with ammunition, fuel, and rations for a period of at least four weeks.

Provisions were also made to provide a stock of food, enough for all the inhabitants of the Székel Corner for the same period of time.

The south Székel Corner was covered by the 68th and 69th Border Guard Groups, as well as the 9th Border Guard Brigade, (with the 65th Border Guard Group, the 67th Border Guard Group and the 70th Border Guard Group). It also had the 59th Border Police Battalion and some peace time strength fortress companies.

(An interesting note about these “companies”: The fortress company of the 25th Border Guard Battalion at Borszék consisted of 193 officers and 2000 men!)

In the north Székel Corner the 1st Mountain Brigade covered the area encompassing the cities of Beszterce – Borsa – Máramarossziget – Aknaslatina. The brigade had assigned the 62nd Border Police Battalion and the 1st Fortress Battalion. In the case of mobilization, the 1st Mountain Brigade raised the 71st Border Guard Group to take over the area as well as the 66th Border Guard Battalion.

Upon mobilization, some of the Border Police Battalions were supposed to raise Border Guard battalions. The mobilization of the border defense forces was ordered by the Honvéd Ministry on 1.03.1944. Equipment for the new Border Guard Battalions – with three infantry and one MG companies and miscellaneous support units – had been stored in depots.

The upsurge partisan activity in the south (Yugoslavia) and east (Ukraine) initially only caused the border units to increase surveillance of railway lines, dams, bridges, etc. However, as these activities increased, reinforced patrols were sent out, and peace time strength infantry divisions were relocated behind these troubled sectors to reinforce the border defense forces.

Preparations for the Defense of Hungary

Considering that the Germans were well on their way to losing the war and that the Russians were also getting quite close to the Hungarian border, the Hungarians were forced to look to their own defenses. On 2.01.44, the Hungarian general staff ordered the deployment of its forces as follows:

First Army, along the eastern Carpathians:
- 10th Infantry Division at Körösmézo
- 7th Infantry Division at Kalocsa
- 16th Infantry Division at Szentiván and Ökörmező

Third Army, in Hungary:
- 6th Infantry Division at Volóc
- 20th Infantry Division at Veszérszélnás
- 24th Infantry Division at Penyesvolgy
- 2nd Mountain Brigade at Perecsény and Szolyva

I. Armored Corps as GHQ Reserve
- 1st Armored Division at Ungvár
- 2nd Armored Division at Munkács
- 1st Cavalry Division at Szobránc

The 13th Infantry Division had to remain in its garrison in Szabadka on the Yugoslav border, as the Tito partisans were becoming an ever increasing threat.

The 25th Infantry Division and the 27th Light Infantry Division were to be left on the border within Transylvania in case of unexpected Rumanian activities.

In addition to the regular divisions, there was the Second Army (in Russia) with the reserve (security) divisions which were mobilized.

Accordingly, the First Army was activated on 6.01.1944.

During the Summer and Fall of 1943 the Axis armies continued to fall back on all fronts. The Hungarians felt that Germany could not possibly win the war anymore, and was in the process of losing it more rapidly every day. Kallay redoubled his efforts to bring back the security divisions from the East Front. Discreetly and quietly – hoping not to provoke Germany – steps were taken to bring Hungary’s participation in the war down to a minimum.

The German suggestion to transfer security duties in Serbia to the Hungarians had been politely but firmly turned...
In April 1943 Hungarian pilots training in France were forbidden to fly against the Western Allies. In late fall 1943, the Hungarians again attempted to withdraw three security divisions from the Ukraine, but were thwarted by the Germans.

All these activities did not go unnoticed by the Germans. Contingency plans were therefore made in the event that Hungary decided to attempt to withdraw completely from the war, or surrender, such as the Italians had done.

The Hungarians and the Rumanians were on the verge of open warfare. The Hungarians had concentrated most of their equipped divisions along the Rumanian border, and the Rumanians had shifted a reserve division and some “training” units to this area. The Germans could not afford to let this situation go on, and after applying pressure on both parties, the situation was eased.

General Szombathelyi made three visits within a period of two months to Hitler’s headquarters at the Wolfschanze, in September and November 1943, as well as a later visit in January 1944. Each time, the C.O.S. requested the return of the security divisions from the East Front. During his visit in to Germany in January 1944, Szombathelyi stated that Hungary felt it could defend the Carpathians with Hungarian units only. Horthy had indicated that the Carpathians were the ideal defense line for southeastern Europe. It would be far easier, he indicated, to hold the Russians there than somewhere out in the plains. He felt that the Hungarians could hold the Carpathians without the assistance of the Germans, and that this could release troops for other fronts. Horthy also felt that the Hungarian soldier would fight more effectively in the immediate vicinity of, or in his homeland. If Hungary were allowed to undertake its own defense without the aid of Germany, the vital industries in Hungary would be immune from air raids, as the Allies were not bomb-hungarian industry at all, and would be unlikely to do so as long as the Hungarians did not get further involved with the Germans and stuck to fighting the Russians. Horthy based his statements to Hitler on the fact that Hungary had signed a secret treaty on 9.08.1943 with the USA and Great Britain on the deck of a British ship in neutral Turkish waters. Part of the agreement was the Hungarians would refrain from attacking Anglo-American aircraft and allowing free passage for US Army and RAF bombers from air bases in southern Italy to targets in eastern Germany. In turn, the USA and Great Britain pledged not to bomb Hungarian targets.

But in after the German occupation in March 1944 and, amongst other matters, the subsequent stationing of German aircraft on Hungarian airfields, the treaty was cancelled, and the Allies began to make plans to start bombing the Hungarian industry. Hungary was primarily engaged in producing war materials for Germany, and allowing the transit for German troops and supplies. However, the bombing did not commence until late March 1944. The delay was probably owing to the transfer of Hungary as an operation bombing zone from the British Middle East Command to the Allied Mediterranean Command. Up to this date, there had been no Luftwaffe units stationed in Hungary at the express wish of the Hungarians.

Mobilization

Hungarian Army strength in February 1944 was 450,000 men, of which 360,000 were in Hungary and 90,000 in Russia with the occupation forces. In terms of combat units, the Army had:

- 1 armored division
- 1 cavalry division
- 8 infantry divisions
- 7 reserve divisions
- 1 light division
- 2 mountain brigades
- various Border Guard groups
The First Army headquarters was mobilized on 6.03.44. Commanded by General István Nady, it was to defend Hungary along the East Carpathians.

The 16th and 24th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 2nd Mountain Brigade were assigned to the First Army. They were already on their way to the front, having been dispatched on 6.02.44. The 2nd Armored Division was assigned to the Army reserve. The First Army was under complete Hungarian control, and was not bound by any German orders. Mobilization had taken place battalion by battalion, in the least conspicuous manner, (and consequently had taken until the middle of February 1944), owing to the troublesome situation with motor vehicles, and also so as not to alarm the civilian population. In the deployment areas, a maximum of five to six trains with military equipment were allowed to be off loaded per day. Train schedules were rearranged so that the trains arrived at their destinations after nightfall, thereby allowing the off loading to take place in the dark. In addition, divisional supply elements were not mobilized until the second echelon, and consequently did not arrive until early March 1944.

The First Army divided the Carpathians into two defense sectors. The boundary dividing the two sectors was between Kelecseny and Kereszke. On the east was the 16th Infantry Division, on the west the 24th Infantry Division. All units of the 2nd Mountain well as the Border Guard battalions in the area were parceled out amongst these two divisions. The 2nd Armored Division was Army Reserve, and, together with First Army headquarters, was stationed at Munkács.

In February 1944 the Soviet Air Force showed increasing interest in the area of the cities of Körösmező, Mármarossziget and Kelecseny and Kereszke. On the east dividing the two sectors was between February 1944.

The first days of March 1944 found the Axis armies on the East Front in a very sorry state indeed. Besides the heavy fighting all along the front, the Soviet forces had encircled strong German forces at Cernovic, and had thereby opened a yawning gap of over 200 kilometers between Tarnopol and Cernovic.

Italy’s example in 1943 had made Germany very sensitive about another ally dropping out of the war. Hungary’s perfectly justified overtures to the Allies had not gone unnoticed.

The very obvious lack of will on the part of the Hungarians to further participate militarily, and their continued efforts to get the security units back to Hungary, were regarded by the Germans as further marks unreliability.

The Germans felt that the Hungarian Government was unwilling to send units into the Balkans because it feared that its troops would come into conflict with possible Allied forces landing there. (On the other hand, the reports coming out of Hungary indicated that the Hungarian Army could be relied on by the Germans; no Hungarian soldier would turn his weapon against a German.)

There were additional factors, such as the Hungarian refusal to deliver captured British and American airmen to the Germans; the refusal to provide air bases for the Luftwaffe in Hungary; the very belated recognition of the reinstated Musolini; the naming of anti-Germans to important positions within the government; the tendency of Hungarian radio and newspaper news to go into more details regarding the Allies than of the Germans, etc., etc. The Hungarian efforts to seek a separate peace with the western Allies were a major cause for the German grievance. Through her ambassador in Lisbon, Portugal, Hungary offered unconditional surrender to the Western Allies on 7.02.44, but not to the Russians! It was only the Western Allies’ determination to hold together with Russia that defeated these attempts. Hungary was very ardent in her attempts at suing for peace. Hungary was difficult to turn down, as sympathy for her cause still existed in many western circles.

The continuing refusal by the Hungarians to upgrade their security forces in Russia was another major contributing factor in the bad feelings between the two nations.

The tensions between Rumania and Hungary was a major detraction from the war effort of both these countries, and was to be settled once and for all.

The Germans also felt that the equipment they had delivered and shared with the Hungarian Army was laying around useless, and could be better used elsewhere. The Germans also felt that the Hungarians were not sending all the oil that their production could spare.

Whatever the main reason, the Germans decided to put into effect their plans for keeping Hungary in the war. This involved the occupation of Hungary by German military forces.

It must be remembered that Hungary was a sovereign nation. Its leaders had the moral obligation and the political duty and the sovereign right to do what was best for Hungary and its people. Germany had proved itself an unreliable ally, who refused to sell Hungary the necessary weapons or the rights to manufacture them, who withheld equipment already paid for, (motor vehicles and weapons such as the 105mm antiaircraft guns, etc.), who held the security forces as hostages to Hungary’s participation in the war, who conscripted thousands of Hungarian citizens into the Waffen-SS, (the “Volksdeutscher” in the Bácska) – many against their will – and who threatened hundreds of thousands of its citizens with deportation and extermination, (the Jews, the Gypsies, Serbs, etc.), and who threatened the very integrity of Hungary and the safety of its citizens by planning to defend the Nazi Reich on Hungarian soil.

One of the main aims of the German occupation was to insure that the Hun-

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>German Order of Battle for Fall Margareta 19.03.1944</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Oberbefehlshaber Südost (Vienna)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>XXII. Gebirgskorps</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Kampfführung A (south from the Banat)</td>
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<td>92. Grenadier-Regiment (mot)</td>
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<td>45. Panzer-Bataillon (mot)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LXIII. Armeekorps z.B.V.</strong></td>
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<td>(northwest from Vienna)</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. SS-Panzerdivision z.B.V.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1./5. Panther-Regiment (Panther)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>907. schwere Artillerie-Abteilung (mot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one motorized bridge column</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one engineer construction battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LXXXVIII. Armeekorps z.B.V.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(north from Neumarkt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1029. Grenadier-Regiment (mot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1030. Grenadier-Regiment (mot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one battalion Regiment Brandenburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one motorized bridge column</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one engineer construction battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In Reserve:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Panzer-Division (in France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100. Jäger-Division (in Belgrad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>507. schwere Panzer-Abteilung (in Holland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301. Panzer-Abteilung (Funklenk) (in Italy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
garian economy continued production without stop. Field Marshal Keitel – C.O.S. of the OKW (German Armed Forces High Command) – had issued orders to the invading forces that expressly forbade damaging or interfering in any way with the economy.

The top Hungarian military leaders (Horthy – the Head of State, General Ferenc Szombathelyi – the Army C.O.S., Jenő Ghyczy – the Foreign Minister, and General Lajos Cstay – the Honvéd Min-ister), had been invited to Germany to meet with Hitler to discuss military top-ics, in particular the return of the occupa-tion forces from the East Front. They had been purposely lured to Germany so that the main Hungarian leadership would be away from the scene of events at the critical time and thereby unable to influence events. They arrived in Ger-many on 18.03.1944.

In the meeting with Horthy, Hitler threat-ened the regent with imprisonment if the Hungarians did not accede the occupation without resistance. He also threatened to allow the Rumanians, Slovaks, Serbs, and Croatians to assist in the occupation of Hungary if the Hungarians did not cooper-ate. (However, this was merely a bluff, and was never seriously contemplated). The “anti-German” government in power, with premier Kállay at its head, was to be re-placed. Hitler promised to withdraw the occupying troops once a new cabinet more to his liking had been sworn in.

The German Army began its occupation of Hungary on 19.03.44. Only two inci-dents of resistance were encountered.

Based on a misunderstanding some shots were fired at Pétervárad, near Újvidek.

The IX Corps mobilized, but on receiv-ing no confirmation from the VFK or Admiral Horthy, stood down. The great majority of the population and even most of the military did not really know the exact status of German-Hungarian rela-tions was, and remained passive. The fact that the German stab in the back failed to provoke more resistance is because the Hungarians were so anti-Communist and anti-Russian.

Units of the GESTAPO (German secret police) commanded by SS leader Otto Skorzeny, arrest Gen. Lajos Keresztes-Fischer, the Minister of Interior, (the Regent’s former Military Chief of Staff), Prime Minister Miklos Kállay, many Hungarian statesmen, politicians, lead-ing military personnel, and confine them to detention camps.

Contrary to the Hungarian politicians, many of the senior officers were openly sympathetic to the Germans. In any event, most of those troops that were mobilized and equipped – and there-fore could have offered a coherent re-sistance – were either in the Carpathian Mountains or in Russia. Matters were not helped by the fact that at this criti-cal moment the Russians increased the pressure on the troops east of the Car-pathians, and had advanced to within 100 kilometers of the eastern Hungarian border.

On 1.05.1944, German forces stationed in Hungary were as follows: 53,425 troops in the operational zone 2,032 in western Hungary 1,793 in Budapest.

By 1.06.1944, this number had decreased to some extent, and the emphasis on location had been changed to the capital: 41,661 troops in the operational zone 1,738 in western Hungary 3,077 in Budapest.

Under German Administration

On 20.03.1944, the Croatians decided to take advantage of the German occupa-tion and announced their claim to the Mur Island occupied in 1941 by Hun-gary. The Hungarian General Staff re-quested – and received permission – to move elements of the III Corps to the south west border.

By 21.03.1944, the leading elements of the various German Kampfgruppen had met at the Tisza River. The new pro-German cabinet was installed on 23.03.1944. The Germans regarded the occupation of Hungary as completed by 24.03.1944.

The area between the Tisza River and the Carpathian Mountains was declared to be an operational zone under complete Ger-man military control as of 25.03.1944, and included all Hungarian units in the area.

On 11.03.1944 Feldmarschall Keitel is-sued orders that the main mission of the new German administration in Hungary was to secure the continued functioning of agricultural, the oil industry, the ar-maments factories, and mines as vital to the German war effort.

Although the Szabolcs Plan had foresen a certain continuing reorganization in 1944 for the Army, the 1943 aspect of the plan had not been completed except for the personnel and organizational aspects, and even these were behind schedule. To further complicate the matter, the Ger-man invasion brought with it the German demands to move parts of the Hungarian armaments industry to the Reich.

In June 1944, General der Infanterie Walter Bühle, representing the OKW (German Armed Forces High Command), came to Hungary and met with General Cstay, the Honvéd Minister.

The subject of the meeting was to dis-cuss the armaments industry, and the equipping of the Hungarian Army with German weapons. Since 90% of the weapons being produced in Hungary – as was almost the entire industrial out-put – were bound for Germany, (which in turn also supplied most of the raw materials for the production), the Army was not receiving much in the way of modern equipment from the Hungarian industry. The talks resulted in the “Bühle Contract” of 10.06.1944. It promised that the equipment and arms that the Army lacked because of the deliveries of the Hungarian industry to Germany would be in turn compen-sated by the Germans. The Bühle Con-tract fixed German deliveries of weap-ons and equipment in the annex of the contract. The annex was known as the “Elch Program”.

The Elch Program supposedly com-mitted the Germans to a monthly de-livery of: 700 light machine-guns 250 heavy machine-guns 200 mortars 35 antitank guns (75mm) 24 howitzers (105mm) 8 antiaircraft guns (80mm) 25 Hetzer tank destroyers

However, ammunition for the above was not included in the Elch Program.

It was intended by the Hungarians to use these deliveries to modernize their divisions which had been mobilized for war, but were still located in the peacetime garrisons. The Hungarian equipment freed by these deliveries was to be passed on to the reserve divisions in Hungary and on the East Front as well as replacement forma-tions in Hungary.

General der Artillerie Eduard Wagner, the Quartermaster-General of the German Army, came to Budapest and promised that the German Army would replace lost and worn out material for the Hungarian combat divisions at the front in the same manner as for Ger-man units.

The Hungarian industry was contracted to deliver weapons to the Army each month, over and above what the Ger-mans were delivering: 400 light machine-guns 40 heavy machine-guns 50 mortars
Unfortunately, the Germans and the Hungarians did not come away from the meeting with the same interpretation of the Elch Program. The Germans assumed that the weapons should be delivered to those divisions already at the front, where enough ammunition was available to use the weapons at once. So they began to insist that the deliveries be sent to the front, and not into the Hungarian for divisions in the process of mobilizing.

As the Germans would only deliver the promised arms and equipment to those divisions at the front, (which included the divisions of the II Reserve Corps), the Hungarians found that they had little prospect of establishing and training a modern army within Hungary.

The Hungarians planned to raise four infantry divisions with modern equipment in Hungary by August 1944. But only the 7th Infantry Division (in June 1944) and the 20th Infantry Division (in August 1944) was issued German equipment in accordance with the Hungarian interpretation of the Bühle Contract.

Unfortunately, the Hungarian equipment so freed did not go to the reserve or replacement divisions in Hungary as planned, but had to be used to replace losses sustained by the combat divisions at the front. In addition, German commands seized shipments of the “Elch Program” for their own use while they were enroute to the front. These were usually counted by Germany as having been delivered. Furthermore, the promised resupply in the field by the Germans rarely took place, and Hungarian equipment had to be used instead.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFANTRY DIVISIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORIZED MAIN WEAPONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>light MG</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943 Infantry Division (Szabolcs I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bicycle Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cavalry Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944 Infantry Division (Szabolcs II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assault Gun Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bicycle Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cavalry Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944/45 Infantry Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank Battalion</td>
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<td>Bicycle Company</td>
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<td>Cavalry Company</td>
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<td>Reconnaissance Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Organizational Changes in 1944

The new Szabolcs Plan II of 1.03.1944, coupled with the occupation of Hungary in March 1944 by the Germans, brought many organizational changes. The promised modern equipment covered in the Bühle Contract caused the modification of some of the equipment authorized in the Szabolcs Plan. As indicated above, this affected only those divisions sent to or on the front, and then only for some of them.

As foreseen by the mobilization plan, the field forces now had only the First Army and five corps headquarters (II, VI, VII, VIII (redesignated in April 1944 as II Reserve Corps), and IX Corps.

The Second Army (functioning as the Hungarian Occupation Forces Command) had been relieved on 6.04.1944. After mobilizing the active infantry divisions, the I, III, IV, and V Military Districts were to remain behind. When it returned from the East Front in April 1944, the VIII Corps Headquarters was also relegated to cadre status.

The Second Army, the Third Army, the I Armored Corps, the Engineer Command Staffs, the Signal Command Staffs, as well as the Artillery Command Staffs were to be discontinued.

This plan, which was to allow a simplification and a streamlining of the command structures in the field, could only be partially achieved owing to main three factors.

The first was the activation of the Replacement Army on 1.05.1944.

The second was that many measures meant to implement the Szabolcs Plan were often hampered by German intervention.

The third was the rapidly deteriorating situation of the East Front. Most of the corps headquarters remained in existence to one extent or another. The Second and Third Armies – which had been discontinued in the meantime – were raised again. Even the artillery command staffs had to be reactivated.

In August 1944, the Military Police Service (harcgegyelembiztositó szervezet) was established. On 7.08.1944 each division and brigade in the Army received a military police staff (battalion level) and a military police company. These units were mainly engaged in maintaining order in the rear areas.

Most of the combat units of the infantry divisions existed in the peace time order of battle as cadres which could be quickly filled up with personnel. Except for a couple of transport columns and a cadre command staff, the supply and support services were mobilization units.

The infantry divisions were modified from the Szabolcs I to the Szabolcs II Plan during the spring and summer of 1944. The changes in the infantry division from the Szabolcs I Plan of 1.10.1943 to that of the Szabolcs II Plan of 1.03.1944 are listed below. (See also table on page 109).

The infantry regimental units were consolidated into a headquarters company, which was also further strengthened. The mortar company was authorized 12 heavy mortars. The antitank company was equipped with 9 heavy (75mm) antitank guns. The infantry companies were to be strengthened with more weapons. (The antitank rifles (20mm) were not longer included, as their production had ceased).

The reconnaissance battalion platoons were consolidated into a headquarters company, to which a motor maintenance platoon was added. The Mortar Platoon was to be upgraded to company size with heavy (120mm) mortars added. The Antitank Platoon was to be converted to heavy antitank guns. The Bicycle and Cavalry Companies were also authorized more equipment.

The artillery regiment received a motorized heavy battalion with 2 batteries of 4 field howitzers. The former 4th battery was supposed to be ceded to the reserve division of the parent Military District.

The Szabolcs Plan II also foresaw an assault gun battalion for each infantry division. The 2nd – 8th Assault Gun Battalions were renumbered as 7th, 10th, 13th, 16th, 20th, 24th, and 25th, respectively, to indicate the infantry division to which they were supposed to be assigned. Confusingly, the 1st Assault Gun Battalion was not redesignated as the 6th.

Slow production of the Zrínyi assault guns prevented the implementation of this plan.

The total number of supply columns in each infantry division was reduced from 11 to 7.

Personnel to fill up the mobilized units to full war time strength was provided by mid-1944 by means of March Battalions. Motorization was inadequate. The motor vehicles were overwhelmingly from the civilian sector, and were of many makes and models.

Starting in the Summer of 1944, the Army attempted to reorganize its infantry divisions along German lines. This lead to the first formations mobilized (6th, 7th, 10th, and 13th) receiving additional units and equipment, such as platoons of heavy antitank guns. An antiaircraft battalion with two batteries of 80mm guns and a heavy artillery battalion with two batteries of 149mm howitzers (both from GHQ Troops) were permanently assigned. They were also each given an additional motorized supply column.

These extras could only be done at cost to the other, non-mobilized infantry divisions. When these other divisions were mobilized, the heavy antitank platoons was to be returned to them.

On 1.05.1944, the Replacement Army was raised, and the replacement system of the Army was restructured. All the units participating in the personnel replacement pipeline were consolidated under this new command. The infantry divisions raised field replacement battalions. Personnel for these battalions would be received from a newly-raised, single central replacement and training depot (kiképző és felázerelő központ – abbreviated to kık ) in each Military District. During the Fall of 1944, personnel replacements were also received from other combat formations which had been dissolved.

The regimental heavy mortar companies could not be provided with enough weapons. The few mortars (120mm) available were assigned to the artillery regiments, which maintained a battery with eight weapons each.

In the Fall of 1944, a new organization was proposed as the 1944/1945 organization. It was a further attempt by the Army to create an infantry division structure identical to that of the German Army. In some cases, even the weapons were to be German. The plan remained basically stillborn. Weapons and equipment were not available in enough numbers. Replacements were not forthcoming for the few German weapons the Hungarians had. And the continuing losses of equipment and arms in combat could not be made up from either domestic or foreign sources.

The reserve divisions foreseen by the Szabolcs Plans were supposed to have the same organization as the infantry divisions, although they only were authorized three artillery battalions. (The fourth was to come later from the infantry divisions). However, the light divisions on the East Front which were supposed to become the reserve divisions were never really fully reorganized in accordance with the Szabolcs Plan II.
and remained Huba III light divisions under reduced strength tables of organiza-
tion and equipment. Many improvisa-
tions and some improvements took place in 1943 and 1944. (See Chapter 13 – The
Hungarian Occupation Forces). Those
reserve divisions that were supposed to
be raised in Hungary in accordance with
the Szabolcs Plans were not activated for
lack of equipment.

The 27th Light Division was a regular
infantry formation under the new Szabolcs
Plan organization. It only had one infantry
regiment and one artillery battalion with
correspondingly reduced supply and sup-
port service units. (The second infantry
regiment and a second artillery battalion
were to be raised upon mobilization). On
1.10.1943, it was assigned to the Székely
Command. Its was to serve as the mobile
reserve of this command in case of a Ruma-
nian surprise attack on southern Transyl-
vanian. Upon mobilization, the 57th Infan-
try Regiment and the II/27th Artillery Regi-
ment were filled up by personnel from the
Székely Corner. The remaining units were
to be raised by replacement units of the 25th
Infantry Division. The 27th Light Division
was also known as the “Székely” Division.
This subordination was dissolved by the
Germans in May 1944, and the division
was assigned to the First Army.

Contrary to the mobilization plan, the
27th Light Division was filled up with personnel from the Székely Corner. Mo-
bilization was completed by mid-1944.
It was reinforced with a 149mm howitzer
battery and an 80mm antiaircraft battery.
The artillery was reequipped with Ger-
man 10.5cm howitzers in August 1944.

On 15.11.1944 27th Light Division was
converted to a 1944 infantry division with 3 infantry regiments and redesign-
ated as the 27th Infantry Division.

The peace time organization of the 1st and
2nd Mountain Brigades closely resembled
that of their mobilized organizations. The
combat units, stationed directly behind
Hungary’s borders, had been at almost full
mobilization strength since the beginning of
the war. The supply and support units
were at 85% of full strength.

The mountain brigades were also reorga-
nized in accordance with the Szabolcs II
Plan. The battalion units were consoli-
dated into a Headquarters Company. The
Mortar Platoon received 120mm instead
of 81mm equipment. The three infantry,
The MG, and the cavalry companies were
strengthened.

The mountain gun batteries which had
been organically assigned to the mountain
infantry battalions prior to 1.10.1943 were
consolidated under an artillery battalion
headquarters. They maintained their old
numbering corresponding to their former
parent mountain battalions.

During the Summer of 1944, the two
mountain brigades each received a mo-
torized heavy artillery battery (149mm
howitzers) and an antiaircraft battery
(80mm guns).

The brigades raised field replacement
battalions, formed from the March Bat-
talions of the VIII and IX Military Dis-
tricts. With the establishment of the Re-
placement Army on 1.05.1944, all re-
placement units for the mountain bri-
gades were assembled under into two
field replacement brigades, and

The tank regiment’s subunits were con-
solidated into a headquarters company.
The tank battalions’ self-propelled anti-
aircraft platoons were joined into a com-
pany at regimental level. The battalions
received a second heavy tank company.
The Toldi tank platoons were deleted
from the companies.

The reconnaissance battalion units were
also consolidated into a headquarters com-
pany. The antitank platoon received 3
heavy antitank guns. The Infantry and heavy
companies were strengthened.

The reconnaissance battalion units were
consolidated into a headquarters com-
pany. The antitank platoon received 3
heavy antitank guns and was reinforced
by a mortar company. The armored car
company was deleted. Instead, the bat-
talion received a company with light Toldi
 tanks. The reconnaissance component
was augmented by a second motorcycle
company. These three reconnaissance
companies were organized in the same
way as the motorized infantry companies

The signal battalion received a third,
heavy telephone construction company.

The 2nd Armored Division was assigned
a third battalion with heavy howitzers in
March 1944, the independent 1 Motor-
ized Heavy Artillery Battalion.

The 2nd Armored Division was filled up
to full mobilized strength by mid-1944.
The motor vehicle situation, as discussed
elsewhere, was appalling. The supply
trains of the combat and signal com-
panies consisted almost entirely of requisi-
tioned civilian motor vehicles. The same
applied in part for the trains of the artil-
ley and antiaircraft batteries.

The 2nd Armored Division had absolute
priority regarding equipment. The lack of
motor vehicles and tanks meant that the 1st
Armored Division was removed from the
order of battle until enough Hungarian
vehicles and equipment could be provided
to equip this formation. The units of the 1st
Armored Division were relegated as re-
placement units for the 2nd Armored Divi-
sion. The 1st Armored Division had only
weak cadres, so as enable the division to be
made ready when, and if, the necessary
equipment became available. The 1st Mo-
torized Regiment was made into a normal
(foot) infantry regiment.

The extreme scarcity of vehicles meant
that other parts of the 2nd Armored Divi-
sion had to be virtually de-motorized on
1.04.1944. The units were affected by
this measure:

7th Motorized Artillery Battalion
3rd Battery/I Motorized Artillery Battalion.
2nd Motorized Traffic Control Company
1/2nd & 2/2nd Bridge Columns
1/2nd & II/2nd Supply Service Command Staffs
2/2nd Supply Services Anti-Aircraft Com-
mpany
three cross-country ammunition columns
two motorized ammunition columns
one fuel column
one engineer equipment column
The 1st Cavalry Division was raised on 1.10.1942 in accordance with the Huba III Plan, absorbing most of the two cavalry brigades. The Szabolcs I Plan foresaw the expansion of the formation to a modern cavalry division.

Hungary had a cavalry division mainly for economic reasons. But Hungary also had a long, rich tradition of cavalry, and also had a large number of good horse stock within its borders. It was a mobile formation within what was a basically an infantry army. The experiences of the 1941 Russian Campaign had moved the Honvéd Minister dissolve all horsed units and to replace them with bicycle troops. Admiral Horthy, in his function as head of state and Army supreme commander – under protest of the Army General Staff – cancelled this plan. He pointed out that Hungary had a glorious cavalry tradition, he ordered the accelerated formation of the Cavalry Division.

The Cavalry Division was the mobile reserve of the Army supreme command for the defense in Hungary, and not to be used outside of the borders of the nation. The horses were conceived only as being a method of transporting infantry quickly in a country not overly blessed with good roads. It was obvious to all concerned that cavalry was particularly vulnerable to armored and air attack, as had been amply shown by the 1st Cavalry Brigade in the 1941 Russian Campaign in the Ukraine.

Training in the Cavalry Division was based on using the horses to move rapidly over large areas through any terrain to be encountered in Hungary. Once the horses arrived at their destination, their riders were to dismount and fight as infantry. To support the weight of the infantry attack, motorized and bicycle elements, as well as a tank battalion, had been added to the organization of the division. It was also obvious to the Army that although it was faster than infantry, the horsed infantry was by no means as fast as mechanized units, and could not compete, let alone fight them on an even footing.

Dismounted, the cavalry division had a combat strength equivalent to a very strong infantry regiment. The 10 artillery batteries supplied an overwhelming, tactical, battlefield firepower edge, but heavy long range artillery was completely missing. After the experiences in 1941, any further idea of including tanks within the Huszár regiments was completely abandoned. Even the motorized heavy weapons could on occasion not keep up with the mounted units in rough terrain.

Whatever the combat strength of the Cavalry Division, it had an inner strength based on its long traditions.

The peace time garrisons of the Cavalry Division were spread out over the 5th, 8th, and 9th Military Districts. All units, excluding the logistics units, were fully mobilized. The Cavalry Division also suffered the same problems regarding motor vehicles as the armored divisions did.

Changes effecting the Cavalry Division in 1944 were:

The Huszár regiments received an heavy antitank company, and a mortar company with 12 mortars (81mm). The cavalry MG companies were strengthened, and authorized a heavy antitank platoon. The battalion subunits of the bicycle battalion were gathered into a headquarters company, the antitank platoon was re-equipped with 3 heavy guns, and a motorcycle scout platoon was added. The self-propelled antiaircraft platoon was deleted.

The reconnaissance battalion platoons were consolidated into a headquarters company. The antitank platoon received heavy antitank guns. The battalion was reinforced by a mortar company.

The 1st Cavalry Tank Battalion was converted to 1 heavy and 3 light companies. The 2nd Horse Artillery Battalion was raised from the regimental horse artillery batteries. A signal battalion with two companies was raised. The Cavalry Division was de-motorized in Spring 1944 under the optimistic assumption that it would not mobilized in the near future.

When the Cavalry Division was mobilized on 25.04.1944, it received 39 heavy antitank guns and a motorized heavy artillery battery (1/VII).

The replacement depots for the Cavalry Division were moved west of the Danube from the 5th, 8th, and 9th Military Districts and gathered under the Central Cavalry Training Group (Körzponyi lovás kiképző csoport). It was again moved in November 1944 to the area north of Lake Balaton, and in December 1944 north of the Danube River to Csalókőz, the Great Schütt Island.

After losing all its tanks, the 1st Cavalry Tank Battalion was removed from the division. The personnel were used in the Danube line under command of the River Brigade.

The 1st Cavalry Division was renamed the 1st Royal Hungarian Huszár Division on 1.08.1944.

* * *

NOTE:
The organizational diagrams presented on the following pages depict mobilized formations in accordance with the 1943 Szabolcs I and 1944 Szabolcs II Plans. It is must be emphasized that the diagrams represent ideal organizations that were rarely, if ever, achieved.
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Divisional Supply and Support Services Headquarters

1. Anti-Aircraft Company (12 AAMG)(horse-drawn/wagon-mounted)
2. 4 Supply Columns (horse-drawn wagons)
3. 5 Supply Columns (horse-drawn carts)
4. 3 Supply Columns (pack animal)
5. 1 Supply Column (ammunition)(horse-drawn wagons)
6. 1 Supply Administration Unit (ammunition)(horse-drawn carts)
7. 1 Supply Administration Unit (ammunition)(pack animal)
8. 1 Maintenance Company
9. 1 Veterinary Company
10. 1 Mountain Combat Bridge Column
11. 1 Supply Administration Unit (ammunition)
12. 1 Maintenance Company
13. 1 Veterinary Company
14. 1 Mountain Combat Bridge Column
15. 1 Supply Administration Unit (ammunition)
16. 1 Supply Administration Unit (rations)
17. 1 Field Bakery Company
18. 1 Medical Company (partially motorized)
19. 1 Ambulance Column (motorized)
20. 4 Field Replacement Companies

**NOTES:**

The two Mountain Brigades each raised a Border Guard Group (Hv.) upon mobilization. Attached was a varying number of static Border Police (Po.) and Fortress Infantry (Er.) Companies.

Upon general mobilization, the Border Police units remained assigned to the Ministry of the Interior. (Unless they raised a Border Guard Battalion, which was reassigned to the Honvéd Ministry). The Border Police, the Border Guard and the Fortress units remained in place, and did not follow the Mountain Brigades into the field.
### Division Headquarters
- Divisional Artillery Commander
- Divisional Infantry Commander
- Field Post Unit

### Infantry Regiments
- Bicycle Pioneer Platoon (3 LMG)
- Field Telephone Platoon
- Cavalry Scout Platoon (3 LMG)
- Mortar Company (8 mortars [81mm])
- Motorcycle Anti-Tank Company (8 ATG [40mm])

### Infantry Battalions
- Field Telephone Platoon
- Anti-Tank Platoon (4 ATG [40mm])
- 3 Infantry Companies (12 LMG + 2 mortars [50mm] + 2 ATG [20mm])
- Machine Gun Company (12 HMG + 4 mortars [81mm])

### Reconnaissance Battalions
- 1 Csaba armored car
- Bicycle Pioneer Platoon (3 LMG)
- Bicycle Telephone Platoon
- Armored Pioneer Platoon (4 ATG [40mm])
- Mortar Platoon (4 mortars [81mm])
- Bicycle Infantry Company (12 LMG + 2 mortars [50mm] + 2 ATG [20mm])

### Combat Engineer Battalions
- 3 Combat Engineer Companies (4 LMG + 2 HMG)
- 1 Heavy Combat Bridge Column

### Signal Battalion
- Telephone Company (5 LMG)
- Radio Company (4 LMG)

### Artillery Battalions
- 2 Light Artillery Batteries (4 horse-drawn field howitzers [100mm])
- 1 Heavy Artillery Battery (4 horse-drawn field howitzers [149mm])

### Artillery Observation Battery
- Anti-Aircraft Battery (12 motorized anti-aircraft guns [40mm])

### Divisional Supply and Support Services Headquarters
- Anti-Aircraft Company (12 AAMGs [horse-drawn/wagon-mounted])
- Supply Command
  - 7 Supply Columns (ammunition [horse-drawn wagons])
  - 2 Supply Columns (ammunition [motorized])
  - 1 Supply Administration Unit (ammunition)
  - 1 Supply Administration Unit (rations)
  - 1 Field Bakery Company
  - 1 Medical Company (motorized)
  - 1 Field Hospital
  - 2 Ambulance Columns (motorized)
  - 1 Veterinary Company
  - 1 Motorized Maintenance Company
  - 1 Guard Company
  - 1 Engineer Equipment Company
  - 1 Band

### Military Labor Battalion
- 3 Military Labor Companies
Chapter 9  Reconstruction and Reorganization

Division Headquarters
Divisional Artillery Commander
Divisional Infantry Commander
Field Post Unit

Infantry Regiments
- Headquarters Company, with
  - Bicycle Pioneer Platoon (3 LMG)
  - Field Telephone Platoon
  - Cavalry Scout Platoon (3 LMG + 2 mortars [50mm])
- Mortar Company (12 mortars [120mm])
- Motorized Anti-Tank Company (9 ATG [75mm] + 9 LMG)

Infantry Battalions
- Field Telephone Platoon
- Anti-Tank Platoon (4 ATG [40mm])
- Machine Gun Company (12 HMG + 8 mortars [81mm])

Reconnaissance Battalion (1 Csaba armored car)
- Headquarters Company, with
  - Armored Car Platoon (4 Csaba armored cars)
  - Bicycle Pioneer Platoon (3 LMG)
  - Bicycle Telephone Platoon
  - Motorized Maintenance Platoon
  - Motorized Anti-Tank Platoon (3 ATG [75mm] + 3 LMG)
- Mortar Company (8 mortars [110mm] + 4 mortars [120mm])
- Bicycle Infantry Company (9 LMG + 3 HMG + 6 mortars [50mm])
- Cavalry Company (9 LMG + 3 HMG + 6 mortars [50mm])

Combat Engineer Battalion
- 3 Combat Engineer Companies (4 LMG + 2 HMG)
- 1 Heavy Combat Bridge Column

Signal Battalion
- Telephone Company (5 LMG)
- Radio Company (4 LMG)

Assault Gun Battalion
- 2 Assault Gun Batteries (10 Zrinyi [75mm] assault guns)
- 1 Assault Gun Battery (10 Zrinyi [105mm] assault guns)

Artillery Battalions
- 2 Light Artillery Batteries (4 horse-drawn field howitzers [100mm])
- 1 Heavy Artillery Battery (4 horse-drawn field howitzers [149mm])

Motorized Heavy Artillery Battalion
- 2 Motorized Artillery Batteries (4 towed field howitzers [149mm])

Artillery Observation Battery
- Anti-Aircraft Battery (12 motorized anti-aircraft guns [40mm])

Divisional Supply and Support Services Headquarters
- Supply Command
  - 5 Supply Columns (ammunition/horse-drawn wagons)
  - 1 Supply Column (ammunition/motorized)
  - 1 Supply Column (ammunition/motorized)
  - 1 Supply Administration Unit (ammunition)
  - 1 Supply Administration Unit (rations)
  - 1 Field Bakery Company
  - 1 Medical Company (partially motorized)
  - 1 Field Hospital
  - 2 Ambulance Columns (motorized)
  - 1 Veterinary Company
  - 1 Motorized Maintenance Company
  - 1 Guard Company
  - 1 Engineer Equipment Company
  - 1 Band

Military Labor Battalion
- 3 Military Labor Companies

Field Replacement Battalion
- 4 Field Replacement Companies

1944 Infantry Division (March 1944)
### 1943/44 Reserve Division (March 1944)

#### Division Headquarters
- Divisional Artillery Commander
- Divisional Infantry Commander

#### Infantry Regiments
- Field Post Unit
- Bicycle Pioneer Platoon (3 LMG)
- Field Telephone Platoon
- Cavalry Scout Platoon (3 LMG)
- Anti-Tank Company (8 ATG [40mm])

#### Infantry Battalions
- Field Telephone Platoon
- Anti-Tank Platoon (4 ATG [40mm])
- 3 Infantry Companies (12 LMG + 2 HMG)
  - Machine Gun Company (12 HMG + 4 mortars [81mm])

#### Reconnaissance Battalion
- 1 Csaba armored car
- 3 Reconnaissance Platoons (12 Csaba armored cars)
- Bicycle Pioneer Platoon (3 LMG)
- Bicycle Telephone Platoon
- Anti-Tank Platoon (4 ATG [40mm])
- Mortar Platoon (4 mortars [81mm])
- Bicycle Infantry Company (12 LMG + 4 mortars [50mm])

#### Combat Engineer Battalion
- 3 Combat Engineer Companies (4 LMG + 2 HMG)
  - 1 Heavy Combat Bridge Column

#### Signal Battalion
- Telephone Company (5 LMG)
- Radio Company (4 LMG)

#### Artillery Battalions
- 2 Light Artillery Batteries (4 horse-drawn field howitzers [100mm])
  - 1 Heavy Artillery Battery (4 horse-drawn field howitzers [149mm])

#### Artillery Observation Battery
- Anti-Aircraft Battery (12 motorized anti-aircraft guns [40mm])

#### Divisional Supply and Support Services Headquarters
- Supply Command
  - 5 Supply Columns (ammunition/horse-drawn wagons)
  - 1 Supply Column (rations/horse-drawn wagons)
  - 1 Supply Column (ammunition/motorized)
  - 1 Supply Administration Unit (ammunition)
  - 1 Supply Administration Unit (rations)
  - 1 Field Bakery Company
  - 1 Medical Company (partially motorized)
  - 1 Field Hospital
  - 1 Ambulance Column (motorized)
  - 1 Veterinary Company
  - 1 Motorized Maintenance Company
  - 1 Guard Company
  - 1 Engineer Equipment Company
  - 1 Band

#### Anti-Aircraft Battery
- 12 motorized anti-aircraft guns (40mm)

### Notes:
The 1943/44 Reserve Divisions basically reflect the organization as authorized for the Infantry and Reserve Divisions on 11.11.1943, but without the additional equipment issued to those formations being mobilized in March 1944. Non-mobilized Infantry Divisions maintained the old organization. However, the Reserve Divisions were very much under strength according to the new Szabolcs Plan. (See the chapter on Hungarian Occupation Forces).
Chapter 9  Reconstruction and Reorganization

Division Headquarters
Divisional Artillery Commander
Divisional Infantry Commander
Field Post Unit

Infantry Regiments
Headquarters Company, with
- Bicycle Pioneer Platoon (3 LMG)
- Field Telephone Platoon
- Cavalry Scout Platoon (3 LMG)
- Mortar Company (8 mortars [81mm])
- Anti-Tank Company (4 ATG [40mm])

Infantry Battalions
Field Telephone Platoon
Anti-Tank Platoon (4 ATG [40mm])
3 Infantry Companies (12 LMG + 6 HMG)
1 Machine Gun Company (12 HMG + 8 mortars [81mm])

Reconnaissance Battalion
1 Csaba armored car

Headquarters Company, with
- Armored Car Platoon (4 Csaba armored cars)
- Bicycle Pioneer Platoon (3 LMG)
- Bicycle Telephone Platoon
- Motorized Anti-Tank Platoon (3 ATG [75mm] + 3 LMG)
- Mortar Platoon (4 mortars [81mm])
- Bicycle Infantry Company (12 LMG + 2 mortars [50mm])

Combat Engineer Company (4 LMG + 2 HMG)

Signal Company (5 LMG)

2 Artillery Battalions
2 Light Artillery Batteries (4 horse-drawn field howitzers [100mm])
1 Heavy Artillery Battery (4 horse-drawn field howitzers [149mm])

Anti-Aircraft Battery (6 motorized anti-aircraft guns [80mm])

Anti-Aircraft Battery (12 motorized anti-aircraft guns [40mm])

Divisional Supply and Support Services Headquarters
Anti-Aircraft Company (12 AAMG) (horse-drawn/wagon-mounted)

Supply Command
5 Supply Columns (ammunition) (horse-drawn wagons)
1 Supply Column (rations) (horse-drawn wagons)
1 Supply Column (ammunition) (motorized)
1 Supply Administration Unit (ammunition)
1 Supply Administration Unit (rations)
1 Field Bakery Company
1 Medical Company (partially motorized)
1 Field Hospital
1 Ambulance Column (motorized)
1 Band

Field Replacement Battalion
3 Field Replacement Companies

1943/44 Light Division (March 1944)
## Division Headquarters

**Divisional Artillery Commander Staff**
- Motorized Field Post Detachment
- Motorized Pioneer Platoon
- Motorized Maintenance Company

**Tank Battalion**
- Headquarters Company, with:
  - Signal Platoon: 1 Turán [40mm] command tank
  - Light Tank Platoon: 5 Toldi [20mm] tanks
- Motorized Supply Company (cross-country)
- Motorized Heavy Combat Bridge Column

**Motorized Infantry Regiment**
- Motorized Pioneer Platoon (3 LMG)
- Motorized Telephone Platoon
- Motorized Traffic Control Platoon
- Motorized Heavy Company (12 HMG + 4 mortars [81mm])

**Motorized Combat Engineer Battalion**
- 2 Combat Engineer Companies (4 LMG + 2 HMG)
- 2 Motorized Heavy Combat Bridge Columns

**Armored Reconnaissance Battalion** (1 Csaba armored car)
- Motorized Pioneer Platoon
- Motorized Field Post Detachment
- Motorized Maintenance Platoon
- Motorized Anti-Tank Company (6 ATG [40mm])
- Armored Car Company (13 Csaba armored cars)
- Motorcycle Infantry Company (12 LMG + 2 mortars [60mm])
- Motorized Infantry Company (12 LMG + 2 mortars [60mm] + 2 ATR [20mm])

**2 Motorized Light Artillery Battalions**
- 3 Motorized Light Artillery Batteries (4 towed field howitzers [105mm])
- 1 Motorized Heavy Artillery Battalion
- 3 Motorized Heavy Artillery Batteries (4 towed field howitzers [149mm])

**Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Battalion**
- 1 Motorized Anti-Aircraft Battery (4 Nimrod [40mm] self-propelled AA guns)

**Motorized Signal Battalion**
- Motorized Telephone Company (5 LMG)
- Motorized Radio Company (4 LMG)
- Motorized Field Post Detachment

### 1943 Armored Division

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<td>3 Motorized Infantry Battalions</td>
<td>2 Combat Engineer Companies</td>
<td>1 Signal Battalion</td>
<td>3 Field Supply Columns</td>
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- **Armored Reconnaissance Battalion** (1 Csaba armored car)
- **Motorized Heavy Combat Bridge Column** (12 HMG + 4 mortars [81mm])
- **Motorized Heavy Company** (12 HMG + 4 mortars [81mm])
- **Motorized Heavy Combat Bridge Column** (12 HMG + 4 mortars [81mm])
1944 Armored Division (March 1944)

**Armored Reconnaissance Battalion** (1 Toldi [20mm] tank)
- Headquarters Company, with
  - Motorized Pioneer Platoon (3 LMG)
  - Motorized Field Telephone Platoon
  - Motorized Heavy Anti-Tank Platoon (3 ATG [75mm] + 3 LMG)
- Motorized Motor Company (8 mortars [81mm] + 4 mortars [120mm])
- Light Tank Company (5 Toldi [20mm] tanks)
- Motorized Maintenance Platoon

**Motorized Infantry Regiment**
- Headquarters Company, with
  - Motorized Pioneer Platoon (3 LMG)
  - Motorized Traffic Control Platoon
  - Motorized Maintenance Platoon
- Motorized Combat Engineer Battalion
  - Headquarters Company, with
    - Motorized Pioneer Platoon (3 LMG)
    - Motorized Telephone Platoon
    - Motorized Heavy Anti-Tank Platoon (3 ATG [75mm] + 3 LMG)
- Motorized Heavy Company (12 HMG + 6 HMG)
- Motorized Heavy Combat Bridge Column
Division Headquarters
Divisional Artillery Commander
Divisional Cavalry Commander
Motorized Field Post Unit

Huszár Regiments
Mounted Pioneer Platoon
Mounted Field Telephone Platoon
Mounted Mortar Platoon (4 mortars [81mm])
Motorized Anti-Tank Platoon (4 ATG [40mm])

Horse Artillery Battery (4 horse-drawn cavalry guns [75mm])

Cavalry Battalions
Mounted Pioneer Platoon
Mounted Field Telephone Platoon
Mounted Assault Platoon (3 LMG)
3 Cavalry Companies (9 LMG + 2 mortars [50mm] + 2 ATR)

Heavy Company, with
- Mounted Heavy Machine Gun Platoon (5 HMG)
- Mounted Medium Mortar Platoon (6 mortars [81mm])
- Motorized Heavy Anti-Tank Platoon (3 ATG [40mm])

Motorized Combat Engineer Company
2 Armored Car Companies (13 Csaba armored cars)
Light Tank Company (18 Toldi [20mm] light tanks)
2 Motorcycle Infantry Companies (12 LMG + 2 mortars [60mm] + 2 ATR [20mm])

Motorized Combat Engineer Company (4 LMG + 2 HMG)

Motorized Divisional Supply and Support Services Headquarters
2 Anti-Aircraft Companies (6 anti-aircraft machine guns) (motorized)
2 Supply Commands (motorized)
2 Field Bakeries (motorized)
1 Veterinary Company
1 Engineer Equipment Company
1 Medical Company (motorized)

1943 Cavalry Division
Motorized Mixed Signal Company (5 LMG)
1 Horse Artillery Battalion
3 Horse Artillery Batteries (4 horse-drawn cavalry guns [76.5mm])

Motorized Artillery Battalion
3 Motorized Light Artillery Batteries (4 towed field howitzers [105mm])
2 Motorized Anti-Aircraft Batteries (6 anti-aircraft guns [40mm])

Anti-Aircraft Battalion
1 Motorized Anti-Aircraft Battery (4 anti-aircraft guns [80mm])
1 Motorized Anti-Aircraft Battery (4 anti-aircraft guns [40mm])

Bicycle Infantry Battalion
Motorized Pioneer Platoon
Motorized Field Telephone Platoon
Motorized Anti-Tank Platoon (4 ATG [40mm])

Motorized Artillery Battery
1 Bicycle Infantry Company (12 LMG + 2 mortars [60mm])
1 Motorized Machine Gun Company (6 HMG)

Motorized Combat Engineer Company (4 LMG + 2 HMG)
**Division Headquarters**

- Motorized Field Post Unit

**Huszár Regiments**

- Mounted Pioneer Platoon
- Mounted Field Telephone Platoon
- Mounted Heavy Mortar Company (12 mortars [120mm])
- Motorized Anti-Tank Company (9 ATG [75mm] + 9 LMG)

**Cavalry Battalions**

- Mounted Field Telephone Platoon
- Mounted Assault Platoon (3 LMG)
- Heavy Company, with
  - Mounted Heavy Machine Gun Platoon (12 HMG)
  - Mounted Medium Mortar Platoon (8 mortars [81mm])
- Motorized Heavy Anti-Tank Platoon (3 ATG [75mm] + 3 LMG)

**Armored Reconnaissance Battalion** (1 Csaba armored car)

- Headquarters Company, with
  - Motorized Pioneer Platoon
  - Motorized Field Telephone Platoon
  - Motorized Heavy Anti-Tank Platoon (3 ATG [75mm] + 3 LMG)
  - Motorized Maintenance Platoon
- Motorized Mortar Company (5 mortars [81mm] + 4 mortars [120mm])
- 2 Armored Car Companies (13 Csaba armored cars)
- Light Tank Company (18 Toldi [20mm] light tanks)
- 2 Motorcycle Infantry Companies (12 LMG + 6 HMG)
- Motorized Infantry Company (12 LMG + 6 HMG)

**Cavalry Tank Battalion**

- Headquarters Company, with
  - Motorized Pioneer Platoon
  - Motorized Field Telephone Platoon
  - Motorized Medium Mortar Platoon
  - Light Tank Platoon (5 Toldi [20mm] tanks)
- Motorized Supply Company
- Motorized Maintenance Platoon
- 1 Heavy Tank Company: 2 Turán [75mm] tanks
- 15 Turán [75mm] tanks
- 3 Medium Tank Companies: 2 Turán [40mm] tanks
- 25 Turán [40mm] tanks

**1944 Cavalry Division (March 1944)**

**Motorized Signal Battalion**

- Motorized Telephone Company (5 LMG)
- Motorized Radio Company (4 LMG)

**2 Horse Artillery Battalions**

- 3 Horse Artillery Batteries (4 horse-drawn cavalry guns [76.5mm])

**Motorized Artillery Battalion**

- 3 Motorized Light Artillery Batteries (4 towed field howitzers [105mm])

**Anti-Aircraft Battalion**

- 1 Motorized Anti-Aircraft Battery (4 anti-aircraft guns [80mm])
- 2 Motorized Anti-Aircraft Batteries (6 anti-aircraft guns [40mm])

**Bicycle Infantry Battalion**

- Headquarters Company, with
  - Bicycle Pioneer Platoon
  - Bicycle Field Telephone Platoon
  - Motorized Anti-Tank Platoon (3 ATG [75mm] + 3 LMG)
- Motorized Maintenance Platoon
- Motorized Artillery Battery (4 field howitzers [105mm])
- 2 Bicycle Infantry Companies (12 LMG + 6 HMG)
- 1 Bicycle Artillery Company (12 LMG + 6 HMG)
- 1 Bicycle Heavy Company (6 HMG + 8 mortars [81mm])

**Motorized Combat Engineer Company** (4 LMG + 2 HMG)

**Motorized Divisional Supply and Support Services Headquarters**

- 2 Anti-Aircraft Companies (6 anti-aircraft machine guns [motorized])
- 2 Supply Commands (motorized)
- 3 Supply Columns (ammunition) (motorized)
- 2 Supply Columns (motorized)
- 1 Supply Column (P.O.L.) (motorized)
- 1 Motorized Maintenance Company
- 2 Heavy Combat Bridge Columns (motorized)
- 1 Supply Administration Unit (ammunition) (motorized)
- 2 Field Bakeries (motorized)
- 1 Veterinary Company
- 1 Engineer Equipment Company
- 1 Medical Company (motorized)
- 2 Ambulance Columns (motorized)
- 1 Bicycle Guard Company
The Replacement Army

The concept of changing the training and replacement system first came up after the mobilization of the First Army in February 1944. It was planned to establish training and replacement divisions and brigades within the Military Districts, under the overall command of a Replacement Army, to provide depth to the field units. (The reserve divisions were still on the East Front). Each of the four infantry divisions, 2 mountain brigades, and the 2nd Armored Division received a field replacement battalion, which was to provide replacements directly to the formation in the field. These battalions, in turn, were fed personnel by the Replacement Army.

The Replacement Army was officially established on 1.05.44. and was responsible for basic and advanced training of all troops sent to the front. The field replacement battalions provided orientation and refresher courses. In case of a national emergency, these replacement formations could be mobilized and thrown into the line as a last ditch defense of the national borders.

Each Military District was to maintain one replacement division. These replacement divisions had three infantry regiments, one artillery battalion (with three batteries), and the respective replacement engineer, signal and supply troops.

The strength of the replacement divisions was not standardized. It could be said that the average strength of each division was about 5,000 men,-- about half the equivalent of a regular infantry division, but without its artillery and antitank capabilities. The replacement divisions were made up mainly of the 3rd Reserve consisting of older men. The few artillery batteries were equipped mainly with World War I vintage equipment. In some cases, the artillery was towed by cattle.

In 1944, it was hoped to train 100,000 new recruits in two six-month periods, and another 100,000 reservists in four three-month periods.

The 1st Armored Division had been redesignated as the 1st Armored Replacement Division, and assigned to the First Army. Frankly speaking, the 1st Armored Division had become the replacement and training unit for the mobile forces of the Hungarian Army, and was no longer a field unit. It had only cadres and some training equipment, and had furthermore been demotorized, (i.e. it lost its motor vehicles), and was not regarded as a combat formation. The infantry was transported in local buses.

Under German Command

One of the results of the German occupation of Hungary was that the Hungarian Army became almost completely subordinated to German command. And the Germans had definite plans for a more active Hungarian participation in the war. The first step was to put all active units of the Honvéd under German command. On 21.03.44, the First Army (with VI Corps, the 1st and 2nd Mountain Brigades, and the 16th and 24th Infantry Divisions), was assigned to Heeresgruppe Nordukraine.

The 2nd Armored Division was assigned to the First Army on 28.03.1944. A day later, the First Army was ordered to move into Galicia.

The second step involved reorganizing the structure of what were basically the defensive formations within Hungary. The Hungarians had been building up the IX Corps and the Székel Defense Command in northern Transylvania because of strong Romanian forces across the border in southern Transylvania.

On 3.04.44, the OKW declared the area to be a German operational theater and directed that the 27th Light, 20th, and 25th Infantry Divisions assemble behind the Carpathians between the Tartar Pass and Cluj. All other Hungarian forces in Transylvania were to be moved west of this line.

All of the IX Corps units were affected. The 9th Border Guard Brigade was ordered to the Bácska to relieve the 13th Infantry Division. The 69th Border Guard Group (3 battalions) was ordered to western Hungary, there to take over from the 3rd Military District the mission of securing the southwestern border. The 13th Infantry Division and 3rd Military Dis-
trict thereby released were to stand by for transfer to the East Front.

The 27th Light and 25th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 20th Infantry Division were assigned to the First Army on 5.04.44, and arrived at the Tartar Pass and Skole respectively. The Székel Frontier Defense Command managed to retain four battalions of the Border Guards and most of the Székel militia in its area, so that the Székel Corner (northern Transylvania) was not completely denuded of defenses.

The removal of all Hungarian mobile combat forces from northern Transylvania was to have disastrous consequences. These units could have occupied the Carpathian passes in case of a Rumanian betrayal. And indeed, when the Rumanians did capitulate to the Allies in August 1944, the Carpathian mountain passes in southern Transylvania were instead occupied by Rumanian forces. From the German point of view, the removal of all Hungarian forces from this area should have allowed the Germans quickly to have forces from this area should have allowed the Germans quickly to have

| **1st Rumanian Army Order of Battle 31.07.1944** |
|-----|-----|
| **Mountain Corps** | **VI Corps** |
| 1st Mountain Training Division | 2nd Infantry Division |
| 3rd Infantry Division | 20th Infantry Training Division |
| 13th Infantry Division | | |
| 6th Cavalry Regiment | | |
| **VII Corps** | **1st Army Reserves** |
| 1st Infantry Training Division | 19th Infantry Division |
| 3rd Mountain Division | | |
| 9th Cavalry Division | | |

replaced him with a more aggressive leader, the commanding general of the Hungarian Occupation Forces Command, (Second Army), General Géza Lakatos on 6.04.44.

The Hungarian Occupation Forces Command was dissolved on 7.04.44. The VII Corps (18th, 21st, and 201st Reserve Divisions), was transferred to the Field Forces, and reassigned to the First Army. The VIII Corps (1st, 5th, 9th, 12th, and 23rd Reserve Divisions) was redesignated as the II Reserve Corps on 1.05.44, and assumed all occupation duties of the Hungarian Army.

The Battle for Galicia

The VII Corps had been slowly withdrawing to the Dnyester River, between Zalcszezyi and Tarnopol, and had maintained three bridgeheads across the river. On 19.03.1944, the 201st Reserve Division was at Usieczezkó, the 19th Reserve Division at Niezwiska, and the 18th Reserve Division at Niznov. The OKW had declared Stanislavov to be a Fester Platz, and had assigned German forces in strength of two infantry battalions, one under strength Tiger heavy tank company, and some antitank units – but no artillery – to hold the city. In addition, VII Corps determined that the 16th Infantry Division should send one of its artillery battalions to Stanislavov.

On 28.03.44, the 201st Reserve Division was thrown out of its positions at Usieczezkó, and was forced to retreat to Kolomea. Here, after fierce Soviet attacks during the afternoon of 27.03.44, the 21st Reserve Division was again forced to retreat, this time in the direction of Delatyn, in the process losing its one and only artillery battery. On 23.08.44, the 201st Reserve Division continued its retreat under strong pressure to Mikulicyz. On this same day, the 19th Reserve Division was pushed out of Niezwiska by Soviet armor. The 18th Reserve Division, on the other hand, was able to maintain its positions.

By early afternoon of 28.03.44, the 21st Reserve Division was finally forced to abandon Delatyn, and retreated to Mikulicyz.

When the Germans occupied Hungary the formation of the First Hungarian Army was well advanced. The Germans, hard pressed in the Ukraine, had other plans for this army. As indicated above, they assigned the First Army to Heeresgruppe Nordukraine. The Heeresgruppe gave the First Army the mission of drawing off as many Soviet forces as possible to relieve the pressure on the German-Rumanian front at Jassy. It was also to establish a defensive line comprising the cities of Kuty, Kassov, Kolomea, and Obertyn. It is interesting to note that these cities were already in the hands of the Soviet forces at the time of the order. For the purpose of carrying out this mission, on 28.03.44 the First Army ordered the following orders and dispositions, to be completed by 7.04.44:

**VI Corps**

The 16th Infantry Division was to march via the Toronya Pass to Stanislavov and Kalusz. The 24th Infantry Division was to march on Dolina, and 2nd Armored Division was to march on Solotwina. The 1st and 2nd Mountain Brigades were to take defend the Tartar (Joblonica) Pass.

**VII Corps**

The 201st Reserve Division (exhausted after its recent retreat), was to assemble what forces that remained at Körösméző, and secure the Pantyr Pass; the 18th Reserve Division was to defend the northern approaches of Stanislavov, and was detached to the Commandant of this city for the duration of the mission; the 19th Reserve Division was to assemble at Kalusz together with the 16th Infantry Division.

On 14.04.44, the Germans demanded that the 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions be broken up, and the personnel and equipment thus freed be to be sent to the front as replacement battalions. Those units not sent to the front were to be sent to the Croatian border to prevent the Tito partisans from raiding across into Hungary.

On 1.05.44, the Germans changed their minds, and instead urged that the 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions be mobilized immediately. As mentioned, the 27th Light, the 20th and 25th Infantry Divisions had already been mobilized and sent to the front in April.

Another effect of the occupation was that armored vehicle production came to a complete stop. After a while, a few vehicles did again start to dribble off the production lines, but the newly approved Turán III and Zrínyi I were never produced. On the other hand, the Germans did little to encourage the production of armored vehicles in Hungary, and even when Hungary requested license rights to produce the Panther tank, the Germans wanted the ridiculous sum of 200 million Pengő, upon which the Hungarians quickly dropped the matter.

The snowed-in passes and the muddy Galician roads severely delayed troop movements, even though railway transportation was used in as many cases as possible. For example, the infantry of the 16th Infantry Division was moved by rail from Dolina to Stanislavov, while the divisional supply trains were sent by road.

Because of the delays incurred by the weather, the First Army was forced to
The objective of the attack, on an operational level, was the occupation of the cities of Kuty, Kolomea, and Obertyn. The path of the attack was funneled by the Dniester and the Pruth Rivers. The attack was to start at 1400 hours.

The main attacking force was spearheaded by the 2nd Armored Division. It moved along the axis of Solotwina – Nadvorna, and into the Pruth valley to Kolomea. The object of the attack was to cut off Delatyn, and to facilitate the 2nd Mountain Brigade’s deployment out of the bottleneck formed by the Dnieper and the Pruth.

The order of battle for the operation was as follows:

**VI Corps**
- with the 27th Light and 25th Infantry Divisions, both still enroute; the 1st and 2nd Mountain Brigades, detached to the XI. Armeekorps. The VI Corps was to occupy Kuty, Kosov, and Jablonov. In addition, it was to cover the southern flank of the First Army.

**XI. Armeekorps**
- with the 2nd Armored Division (strength: 55 Turán II, 17 Nimrod, 13 Csaba, as well as Turán I and Toldi II tanks; its ready-strength on 19.04.1944 was 30 tanks, i.e., about 40%); the 24th Infantry Division, the 1st and 2nd Mountain Brigades. This German corps was to take Nadvorna, Delatyn and Kolomea.

**VII Corps**
- with 16th Infantry and 18th Reserve Divisions. This corps was reinforced by the 1st Assault Gun Battalion (The 1st Assault Gun Battalion had its full complement of 30 Zrinyi II assault guns), and was to take Otynia and Obertyn, as well as cover the northern flank of the XI. Armeekorps.

**XXXVI. Panzerkorps**
- with I. Infantrie-367. Infantrie-7. Panzer-Division, was to take the cities of Nizinov and Koropec on the Dnyester, and then to advance upon Tłumacz and Olesza.

The attack was heralded by Stuka attacks. The Soviet forces offered little resistance, their exhausted troops being unable to withstand the assault, equipped as they were with a few antitank guns, mortars, and several T-34’s. The terrain, however, was not suited for tanks.

On the first day of the attack, the 2nd Armored Division and the 16th Infantry Division were able to take their first objectives, and clear the region between the Bystyczka Rivers. To the north, the 18th Reserve Division reached Tysmeniczka.

On 18.04.44, the XI. Armeekorps took Nadvorna (2nd Armored Division) and Delatyn (2nd Mountain Brigade), in preparation for the main attack on Kolomea. The VII Corps following behind the XI. Armeekorps, cleaned up what pockets of resistance that remained.

The VI Corps took Zabie with the lead elements of the still-arriving 27th Light Division. The division then had to pause to allow its main columns to catch up.

By 19.04.44, Soviet reinforcements were slowly beginning to thicken the Soviet defense, and although the 2nd Armored Division fought and won a running tank battle at Nadvorna, the advance slowed.

The VII Corps was forced to redirect the 16th Infantry Division, for the melting snows had raised the water level of the Bystyczka River to the point where it was no longer fordable. The river was now 150 meters wide, and the bridging columns had not yet arrived.

The VII Corps had also encountered the Soviet reinforcements. Dawn of 22.04.44 found the Hungarians giving ground before the newly arrived 27th Tank Brigade. The 16th Infantry Division’s northern wing was forced back. Only the quick intervention of the attached 1st Assault Gun Battalion (readiness: 26 assault guns) saved the day. After knocking out 177 T-34 tanks, the 16th Infantry Division recovered its lost ground, and later that day even managed to take Chelbicyn Lesney. The superiority of the few T-34’s encountered was quite plain to all concerned. The Zrinyi II assault guns were only of limited antitank use. A 105mm howitzer had never been designed for this purpose. Nevertheless, the Hungarians were somewhat cheered by this small success.

The VI Corps threw the advance elements of the as yet only partly arrived 25th Infantry Division into the foray at Berezov. The...
27th Light Division advanced upon Kuty, Kosov, and Pistyn, and thereby outflanked the Soviet advance. This caused the Soviet reserves at Sniatyn to be brought against the 27th Light Division instead of the two mountain brigades. These Soviet forces then counterattacked at Kuty and Kosov on 28.04.44. The battle for these two cities lasted until the beginning of May, but the 27th Light Division held its ground, and was able to provided valuable relief for the hard-pressed mountain brigades.

Although the attack had obviously run out of steam, the First Army had already more than fulfilled its missions, i.e. that of tying down as many Soviet forces as possible, than fulfilled its missions, i.e. that of tying down as many Soviet forces as possible, and of closing the gap between Heeresgruppe Nordukraine and Heeresgruppe Mitte. Consequently, the First Army now assumed a defensive posture.

General Géza Lakatos was relieved as commanding general of the First Army by Károly Beregffy on 27.05.44.

At this time, both sides reverted to a form of trench warfare. Limited objective attacks were made only for the purpose of gaining ground and/or advantageous positions.

As described, in the middle of 1944, the replacement system was changed. The replacements for the field army now came directly from the central replacement and training depots of the Military Districts; the divisional replacement battalions were dissolved. As of the Fall of 1944, when the replacement units themselves were involved in combat, the replacements were taken from dissolved units. In most cases, units were dissolved to create replacements, in particular the replacement divisions, and later, the reserve divisions.

By the middle of June 1944, the casualties of the First Army had added up to 26,000. (3,250 killed, 18,800 wounded, and 4,000 missing). During the same time it had received 510 officer and 15,000 enlisted replacements, with some further 12,000 replacements enroute to the front. The II Reserve Corps had received 112 officers and 4,000 men during the same period.

During the quiet period, the Hungarians prepared their defenses for the coming Soviet offensive. Bridges, railways, and roads were rebuilt or constructed. The Hungarians also began the feverish construction of a series of defensive lines.

The first defensive line was designated as the “Prince Eugen Line” and was 10 kilometers behind the front, having been constructed by the defending divisions themselves.

The second defensive line was the “Hunyadi Line”. It was built by First Army construction troops. It consisted of a series of strongpoints for battalion and company-sized units. The strong points consisted mainly of earth bunkers and pillboxes reinforced with wood. Some antitank and antipersonnel defenses in the form of trenches and barbed wire surrounded these weak positions. The Hunyadi Line can be traced by following a series of landmarks, namely: Uscie-Putilla, Zabie, Kziworowina, Rokietka 1114 (a point halfway between Mikulicznyn and Berezow), Zielona, Smoloda, Ludovikova, Tuchla and Turka. The following high points were also included: Hordie (1,470 meters), Magura (1,350 meters), Javornik-Chomiak (1,544 meters), Stanimir (1,549 meters), and Arsynca (1,589 meters). These were the high points that define the foothills of the Carpathians.

The third defensive line was the “Saint László Line”. It ran along the old Polish-Hungarian border. The highest mountain peaks and the ridges that define the watershed also defined the border. The Szt. László Line ran right along these ridges. It included some old World War I trenches and fortifications. The First Army had not built this line up too much, as it was considered a secondary one.

The main part of the construction troops and material were being used to finish the fourth one, the “Arpad Line”, particularly the series of strong points which had comprised this line up to then.

On 15.06.44, the First Army was short the following equipment:

- 9,058 pistols
- 20,921 rifles
- 15,131 sub-machine guns
- 132 automatic rifles
- 788 light machine-guns
- 399 heavy machine-guns
- 142 light mortars (50mm)
- 104 medium mortars (81mm)
- 205 antitank rifles (20mm)
- 6 antitank guns (37mm)
- 65 antitank guns (40mm)
- 100 antitank guns (75mm)
- 3 mountain guns (75mm)
- 12 light cannon (80mm)
- 18 medium cannon (100mm)
- 9 howitzers (105mm)
- 17 howitzers (149mm)
- 19 antiaircraft guns (40mm)
- 2 antiaircraft guns (80mm)
- 40 medium tank guns (40mm)

The 1st Assault Gun Battalion was the first unit to receive the Zrinyi II (equipped with 105mm howitzer) assault guns. As other Zrinyi II became available they were parcellled out to the other seven assault gun battalions for training. Eventually, all Zrinyi II were concentrated into only four battalions.

The 1st Assault Gun Battalion, which was sent to Galicia with the First Army when it had received its full complement of 30 Zrinyi II towards the end of April 1944. It fought there with distinction with minimal losses until August 1944, when it was withdrawn to the vicinity of Budapest. It was subsequently encircled and lost more than half its vehicles.

The 10th Assault Gun Battalion was the next unit to be issued the Zrinyi vehicles as they became available. It took part in the heavy fighting at Torda in September 1944. Between 13.09.1944 and 8.10.1944 the battalion marked up further successes, but during the ensuing withdrawal lost all its vehicles owing to a lack of fuel.

The 20th Assault Gun Battalion, in addition to its Zrinyi II also had 15 German Hetzer self-propelled antitank guns. It fought at Enying. One of its batteries was lost when Budapest fell.

The 24th Assault Gun Battalion fought in Slovakia. Its last Zrinyi II were destroyed by their crews in Bratislava in May 1945.

During the months of July through September 1944, an additional 40 Sturmgeschütz-III were purchased from Germany, and assigned to the 6th and 7th Assault Gun Battalions. The remainder of the battalions were trained and deployed to take over the vehicles from the other units if and when they became exhausted.
Since the exact division was known to which the assault gun battalions were to be assigned, the 1st – 8th Assault Gun Battalions were renumbered in September 1944 as the 6, 7, 10, 13, 16, 20, 24, and 25 Assault Gun Battalions. The Zrinyi assault guns never became available in sufficient numbers for all these eight battalions, but as a stopgap, even Turán tanks were used.

In addition to the building of fortifications, the divisions on the front began to train special assault battalions in preparation for the upcoming battle.

Although the Hungarians had taken 17,000 casualties during the short period in which they had been engaged the Soviet forces, the Hungarian troops were highly pleased with themselves. On the other hand, the Government knew better. It gave General Beregffy secret orders that in case the Germans initiated another retreat, the Hungarians were only to withdraw in the direction of the Carpathians, German orders to the contrary notwithstanding.

This continued (and justified) pessimism in Hungarian ruling circles, as well as Horthy’s own views on the matter, encouraged him to resist sending any more troops to the front. The II Reserve Corps had been pushed back to Brest, in Poland. Horthy undertook steps to have it returned to Hungary, but its divisions (the 5th, 12th and 23rd Reserve Divisions) were destined to be away from Hungary a while longer.

In the meantime, the newly-activated 7th Infantry Division had also been dispatched to the front, where is was equipped with German weapons.

The Hussar Division

In April 1944, the Germans ordered the mobilization of the 1st Cavalry Division – very much against the wishes of Horthy and the Hungarian Army High Command, who wished to keep this elite formation for the defense of Hungary proper.

The 1st Cavalry Division was mobilized on 26.04.44 and put through intensive training. It was transferred to the Hungarian border over the period of 10.06. – 18.06.44.

Upon its departure from Hungary on 10.06.44, the 1st Cavalry Division had the following armored vehicle strength:
- 84 Tanks, (22 Turán II and 62 Turán I)
- 23 Csaba armored cars
- 7 Nimrod antiaircraft vehicles

Horthy writes in his memoirs that he had released the Cavalry Division on the condition that it be used on the left wing of the First Army. Both Hitler and Keitel promised to comply with this condition. But the promise was not kept. No sooner had the division reached the border, when it was shipped to the Priepjet Marshes.

The Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division began offloading at Pinsk on 20.06.44 and at Lunynets on 21.06.44. Although assigned to the II Reserve Corps for appearances sake, it was not part of the occupation
forces. Upon its arrival the 1st Cavalry Division was attached to the I. Kavalerie-Korps. The division was used until 26.06.44 against the local partisans which had disrupted the railway connections in the area.

The Soviet offensive against Heeresgruppe Mitte burst through the German lines on 22.06.44 some 150 kilometers to the east of the 1st Cavalry Division positions. Although the unit had just barely gotten organized after its train ride, it was immediately ordered to break off operations against the partisans and proceed towards the east to help stem the Soviet southern advance. The Soviet breakthrough was so overwhelming and so rapid, that by 30.06.44 Slutsk had fallen, and the Cavalry Division was diverted north. After a forced march through the woods, (1. – 4.07.44), the Cavalry Division was faced with four Soviet tank units. Although the Germans had also promised Horthy not to use the 1st Cavalry Division against Soviet tank units, the Germans threw the division into the brunt of the Soviet offensive.

The 1st Cavalry Division had some armor, but it was far from being equipment that was capable of meeting the Soviet tanks on equal terms. The emergency forced the Germans to use small units where larger ones had served before. So it was the case of the 4. Panzer-Division, which was now replaced by one cavalry battalion of the Cavalry Division.

The overwhelming armored strength of the Soviet forces caused heavy casualties to the 1st Cavalry Division, especially as the division had virtually no antitank weapons. Nevertheless, the Hungarian Hussars performed admirably and did their part in stabilizing the front.

The 1st Cavalry Division occupied defensive positions at Miszanka on 6.07.44. By early 7.07.44, the cavalry was forced to abandon these positions as it was under attack on both flanks. The division now dismounted, as the horses were totally exhausted after two weeks of continuing combat; the men fought on as infantry.

On 11.07.44, the Soviet advance took Ivanovits. The Cavalry Division was again forced to withdraw, this time to Berezanka-Kartuska. On the following day, the 1st Cavalry Division managed to delay the Soviet forces for a while at Sialece, although on the same day the division was given the additional task of holding the Jasiolda Valley.

By 15.07.44, the armored strength of the Cavalry Division was down to 6 Csaba armored cars. All of the other fighting vehicles had been lost. Although the Germans ordered that the division hold its positions to the last man, the commanding officer, General Antal Vattay, withdrew his division in the face of the steadily advancing Soviet forces, taking heavy losses, but managing to extract his unit.

From 15.07. – 2.08.44, the Cavalry Division continued its withdrawal, harried by the Soviet forces, plagued by a lack of ammunition, supplies, heavy antitank guns, and the flagging strength of the infantry and horses.

The rapidly dropping strength of the Cavalry Division finally caused the Germans to relieve the division. It was sent for rest northwest of Warsaw.

During 3.08. – 20.08.44, the division was reequipped in this area with German material, including a company of German Hetzer self-propelled antitank guns.

On 18.08.44, the Germans attempted to use the Cavalry Division against the Polish partisans, but the new commander, General Mihaly vitész Ibrányi, refused, indicating the long standing friendship between the Hungarian and Polish people.

During this time, the Cavalry Division was renamed by Horthy. It was henceforth to be known as the Hussar Division, in honor of its performance in combat. On 20.08.44, the Hussar Division was assigned to the IV. SS-Panzerkörps to assist in the defense of Warsaw.

Starting on 22.08.44, the Hussars were continually engaged in heavy fighting while defending Warsaw. On 23.09.44, the Hussar Division finally left Poland for Hungary.

The extraordinary accomplishments of the Hussar Division caused the Germans to repeatedly mention this unit in the official dispatches, an event very rare in the annals of the Germans. Even Guderian complemented the behavior of the Hussar Division.

Withdrawal to the Hunyadi Line

The major 1944 Soviet campaign started on 22.06.1944 and broke through meager Heeresgruppe Mitte defenses with devastating force. The indirect effects were felt to the south by the First Army when the Germans pulled out their divisions one by one to prop up the rapidly collapsing Heeresgruppe Mitte front. By 17.07.44, there were no German divisions left within the Hungarian sector.

Although some minor probing attacks had been beaten off, the Hungarians were not to feel a major Soviet blow until soon after the last German units had left. On 22.07.44, as if they had been awaiting this sign, the Soviet forces attacked the First Army. By evening, the Soviet forces had made a five kilometer deep and a ten kilometer wide breech in the Hungarian lines. The penetration was located on the left wing of the 16th Infantry Division. After pushing back the flanks of this division, the 7th Infantry Division also came under heavy Soviet artillery fire.

By 23.07.44, the Hungarians had fully occupied the Prince Eugen Line, and were engaged in heavy fighting to maintain their positions there all day, particularly in the VII Corps sector. The Soviet forces took Otynia. A counterattack by the 2nd Armored Division (ready strength: 39 tanks, including 8 Pz-IV, 4 Pz-VI, and 11 assault guns) and the 16th Infantry Division failed to dislodge the Soviet forces as strong Soviet resistance stopped the attack before it really got under way. The 2nd Armored Division was given the mission of covering the withdrawal of the rest of the VII Corps on 27.07.44.

On 27.07.44, the Soviet forces attacked the 24th Infantry Division was forced to withdraw to Delatyn, and the VI Corps withdrew from the Prince Eugen Line.

Owing to this breakthrough, the First Army headquarters was quickly withdrawn to Tatarov, losing contact with events of the day. In response the Germans put the two northern corps (VII and the XL. Armeekorps) under the command of the I. Panzerarmee, and designated it as Armeegruppe Buhnau.

The Soviet forces took Nadvorna on 25.07.44 splitting the First Army in two. General Beregffy was replaced on 28.07.44 by General Miklos. First Army headquarters was established at Huszt.

General Forkas, commander of the VI Corps, shifted the 2nd Mountain Brigade from the right to the left wing to reinforce the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions. The VII Corps was again forced to withdraw, this time to Bohorodzczany and Rosulna. Headquarters was established at Perehinsko. For the first time, the Hungarians were also under heavy pressure from the local partisans, concentrated in the woods between Stanislawov and Jasien.

On 26.07.44, the VII Corps, without consulting the Germans, withdrew south to the Carpathians before it was driven elsewhere by the turn of events and further away from Hungary. Orders were subsequently issued to its subordinate units to withdraw south to the Carpathians.

The 2nd Armored Division covered the withdrawal, staying in Dolina. During the 27. and 28.07.44, the Soviet forces at-
tempts to take this city were beaten off by the Hungarian defenders. Further south, the VI Corps was also forced to withdraw, but to the south, so that the gap between the two corps was opened even further.

In effect, the Hungarians had managed to withdraw from the Prince Eugen Line and occupy the Hunyadi Line in relative security, and without undue losses. The Soviet forces kept up a determined pursuit, and made every effort to take the vital passes through the eastern Carpathians. But the Hungarians were prepared, and, for the first time, fighting on their own soil.

The Hungarian C.O.S., viewing the approaching Soviet forces with alarm, mobilized the 6th Infantry Division on 13.07.1944, as well as the 10th and 13th Infantry Divisions on 22.07.1944. The 13th and 6th Infantry Divisions were assigned to the newly-arrived III Corps. This corps was charged with the defense of the Verecke (Oporzec) Pass and the Uzok Pass. This had become necessary, as the Soviet forces, after taking Stryji and Sambor, had begun their advance upon the passes, and the First Army had no forces left to hold them.

Within three days, the Soviet forces had managed to split the First Army in twain. Although General Miklos had successfully withdrawn the major part of his command into the Carpathians, the Germans very displeased.

Miklos, the commander of the former Mobile Corps in 1941, had enjoyed the respect and trust of the Germans to a certain degree. On the other hand, he had refused to allow them to place a liaison officer on his staff, and had thereby prevented them from taking direct influence on the actions of the First Army.

During this time, the Germans were carrying out, or attempting to carry out, the programs of destruction of the Hungarian Jews. In response to protests received from the Vatican, the King of Sweden, President Roosevelt of America, and various delegations of Hungarian churchmen – led notably by Bishop Mindszenty, a Crown Council meeting was called. The Hungarian government had been told by the Germans that the Jews were required for work in the munitions factories. The protest proved otherwise. In the Crown Council meeting on 26.06.1944, Horthy reportedly said: “I refuse to put up with this any longer. I will not allow that the continued deportations bring shame on Hungary. I order the government to remove Baky and Emdré from their places. And as the deportations of the Budapest Jews, this must be stopped now!” (Baky and Emdré were two members of the Gendarmerie, where Fascism had found a positive reception – unlike the Army). The Gendarmes were preparing a fascist putsch for 6.07.1944. Horthy ordered the 1st Armored Division, (now somewhat filled up by German and Hungarian deliveries), stationed near Esztergom, to proceed to Budapest, and, if necessary, forcibly prevent the deportation of the Jews. The 1st Armored Division stopped the putsch and prevented further deportations of the Budapest Jews.

Horthy ordered the mobilization of the Replacement Army on 5.08.44.

**Consolidation of the Hunyadi Line**

The rapidly withdrawing VII Corps soon lost contact with the main Soviet forces. Consequently, the Soviet forces switched their attack to the VI Corps in the immediate area around Mikuliczyn. The Soviet

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**Map:** Hungarian Positions in the Carpathians 10.08.1944
The Soviet forces were able to push back the Hungarians the next day. Tatarov came under heavy artillery fire, and was continuously the target of air attacks.

On 7.08.44, the VI Corps once again counterattacked, and by late 8.08.44, the lost positions in the Hunyadi Line were back in Hungarian hands. At the same time, the right neighbor of the VI Corps — the XVII. Armeekorps in conjunction with the 27th Light Division — had retaken Kuty and Kosov. This meant that the First Army was now once again in complete possession of the Hunyadi Line, and could take up a defensive posture.

With the VI Corps engaged in the fighting described above, the Soviet forces were fully occupied, and the rest of the front was relatively quiet. The remaining Hungarian units took this rare opportunity to strengthen, regroup, and refit their forces. A series of long overdue administrative matters could finally be carried out, and a series of reorganizations took place.

The 19th Reserve Division was dissolved, its men and equipment transferred to the 20th Infantry Division.

The 18th Reserve Division was amalgamated into the 16th Infantry Division.

The 7th Infantry Division was dissolved, and its meager remnants were integrated into the 24th Infantry Division.

These three infantry divisions had thereby been almost brought up to strength again, although the infantry battalions only had about 60% combat strength.

The VII and III Corps' formations were not involved in major combat, although they did ward off frequent Soviet company-sized probes and patrols. The two corps were principally engaged in expanded and reinforcing the defenses of the Hunyadi Line.

On 13.08.44, the 4. Gebirgs-Division was ordered to leave this quiet sector and move down to Brassó immediately. At the same time, the First Army was ordered to release the 25th Infantry Division, so that it too could be shipped to the Székel Corner.

Preparations for the Defense of the Carpathians

The mobilization of the III Corps and the consequent occupation of the Uzok and Verecke Passes by the 6th and 13th Infantry Divisions, respectively, as well as the timely arrival of the 16th Infantry Division at the Toronya Pass, had reassured the Hungarian General Staff somewhat. It felt that Hungary was no longer threatened by an open back door. Naturally, the threat of a direct assault on the age-old defenses of Hungary was not be discounted, but the probability that the Soviet forces would be able to fight their way through the Carpathians was not taken too seriously. Events were to prove the Hungarians right.

The Carpathians, in their southward run, form on the left and right the river valleys, and provide the watershed for the Drnezer and the Tisza Rivers. This mountain range forms a vast geographical barrier that divides East and West, and prevents easy access to the central European plains. It has served throughout history as a major bulwark against aggression from the East, and, prolonged southwards via the Transylvanian Alps to the Iron Gates, constitutes a pivot of great natural strength for the defense of the central Europe. Although this barrier's natural strength is diminished by a small number of passes across it, has daunted such famous invaders as the Tartars and the Turks.

The highest peaks are found in the High Tatra (2660 meters), and in the Wooded Carpathians, around Nagyszeben (Hermannstadt) (2536 meters).

The mountain range is narrowest at the axis between Streji – Munkács, (at which point the High Tatra and the Wooded Carpathians meet), measuring a mere 100 kilometers across.

Behind the Hunyadi Line was the Szt. László Line. It comprised the old border fortifications of the Soviet-Hungarian border, and was situated along the ridges and peaks of the Carpathians. Its main purpose was to defend the Tartar (Jabolna) Pass (934 meters), the Pantyris Pass, the Toronya (Wiskov) Pass (941 meters), the Verecke (Beszki) Pass (1014 meters), and the Uzok Pass (889 meters). Owing to its exposed position (both to the weather and the enemy), the Szt. László Line was not heavily fortified, and was intended merely as a delaying line. Particularly in the winter, the heavy snows made supply and com-
munitions difficult, and the extreme cold (some –20°C) at these altitudes made occupation of these positions both hazardous and arduous during the cold months. In addition, the terrain prevented any useful artillery observation except in the passes themselves.

The last and strongest position was the Arpad Line, to the rear and south of the main ridges, anchored by the Howerla Peak (2,058 meters), and running through the cities of Körösmező, Kiralymező (Besz-kid), Ökörméző, Volovec, and Fenyves-völgy, interspaced by the heights of Swedowec (1,883 meters), Douha (1,723 meters), Stoj (1,679 meters), Schönborn (1,097 meters), and Polonia Runa (1,482 meters).

The fortifications of the Arpad Line were located in valleys, and consisted of a series of reinforced concrete bunkers, each containing 1 to 2 heavy infantry weapons. In front of the bunkers were antitank obstacles in the form of dragon’s teeth (concrete tetrahedra) and steel bars set in concrete, antitank mines and antipersonnel mines, as well as barbed wire, parts of which were electrified.

The defensive positions were so sited to cover the roads and paths through the mountain passes, and stretched up the hillsides for approximately 1 to 2 kilometers in either direction away from the bunkers.

Each valley fortification system contained some 10 to 20 concrete bunkers, gathered together under the single command of a fortress company, each comprising some 200–300 men. There was no continuous defensive line. There existed enormous gaps between these valley systems, and consequently the bunkers were constructed and sited to provide all-round defense. To provide depth to the somewhat meager valley defense positions, there was a second line some 5–10 kilometers behind these forward positions, laid out and occupied much as the forward ones. The two positions, with their corresponding fortress companies, were gathered under a fortress battalion headquarters, which was charged with the defense of each valley. The bunkers were in communication through buried telephone cables as well as radio.

It is interesting to note that these positions were not intended to provoke a static situation, but merely to delay the enemy until the mobile forces deployed in the plains behind the foothills arrived to deal with the invaders.

Further to the south, in the Székel Corner (the recently reacquired Transylvanian part of Hungary), the defensive positions were not nearly so well built or provided for. Although Hungary had immediately started fortifying the Carpathians in the Székel Corner after the reoccupation of this territory, the work was by no means complete. Only the mountains facing east had been fortified in the same manner as the Arpad Line.

The long loop described the Székel Corner passed to the north of the Transylvanian Alps, and did not include the vital passes around Brassó (Kronstadt), the Red Tower Pass, the Vulkán Pass, nor the Iron Gates. This was to prove disastrous for the defense of Hungary in the near future. It also proved difficult to provide for a continuous front which included the southern bulge, comprising the Székler Corner. It was feared that this area would be quickly isolated, and therefore independent Székler militia battalions had been raised locally to provide for the defense of this area.

These units were provided with bunkers and stockpiled with supplies.

The gaps between the fortified valleys became an ever increasing worry to the Hungarian High Command, especially when it became quite clear that the Germans were rapidly losing the initiative, if not the war, on the East Front. Consequently, in 1943 these gaps were lightly sprinkled with mutually supporting strong points, consisting of earthen forts, dugouts, and observation positions. It was still not possible to hook up the individual valleys in a continuous line, but a reasonably effective screen was provided. In addition, barracks for reserves were constructed within easy marching distance of the front.

Geographically speaking, the easiest invasion route is through the valley of the Dukla River, which offers a tight communications network facilitating military operations via Kassa southwards into the Hungarian Plain. For this very reason, the Austrian-Hungarian Imperial Army had heavily fortified this area during World War I.

In the southern sector of the Carpathians—the Transylvanian Alps—the area of Brassó offers the most favorable tactical crossing opportunities, being here pierced by four major passes and two railway lines.

Between the Black Sea and the corner of the mountain range, (near Focsani), there is a flat stretch of land some 200 kilometers wide, the eastern half of which is covered with numerous rivulets and streams comprising the Danube Delta, as well as a chain of lakes. The danger area, through which an aggressor might circumvent the Carpathians, is reduced to about 100 kilometers. This strip of land is known as the Galatz Gap, and it was this strategic geographical area that Hitler wanted to hold against the Soviet advance.
The Disaster at Jassy and its Aftermath

On 20.08.44 massive Soviet artillery fire struck the Heeresgruppe Südukraine positions at Jassy in Bessarabia, followed an hour and a half later by the concentrated assault of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts.

The 2nd Ukrainian Front struck south from Jassy down both sides of the Sereth in the direction of Bucharest. It was a threat to the flank and rear of the large salient that still projected into southern Bessarabia.

The 3rd Ukrainian Front attacked more directly, advancing westwards from the lower Dniester. In the beginning the Germans offered stiff resistance, but the pace soon quickened.

Within a few days, the 3rd Rumanian, the 4th Rumanian, and 6. Armee as well as a large portion of the 8. Armee had been devastatingly crushed. Eighteen of the nineteen infantry divisions of the 6. Armee were completely lost. Only one infantry and two mechanized divisions of the 8. Armee were able to save portions of their units. Over 100,000 prisoners were taken.

Rumania capitulated on 23.08.44, and, after the Germans bombed Bucharest, declared war on Germany two days later. It was followed by a declaration of war on Hungary on 7.09.44.

On the night of 24. – 25.08.44, Hitler approved the request of Heeresgruppe Südukraine that it be allowed to retreat immediately to the protective wall of the Carpathians. This undertaking had in fact already been in full swing for several days, as parts of the 6th and 8th German Armies had managed to break through the encircling Soviet forces. But, after two days, the supreme commander of the German Wehrmacht changed his mind once again, and demanded that a new defensive front comprising the Danube Delta, the Galatz Gap, and the cities of Galatz and Focsani, as well as the southern Carpathians, be held. Naturally, events had already progressed beyond the point at which a defensive line of this nature could even be considered; the Heeresgruppe considered itself lucky to be able to assemble what few troops remained after the catastrophe in Rumania in the Transylvanian Alps.

After the collapse of Heeresgruppe Südukraine, the next principle goal of the Soviets was the political and military...
occupation of Rumania and Bulgaria. This mission was initially so important, that the main Soviet forces were advanced through Bulgaria and Rumania to the Iron Gates. The defeat of the remaining German-Hungarian forces in the Balkans became temporarily of secondary importance.

Bulgaria capitulated on 26.08.44 and declared war on Germany on 8.09.44.

The 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts drove the remaining German troops out of these two countries with the passive, and in the case of Rumania after the bombing of Bucharest by the Luftwaffe, active assistance of these countries. The Germans were interned, later becoming prisoners of war. At the same time, the 4th Ukrainian Front, taking advantage of the 1st Ukrainian Front’s success, advanced into the spurs of the Carpathians. The oil fields of Ploesti fell 30.08.44. Bucharest was occupied on 1.09.44.

Rumania broke off relations with Hungary on 30.08.44, and demanded the return of northern Transylvania within 48 hours. This resulted in the activation of the Second Army under General Lajos vitéz Veress. It was to be made up of IX Corps units already in the area, followed by units reassigned from the First Army, consisting of the 25th Infantry Division, 2nd Armored Division, 20th Infantry Division, VII Corps Headquarters, and formations of the quickly mobilized (25.08.44) Replacement Army.

The Germans began their retreat into the Carpathians on 29.08.44, first evacuating Uscie-Putille. The Soviet pressure was consistently of secondary importance. As only portions of the 2nd Ukrainian Front pursued the remnants of the 6. Armee and 8. Arme, Heeresgruppe Südukraine were able to establish positions to defend Transylvania.

The 8. Arme, moreover, had been able to extract five of its divisions in good order from the catastrophe, namely those that had been northwest of the Jassy breakthrough. By 26.08.44, the Heeresgruppe had occupied the passes in the Carpathians with its left wing anchored at the Borgo Pass and in contact with the southern wing of the First Army.

The front of the 8. Arme ran roughly along the mountain ridges, and included the important passes of Tölgyes (Tilges), Gyhzmes (Gyimes), and Oitoz (Ojtoz). From these positions, the 8. Arme was able to frustrate the continuing Soviet attempts to dislodge it from its positions.

The main Soviet attacks came through and up the Bistrita and Trotus valleys. Westwards of the Ojtoz/Ojtoz Pass, the front curved around the Székler Corner and followed approximately the 1940 Hungarian-Rumanian border westwards to the area north of Brasso.

Further to the west the situation was not as positive for the defense. The 6. Arme, charged with the defense of this stretch of the front, had managed to extract virtually no intact units from the Jassy debacle. What troops it consisted mainly of remnants, line-of-communications troops and Luftwaffe ground support personnel. These remnants were combed through for any nonessential personnel, and then organized into battle groups. It was on these ad-hoc units that the whole defense of southern Transylvania rested, and it was indeed these units that turned back the first Soviet-Rumanian advances on 5.09.44.

On 2.09.44, the situation along the front was as follows:
- From the Red Tower Pass to the Kelemen Mountains, the XVII. Armeekorps advanced into the area. By 23.09.44, the Soviet forces had still not been repulsed from the defenses, so that the First Army ordered the retreat to the Arpad Line; withdrawal took place on the night of 27. – 28.09.44.

Meanwhile, the massive air armadas of the Allies were appearing regularly over Hungarian territory and dropping tons of bombs, although the greatly outnumbered Hungarian fighters put up a brave defense.

By the beginning of September the situation in southern Hungary had been stabilized to certain extent. As only portions of the 2nd Ukrainian Front pursued the remnants of the 6. Arme and 8. Arme, Heeresgruppe Südukraine were able to establish positions to defend Transylvania.

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- From the Red Tower Pass to the Kelemen Mountains, the XVII. Armeekorps...
With attached 9th Border Guard Brigade covered the passes.

- South, to the Rumanian border at Sepsi, the Székler Border Command, (with the 2nd and 3rd Replacement Divisions, local Border Guard battalions, and the Székler Border Guards), was defending the loop of Hungarian Transylvania. The Széklers had already been involved in the bitter fighting with the Soviet forces in the Gómés/Gymmes and Ojtoz/Oitoz Passes on the 209.44.

At Brasso, the newly-arrived 4. Gebirgs-Division was located at Sepsiszentgyörgy. It had halted the enemy advance there.

These forces were placed under the command of the 8. Armee. The remnants of the shattered 6. Armee (amounting to perhaps some 2 – 3 divisions in strength) was placed in Heeresgruppe Südugraine reserve at Brasso.

Between the right (west) wing of the 6. Armee and the left (east) wing of the Second Hungarian Army, there were no combat units to speak of. It was into this void that the first Rumanian forces struck. Close on the heels of their erstwhile enemies followed the highly mobile spearheads of the Soviet Army, although the main body of the Soviet forces was still south of the Transylvanian Alps.

The only units in this gap were weak Hungarian Border Guards units which had not been overly keen to establish contact with the Heeresgruppe Südugraine. According to General Friessner, (who must not be considered as pro-Hungarian at all), these units did not make a very trustworthy impression. For this reason, and from his recent experience with the Rumanians, General Friessner decided to place all the Hungarian units in the area under German command, and furthermore, to integrate the Hungarian and German units. General Friessner thought – characteristically for him – that the Hungarians had not yet achieved the necessary decisiveness needed to defend their homeland.

The Second Army, under the command of General Lajos Veress consisted of the II Corps with the 7th and 9th Replacement Divisions, later supplemented by the 2nd Armored and 25th Infantry Divisions from the First Army. The hurriedly activated 1st and 2nd Mountain Replacement Brigades were included in this army. Also attached was SS-Gruppe Phelps, with the 8. SS-Kavallerie-Division and other small German unit.

Meanwhile, the units that were further to the west of the Second Army were integrated with the also hurriedly mobilized Replacement Army troops, and gathered under the command of the Third Army. This Third Army remained, for the time being, independent of German control, and directly subordinate to the Hungarian General Staff. This was initially tolerated by the Germans, as the commander, General József Heszlényi, was a staunch pro-German soldier.

The German High Command was, as usually, uncertain as to the exact plans
of the Soviet forces at this time. Hitler was – erroneously – convinced that the Soviet forces were in the process of fulfilling their centuries-old ambition of acquiring a passage to the Mediterranean Sea, and would neglect the Hungarian Front until this aim was achieved. This same conviction led him to the belief that here was the great opportunity to split the Allies once and for all.

Hitler to refuse permission to withdraw from the dangerously exposed bulge around the Székler Corner. On the contrary, against the advice of Guderian, he ordered the weakened Heeresgruppe Südukraine to establish communications with the retreating Heeresgruppe F to the south in the Balkans, and to maintain a continuous front stretching from Brasso to the Iron Gates, using the natural defenses of the Carpathians.

The Battle for Transylvania

To achieve this grandiose plan, it was of course first necessary to be in possession of the territory that included these natural defenses. This area had belonged to the Rumanians all during the war, and they were still very much in possession of it, and they were now advancing north. It was deemed necessary to push the Rumanians out of this region. For this operation, the Second Hungarian Army was assigned four green divisions gathering at Kolozsvár (Cluj).

Meanwhile, on 5.09.44, the 3rd Ukrainian Front had reached Turnu Severin at the Iron Gates on the Danube River. The advance was aimed at reaping the political harvest in Bulgaria and Rumania that the Germans had sown.

Heeresgruppe Südukraine intended to march the remnants of the 6. Armee and the Second Hungarian Army through the Rumanian part of Transylvania southwards, and to occupy the vital Red Tower and Vulkán Passes. At the same time, the Third Army was to advance and retake Arad and establish communications with the 2. Panzerarmee of Heeresgruppe F.

The attack plans were greeted with enthusiasm by the Hungarian troops. Here was the long awaited chance to liberate the remainder of Transylvania. The forces of the Second Army assembled in the area of Kolozsvár – Máros Vasarhely.

The attack was launched at dawn on 5.09.44. The Second Army, spearheaded by the 2nd Armored Division followed by the 7th and 9th Replacement Divisions, and reinforced by the 1179. Sturm Batterie, advanced along the road between Kolozsvár and Torda.

Although the Rumanians resisted fiercely, the Hungarians steadily pushed them back and, crossing the border, continued to advance on the Máros River. The 2nd Armored Division advanced as far Somfalva and Kiralyfalva in the valley of the Small Kokel River, approximately 20 kilometers south of Lechintza and Ogra. The remaining troops, (7th and 9th Replacement Divisions, as well as the 1st and 2nd Replacement Mountain Brigades), broke the resistance of the Rumanian defenders, and the 2nd Armored Division was able to cross over the Máros River.

During the following days, the initially surprised Rumanians regained their composure, and began to slow the invaders.

While these events were taking place to the north, the 2nd Ukrainian Front had crossed unopposed over the Transylvanian Alps, and had occupied the cities of Brasso, Nagy Szeben, and the Vulkán Pass. Soviet forces then proceeded to advance towards the Máros River, where they encountered the advancing Hungarian and German forces. The meeting halted both advances, the Rumanians gaining heart at the appearance of the Soviet forces. The attack by the Second Army stalled. The German High Command ordered the suspension of all offensive activities. On 9.09.44, the Hungarian attack was

Transylvania

(shaded areas are mountainous regions)
The arrival of these reinforcements already advanced through the passes, and strong Soviet reinforcements were arriving elements of the 25th Infantry Division to the Máros River. To reinforce the slowing attack, the Second Army immediately marched the 25th Infantry Division, the attack of the two replacement divisions, as was part of its artillery. Since troops were also tied up in various rear guard actions, the total strength of the division did not amount to more than 3 battalions. The remaining 3 battalions could not be expected to occupy their positions before 13.09.44.

On 14.09.44, the Soviets tried to break through the Hungarian lines west of Torda. The 2nd Mountain Replacement Brigade, although having just arrived, was able to throw back this attempt. In the early afternoon, the Soviet forces attempted the same attack to the east. This time, they encountered only one weak battalion, and managed to advance up to the outskirts of Torda. Only a last-minute counter attack by the 25th Infantry Division prevented the successful occupation of Torda.

By 22.09.44, the Soviet forces in turn attacked in full strength. With three Soviet and one Rumanian Division, supported by a tank brigade, the Hungarians’ situation had become very critical by noon. A counterattack by the 2nd Armored Division, (ready strength on 20.9.44: 57 tanks), was unable to stop the Soviet advance. The 2nd Armored Division combined forces with the 25th Infantry Division, and was just barely able to prevent the Soviet forces from capturing Torda. The Hungarians lost over 1000 men on 22.09.44 alone.

On 23.09.44, the 23. Panzer-Division arrived to relieve the weary and battle-worn 2nd Armored Division. But the German Panzer-Division was not able to restore the situation, and instead lost some 30 – 40 % of its infantry. The battle had also taken its toll on the Soviet forces, and the main attacks were diverted to other sectors.

Owing to the breakthrough in the Third Army’s sector by the 2nd Ukrainian Front the 23. Panzer-Division and the 76. Infanterie-Division were dispatched towards Nagyvarád on 27.09.44.

The 25th Infantry Division remained in the Torda positions until 8.10.44, when the general situation dictated that it be withdrawn further towards the north. Losses for the 25th Infantry Division from 8.09. – 22.09.44 were 750 KIA, 1500 WIA. Of these casualties, 85% belonged to the infantry.
The Battle for Arad

The Third Army was charged with the advance on the right (west) wing of the Axis offensive. Its mission was to take Arad and advance south to block the Soviet advance.

The Battle for Arad involved the 1st Armored Division, the 6th Replacement Division, the 1st Cavalry Replacement Brigade, and the 7th Assault Gun Battalion. Arad was taken by the IV Corps on 13.09.44. The Hungarian forces then advanced to Lippa on 19.09.44.

The 7th Assault Gun Battalion successfully destroyed 67 T-34 tanks. Of its full establishment of 30 Sturmgeschütz-III (some of which had been taken over from the 1st Assault Gun Battalion in accordance with Hungarian assault gun doctrine), 8 were destroyed, 10 badly damaged but recovered from the field, and the remaining 12 were somewhat damaged, but repairable within a week. (At the end of the battle, 7th Assault Gun Battalion was redesignated as the 25th Assault Gun Battalion, and fought under the Second Army in October 1944 with 14 Sturmgeschütz-III.)

The Soviet forces then counter attacked and completely overwhelmed the mostly untrained and under armed troops, and by 20.09.44 the Hungarians were once again withdrew from Arad. The Soviet forces retook Arad on 22.09.44.

The Soviet forces also advanced around the southern flank of the Carpathian Mountains with mechanized forces, and turning north into western Rumanian, occupied Temesvár on 19.09.44.

The Soviet offensive in Transylvania finally ground to a halt on 25.09.44.

The Quiet Before the Storm

Guderian intended to use this unexpected intermission, and, on his own responsibility, ordered the exposed Székler Corner positions to be evacuated.

General Friessner, then commanding general of the Heeresgruppe Süd Ukraine, (due care must be taken regarding his dislike of the Hungarians), comments about the situation that existed in the Hungarian Army at this time. He remarks that “with all due recognition of the extraordinary individual performances of some Hungarians, it is not possible to avoid saying that many Hungarian units were failures. The weak resistance that the Hungarian units offered lay basically in the fact that they were not capable of withstanding the Soviet onslaught. They had not enough arms, in particular modern weapons and antitank guns. In addition, the Hungarian soldiers were not properly trained. Last but not least, the unsettled political situation and its influences had their effect.” (Translation by author).

Hungary, seeing its national territory threatened and invaded by the Soviet forces, demanded the immediate transfer of 5 Panzer divisions to Hungary if Hitler wanted to avoid a Hungarian demand for armistice. Hitler could not ignore this ultimatum, and sent the III. Panzerkorps with three mechanized divisions, ordering the transfer of further forces from Galicia and Yugoslavia.

The III. Panzerkorps arrived in Hungary, and the 23. Panzer-Division was assigned to it. It was also destined to get the 109. and 110. Panzer-Brigaden, both in the final stages of formation. The first mission of this strong armored force was not an attack on the advancing Soviet forces, but the establishment of German authority in Budapest. However, the situation soon normalized itself, and disaster was avoided. Hitler then released the 23. Panzer-Division on 13.09.44.

Although Guderian wanted to use the III. Panzerkorps around Arad to prevent a thrust via the Vulkán Pass onto the Hungarian Plain (The Pusta), Hitler insisted that the III. Panzerkorps be included in the attack further east, from Kolozsvár southwards. This drive was to be a continuation of the Second Army’s stalled attack, and had as its objectives the recapture of the Carpathian Passes, and the establishment Hitler’s “Winter Defense Line” there. Hitler was still convinced that the Soviet forces were intent on with their Balkan conquest.

Meanwhile, with the prospects of an easy victory in sight, the STAVKA ordered the 4th Ukrainian Front to destroy the Axis forces in the Carpathians, and then advance upon Ushgorod and Munkács, thereby “liberating” the Carpatho-Ukraine.

The 2nd Ukrainian Front, with the front defined by the cities of Turgu-Márós – Torda – Arad – Temesvár – Újvidék, was ordered to advance on the cities of Debrecen, Kolozsvár and Szeged, and then proceed to the Tisza River.

During September 1944, the Third Hungarian Army headquarters (under General Heszlényi), raised from the IV Corps staff, to counter the Soviet invasion expected through the Bánát and Arad. The initial forces at its disposition comprised the VII Corps, (1st Replacement Armored Division, 4th Replacement Division, and Hungarian Order of Battle

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1st Armored Division: 6 Hungarian tanks; 3 ATG (75mm)
2nd Armored Division: 64 Hungarian tanks; 15 assault guns; 17 Panzer IV; 4 Panzer V; 3 Panzer VI
7th Assault Gun Battalion: 7 assault guns
20th Assault Gun Battalion: 4 assault guns
25th Assault Gun Battalion: 4 ATG (75mm)
the 20th Infantry Division were dispatched to the front. As soon as it arrived from Poland, the II Reserve Corps, (re-designated once again as the VIII Corps), with the Huszár Division, 12th Reserve Infantry Division, and the 23rd Reserve Division followed.

This force was to be used to form a buffer between the Soviet spearheads and Arad.

The Third Army units on the right (west) wing of the Heeresgruppe Südakraine had not yet been assigned to the army group. This situation led Hitler to issue an ultimatum to the Hungarians on 20.09.44. stating that unless the Hungarian General Staff acceded to Heeresgruppe Südakraine’s desired structural changes, (i.e. the assignment of the Third Army to the Germans), Hitler would have to reexamine the alliance between the two nations.

Upon receiving the message, the Third Army was therefore immediately assigned to the Heeresgruppe Südakraine on 21.09.44. The Third Army’s front was about 300 kilometers wide, stretching from Nyivyár to the southern Heeresgruppe Südakraine boundary, which was approximately halfway between Szegedi and the mouth of the Tisza River.

On 24.09.44, Heeresgruppe Südakraine had redesignated as Heeresgruppe Süd, and Heeresgruppe Nordakraine as Heeresgruppe A.

On this same day, the Heeresgruppe Süd reported that a large shift in forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was taking place. The Soviets were massing troops in the region of Temesvár – Arad – Nyivyár, where the newly formed Third Army had failed to prevent the Soviet forces deploying out of the passes. It was obvious that the Soviet forces were about to initiate large scale operations into Hungary. This evidence was further enhanced by the fact that the left wing of the 1. Panzerarmee in the Beskid Mountains had been pushed back by superior forces, and was now barely clinging to the mountain crests. Then Slovak troops, assisted by Soviet paratroopers dropped behind the Axis lines, rose against the Germans. Although put down, it was only at the cost of losing the defensive positions held by the 1. Panzerarmee. The Dukla Pass was taken on 6.10.44.

All facts pointed to a double-pronged attack. Guderian therefore ordered that the Heeresgruppe Süd should initiate preparations for the withdrawal behind the Tisza River, along a line defined by Szeged – Debrecen – Uzhhorod. At the same time, the rest of Hungary was declared to be part of the Heeresgruppe Süd operational area.

During the second half of September, 1944, the Heeresgruppe Süd received 14 German divisions; two from the north in Poland, four removed from the 1. Panzerarmee in the south and the rest from the West.

Fearing above all an invasion of the Hungarian Plain from the north, through the Carpathians via Czechoslovakia and Ruthenia, the German commander sent
his main reserves, including most of the armor, to Kolozsvár.

To screen the withdrawal of the First Army on 27.09.44, the Hungarians left strong forces in the Hunyadi-Line which were withdrawn only if the Soviet pressure became unbearable. With the First Army’s withdrawal to the Arpád Line, the 1st Mountain Brigade was dispatched to Raho-Vissovóly, and assigned to the newly-activated V Corps there.

To enable a more cohesive defense of the Carpathians, the 24th Infantry Division, defending the Pantyr Pass, was reassigned to the VI Corps.

The southern wing of the First Army was anchored by the 6th Border Guard Group at the Burkut Mountain.

The rear guard in the Szent-László Line consisted of battalion-sized infantry groups, reinforced with artillery, which were dug-in across and along the sides all the mountain pass roads as well as along the railway line between Krómeszió – Woroctha. The paths through the woods and mountain tracks were covered by reinforced companies with mortars and anti-tanks weapons. The rear guard had orders to not abandon the Szent-László Line without express permission from the First Army.

The Soviet forces followed slowly in the path of the retreating Hungarians, so that the Hungarian rear guards were able to move back reasonably intact to the Arpád Line on the 30.09.44 in accordance with the plans laid by the First Army. Meanwhile, the Hungarian forces had three days to prepare their defense in the permanent fortifications installed along the Arpád Line.

The Soviet forces continued to follow the rearguards at a slow and careful pace, severely hampered by the Hungarian destruction of roads and bridges, as well as numerous mine fields laid down in their path. Small Soviet probes to reconnoitre the defenses were launched. The main thrust of these Soviet activities was cleverly directed at the positions between the main valley fortifications, where the defenses were spread somewhat thinner. One of these reconnaissances-in-force attempted to take Ökörmező by surprise, but was beaten back by the 16th Infantry Division.

The aim of the Soviet forces was obviously to pin down as many forces of the First Army and 8. Armee as possible and thereby to preventing them from sending reinforcements south.

The Battle for the Tisza River

By 27.09.44 it had become obvious that the Third Hungarian Army would be unable to prevent the breakthrough in the direction of Budapest or Debrecen. In addition, the sector between Nagyvarád and Kolozsvár (Second Army) was still virtually undefended. Heeresgruppe Süd considered that the present lines were only defendable if it received additional armored and infantry divisions. Furthermore, the Third Army’s sector was shortened to include the line between Nagyvarád and the southern wing of the Heeresgruppe Süd, south of Timisoara.

The southern flank of the Third Army was held by the 4. SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division and the 5th Military District.

An attempt to combine the Third Hungarian and the 6th German Armies into an “Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico” failed because communications of any sort between the two armies was virtually nonexistent.

Hitler, finally realizing that the situation was not what he had imagined it to be, rescinded the attack order to the III. Panzer-Korps, and disposed that 5 mobile divisions be assembled around Debrecen. Two of these units had yet to arrive from Galicia. This force was to defeat the Soviet mobile forces in the area, and then to reoccupy the “winter positions” in the mountain passes of Transylvania. Whether this plan was practical or not is debatable. It depended on the Soviet forces leaving the Germans enough time to implement it.

In fact, the Soviets moved first. The bad rail communications between Galicia and Hungary delayed the arrival of the two Panzer divisions.

The opening phase of the Soviet attempt to take the Hungarian plain between the Danube and the Tisza Rivers began on 6.10.44. At 0400 hours, the 2nd Ukrainians Front, with 3 mechanized and 3 cavalry corps, as well as 17 rifle divisions, attacked the Third Army. Half an hour later, the Soviet tanks had rolled over the Hungarian positions and overwhelmed the 4th Replacement Division.

The strength, size, and direction of the Soviet thrusts were not clear initially to the Axis command owing to the dark. When the sun began to rise, the early morning mist further prevented definite intelligence.

In the VII Corps sector, the Soviet forces crossed the Körös River at Komadi. The VIII Corps was overrun by over by what it reported as amounting to 300 tanks. The Soviet advanced along the railway line between Arad and Békéscsaba (due west of Gyula). The 20th Infantry Division, which was covering a front of some 20 kilometers, was also immediately overwhelmed. Within two hours of opening their attack, the Soviet forces had virtually destroyed the Third Army defenses. By 0700 hours, the Third Army ordered the retreat to the Tisza line.

The Soviet forces then crossed the Körös River in the face of fierce counterattacks by the 1. and 13. Panzer-Divisionen.

A counterattack by the 1st Armored Division from Tokomlos was quickly halted by the Soviet armored spearheads. But, the slight letup allowed the 8th Replacement Division to withdraw relatively intact. In the confusion, the LVII. Panzer-Korps was not notified of the retreat order until well after 1200 hours.

General Veress had been requested by the local authorities to withdraw his forces from Kolozsvár, so that the city could be spared the ravages of war. On his own authority, and taking into consideration the situation on his right flank which threatened to develop into an encircling movement, he ordered the withdrawal of the Second Army from its positions in Kolozsvár on the night of 7.10.44.

On 8.10.44 Hitler finally approved the withdrawal of the Hungarian and German forces defending the Máros River as well as those positioned east of the Vatra Dornei. These units were ordered to take up positions behind the Nagyvarád-Szeged Line.

By 10.10.44 the 25th Infantry and 9th Replacement Divisions of the II Corps were beaten. The defeat of this corps forced the Germans to abandon the Kolozsvár bridgehead.

The Hungarians were forced out of Szeged 11.10.44, the Soviet forces advancing as far as Kecskemét, there to be met and halted by the Huszár Division. Meanwhile, Heeresgruppe Süd had managed to assemble three Panzer divisions near Debrecen. This strong armored force was able to stop those Soviet forces which had penetrated through the Hungarian lines between Nagyvarád and Kecskemét. However, in the meantime the other prong of the Soviet thrust had crossed the Tisza River at Szeged, and had advanced almost as far as the Danube River, reaching Sambor and Kiskunkalás before be-
ing halted. For all practical purposes, the Third Army had been totally defeated.

German comments at the time state that the Hungarian soldiers fought valiantly, but that most of the upper echelons of the officer corps appeared to have lost the will to fight, and that Third Army units caved in very rapidly. (Hardly surprising as these replacement units were hardly trained and badly equipped).

By 12.10.44, it was high time to withdraw the exposed right wing of the Third Army, and thereby avoid the encirclement of the VI Corps and the 10th Infantry Division.

Consequently, on 13.10.44, the Hungarian General Staff ordered that the VI Corps and the 10th Infantry Division be taken out of the line, and be sent to Budapest to take part in the preparations for the defense of that city. At the same time the First Army was to begin its withdrawal, maintaining contact with its right neighbor, the Second Army, and providing cover for the defense of Budapest. Consequently, the 66th Border Guard Group still secured the area around Russzpolyana and Borsa. It was also attached to the 24th Infantry Division.

The 10th Infantry Division, after leaving one of its regiments behind to reinforce the 24th Division, was marched to Mármarossziget to be entrained. The 66th Border Guard Group still secured the area around Russzpolyana and Borsa. It was also attached to the 24th Infantry Division.

October 15th, 1944

The situation in mid-October 1944 was described by the C.O.S. as follows:

- The battle at Debrecen had been lost.
- The region east of the Tisza River was no longer tenable.
- The plains between the Tisza River and the Danube were in the process of falling into Soviet hands.
- He viewed the fighting between Hatvan and Miskolc with pessimism.
- The railway network and many stations were destroyed.
- Owing to the continuing bombing attacks by the Allies, a large portion of the factories had been laid to waste.
- The antiaircraft defenses existed mostly on paper.
- It was his considered opinion that even newly arrived armored reinforcements could do absolutely nothing to change the situation. Further resistance was useless.

The Hungarian Army had a strength of 1,071,751 on 15.10.44.

The Hungarians had long been negotiating for a settlement with the Allies, who demanded total surrender and insisted that the Soviet forces be allowed occupy Hungary. After much hesitation, and being forced into this position by the military situation, the Hungarians decided to capitulate.

The Second Hungarian Army was to go over to the Soviet 2nd Ukrainian Front, and combine with the Soviets to attack the Germans in this area.

The Third Hungarian Army was ignored, as the commanding general, General Heszlényi, was considered to be pro-German, and the government considered that he would ignore this command.

The commanders of the First and Second Armies were in receipt of orders which, after receiving the command "Carry out order of March 1st, 1920", commanded them to take up contact with the Soviet forces, and join with the Soviet forces against the Germans. General Lajos Veress (Second Army) was informed of this order on 11.10.44, General Béla Miklós (First Army) on 12.10.44.

On 15.10.44, Horthy read out a proclamation to the people and soldiers of Hungary on the radio.

The proclamation explained Hungary's position on the side of Germany in the war. He considered that Germany had lost the war, and, that in the words of Bismarck, no sovereign nation was pledged to sacrifice itself on the altar of an alliance. Horthy continued that he had taken steps to end the war for Hungary. He emphasized German contempt and failure to keep promises. He condemned the Jewish pogroms being carried out by the Gestapo, and General Miklós of plundering and destroying the Hungarian countryside during their retreat, of kidnapping high officials and generals, of distributing pamphlets which encourage treason against the government, and of planning to establish a pro-German government in place of his own.

As a consequence of all these acts, Horthy concluded that he was in the process of suing for an armistice with the Allies. He enjoined all the soldiers to obey the orders to be issued by their commanders which would deal with the problem in detail.

The Germans reacted quickly. Although the Hungarians had erected barricades all throughout Budapest, the schwer Panzer-Abteilung 503 was assigned to 22. SS-Kavallerie-Division in Budapest. The heavy Tiger tanks were positioned on all the Danube bridges, and stopped all traffic. The Hungarian troops that had followed Horthy's orders were disarmed by German units also supported by one Tiger tank each. The Gestapo arrested Horthy and his son.

Budapest was brought under control. The Germans also occupied the palace. Horthy was taken away to Germany, and the leader of the fascist Arrow Cross, Count Ferenc Szálasi, became Premier. The new 109. and 110. Panzer-Brigaden, still in the process of forming up, were also put on alert and transferred to the immediate vicinity of Budapest.

The Results of the October 15th Proclamation

Horthy's October 15th Proclamation left the administrative, commercial, and industrial sectors in great confusion, which in turn resulted in the intended reorganization and mass mobilization of the economy for the war effort never being achieved. On the contrary, chaos was rampant, and thanks to the uncertain political and military situation, what remained of the production capacity production fell further.

The Hungarian Army was especially affected by the attempted armistice. Although the Germans had counted on an increased effort on the behalf of the Honvéd, the opposite in fact occurred. The desertions of officers and men increased day by day.

General Friessner, (with his usual bias), notes in his memoirs that from all portions of the front he received word that the Hungarian units were showing signs of dissolution. In his opinion, it was therefore no longer possible to rely on these “allies”. Hungarian officers and men failed to demonstrate the will to fight. Neither the new Hungarian Premier Szálasi nor the new C.O.S. Károly Beregffy were accepted.

Generals Miklós and Veress were relieved of their commands, and replaced by General László Dezso (First Army) and General Jenő vitéz Major (Second Army). On 16.10.44, General Veress was arrested for “breach of alliance” by the Germans. General Miklós escaped a similar fate by going over to the Soviet 4th Ukrainian Front with his complete Headquarters on 17.10.44. He proceeded to assist the Soviet forces as far as he was able in accordance with Horthy’s last commands.

The Third Army remained under the command of General Heszlényi. But many Hungarian soldiers either went over to the Soviet forces or were disarmed by the
Germans. General Miklós and the commander of the 2nd Mountain Brigade came to an agreement, and large portions of the brigade went over to the Soviet forces. The 5th Replacement Division was removed from the front line and disarmed by the Germans while attempting to do the same.

To prevent the complete collapse of the Hungarian Army, the Germans now began to take steps to integrate the Hungarian units into their own command structure. The Hungarian Army in effect had ceased to exist as a separate entity. In fact, the Germans now began to recruit Hungarians for their own units. In addition, on 15.10.44, the OKH declared all of Hungary to be an operational war zone, and ordered that all Hungarian units and soldiers were now subject to German command, and were to obey German orders.

Following Horthy’s attempt to withdraw Hungary from the war, Hitler replaced him with the Arrow Cross, (the Hungarian Fascist Party), which pledged to keep Hungary in the war. This new government required several strong armored units stationed in and around Budapest to keep it in power. This further sapped the already weakened Heeresgruppe Süd’s striking power.

The situation was not improved by the dissolution of the First Army in the Carpathian Mountains. The commander’s departure with some of this army’s units had left a wide gap which threatened the Heeresgruppe Süd with encirclement from the north. In addition, on 16.10.44 the 2nd Armored Division had left its positions in the line and had retreated westwards behind the Tisza River during the night upon orders of General Miklós.

Withdrawal on All Fronts

On 17.10.44, the 2nd Ukrainian Front opened its second attempt to cut off and encircle Heeresgruppe Süd east of the Tisza River. Heeresgruppe Süd ordered Armeegruppe Wöhler (Second Army and 8. Armee) to counterattack. Together with the Panzer divisions attacking from the west, the Germans managed to encircle to Soviet mobile units and, in a week-long battle, severely mauled them and brought them to a complete stop. After this success, the Armeegruppe Wöhler continued its withdrawal westwards, and reached the west side of the Tisza River near Tokaj. To the north, the 1. Panzer-Arme and the First Army began to withdraw from the Carpathians.

Although the First Army’s withdrawal took place as planned, the timetable set up by the Germans for the withdrawal itself could not be kept. The 24th Infantry Division moved back on 17.10.44 to Chust. It arrived there on 20.10.44, barely in time to partake in the defense of that city.

At the same time, the 16th Infantry Division was positioned at Bilke, the 1st Mountain Brigade around the Buzsora Peak, and the 13th Infantry Division was strung out amongst the high hills from Polena to Verecke, where it maintained...
contact with the 6th Infantry Division, which was in the Arpád Line.

The 2nd Ukrainian Front attacked Debrecen from the south east and the south west, while cavalry and armor outflanked the city. The city proper was stormed on 20.10.44. By the end of the month, Soviet mobile units had reached the Tisza north of Debrecen. There they encountered the strong and well-organized Axis defences. This unexpected resistance halted the advance. The Soviets were forced to prepare a carefully calculated attack after bringing up reinforcements.

The right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, after mopping up in Transylvania ensuing the fall of the capital of this region, Kolozsvár, crossed the Hungarian border northwest of Satu Mare and reached the Tisza River near Csap.

Soviet attempts during the 21. and 22.10.44 to take the important traffic and communications center of Szolyva, were beaten back by the 13th Infantry Division with severe losses on both sides.

At the same time, the 16th Infantry Division had withdrawn to Irsava, the 1st Mountain Brigade eastwards of Munkács, and the 13th Infantry Division later managed to reach Polena and Szolyva.

The Soviet forces kept up continual pressure, but were not able to prevent the orderly withdrawal of the First Army.

With the Hungarian and German resistance broken on a wide front by the offensive of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the Soviet Forces were able to penetrate deeply into Hungary. The Axis commands, on the other hand, was compelled to switch its reserves from one crisis point to another and found it difficult to organize an cohesive effective defence.

On 18.10.44, the 4th Ukrainian Front began crossing the Carpathians, and entered Czechoslovakia. On the same day the advance up the west side of these mountains by the 2nd Ukrainian Front brought the fall of Sighet with it. By 26.10.44, Munkács fell. Ungvár followed on 27.10.44.

Although the second attempt to cut off Heeresgruppe Süd had run out of steam, the Soviets decided to try the same tactic again, but this time by advancing from Kecskemét up the west bank of the Tisza River.

The Soviet thrust was also ordered to envelop Budapest, and to take the Hungarian capital if it proved at all possible at the time.

To counter this advance, four Panzer Divisions were ordered to attack the Soviet spearheads, and then to continue advancing south, thereby reestablishing communications with Heeresgruppe F. Further urgently needed reinforcements and replacements were not forthcoming. Hitler were building up his forces...
for the grand Ardennes Offensive, designed to split the Allies, and win the war once and for all.

On 29.10.44, the Axis forces in Hungary were grouped as follows:

**Armeegruppe Wöhler**, (now the First Hungarian Army and 8. Arme) defending the Tisza River from Polgar to the northern wing of the *Heeresgruppe Süd*.

6. *Arme* (Between Tisza River and the Danube)

Third Hungarian Army (withdrawn from the line, and given the mission to organize resistance west of the Danube in Transdanubia, and reestablish communications with the *Heeresgruppe F* to the south).

Before the 4 German Panzer divisions could go over to the attack, the 2nd Ukrainian Front destroyed the last Hungarian remnants at Kecskemét on 30.10.44.

The Soviet attack had been piling up in front of Kecskemét. In addition to the 4th Mechanized Corps, the 2nd Guard Mechanized Corps had been introduced into the battle. The 23rd Reserve Division was immediately overwhelmed, and although fighting fiercely, had to swing aside and let the Soviet armor which followed the infantry attacks flood through.

By this time, the Soviet order of battle included two Rumanian Armies, which were put into the line north of Kecskemét.

Kecskemét fell on 1.11.44. The Soviet forces were able to advance as far as the Danube, driving the remnants of the 5th and the 8th Replacement Divisions before them.

The events between the Tisza and the Danube decided the Germans to henceforth keep all Hungarian forces under their complete tactical and operational control, and to stiffen them with German units. As it was not considered advisable to have German troops under Hungarian command, the Germans therefore assumed direct command of all Hungarian formations. The Third Army was combined once again with the 6. *Arme*, (designated as *Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico*).

In addition, there was the *Gruppe Budapest*, with the 8. *SS-Kavallerie-Division* and the 22. *SS-Kavallerie-Division*, as well as the VI Corps.

Meanwhile, the Germans began operations with the Panzer divisions that had been gathering for the thrust to the south. The *LVII. Panzerkorps* (with the 1st Armored and Huszár Divisions, as well as the 1., 23., and 24. *Panzer-Divisionen*) moved south and engaged the Soviet forces advancing from Kecskemét. The *III. Panzerkorps* consisting of the 2nd Hungarian Armored Division, as well as the 13. *Panzer-Division* and the Feldherrnhalle *(FH)* *Panzer-Grenadier-Division* struck west of Kecskemét on 2.11.44, and managed to halt the Soviet advance.

Hungarian remnants and small units were gathering on the Csepel Island south of Budapest. Further groupings of miscellaneous troops were being put into the defenses of Budapest. The Budapest bridgehead was put under the command of the *III. Panzerkorps*, (designated as *Panzer-Gruppe Breith*). This meant that the 8. SS and 22. *SS-Kavallerie-Divisionen* were now also available to the *III. Panzerkorps*. The Huszár Division was transferred to the Csepel island.

On 4.11.44, the Soviet forces attacked the 25th Infantry Division which was positioned forward of Szolnok and Cegléd. The Hungarian division was quickly overrun, and both cities were taken. On the same day, the 9th Border Guard Brigade was driven back across the Tisza River, so that the entire Tisza line had to be abandoned.

On 7. and 8.11.44, the 3rd Ukrainian Front launched an attack which surprised the *Heeresgruppe F* forces along the west banks of the Danube, at the Drave River mouth, and established bridgeheads across the Danube at Mohács.

The withdrawal of the First Army from the Carpathians, the retreat of *Armeegruppe Wöhler*, and the slow advance of the Soviet forces in the center had shortened the width of the Axis forces facing the 2nd Ukrainian Front from 1400 kilometers to 700 kilometers. At the same time, the advance of the 4th Ukrainian Front into the Carpathians and Slovakia, as well as the surprise crossing of the 3rd Ukrainian Front over the southern portion of the Hungarian Danube, had effectively joined up the three Fronts, and enabled the 2nd Ukrainian Front to make a concentrated advance to Budapest without having to worry unduly about its flanks.

On 11.11.44, the 2nd Ukrainian Front launched its offensive against the *Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico* from Cegléd. The main blow fell against the sector held by the *LVII. Panzerkorps* (with the 13. *Panzer-Division* and 23. *Panzer-Division*, the 4. *SS-Panzergranadier-Division* and 18. *SS-Panzergranadier-Division*, and

### Units in Hungary
#### Order of Battle 3.12.1944

**Heeresgruppe Süd**

2. Panzer-Arme

LVIII. Korps

44. Infanterie-Division

13. SS-Gebirgs-Division

71. Infanterie-Division

1. Gebirgs-Division

Brandenburg Pz.-Gren.-Division

92. Brigade (motorisierte)

**Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico**

(Third Army & 6. Arme)

II Corps

20th Infantry Division

25th Infantry Division

8. SS-Polizei-Regiment

Danube River Flotilla

LVII. Panzerkorps

23. Panzer-Division

271. Volks-Grenadier-Division

LXXII. Corps

Kessecő Group

III. Panzerkorps

22. *SS-Kavallerie-Division*

8. *SS-Kavallerie-Division*

FHH *Panzer-Grenadier-Division*

13. Panzer-Division

10th Infantry Division

12th Infantry Division

IV. Panzerkorps

1. Panzer-Division

4. SS-Pz.-Gren.-Division

18. SS-Pz.-Gren.-Division

46. Infanterie-Division

76. Infanterie-Division

357. Infanterie-Division

*Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico* Reserves:

153. Feldausbildungs-Division

IX. SS-Gebirgs-Korps

2nd Armored Division

**Armeegruppe Wöhler**

(First Army & 8. Arme)

XXIX. Korps

8. Jäger-Division

15. Infanterie-Division

3. Gebirgs-Division

24. Panzer-Division

XVII. Korps

Gruppe Schulz

2nd Replacement Division

24th Infantry Division

V Corps

16th Infantry Division

1st Mountain Brigade

4. Gebirgs-Division

<table>
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<th>2nd Armored Division AFV strengths:</th>
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the 46. Infanterie-Division). The Soviet forces soon managed to penetrate the lines, as the 18. SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division (composed of Volksdeutscher) broke under the pressure, and disintegrated. At the same time, the 23. Panzer-Division was transferred elsewhere. The German defenses collapsed, and the line was pulled back.

The west bank of the Danube was still in Axis hands.

The Third Army had been charged with the defense of area west of the Danube. For this mission, it had the still untrained and untried 271. Volks-Grenadier-Division. In addition, there was the 31. SS-Freiwilligen-Grenadier-Division composed mainly of Volksdeutscher and not equipped with modern weapons, and whose training was still incomplete. The 20th Infantry Division, vastly under strength, the 25th Infantry Division, the Danube River Flotilla, and several small miscellaneous units, were gathered under the II Corps. The Soviet forces were able to cross the Danube on 27.11.44 and decimated the 31. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS at Pécs.

Meanwhile, the Soviet forces made an attempt to occupy the Csepel Island, located due south of Budapest in the Danube River. A fierce counterattack by the Huszár Division saved the day. The Soviet forces were thrown back across the river.

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The 3rd Ukrainian Front’s successful expansion of its bridgeheads, and the sever mauling of the 31. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS caught the Germans by surprise. The switch of the attack from Budapest to the north had brought the Soviet forces into contact with the LVII. Panzerkorps.

The main success of this Soviet advance was the severing of the railway line between Budapest and Miskolc, which fell on 3.12.44. On the other hand, the Germans were successful in keeping the Soviet forces from advancing into the mountains between Hatvan and Eger. Consequently, towards the end of November 1944, the Soviet advance petered out.

The armored vehicle situation for the Germans was catastrophic. The heavy fighting had left the 13. Panzer-Division with two tanks, the 24. Panzer-Division had no tanks at all, and mere 7 armored personnel carriers. The strongest division within the command of Heeresgruppe Süd had a mere 8 tanks; the average for the army group was 4 – 5 vehicles. A major problem encountered by the Germans was that factory-new tanks were breaking down after a few hours of use. Hungarian units were burnt out to a large degree.

Reorganization and New Units

The Soviet advance through Hungary brought many organizational problems for the Axis forces with it. The border
defense positions had been equipped with Yugoslavian weapons. As discussed earlier, each of the passes was defended by a battalion. There were 8 Border Guard battalions headquarters, (numbered 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68), with 35 fortress companies plus the 1st Fortress Battalion. Of these, 11 companies were in the 9th Border Guard Brigade sector, 6 companies plus the 1st Fortress Battalion in the 1st Mountain Brigade sector, and 18 companies under the 2nd Mountain Brigade.

The Germans ordered the evacuation of the pocket in the Székler Bulge on 7.09.44. The defenses and bunkers were made unusable or destroyed, and the weapons dismounted. All the border defense companies in this area were amalgamated into four fortress battalions (Nos. 211, 212, 213, 214), four fortress machine-gun battalions (Nos. 215, 216, 217, 218), and two fortress artillery battalions. These units were transferred by rail to Transdanubia, (the area west of the Danube), between Lake Balaton and the Drave River. They were used to fill up the 7th Replacement Division to strength.

The strength of these battalions varied, but they had an average strength of 400–500 men, (in one case over 1000 men) with 24 machine-guns and 16 mortars. The fortress artillery battalions each had 36 Soviet 76.2 mm cannon.

Other organizational matters concerned raising, once again, of so-called “march battalions”. These were large groups of men, usually only equipped with small arms (rifles and pistols), designed as mobile replacement units. But many of these march battalions were instead used to raise new ad-hoc units and sent to strengthen bridgeheads and defensive lines. Some were gathered into regiments (although without the regimental heavy weapons units), and thrown into the fray, usually being given specific sectors to defend.

The Solt Regiment, so designated because it was to defend the Danube Bridgehead at Solt, was assigned to the Kesseö Group (2nd Anti-Aircraft Brigade) and fought under this unit until the encirclement of Budapest.

The Bátašzek Regiment consisted of three battalions. It was used to defend the Danube Bridgehead at Baja. Its remnants were later used to fill up the 20th Infantry Division.

The Drava Regiment was used to defend the borders formed by the Drave and Mur Rivers against the Croatian and Serbian partisans. The major part of this regiment was formed from Royal Gendarmerie battalions which had been incorporated into the Royal Hungarian Army. In April 1945 the remnants of this regiment was used to fill up the Szent László Division.

The Bakony Regiment was emplaced in the Margaret Island) Line south of Lake Balaton. It consisted of three battalions.

During October 1944, the Szent-László Division was raised. It was an elite formation, consisted of the 1st Parachute Regiment (with one parachute, one heavy weapons, and one training battalion), 2nd Regiment (with the Royal Guards Infantry Battalion and a Royal Gendarmerie battalion), 3rd Regiment (designated as “Air Force Infantry Regiment” because it was made up of ground crews and other personnel of the Hungarian Air Force). The artillery included the 1st, 9th, 76th, and 6th motorized Artillery Battalions, as well as the 1st Rocket Launcher Battalion, and the 20th Assault Gun Battalion. Two antitank gun companies (one of which was equipped with German Hetzers light tank destroyers) provided the mobile elements of the division. There were also engineer, reconnaissance, and signal units. The supply elements were taken over from the 6th Replacement Division which had been dissolved.

Elements of the division saw action for the first time on 19.12.44. The Szt. László Division was very seldom used as a single cohesive unit, the rapidly deteriorating situation meant that the different regiments were used piecemeal as soon as available to plug the ever recurring gaps. It was not until April 1945 that the division was finally gathered, and then only after the remnants of the 20th Infantry, 8th Replacement, and 7th Replacement Divisions were used to fill up the Division. In addition, the 3rd Regiment was filled up with fortress battalion personnel, and thereafter designated as the Fortress Regiment.

In addition to the above measures, the various divisions and brigades were also filled up by the dissolved units. During the next few months, the Hungarian Army ordered further reorganizations and consolidations, the most important were:

During October 1944:
- 12th Reserve Division received the remnants of the 4th Replacement Division, and was duly redesignated as the 12th Infantry Division;

During November 1944:
- 1st Mountain Replacement Brigade filled up the 1st Mountain Brigade;
- 2nd Mountain Brigade was filled up by the 2nd Mountain Replacement Brigade;
- The 1st and 2nd Mountain Brigades were supposed to be amalgamated into the 1st Mountain Division. But the two units were never together in one place long enough to be joined.
- The Huszár (the former 1st Cavalry) Division was filled by the 1st Cavalry Replacement Brigade;
- 27th Light Division was filled up with Székél battalions and redesignated as the 27th Infantry Division;
- 9th Border Guard Brigade was also filled up with Székél Border Guard battalions, and upgraded to division status.
- 16th Infantry Division was filled up by the 6th Infantry Division;
- 24th Infantry Division was filled up by the 13th Infantry Division;

In January 1945:
- The 20th Infantry Division was filled up by the 2nd Replacement Division.

Those units that were used to fill up other units were stricken from the rolls.

NOTE: In many instances, German orders of battle for late 1944 and 1945 still included Hungarian units that had long been destroyed, amalgamated into other units, or dissolved. This incorrect information was probably owing to the confusion of battle, poor communications, and in some cases, just plain German disinterest about their Hungarian allies.

The Battle for the Danube

On 13.11.44, the Second Army, the III Corps, IV Corps, VI Corps, and VII Corps were relieved from the front and assigned duties elsewhere. The Second Army was deactivated on 17.12.44

After the previous attempts to encircle the Heeresgruppe Süd had failed, the Soviet forces made preparations once again, only this time the advance was to take place up the west bank of the Danube, northwards.
The collapse of the Third Army meant that the 23. Panzer-Division had to be transferred to this sector to plug the ensuing gaps. The Germans noted that even in Hungarian units which had been considered reliable, there were now signs of demoralization and break down. The Hungarians were deserting in groups of up to 100 men and going home.

Besides winning the war against the Axis, the Soviets had given as their major aims “the breaking of the German forces in the south east, so as to remove Hungary as the last ally of the Germans, and to free Carpatho-Ukraine, as well as to assist the people of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Albania in their fight to regain their freedom.”

Naturally, these were nice propaganda aims, but they appeared for the benefit of those who would listen to them. The main reason for the continuing efforts of the Soviet forces to occupy Hungary can be found in several other sources.

First, the capture of Budapest was thought to completely break the will of the Royal Hungarian Army.

Second, Budapest was the center of 2/3 of the Hungarian industry, and in particular the center of the armaments industry. There were more than 20 major factories turning out guns, airplanes, tanks, and many other war materials.

Third, the Germans received over 1 million tons of bauxite from Hungary.

Probably the most important single reason that the Soviet forces wanted to take Hungary was the oil fields in Nagykanizsa. This was the last source of natural oil for the Germans, except for their own meagre resources.

While the 2nd Ukrainian Front had occupied the Germans’ foremost thoughts, the 3rd Ukrainian Front to the south had attacked out of its bridgeheads on 27.11.44 across the Danube River towards Budapest, striking out to the north between the Danube and Lake Balaton, and to the west, between Lake Balaton and the Drave River. Mohács fell on the first day. Pécs fell in turn on 29.11.44. Three days later, as the Second Army was retreating without putting up much resistance, Kaposvár also fell. Nagykanizsa (the only remaining oil fields within the Axis) was threatened. The Soviet right flank, moving now up the west bank of the Danube took Pak.

On the evening of 4.12.44, the forces of the Heeresgruppe Süd on the west bank of the Danube River formed but a thin defense, stretching from Barcs on the Drave River, through Lake Balaton, through Siofok, Céce, and to the Danube at Dunaföldvár. This dangerous situation resulted in the 8. Panzer-Division being sent to the Heeresgruppe Süd. The combat value of most of the Heeresgruppe units was quite low, and some Germans commanders considered that the Hungarian divisions were next to worthless.

On 5.12.44 the 3rd Ukrainian Front started its third attempt to take Budapest. The most critical section for the Axis defense was between the Danube and Lake Balaton, where no cohesive defense was in place. The Soviet 4th Guard Army was able to advance until it encountered the German units which attempted to halt the Soviet forces. As these German units had no contact with their neighbors on either side, the Soviet forces pushed through and around them and continued to advance between Lake Balaton and Lake Valence, with the intention of encircling Budapest from the west. The first objective of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was Székesfehérvár, a very important communications and rail center, as well as being an integral part of the Margitsziget (Margaret Island) Line. (This was the line of defense between Lake Balaton and Budapest).

The developments to the south forced the Heeresgruppe Süd to withdraw the 1. Panzer-Division from the Budapest bridgehead and send it to the endangered area. Together with the 8. Panzer-Division, the Germans attempted to stem the flow.

The Margitsziget Line was not finished, in some cases not even started; the unending rain had filled the trenches with water, and there were no antitank guns or mines to reinforce the line. There were few heavy weapons or even troops to man the defenses. Although the Hungarians sent civilians to assist in the work, the Margitsziget Line was not finished until 20.12.44.

By 7.12.44, the southern banks of Lake Balaton were cleared of Axis troops, which had started their retreat to the unfinished Margitsziget Line on 8.12.44. The LVII. Panzer-Korps (with the 1. and 23. Panzer-Divisionen, the hastily brought up 153. Feldausbildungs-Division as well as the MG-Bataillon “Lausitz”), was stretched from Lake Balaton to Lake Valence.

Lake Balaton is usually frozen the entire winter. The ice is some 25 – 30 centimeters thick. The freezing weather causes the ice to buckle and crack, making the surface difficult to cross. The ice will bear men on foot, but not motor traffic or armor. Although the lake is not very deep, (indeed, it is wadable for large portions in the summer), it proved a good natural defensive position for the Third Army.

Between Lake Valance and the Danube at Budafok, (a suburb of Budapest on the west side of the Danube) the LXXII. Korps, (with the 271. Volks-Grenadier-Division, the Kessöö Group, the Huszár Division, and remnants from different units), was in change of the defense.

The 6. Armee, charged with holding the Margitsziget Line, had only the newly-arrived 8. Panzer-Division in reserve near Csákővár, which obviously insufficient to cover the more than 100 kilometer front against the Soviet onslaught.

The Germans, taken by surprise by this rapid turn of events, were forced to pull two divisions out of Italy to help plug as many gaps as could be.

Meanwhile, the situation east of the Danube was becoming more critical.

Fog and rain hid the Soviet concentrations north of Budapest. On 9.12.44 the Soviet forces attacked along a front of 120 kilometers. Within hours they made their first breakthrough of the defenses of Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico at Hatvan. Tanks and cavalry pressed north and north west through the gap and took Miskolc, Belassagyarmat, and Vacs. The critical situation in and around Budapest, however, demanded the immediate withdrawal of the 13. Panzer-Division and FHH Panzer-Grenadier-Division from the area, without being able to stop the Soviet forces.

The Battle for Budapest had begun in earnest.

Since 25.11.44, the Soviet forces had managed to obtain a foothold on the Csepel Island, and had been working their way up the island since then. To the east, some suburbs of Budapest, namely Pécél and Isaszeg had already been occupied. On 11.12.44, following further Soviet attacks, the 10th and the 12th Infantry Divisions were not able to hold their positions, and had to withdraw. This left the left flank of the 13. Panzer-Division unprotected, and it too was forced to withdraw and, so that the suburbs Alag and Kisalag also were lost.

Meanwhile, the Soviet advance east of the Danube continued. By 14.12.44, Sahy was occupied, and the east bank of the Ipel River was in Soviet hands. The Soviet forces then turned eastwards against the 8. Armee, threw the Axis forces out of Miskolc, and advanced as far as the
Slovak border. The 2nd Armored Division was pushed into the breach as Sahy, supported by SS-Brigade Dirlewanger, but was forced back.

The situation of Heeresgruppe Süd continued to deteriorate. By 17.12.44, the Soviet forces had crossed the Ipel River. During the Soviet advance in the north, the other sectors of the front had by no means been quiet. From the Drave River to the Matra Mountains, some 600 kilometers, the Soviet forces continued their advance. Although Nagykanizsa had fallen the 2. Panzer-Armee to the south had stalled the Soviet attempts to exploit the German weakness between the Lake Balaton and the Drave. But the situation of the 6. Armeen between the Lake Balaton and the Danube to Heeresgruppe A was far from satisfactory.

The Germans reacted. General Guderian ordered that the 3. and 6. Panzer-Division be transferred to Heeresgruppe Süd at once. Heeresgruppe Süd was also allocated three independent Panther tank battalions (1./Pz.Rgt. 6; 1./Pz.Rgt. 11; 1./Pz.Rgt. 130) and three heavy Tiger tank battalions (501. s. Pz.Abt.; 503. s. Pz.Abt.; 509. s. Pz.Abt.).

The Panzerkorps had intended to use the two Panzer divisions, as well as the six independent tank battalions, (totalling some 300 tanks), in an operation west of Budapest (designated as Operation Spätelese) to crush the Soviet forces, relieve encircled Budapest, and clear the area between the Danube and Lake Balaton.

The problem was Germany’s old enemy, the weather. During all these operations, the unceasing rain, snow and sleet did not let up. All roads, and particularly the fields, were thoroughly drenched. In this sea of mud, the German tanks continually got stuck, and wheeled vehicles were immobile. The Soviet infantry seemed to move about as if there were no weather or terrain handicap to worry about.

General Friessner decided to postpone the counterattack until the ground froze. Naturally, with crisis at all fronts, it would have been impossible to keep all these Panzer divisions and the valuable tank battalions (with their 300 tanks and other equipment) sitting around with nothing to do but wait for the first frost. The situation was much too desperate on all fronts in December 1944 to have a major armored force sitting on its haunches and not fighting the enemy. So the units were used piecemeal.

The main effort of the Germans was directed at the Soviet spearheads on the Ipel River, at Sahy. The unarmored battalions of the 3. and 6. Panzer-Divisionen, as well as the entire 8. Panzer-Division were ordered to attack to Soviet forces at Sahy. To coordinate the attack, the LVII. Panzer-Korps was relieved from the 6. Armei (its sector was taken over by the III. Panzer-Korps) and sent north via Komárom. The Szent-László Division was also sent north. On 18.12.44, the OKH the LVII. Panzer-Korps, (with the attached 8. Panzer-Division, with the unarmored elements of the 3. and 6. Panzer-Divisionen), to move up from its reserve positions in the hope of saving the situation.

The Soviet forces now received orders to complete the encirclement of Budapest without consideration of weather or losses. Orders for this move came from Stalin personally. The preparations for the assault took ten days. Both 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts were gearing up to capture Budapest.

On 20.12.44, the Soviet forces attacked on both sides of Lake Valence. The German defenses were completely overrun. A counterattack by the III. Panzer-Korps, with tank battalions of the 3. and 6. Panzer-Divisionen (gathered under the Headquarters of the FHH Panzer-Grenadier-Division) was unable to stop the Soviet forces. The Soviet infantry just parted as the waves of the sea, and closed up behind the attacking army, thereby preventing the resupply of these units. When the cutoff and unsupported tanks withdrew, the Soviet forces followed up, cancelling the efforts of the armored units.

The German infantry divisions were faced by a superior force of 26 Soviet rifle divisions, several mechanized and armored corps, and were backed up by a wealth of support units, which were drawn up on both sides of Lake Valence. The 4. Kavallerie-Brigade was diverted from its march to the 2. Panzerarmee, and thrown into the defense. The vain attempts of the III. Panzer-Korps to hold Székesfehérvár were finally brushed aside, and that city fell on 23.12.44.

The Margitsziget Line had now been pierced in several sectors. Of grave danger was a 18 kilometer gap which had been forced open to the north east of Lake Valence. The 4. Kavallerie-Brigade was diverted from its march to the 2. Panzerarmee, and thrown into the defense. The vain attempts of the III. Panzer-Korps to hold Székesfehérvár were finally brushed aside, and that city fell on 23.12.44.

The immediate attempts by Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico to break through the Soviet ring around the city were beaten off. The lack of adequate reserves now made it-

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**Budapest Garrison Order of Battle**

**1 Corps** (CG: General Ivan Hindy)  
(Responsible for law and order in Budapest)  
- 10th Infantry Division  
- 12th Infantry Division  
- 1st Armored Division (portions only)  
- Hussar Division (portions only)  
- Group Bullinzer (what remained of four assault gun battalions. The armored vehicles consisted of Sturmgeschütz III’s, Hetzer’s and Zrínyi II’s)  
- 1st Parachute Battalion  
- Budapest Watch Battalion  
- Five battalions Royal Gendarmerie  
- Budapest Air-Defense units (160 guns)  
- Three engineer battalions  
- Budapest University Assault Battalion  
- Royal Life Guard Battalion  
- An Arrow-Cross group (1000 – 1500 men)  
- The Budapest Police  

**IX. SS-Gebirgs-Korps**  
(CG: General Pfeffer von Wildenbruch)  
- 8. SS-Kavallerie-Division  
- 22. SS-Kavallerie-Division  
- 13. Panzer-Division  
- FHH Panzer-Grenadier-Division  
- 271. Infanterie-Division (remnants: 800 men)  
- Flakartillerie-Regiment No. 12 (100 guns)  
- 4. SS-Polizei-Regiment  
- Four German infantry battalions of remnants with unknown strength and composition.

By morning of 26.12.44, the Soviet forces had reached the southern banks of the Danube 10 kilometers north of Budapest and later that same day, Esztergom was occupied by Soviet forces. The last army out of Budapest was cut. Budapest was now a besieged city.

To the north, the Soviet forces pressed their attack home, and by 23.12.44 had reached Esztergom on the northern banks of the Danube. The 2nd Armored Division was decimated while defending the Ipel River. The Szent-László was able to hold the line long enough for the LVII. Panzer-Korps to withdraw its forces relatively intact. This penetration in the 8. Armei sector, the northern wing of the Heeresgruppe Süd forced the slow withdrawal of the entire army.

**First Attempt to Relieve Budapest (Operation Konrad I)**

The immediate attempts by Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico to break through the Soviet ring around the city were beaten off. The lack of adequate reserves now made it-
Guderian’s pleas to the OKW (German Armed Forces High Command) to break off the unsuccessful Ardennes Offensive and send these units – as well as the mobile reserves of the Germans – to assist in the relief of Budapest and stem the Soviet advance in central Europe were rejected by Hitler, who considered it necessary to “maintain the momentum gained in the west”!

Hitler did order the IV. SS-Panzerkorps with the 3. SS- and 5. SS-Panzer-Divisionen, as well as the 96. Infanterie-Division down to Hungary. They arrived at Komárom on 30.12.44.

Generals Friesner (Heeresgruppe Süd) and Fretter-Pico (Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico) were made responsible for the loss of the Margitsziget Line, and were relieved of their commands. The new commanding general of Heeresgruppe Süd was General Wöhler (former Commanding General of 8. Armee) and for the combined Third Army and 6. Armee was General Balck. General Kreysing took over the 8. Armee.

Budapest had been “mobilized” on 10.12.44. In accordance with the law, the entire population, aged from 14 to 70 years of age, were pressed into the defense of the city. The construction of fortifications and the building of defenses began immediately. Martial law was imposed. These measures sound imposing, but in fact the population mostly ignored the mobilization order. Although Budapest was under artillery fire, the inhabitants going about their affairs as if nothing were amiss. Evacuation continued in a slow and desultory fashion. The Arrow Cross party was well aware of the consequences of the occupation of Budapest by the Soviets to their members, and unsuccessfully tried to impose their will on the population of the city.

When the Soviet forces occupied Vác, the Hungarian government evacuated to Szombathegy. The Arrow Cross party members were left to their own devices in the beleaguered city, and during the remaining few months completely managed to destroy what little sympathy or understanding there had been in Budapest for the Hungarian fascists.

Budapest had 800,000 inhabitants in December 1944. Although the Hungarian authorities attempted to have Budapest declared an open city, Hitler refused to allow the beautiful old city to surrender without resistance. On the contrary, on 6.12.44 Hitler ordered that Budapest be declared a “Festung” (fortress) in which the defenders must fight to the last man.

The total number of soldiers in Budapest is somewhat unclear. Some sources indicate as many as 200,000 troops, (mainly Soviet and postwar Hungarian sources), while others speak of 70,000. According to General Hindy (Commanding General of the I Corps in Budapest), the Hungarians had 37,000 soldiers in the city. The IX. SS-Gebirgs-Korps had a strength of some 33,000 men. The Hungarian total included Honvéd troops, auxiliary forces, police, gendarmerie, etc. Naturally, this colorful conglomeration of units and men indicated very different fighting qualities. The Budapest police engaged in the fighting for Budapest. Even the Royal Life Guards Battalion entered into the fray on 1.02.45.

The Soviets had no inclination to besiege the city, and offered extremely fair surrender terms. SS-Brigadeführer Zeiender, the commanding general of the 22. SS-Kavallerie-Division refused even to read the offer or deign to pass on the message to the IX. SS-Gebirgs-Korps.

The one Hungarian air transport squadron, equipped with nine Ju-52’s, was of little use in the air supply missions to Budapest, as its aircraft usually engaged in special missions for the Hungarian general staff. It was calculated that 70 tons of ammunition, 100 tons of sugar, 27 tons of dried vegetables, 70 tons of butter, 50 tons of cheese, and 100 tons of canned meat and milk were needed. The 417 tons per day of supplies were to be flown into Budapest by the nine Hungarian Ju-52’s, an impossible task. The squadron sometimes freed as many as two Ju-52’s for general supply missions to the encircled area, but these were rarely available; they were usually fulfilling some special mission for the Hungarian General Staff.

Heeresgruppe Süd threw the IV. SS-Panzer-Korps (with the 3. SS-, 5. SS- and 6. Panzer-Divisionen, as well as the 96. and 711. Infanterie-Divisionen) against the Soviet 18th Rifle Corps and 1st Mechanized Corps south of the Danube River on a front of some 20 kilometers. The Germans hoped to distract the Soviet forces by a simultaneous feint attack of the III. Panzer-Korps (with the armored components of the 3. and 6. Panzer-Divisionen) enabling the capture of
Bicske, after which the armored battalions would break through to Budapest, and reoccupy the Margitsziget Line. The terrain for the attack was once again not particularly favorable to tanks, and the armored columns could only move along the main roads. The countryside consisted of the hilly and wooded terrain, and the roads were well covered by Soviet antitank teams.

On 4.01.45, the Soviet forces shifted their reserves in front of the German attack, and were starting to slow down the German advance. After heavy fighting, the Germans did manage to reach the outskirts of Bicske, but the Soviet forces held the city in the face of savage German attempts to capture this city. By 6.01.45, the Germans had to stop their offensive, go over to the defense and dug in.

On this same day, (6.01.45), the Soviet forces attacked along the northern banks of the Danube across the Gran River towards Komárom. By noon, the Szent László Division and the 211. Volks-Grenadier-Division were pushed out of their positions. A counterattack by the 8. Panzer-Division (under the LVII. Panzer-Korps) was unable to change the situation.

The grave threat to Komárom, (a critical communications and rail freight center, and, most important, had the only bridge across the Danube for 100 kilometers), forced the Germans to release the 20. Panzer-Division from their reserves to assist in the defense this city. It arrived at the LVII. Panzer-Korps sector on 8.01.45. Its timely counterattack was just in time to stop the Soviet advance at the very gates of Komárom.

The Germans had thereby stopped the Soviet drive north of the Danube, with which the Soviet forces had (unsuccessfully) attempted to draw the reserves of the Heeresgruppe Süd.

Second Attempt to Relieve Budapest (Operation Konrad II)

Panzergruppe Breith (consisting of the VIII Corps, and the III. Panzer-Korps with the Kampfgruppe 271. Infanterie-Division, 3. Panzer-Division, as well as the 1. Kavallerie-Korps consisting of the 1. and 23. Panzer-Divisionen, plus the 4. Kavallerie-Brigade) pushed its feint home and managed to advance 10 kilometers.

By 11.01.45, the city of Zamoly had been retaken by the Germans, but as the main attack by the IV. SS-Panzer-Korps had been stopped by the Soviet forces, the attack of Panzergruppe Breith’s was also slowed to a halt.
To the north the 5. SS-Panzer-Division had been redirected along the southern banks of the Danube, and managed to advance just beyond Dorog on 12.01.45. But the successful advance by the Germans to the north and south was brought to a sudden halt. Hitler had decided to switch the main weight of the attack to the Panzerguppe Breith sector, with the main emphasis on Székesfehérvár instead of Bicske.

For a short while the fighting in Heeresgruppe Süd died down. The Germans were busy moving their armored forces around, and the exhausted Soviet forces were recovering from the most fierce German counter attack they had experienced in many months.

Third Attempt to Relieve Budapest (Operation Konrad III)

On 16.01.45 the IV. SS-Panzer-Korps had arrived at its starting positions with the following units: the German Army 1. Panzer- and 3. Panzer-Division, as well as two Waffen-SS formations, 3. SS-Panzer- and 5. SS-Panzer-Division.

The attack was unleashed on 18.01.45. By the end of the second day, the Germans had reached the Danube. But Székesfehérvár was not taken. Although the 23. Panzer-Division (part of the Panzerguppe Breith) was maintaining severe pressure, the Soviet forces stubbornly refused to give up the city. Even the last minute maneuver of the 1. Panzer-Division to cut off the city from the east, did not cause the Soviet forces to surrender.

The Soviet 135th Rifle Corps in Székesfehérvár was attacked by the 1., 23. Panzer Division, and the SS-Regiment Ney. But the advantage of surprise had been lost. The Soviet forces had been given time to react. The 3rd Ukrainian Front established a strong defensive line between Lake Valence and the Danube, and sent in the 7th Mechanized, 1st Guard Mechanized, and the 5th Guard Cavalry Corps, as well as all possible artillery reserves. The Germans now faced over 200 tanks and 600 guns.

On 20.01.45, Székesfehérvár fell. The 1. Panzer- and 3. SS-Panzer-Divisionen now pivoted to the north, and attempted to breach the Soviet defenses. The 23rd Tank Corps, equipped with US Sherman tanks was given the mission of stopping the drive. And failed. By 26.01.45, the Germans had reached a point no less that 18 kilometers away from the encircled forces in Budapest. By evening of the 26.01.45, the armored points of the 1. Panzer-Division was 16 kilometers from Budapest. Suddenly, the order came to halt and return to that morning’s positions.

On 29.01.44, the 3. and 5. SS-Panzer-Divisionen stopped, and had gone over to the defensive under extremely difficulties, as the ten-day battle had taken an immense toll in men and material of the attacking divisions. (The 1. Panzer-Division had 100 men left in each of its two infantry regiments, the 3. Panzer-Division’s infantry regiments were in similar straits, and had only 5 tanks, as did the 23. Panzer-Division. The 3. SS-Panzer-Division had 9 tanks, the 5. SS-Panzer-Division had 14, and the 509. schwere-Panzer-Abteilung (Tiger) had only 5 tanks left.)

The Soviet forces, seeing that they could not halt the German armored thrust in time, had gone over to the attack near Bicske, and had advanced halfway to Csákúr. The entire armored forces at the disposal of Heeresgruppe Süd were thereby threatened with encirclement and had to break off the attack. The last attempt to relieve Budapest had come to an end.

The severe reverses suffered by the Germans in the Hungarian theater of operations, as well as the abysmal news from the other fronts, had further demoralized the Hungarians to such an extent that many Hungarian soldiers just gave up and went home, seeing no reason to sacrifice themselves any longer for the Germans. This behavior caused the Germans to become even more distrustful of their allies and they removed those units that they considered as untrustworthy from the front, disarmed them, and often used the men as labor troops.

Last Days for Budapest

On 6.02.45, certain that the relief of Budapest was no longer possible, the OKH ordered Heeresgruppe Süd and the 2. Panzer-Armee to concentrate on holding Nagykanizsa (with its oil fields), Székesfehérvár, and Komárom, and to prevent a breakthrough to Vienna.

Meanwhile, Budapest had been the subject of heavy pressure from the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts. Every week of endurance brought further gains by the Soviet forces.

The Luftwaffe attempted to supply the Axis forces by air, but was not able to fly in the needed minimum 100 tons of military supplies per day. On the contrary, they managing only about an average of 36 tons.

The main effort of the Soviet forces was concentrated on the east side of the Danube, attacking Pest without regard for losses. When the IV. SS-Panzer-Korps attack finally ground to a halt on 26.01.45, Hitler ordered the IX. SS-Gebirgs-Korps and all its troops to remain in the encircled city, and not to attempt a break-out under any circumstances. The optimistic and unrealistic OKW still had plans for a major counter-attack against the advancing Soviet forces using the Budapest bridges!

On 17.01.45, the Axis forces evacuated Pest (the east side of Budapest). By this time, some Hungarian prisoners of war had been formed into company-sized units, and fought under the Soviet 23rd Corps against the Germans and Hungarians. The effect on those Hungarians still fighting on the German side can be imagined.

On 11.02.45, the Axis forces still left in Buda (the part of Budapest west of the Danube) decided to break out to the west. The Soviet forces were waiting. Only 785 men, (including 45 Hungarians), managed to make it to the German lines. The rest were either captured or dead.

Budapest had fallen.

The devastation in Budapest itself can be gauged from a report to the Bern Ministry for Foreign Affairs by the Swiss Legation, which left Budapest towards the end of March, 1945:

“Half the city at a rough estimate is in ruins. Certain quarters have, according to the Soviet forces, suffered more than Stalingrad. The quays along the Danube, and in particular the Erzsébet (Elizabeth) Bridge and the Chain Bridge, are utterly destroyed. On Pal- ace Hill, there is practically nothing left standing. The Royal Palace has been burnt to the ground. The Coronation Church has collapsed. The Parliament Buildings are badly damaged, though their facade is still intact. The Ritz, Hungary, Carlton, Vadászkürt and Gellért Hotels are in ruins. Part of the Bank Buildings and the National Casino have been destroyed by fire.”

After Budapest

The Hungarian Army was in a condition of advanced dissolution by the end of February 1945. After the fall of Budapest the First and Third Armies had the following weak formations or the remnants thereof on 1.03.1943:

16th Infantry Division
20th Infantry Division
23rd Infantry Division
The First Army had been pushed northwards out of Hungary into Slovakia during the retreat, and, although the Hungarian government continually attempted to have these units redirected to Hungary, it was unsuccessful. The Germans considered the matter unimportant to the war effort. Even at this late stage of the war, and under complete German control, the Hungarians needed Slovak permission for each individual train that left Hungary northwards.

Only the Third Army still remained on Hungarian territory. It was virtually a shadow command, with the divisions and brigades, and even individual companies under direct German control.

The total strength of the Hungarian forces in Hungary on 2.02.45 was 214,463 men, including some 50,000 partially armed military laborers. The weapon situation was catastrophic: there were 142,335 rifles, 1290 machine-guns, 159 mortars, and a mere 115 cannon left. Tanks, assault guns, and air planes were available in only very limited quantities.

In February 1945, premier Szálasi issued orders that the dead were to be left only their underwear and shirts. The rest of the uniform was to be reissued.

The morale of the Honvéd troops was even graver than the equipment situation. On 7.02.45 the Hungarian government introduced the threat of collective family liability for desertion. As with most measures by the Arrow Cross, this frantic attempt to improve morale backfired, and not only encouraged the deserters to move west out of Hungary, but also to take their families with them.

During a joint police and military police roundup, the following individuals were collected:

- 995 deserters,
- 2325 soldiers without adequate papers,
- 4125 men not obeying the order to present themselves at the police stations,
- 64 industrial workers who had left their place of employment without permission,
- 5 partisans,
- 129 fugitive military laborers

A major cause for concern to the government were the numbers of officers encountered behind the lines. It could not understand why these officers were there when the situation was so grave at the front. These officers – mostly from the occupied territories to the east – had brought their families with them, and belonging to units and commands which had been destroyed or dissolved.

The situation was not unknown to the government, and in February 1945 Prime Minister Szálasi, asked the Germans to,

1/ initiate a new offensive in Hungary at the earliest possible moment,
2/ symbolically transfer the supreme command of all Hungarian and German troops on Hungarian territory to the premier,
3/ raise Royal Hungarian Army divisions in Germany, not to belong to the Waffen-SS,
4/ set up new guidelines for the Hungarian volunteers,
5/ remove all Hungarian remnants from German units and consolidate them into Hungarian units,
6/ allow the Royal Hungarian Army and Waffen-SS units to be raised in Germany to remain under Hungarian authority.

The last point in particular was of some concern. The Hungarians realized that it was rapidly impossible to carry through a major reorganization of the Royal Hungarian Army on Hungarian territory. The details of this reorganization are covered in Chapter 12.

Portions of the Huszár Division avoided encirclement during January, February, and March of 1945, and held positions in the Vertes Hills west of the capital.

The 2nd Armored Division, together with a few assault gun units, was deployed to the northwest of Budapest, south of the Danube. Taking heavy losses, it was steadily pushed back along the Danube in the Transdanubian region.

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Chapter 12

The Last Days of the Royal Hungarian Army

The Final Days of the Royal Hungarian Army

Hitler’s idea of a massive counteroffensive in Hungary had been conceived in December 1944. When Szálasi visited Hitler on 4.12.44, Hitler promised that he was going to send the 6. SS-Panzerarmee to Hungary. A date for this momentous event was not indicated, as the new army first was to be used on the western front against the Allies. The Battle of the Bulge had gone disastrously wrong for the Germans by late December 1944, and the 6. SS-Panzerarmee was finally withdrawn from the front on 8.01.45. It was then brought back up to strength with all possible dispatch.

Although the German Army High Command, and in particular Generaloberst Guderian, the OKH C.O.S., wanted to use the four elite SS-Panzer divisions of the 6. SS-Panzerarmee in the east, the Soviet forces had arrived within 65 kilometers of Berlin by 21.01.45, Hitler insisted on Hungary as the theater of operations. His argument was that since Germany’s synthetic oil plants had been almost been destroyed, Hungary’s oil fields and corresponding refineries were of vital importance. Without oil, the German mechanized formations could not move, the air force could not fly.

In addition, Hitler argued, it was of the utmost importance that the German public be presented with a victory of German arms. He also thought that the Soviet forces would not expect an attack in the Danube valley, and would be forced to transfer many of those troops now near Berlin to Hungary, thereby bringing relief to all other eastern fronts.

The arrival in Hungary of four elite SS-Panzer divisions and support troops towards the end of February 1945, with the troops in new uniforms, units filled up to strength and with virtually their complete allotment of tanks, guns and other equipment, made an enormous impression on the German units already there and on their Hungarian allies. Here was an indication that the war might not yet have been lost, for this display of German military wealth was incredible to those soldiers and commanders who for months had been starved of men and material.

The aim of the offensive was to clear the Transdanubian plain between the Danube and the Drave Rivers. Several bridgeheads across the Danube were to be established for future offensives against the Soviet forces. The offensive was designated Operation Frühlingsserwachen, (Spring Awakening.)

The 6. Panzerarmee was gathered eastwards of the tip of Lake Balaton. Its initial objectives were the crossing of the Sió Canal and capturing of Dunafoldvár. (The Sió Canal runs from Siólok on Lake Balaton southeast to Szekszard and then to the Danube).

Armeegruppe Balck (the Third Army and the 6. Armeec) was to attack southeast of Székesfehérvár and had the objective of taking the narrows between Lake Valence and the Danube. To the north of this group was the IV. SS-Panzerkorps, which was to await further orders depending on the developing situation.

The 2. Panzerarmee in southern Hungary had the mission of taking Kaposvár. The main weight of the attack was to be in the area of Nagybajom (40 kilometers east of Nagykanizsa).

The Heeresgruppe Süd was assigned four divisions from Heeresgruppe E, which were to attack north across the Drave River at Donji Miholjac and Volpovo.

The Germans based their plans on the concept that the Soviet forces would least expect an attack between the Sárviz Canal and Lake Balaton, and that the attack would gain ground rapidly here. The Hungarian warning that the terrain was exactly as its name indicated, (Sárviz = muddy water) was ignored. (The Sárviz River runs from around Székesfehérvár southeast to Szekszard, joins the Sió Canal there, and, known as Sió-Sárviz Canal, turns east and joins the Danube).

The Germans hoped for a cold spring, and paid no attention to the fact the area was unsuited for armored operations.

The consequences were devastating. Towards the end of February and the beginning March 1945, the weather changed. The temperature rose to 11° Centigrade during the daylight hours, and the days were sunny and warm. The road conditions in the swamppy region deteriorated. Unpaved roads and fields were only partially passable for tracked vehicles. Many roads and paths became even impassable for wheeled vehicles.

On 6.03.45, Operation Frühlingserwachen was launched. The first troops of the Heeresgruppe E crossed the Drave River and established small bridgeheads at Donji Miholjac. By 7.03.44, attempts were started to move towards Pécs, there to join up with the 2. Panzerarmee, and then advance towards the Danube.

The 2. Panzerarmee launched its attack opposite Nagybajom on 6.03.45 on a 10 kilometer front. It was unable to achieve a decisive breakthrough because of the bitter resistance offered by the Soviet forces, as well as the weather. The night, was warm, and the vehicles were massively impeded. Gruppe Konrad, which included the Bakony Regiment, was not able to achieve the day’s targets.

The main attack was in the 6. SS-Panzerarmee sector, between Lake Balaton and Lake Valence. Supported by the 6. Armeec, the Germans attacked on a front of 35 kilometers.

But the Germans did not catch the Soviet forces by surprise. Field Marshal Bukosin was warned by his intelligence office of the date and time of the attack.

The Germans encountered fierce resistance. The Soviet forces had constructed the usual entrenchments and fortifications in preparation for the German assault. The Soviet defense lines had to be pierced one by one, at considerable losses of armor. The total gains for the day at the 6. SS-Panzerarmee was limited to 2–3 kilometers. The cause for the failure to break through the Soviet defenses was also to be found in the terrain. The 504 armored fighting vehicles of the 6. SS-Panzerarmee were only able to lend little support to the attacking infantry. The roads were incapable of supporting the heavy Tiger tanks, which sank into the road beds up to their armor. Their use was obviously precluded.

Mud and newly-fallen snow were the main causes for the slow progress. Tanks could hardly be used, as the ground could not support armor, and therefore channeled the armored vehicles along the few good roads. These, in turn, were well mined and defended with heavy antitank guns. The attack had to rely on the infantry, and would probably remain limited to the infantry. Only a slow advance could be expected.

On the second and third days of the offensive, the fighting continued much as it had on the first day. In the sector where the cavalry units operated, the riders were dismounted, and had to fight practically meter for meter. The 6. SS-
Panzerarmee was only able to advance only an average of 6 kilometers in those two days.

In the III. Panzerkorps area only local actions took place, as the commander was engaged in repairing roads and strengthening the bridges before he could advance his armored vehicles and heavy weapons.

By the end of the third day, the Soviet forces had discerned the main thrust of the German assault, and moved up their mobile reserves.

On 9.03.45, the II. SS-Panzerkorps finally managed to break through the Soviet lines at the 135th Rifle Corps (26th Army). In addition to the difficult terrain and the bitter resistance being offered by the Soviet forces, the lack of ammunition and fuel now began to hamper the operations of the Germans.

On 10. and 11.03.45, the I. SS-Panzerkorps reached Simontornya, and crossed the Sió Canal there.

By this time, the battle had lasted five days. The 3rd Ukrainian Front had been pushed to its limits. All reserves had been thrown in to help stop the Germans. Appeals to the STAVKA were without success. A mere two tank brigades were released. Further reinforcements were not to be expected.

On 12.03.45, the III. Panzerkorps attacked eastwards along the southern edge of Lake Valence and advanced as far as Gárdony. This success was immediately followed up by bringing up the reserve armored division of the IV. SS-Panzerkorps.

On 13.03.45 the offensive gained only little ground eastwards, as the Soviet forces had continued to build and strengthen their defences and even reinforced their units on the front. In addition, the Soviet forces had also moved the 9th Guards Army and the 6th Guards Tank Army up in position behind the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts. These STAVKA strategic reserves had been concentrated north of Lake Valence. On 16.03.45, these two armies were assigned to the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

In the Heeresgruppe E sector, the Germans had managed to establish another bridgehead across the Drave at Valpovo. The II. Panzerarmee’s attack had not gained much more ground than its neighbor to the north. By 14.03.45, it had gained about 10 –12 kilometers eastwards.

By 15.03.45, the Germans had still not been able to reach their first objective, the Danube River.
The Germans had been ignoring the Soviet concentrations north of Lake Valence. They had even weakened the IV. SS-Panzerkorps by withdrawing the 6. Panzer-Division and sending it south.

Meanwhile, Hitler had ordered that the attacks in the south by the 2. Panzerarmee be stopped, and all forces be concentrated between the two lakes.

The Heeresgruppe Süd had taken 15,117 casualties during the brief eight days of the offensive. The III. Panzerkorps was down to 40% of its armored vehicles. The 6. SS-Panzerarmee only had 185 of 595 tanks combat ready.

The concentration of forces by the German lines at the headquarters of the Huszár Division was overtaken by events. The Soviet 6th Guards Tank, the 4th Guards, and 9th Guards Armies were to attack northwest towards Gran and Lake Balaton. The Soviet forces intended to attack westwards south of the Danube, and take Gram.

The Huszár Division was defending the sector which the 46th Army attacked. By this time, the Huszár Division was no longer a very strong fighting force. But compared with the remaining Hungarian Army, it was a very fine unit indeed. It had three artillery battalions, one antiaircraft battalion, nine weakened battalions, and was basically fit for defense only. It was spread out through the Vertes Mountains, with strong points at the few mountain roads through the sector.

The replacements the Huszár Division was receiving were already demoralized. Some of them went deserted at the first opportunity they had after their arrival. Most of them came from supply and support units, had seen no combat until then.

During the first half of March 1945, the situation of the Huszár Division deteriorated again and again. The Soviet forces began a propaganda campaign, which consisted of loudspeakers broadcasting appeals to surrender, indicating that the major offensive was about to begin. Later, the loudspeakers were quite open about the details of the upcoming attack. Reconnaissance patrols began operating in earnest against the entire Huszár sector. After the 10.03.45, Soviet artillery began a very accurate fire against the Huszár positions.

Refugees still arriving through the Soviet lines at the headquarters of the Huszár Division reported massive Soviet efforts in gathering material and troops. The Huszár Division reported this to the Germans, who ignored the Hungarian reports, just as they were ignoring their own Luftwaffe’s reports. When the Soviet forces did attack, they struck at the boundary between the IV. Panzerkorps and the Huszár Division. The former had not obeyed an order placing a battalion behind this boundary, and the Soviet forces drove right through the Axis lines and outflanked the Huszár Division.

The Soviet Response

On 16.03.45, the Soviet offensive began. The IV. Panzerkorps managed to halt the initial onslaught. The Soviet forces switched their efforts to the sector of the Huszár Division.

Colonel Schell, commanding officer of the remnants of the Huszár Division, describes the events of that day:

(Reader’s translation)

“In the early morning hours of 17.03.45, news of several Soviet penetrations in our lines reached me. Then followed one Soviet attack after another. From our northernmost sector, I received a message to the effect that the Soviet forces had managed to break through the defenses of our neighbor along the Sárvíz – Felsőgall – Bánhida railway, and that the front was dissolving as the Germans were retreating. Tataánya, to our west, was already in enemy hands, and Soviet arm or was advancing on Tatatóváros and Környa. The 4th Huszár Regiment was outflanked, and requested permission to withdraw to Környa, if still possible. At the same time, the 2nd Huszár Regiment signalled from the southern sector that it had successfully beaten off the Soviet attack there. It maintained its positions. In the meantime, the Soviet forces had broken through around Zámoly. Although the IV. Panzerkorps proposed to counterattack, the Hungarians predicted that it would fail, as the noise of battle was already coming from the west and northwest. From the center, the 3rd Regiment indicated that it was engaged in heavy fighting, that it had suffered heavy losses, and that ammunition was running low.”

“During the early afternoon, the situation continued to deteriorate. Demands for reinforcements reached me from everywhere. I had none to give. Contact with the neighboring units no longer existed, and we were unable to make contact with higher commands. Runners and messengers returned without having been able to find either corps or other headquarters, but had encountered chaos. All units were retreating, and the enemy was advancing in strength.”

“At noon, the Soviet air force appeared. The village where I was quartered became a burning inferno. The news that Tata had fallen reached me shortly thereafter. In addition, the enemy had appeared in the rear of the 4th Huszár Regiment to the north. Whether Tata had really fallen I was unable to ascertain. The only thing that was certain was the German units and supply trains were rapidly moving west and northwest without fighting. And still we held our positions in the Vertes Mountains, with the exception of the 4th Regiment. During the late afternoon hours we managed to capture a Soviet antitank battery, which had merrily trotted into our positions as if without a worry in the world. They believed that there were no more Axis troops in the Vertes Mountains. By evening, even I had to admit that it was time to withdraw, so that we could avoid encirclement. The Soviet breakthroughs to the north and south had made our
position untenable. I therefore ordered the withdrawal to the Kecskéd – Bokod – Bakony Savarkány line.”

The Soviet breakthrough in two sectors brought about the crisis that Heeresgruppe Süd had feared. The withdrawal of Armeegruppe Balck threw open the entire northern flank of the units participating in Operation Frühlingserwachen. In addition, there were no German units between the Soviet spearheads and Vienna. Something had to be undertaken immediately.

The 6. SS-Panzerarmee was halted. The Panzer divisions were to regroup at Székéshévár. From there, joined by one infantry division, they were to advance due north to Zamoly and cut off the leading elements of the Soviet attack. The 46th Army’s advance was still unknown to the Germans.

On 19.03.45, the Soviet forces had entered Székéshévár, advanced in the direction of Várpalota, and taken Mócsa after passing through Köcs. Tata Tőváros had also fallen into Soviet hands. By evening, the outskirts of Tatabánya had been reached. This indicated that the entire 6. SS-Panzerarmee, still located between Lake Balaton and Lake Valence, was in danger of being encircled and cut off; furthermore, all contact between the 6. Armee and the Third Army had been lost.

To concentrate and coordinate the fighting, the area between Lake Balaton and Lake Valence was made the responsibility of the 6. Armee, the area between Lake Valence and the Danube was the responsibility of the 6. SS-Panzerarmee.

The retreat of the 6. SS-Panzerarmee, which had begun on 17.03.45, was now speeded up. An orderly withdrawal was not possible under the existing conditions. Numerous vehicles were lost in the mud. Nothing was to hold up the withdrawal from the threatening encirclement.

Although the Soviet forces had broken through the German lines in several places, Marshal Tolbukin was not satisfied with the progress. The fierce resistance of the 5. SS-Panzer-Division in Székéshévár was delaying the time-table he had set for the Soviet advance. The Soviet forces were now in turn the victims of the difficult terrain, and the fanatical resistance of the Waffen-SS troops. The gap in the German lines was limited to a width of 35 kilometers and a depth of 15 kilometers. To cut off the rapidly retreating 6. SS-Panzerarmee, Marshal Fedor Tolbukin threw the 6th Guards Tank Army into the attack before schedule.

By the evening of 19.03.1945, the Soviet 4th and 9th Guard Armies intensified their attacks and the 6th Guards Tank Army (with some 425 armored vehicles) advanced to cut off the retreating German forces. It became a race against time. On the next morning (20.03.45), the Soviet 26th and 27th Armies were ordered to attack and to draw off as many reinforcements as possible.

The two Soviet armies hit the sector being held by the 25th Infantry Division and the I. Kavallerie-Korps. The 25th Infantry Division was able to resist the attack for a period of time, thereby enabling the withdrawal of the German cavalry corps. But no reinforcements were sent. By the evening of 20.03.45, the 1. Panzer-Division was forced out of Seregélyes. Any hope of another future attempt to restart Operation Frühlingserwachen was destroyed.

Heeresgruppe Süd had given up any hope of this day before, anyway, and was concerned to save what it could from the situation. It ordered that the bridgeheads across the Drave be abandoned, and these were finally cleared on 22. – 23.03.45. The 2. Panzerarmee did in actual fact continue the pressure, but achieved only local successes.

The collapse of the IV. SS-Panzerkorps had left the Hungarian units of the Third Army to the north of it in a very precarious position. By 20.03.45, the Third Army was backed to the Danube to the north, and surrounded on all land sides. Across the river, the banks were still in German hands, but the 2nd Ukrainian Front also went over to the attack here.

On 21.03.45 Székéshévár fell into Soviet hands. On 24.03.45 elements of the Soviet armor succeeded in penetrating as far as Tapolcafé in the wooded hills of the Bakony Forest.

Cellődőmőlk fell on 27.03.45, and the Soviet forces reached Győr the same day. On 28.03.45 they took Sárvar and Csorna, on 29.03.45 Szombathely, Köszeg, and Kapuvár.

The main danger area for the Hungarians and the Germans was once again the region behind Lake Balaton and the Danube. The defenses there were unable to slow the Soviet advance and were continually being pushed back. The 20 kilometer gap between the 6. Armee and the 6. SS-Panzerarmee was the object of the 6th Guards Tank Army’s advance. Moving through the gap and turning north, the Soviet forces occupied Sopron, and crossed the Austrian Hungarian border on 31.03.45. At this time, Hitler finally agreed to allow Heeresgruppe Süd to withdraw into Austria. On the other hand, the 2. Panzerarmee was ordered to hold its positions.

Communications between the 2. Panzerarmee and the 6. Armee were barely sufficient for a coordinated defense or withdrawal. The 2. Panzerarmee’s left flank was turned, and it was forced to give up its hold on the edge of Lake Balaton.

On 1.04.45, Sopron fell, followed on 2.04.45 by Nagykanizsa and its oil fields.

During the same period the Soviet forces continued their victorious advance. The gaps between 6. Armee and the 6. SS-Panzerarmee and between the 6. Armee and the 2. Panzerarmee still yawned. The Axis forces were unable to close these gaps, and the Soviet forces continued to pour through them.

The End of the Hungarian Army

On 30.03.45, the B.d.E. (Befehlsstaber der Ersatzheer = Commander-In-Chief of the German Replacement Army) issued an order that since German training and replacement units had been moved [read “mobilized” – Ed.], further training of the Hungarian units in Germany (both Royal Hungarian Army and Waffen-SS) was no longer possible. It went on that, in agreement with the Hungarian Inspector for Hungarian Forces in Germany, all Hungarian forces should be used as labor troops. It also ordered that Nazi Party functionaries were to inform the general public that the use of these young Hungarian soldiers in this manner was be considered an emergency measure, and in no way to be seen as an unsuitability to be considered as fighting troops. These untrained men could not be blamed for this, and we thereby helping their comrades at the front. (AHA/Sb/Ia3/Nr. 19493/45 geh.)

From this day on, all training and equipping of Hungarian forces in Germany officially ceased, although in many cases it had either never begun, or had already
ground to a halt for lack of equipment and training personnel.

On 30.03.45, the Honvéd Ministry was evacuated to Germany. The Honvéd Minister, Károly Beregffy arrived in Metten (near Deggendorf on the Danube in Lower Bavaria) on 3.04.45. Certain departments of the Ministry were located in small villages (Eggenfelden, Pfarrkirchen, Griesbach) in the area. The General in Charge of German Armed Forces in Hungary, General der Infanterie Greifenberg was headquartered in the Castle at Egg, about 10 kilometers from Metten. There was no functioning telephone network, and all communication had to be sent by motorcycle messenger or even by the local mail service.

The situation was very confusing. German Armed Forces orders contradicted those of the Nazi Party, the Waffen-SS, etc. The Honvéd Minister was not informed as to where the various German military or political headquarters were located. He was also left in ignorance by the Germans regarding the situation and whereabouts of Hungarian units stationed in Germany or those that had been relocated there from Hungary.

The enormous numbers of Hungarian refugees, including the Hungarian “Volksdeutscher” were also a great worry. The Honvéd Minister main concern was to prevent the Hungarian units and these refugees from being overrun and captured by the Soviet advance.

Examining the strategic situation, the Honvéd Minister determined that the Soviet forces would probably reach the area of the Inn and south of the Danube Rivers before that of the US forces. On 8.04.45 he ordered that:

- That all Hungarian units and refugees were to leave the above mentioned area and gather in and around Munich, where the US forces were most likely to be expected.
- That the armed components of the 25th and 26th Waffen-SS Divisions were to be sent east to reinforce those Hungarian units which were engaged under Heeresgruppe Süd.
- That all hostilities against the Western Allies were to be avoided. (Mentioning that Hungary was not at war with France).

With the exception of some elements of two Waffen-SS divisions, all of the above Hungarian forces were unarmed.

The inspector General of all Hungarian SS forces, Waffen-Obergruppenführer der SS Ferenc Fekethaly-Czeydner was at Burghausen.

Concerned with this dispersion of forces, the Honvéd Minister sent an order to the Hungarian Inspector General of the Hungarian Army in Germany on 8.04.45 attempting to rectify the situation.

- The development of the strategic situation means that immediate contact must be made with German officials so that the regrouping of Hungarian units located in the areas of Dresden, Wittemberg, Magdeburg, Halle, Leipzig, as well as Bamberg, Bayreuth, Grafenwörth, Amberg, and Eger can be achieved.
- The aim is to gather all Hungarian units, schools, etc., in the Munich Wehrkreis. (Meant is the German VIth Military District – Ed.) German orders for these movements are to be requested. If, owing to the military situation, these orders are not forthcoming, Hungarian commanders must act on their own authority and initiative.
  1. Units in and around Dresden are to move to Eger.
  2. Units around Halle, Wittemberg, Magdeburg, and Leipzig are to move to Grafenwörth.
  3. Units in Bamberg and Nürnberg (Nuremberg) are to move via Ingolstadt to Landshut.
  4. Units in and around Bayreuth, Amberg, and Grafenwörth move via Regensburg to Landshut and Mühldorf.
  5. Units in Eger move via Regensburg to Landau.
  6. Units indicated in 1. and 2. will also be moved south of the Danube when they reach their initial destinations.
  7. Measures are to be taken to assure the relocation, protection, and supplying of family members.
- All measures and orders concerning these activities are to be advised to this headquarters immediately.

The objective to gather all Hungarian forces south of the Danube around Landshut, Pfarrkirchen, Landau, etc., (taking into consideration to lack of transport, the chaotic communications situation, and the interruptions caused by air raids), was estimated to take about 10 days.

The Quartermaster General, Major General Miklós Nagyüsszy was sent to Munich to organize quarters and rations for the incoming troops and their dependents.

Unfortunately, the replacement and training units in northern Germany and Denmark could not be reached. All were mobilized in late April and May 1945, and ended the war fighting there.
tary units took with them a large number of civilians, also including the dependents of the officers and enlisted ranks. To gather and order these refugees, the Honvéd Minister set up and enhanced collection points at Lienz, Linz on the Danube, Salzburg and in Passau. Measures were also taken to locate and provide food and shelter for them.

In March 1945, reports once again reached General Wöhler, German Commanding General of Heeresgruppe Süd, regarding the complete unreliability of the Hungarian troops, and that they were going over to the enemy in swarms. He was notified that the 6. SS-Panzerarmee had encountered soldiers in Hungarian uniforms fighting against it on the side of the Soviet forces. As usual, he believed every word. Many German soldiers tended to blame their defeat on the unreliability of the Hungarians. In some cases, reliable Hungarian units would suddenly lose hope, stop fighting, and just leave. Many surrendered to the Soviet forces, and some even fought against their erstwhile allies under Soviet command. In those days some 45,000 Hungarians surrendered to the Soviet forces.

General Wöhler ordered that “in case of signs of dissolution and breaking up of Hungarian units, or the suspicion that Hungarian troops were preparing to go over to the enemy, those Hungarians were to be disarmed immediately. The weaponless units were then to be used as labor troops, and to be distributed among the German forces in platoon and company-sized units.”

General Balck, commanding the 6. Arme, did not wait another minute. After receiving a report, (proved utterly false after the war), about a supposedly upcoming betrayal by the Szt.-László Division, he ordered all Hungarian forces within the 6. Arme to be disarmed. He removed all weapons and ammunition and confiscated all motor vehicles. As virtual prisoners-of-war, the degraded Hungarian soldiers continued their march westwards. They were usually relegated to secondary roads, and were frequently subjected to contempt and abuse by the German soldiers.

Hungarian forces that were subordinate to the 2. Panzerarmee and the 8. Arme escaped this type of shameful discrimination. They remained with the retreating front, and shared the fate of the German forces including the final capitulation.

General Balck describes the situation on 7.04.45: “To the left, contact with the 6. SS-Panzerarmee had been lost; to the right, contact with the 2. Panzerarmee had been reestablished. Behind me there was a stream of civilian refugees and the remnants of the Hungarian Third Army, some of which was still attempting to get through the Alpine Passes, some already in Styrja in Austria.”

After the loss of Hungary on 4.04.45, the remaining Hungarian forces fought in three main areas outside of Hungary.

The First Army in Czechoslovakia. Owing to the refusal to transport them back to Hungary, the 24th and 16th Infantry Division, as well as the remnants of the 3rd Replacement Division continued there, and were forced to surrender to the Soviet forces in Bohemia.

The second group of Hungarians, the Third Army, (with the Huszár, 2nd Armored, 1st Mountain, 23rd Reserve, and 9th Border Guard Divisions), had been driven out of Hungary along the northern banks of the Danube. Part of these units were captured by the Western Allies in Austria.

The third group, the II Corps (with the 20th Infantry, 25th Infantry, and the Szt. László Divisions), were involved in the fierce fighting along the Mur and Drave Rivers until the very end in northern Croatia and southern Austria. The 20th Infantry and Szt.-László Divisions retired to the west across the Cor Alps to Carinthia as ordered, and surrendered to the British.

The Szt.-László Division was kept under arms in Carinthia by the British until the Tito question was clarified. In the end they, too, were disarmed and consigned to P.O.W. camps in Austria and Germany.

On 18.04.45, the Honvéd Ministry moved from Metten to Tann. At the end of April 1945, the Honvéd Ministry issued its last order. The order regulated the behavior of the Army during the coming weeks. It ordered those units still fit for combat to continue to fight at the side of the Germans against the Soviet forces.

All other Hungarian forces were to move once again towards the west. In case of the approach of one of the Western Allies, these forces were to surrender to them. The Minister encouraged the Army forces to behave correctly towards the local population, and not to take revenge for the shameful conduct by the Germans during the preceding weeks. Lastly, the Hungarian forces were ordered not to allow themselves to be disarmed by the Germans.

Aftermath

At the end of the war, Hungary was in a state of chaos, much worse even than that of 1918. This time the country had been a major theater of war. Many fine cities, notably Buda, were in ruins, and communications were wrecked; the retreating Germans had destroyed all the bridges between Buda and Pest and had taken with them all they could of the country’s portable wealth, followed by the Soviets who did much the same with what remained.

Matters were made worse as the Soviet armies had been living off the land since their first steps on Hungarian territory. The Soviet soldiers looted, robbed, stole everything that could be moved, and they destroyed on site what could not be dismantled: they robbed the machinery of entire factories, wrist watches and wedding rings of men, earrings and necklaces of women, boots off the feet of fallen Hungarian soldiers.

During the house-to-house street fighting in Budapest, they threw furniture, art objects, paintings, and carpets out of windows onto the sidewalks. Long trains of freight cars hauled the technology of Hungary out of the country, and they dumped the loot along the railway tracks of the Ukraine. They pillaged the country into abject poverty, depriving Hungary of her possessions, and delaying her chances of economic recovery.

The defeat was sealed in the peace treaty, signed in Paris on 10.02.1947. It restored the Trianon frontiers, (including even a territorial rectification in favor of Czechoslovakia); it imposed on Hungary reparations for the amount of US$300,000,000; and it limited its armed forces. The implementation of the treaty’s provisions was to be supervised by the Soviet occupation forces, a large contingent of which was already in the country.

The upper echelons of the Hungarian government, which had managed to surrender to the Western Allies, were all turned over to the Miklós government, and, with the exception of two ministers, were all condemned and executed as war criminals.

Former Royal Hungarian Army units began marching homeward from American, British and French occupation zones in Austria and Germany in the summer of 1945, two months after the surrender on 8.05.45. They proceeded in military formation, under the command of their officers, with letters of safe-conduct from Anglo-American military authorities. According to press reports and observations by Western military commanders,
they were ‘the best disciplined military forces anywhere at the end of the war (Life magazine)’. Red Army units intercepted them at Wiener Neustadt in Austria, in the Soviet zone of military occupation, tore up the letters of safe-conduct and summarily took them prisoner. They were shipped to POW camps in Russia where they remained for an average of four years. Unfortunately, the Hungarian Army officers taken in captivity had no means to alert the other units marching behind them straight into the Soviet trap.

The Hungarians lost 300,000 in military personnel KIA and MIA, as well as 325,000 POW to the Soviets. Western Allies held a total of 280,000 Hungarian soldiers, some in France and Great Britain proper, most in the American, British and French zones of occupation in Germany.

The following is a breakdown of Hungarian P.O.W.’s taken by the Allies:

On the East Front:
- 8,000 from 26.06.41 to 12.01.43
- 87,000 from 12.01.43 to 19.03.44
- 10,000 from 19.03.44 to 15.09.44
- 105,000 total

In Hungary: 150,000

Surrendered after the armistice:
- 15,000 in Austria
- 10,000 in Germany
- 45,000 in Czechoslovakia
- 70,000 total

The Red Army also rounded up 295,000 civilians – men, women and children between the ages of 13 to 61 years – and deported them to the Soviet Union for slave labor in the forced labor camps (gulags).

The total number of Hungarians captured by the Red Army is broken down as follows: 52% military personnel, 48% civilians. Of the civilian deportees, 75% were men, 25% women. By age groups:
- 15% were between 14–20 years, 40% between 21–30 years, 25% between 31–40 years, 12% between 41–50 years, 8% above 50 years of age.

The catastrophic treatment of the Hungarians taken to the Soviet Union is unbelievable. To cite a only few recorded examples:

A column of 600 Hungarian POW’s and deportees started out from Skotarska, Karpatalja at Christmas of 1944. They crossed the Carpathian mountains on foot. By the time the column arrived at Staryi Sambor, in the Ukraine, 400 of them perished of sickness, such as typhus, and exhaustion. Stragglers, too sick to keep up with the column, were shot out of hand by the guards.

In Marshansk, 37,000 prisoners were fed only on the average twice a week; from autumn till next spring only 1,700 survived, a 4.59% rate of survival!

In camp JU286, in Krivoj Kazan, 1,200 of 2,000 Hungarians died by 1945.

In camp 7362/6, at Stalingrad, out of 1825 Hungarians prisoners 843 starved to death.

In the gigantic staging camp in Focsani, Rumania, 2,000 Hungarians prisoners were loaded in railroad cars daily for transport to the USSR. During the waiting period, 40% of the prisoners died in four months, at the rate of 60–70 a day, every day. Predictably, a devastating epidemic of typhus broke out.

Under international pressure, the USSR repatriated 251,000 (49% of the known total in the USSR) between 1946 and 1948, (but none after December 1948), primarily those POW’s and detainees who were already sick, or too weak to work. The repatriates were crowded into cattle cars, with meager or no provisions, many of the weakest dying enroute.

The home-comers naturally reported the treatment they suffered. In response, Stalin suspended the release of further Hungarian prisoners after December 1948. The condition of the repatriates was a terrible embarrassment for both the USSR and the Communist government in Hungary. The government of Matyas Rakosi, installed in office and maintained in power by the Soviet Army in Hungary, had absolutely no interest, nor the courage, to enquire about the fate of the remaining Hungarian prisoners in Soviet captivity.

It must be assumed that the remaining 219,000 (51%) Hungarians perished in Soviet captivity. They never came back. It is further presumed that owing to the appalling rate of casualties in the labor camps, 119,000 persons must have died by 1950. The cause of deaths was emaciation due to starvation and physical exhaustion 60%, dysentery 20%, typhus 15%, by “accidents” at work and “unexplained incidents” 5%. When unable to work, they were gathered in “hospitals” and left to die. Thus, 51% of the Hungarian POW’s and civilian deportees did not survive Soviet captivity. It is assumed that the rest of the 100,000 persons also perished after 1950.

The fate of the 150,000 Hungarians native to the provinces awarded to Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia by the Peace Treaty of Paris is still unknown.

Repatriation of a portion of Hungarian prisoners was only a part of the story. Out of the repatriates to Hungary, 25% needed up to 3 months of hospital care for rehabilitation, 25% needed six months of institutionalization, 5% required up to two years of hospital care, 15% died within two years, and 30% remained incurably ill and chronically incapacitated.

Hungary’s direct losses in WW II were 669,000 people, with an additional 100,000 dying later in Hungary as the results of their captivity, a staggering number of people in a small population of 14.7 million.

* * *
CHAPTER 13

THE HUNGARIAN OCCUPATION FORCES

From Combat to Occupation Duties

The Hungarian armed forces participated in the Soviet 1941 Campaign starting 27.06.41. The Carpathian Army Group was the first Hungarian formation to invade The Soviet Union. The Carpathian Army Group, basically the VIII Corps headquarters, redesignated to indicate its enlarged responsibilities, included the Mobile Corps and the VIII Corps. The VIII Corps consisted of the 1st Mountain and the 8th Border Guard Brigade, as well as of Corps troops taken from various Military Districts in Hungary so as to spread the burden of mobilization.

As it soon proved impossible for the leg-bound mountain and the border guard brigades to keep up with the Mobile Corps, the two components were separated and the Carpathian Army Group was dissolved.

The dissolution of the Carpathian Army Group on 9.07.41, split the Mobile Corps and the VIII Corps. The two infantry units, (the 1st Mountain and the 8th Border Guard Brigades) were left behind under the command of the VIII Corps. They were assigned occupation and security duties in the Galician plains between the Carpathian Mountains and the Dnyester River. The 1st Mountain Brigade’s area included the cities of Kolomea and Horodenka. The 8th Border Guard Brigade’s area of responsibility encompassed the cities of Stanislavov and Buczacz.

Galicia had at one time belonged to the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, (before 1919), and then to Poland, the former association being as co-citizens, and the latter as allied to the Hungarians. The occupation by the Soviet forces in 1939 was by no means a welcome one. Hence the people were friendly and duty for the Hungarian troops was light. The local populace was not only sympathetic, but willingly assisted the new authorities. This idyll was of a limited nature. The two brigades were marched 200 to 400 kilometers east to the Ukraine in September 1941. The new region comprised the Ukrainian cities of Vinnitsa, Berdichev, Proskurov, as well as the area around them.

As with the Galicians, the Ukrainians were friendly. They hoped for independence, and regarded the Hungarians as partners and allies in this endeavor. The agreement reached between Hitler and Horthy on 8.09.41 allowed the withdrawal of the Mobile Corps and the two infantry brigades, providing that the Hungarians supplied other units instead for occupation duties. The Hungarian leadership was quite satisfied with this solution, as this was in accordance with the new political and military policy of reducing the commitment of forces to a minimum. They achieved a maximum safeguarding of men and material with a minimum of effort needed to appease the requirements of the Germans.

As a consequence of the agreement reached by the two leaders, the Hungarian Occupation Command, (H.O.C., raised by the VIII Corps), was activated on 8.09.41 and four infantry brigades (5th, 8th, 21st, and 24th) were mobilized. The H.O.C. was attached to the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Ukraine, (WB Ukraine, i.e. Military Commander of the Ukraine).

The first two infantry brigades (21st and 24th) set off on foot from Hungary in...
September 1941 towards their distant goal in The Soviet Union to relieve the two regular brigades there.

Because these brigades were specially organized for security operations, their designations were changed by adding 100 to their numbers, resulting in the 121st and 124th Brigades.

On 1.11.41 the VIII Corps was relieved by the H.O.C. at Vinnitsa, and the 1st Mountain and the 8th Border Guard Brigades set off on their return journey towards Hungary on foot.

Loses of the VIII Corps
27.06.41 – 10.11.41

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Upon their departure from Hungary, the infantry brigades had only been filled up to some 50 to 70% of their authorized war strength, and therefore had about 5000 to 6000 men each. Each regiment had 90 officers and 2524 men, 1807 rifles, and 832 pistols. In addition, there were a few light and heavy machine-guns. Infantry and cavalry companies only had three instead of the standard four rifle platoons. The personnel was mostly made up of 2nd and 3rd Reserves. Their equipment was of the lightest—rifles, pistols, and a few machine guns and light mortars. The staffs were also approximately one-third under strength.

The brigades did not have any artillery. Heavy weapons (such as antitank guns, infantry guns, medium and heavy mortars, etc.) were completely lacking. Support units were limited. A light complement of supply troops was assigned, but the bulk of the support and supply was to be provided by the Hungarian Corps or German Army. There was a small saber company under the direct command of the brigade for reconnaissance duties. (These saber companies were often used by the Germans for completely different purposes).

The infantry brigades were intended to provide security for rear areas (line-of-communication) and carry out anti-partisan operations. For these missions, the security units were just adequately equipped. They were not, however, in any fashion capable of combat against regular Soviet units.

The efforts of the Soviets to organize a strong resistance movement in the evacuated territories definitely affected the Hungarian security operations. As early as November 1941, the railway line between Gomel and Chernigov was the subject of frequent attacks. Trains were blown off the rails, armed assaults were carried out against supply units and depots with increasing regularity.

The security units were ordered to move against the partisans and suppress them “with all means possible”. These activities developed into regular small wars within a short time. The dense Brianšk Woods along the Desna River were the scene of frequent and heavy fighting, which was to continue without cessation for months on end, with both sides giving and taking severe casualties.

In November 1941, the other two brigades (5th and 8th) arrived at the East Front, and were redesignated as the 105th and 108th Brigades, respectively.

The H.O.C. was usually only responsible for logistical and disciplinary matters. Tactically, the Hungarian occupation units were almost always detached to German commands. For example, on 4.11.41, the 105th and 108th Brigades were attached to the WB Ukraine, whereas the 121st and 124th Brigades were attached to the Befehlshaber rückwärtiges Heeresgebiet Süden (Befh. Süd, i.e., Rear Area Commander of Army Group South). In December 1941 the 108th Brigade was transferred further east to Priluky and attached to Befh. Süd.

The setbacks in 1941 forced the Germans to face the fact that the war was now going to last at least another year. Germany was not satisfied with the Hungarian contribution so far, and indicated that the Hungarians were going to have to shoulder a greater part of the burden. Generalmajor Rudolf Toussaint, the German military attaché in Budapest, presented Premier Bárdossy with the demand for further security units for occupation duties on 11.11.41.

Reinforcements

In December 1941 four more brigades were mobilized in Hungary for security duties, although ultimately only the 2nd Infantry Brigade was actually sent to the East Front and there subsequently redesignated as 102nd Brigade.

By January 1942, the Hungarians had been further pressured into sending an army to the Soviet Union to assist the Germans, and the remaining three brigades were to form a part of this force.

By the end of 1941, Hungarian occupation forces in the Soviet Union comprised five brigades, with a total of some 40,000 troops. There was also one bicycle battalion at Dnieperopetrovsk, which was engaged in dispatching the remaining equipment of the Mobile Corps to back Hungary.

This fairly large contingent of lightly armed security troops was well suited for its task, as long as the partisans did not start to operate at the regimental level or stronger. The German authorities certainly felt the Hungarians were doing well. If the comments in the War Diaries of the German General Staff (OKW) are any indication, the Hungarian security brigades carried out their anti-partisan operations with success and zeal, perhaps with more zeal than the Hungarian commanders liked to acknowledge a few years later. In a speech on 6.11.41, Stalin also listed the Hungarians for the first time amongst the enemies of the Soviet Union.

On 21.12.41, the Hungarian occupation forces began their first major operation along the Desna River. The area encompassed the region between the Dnieper and Sozh Rivers. Particular emphasis was placed on clearing and securing the railway line connecting Gomel and Chernigov.

By early 1942, the five security brigades of the Hungarian Army
were stationed in the Ukraine. They continued to advance as the main front moved eastwards. To the west of the Dnieper River remained the 121st (headquarters at Berdichev) stationed around Berdichev and Rovno, and 124th Security Brigades (headquarters at Proskurov), securing the area between Proskurov and Vinnitsa. Both units were assigned to the WB Ukraine (Military Commander of the Ukraine).

The other three Hungarian brigades had been assigned to the Befehlshaber rückwärtiges Heeresgebiet Süd, and were charged with the protection of the railway east of Kiev.

The 105th Brigade held the area around Chernigov, the 102nd Security Brigade the Neshin region, and as mentioned above, the 108th Security Brigade occupied the territory around Priyuky. The headquarters of the Hungarian Occupation Command was restructured, and, having been brought up to corps level strength, established itself at the Ukrainian capital of Kiev.

The Security Divisions

On 17.02.1942, all infantry brigades (including those of the security forces) of the Hungarian Army were redesignated as Light Divisions as Hitler had required that Hungary provide divisions and not brigades for use on the East Front. The security brigades were consequently also redesignated as security divisions.

This simple redesignation initially enabled the Hungarians to pull the wool over the eyes of the Germans, but the deception soon proved to be disastrous for the units so redesignated.

As can be seen from the diagram of the 1942 Security Division, the division was in actual fact (as were all Hungarian divisions at the time), still a brigade, and, in the case of the security division, a rather weak brigade at that.

When the Soviet partisan activities began in earnest around Ivanovka, Hungarian counter measures were initiated in March 1942. The well-fortified positions deep inside the Briansk Woods were attacked and taken by the Hungarian security forces. Not only was a large amount of ammunition and equipment captured, but a complete field hospital was taken intact.

During the spring of 1942, the 102nd Security Division was assigned to the German 2. Armeere Communications Zone Command (Korück 580). When the southern front around Kharkov threatened to collapse, and the Soviet forces began breaking through the gaps left by the winter battles, the Germans were scraping the bottom of the barrel, and threw all the forces available to take advantage of the situation. Naturally, Hungarian “divisions” were used to cover the withdrawal of regular forces. The Heeresgruppe B, and, in the case of the security forces, the Heeresgruppe Mitte, were tasked with the activity of pacification of the southern sector of the Briansk Woods.

The Germans did not manage to stabilize the front until May 1942, and only then could bring up further German units. Meanwhile, the 108th Security Division was engaged in costly fighting at the front which took place in those months. Only after the arrival of the German reinforcements was the 108th Security Division returned to its intended mission, namely the occupation and pacification of the southern edge of the Briansk Woods, near the city of Seredina-Buda.

In the summer of 1942 the Briansk Woods once again became the scene of bitter fighting. The partisans had sufficiently recovered from the Hungarian spring operations to resume their activities.

The STAVKA (Soviet General Headquarters of the Armed Forces) assigned to the partisan movement important tasks. The partisan movement in the Ukraine had 83 separate, independent units, comprising over 43,000 men. One of the main Soviet supply bases was in the Briansk Woods. Its exact location was a source of complete mystification to the Hungarians.

The total number of Hungarian security forces in the Ukraine consisted of over lightly armed 40,000 troops, spread out over several hundred kilometers on both sides of the Dnieper River. The Hungarian security forces soon abandoned large scale operations and instead started raiding and securing lines of communications.

Towards the middle of 1942, the 102nd and 108th Security Divisions were assigned to the German 2. Panzer-Armee.

The 105th Security Division remained east of the Dnieper River, under command of the Hungarian Occupation Command.

Reorganization

In June 1942, the command structure was reorganized. The three security divisions east of the Dnieper River, (102nd, 105th, 108th) were gathered under the Eastern Hungarian Occupation Group, those west (121st, 124th) under the Western Hungarian Occupation Group.

The Eastern H.O.G. was assigned to Heeresgruppe B, although two of the security divisions were attached to Heeresgruppe Mitte. The Eastern H.O.G. was also assigned other security units, such as the 213. and 403. Sicherungs-Divisionen, the Italian “Vicenza” Division, and the 105th Security Division.

All during the summer, fall, and winter of 1942, the main effort of the Hungarian occupation forces east of the Dnieper River was to keep the Kursk-Kiev railway line in the Seredina-Buda area open. In this region south of the Briansk Woods the Hungarian security divisions and the Soviet partisans inflicted enormous casualties on each other.

The Hungarian field force, the Second Army, had initiated its participation in the East Front campaign in June 1942. By August 1942, this army had reached the Don River. The railway line through the Briansk Woods was its one and only supply line, and so was given particular emphasis by the Hungarian security forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Losses of the H.O.C.</th>
<th>1.12.41 – 1.08.42</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>516</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>542</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total: 1691 casualties</td>
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</table>

In accordance with the agreement forced by the Germans in January 1942, two further security divisions were raised late in 1942. These, the 1st and 201st Security Divisions, were strictly ad-hoc units. Their components were taken from all over Hungary. The 1st Security Division headquarters came from the 1st Light Infantry Division, which had been dissolved on 1.10.42, and the 201st headquarters came from several staffs. These two divisions were not carried on the rolls as “real” divi-
For the first time, security forces had artillery, albeit only four batteries equipped with captured Belgian 75mm field guns. This additional firepower proved necessary as the Germans had the unfortunate tendency to throw security units into the line more and more often whenever the necessity arose to stop a gap or stem a Soviet breakthrough. Also, the partisans being encountered after the winter of 1941/1942 had weapons and equipment equal or superior to that of the security units assigned the mission of seeking them out and destroying them. Sadly, there were never enough heavy weapons in the Hungarian Army to supply second-line units.

The 1st and 201st Divisions were off-loading west of Kursk late December 1942/early January 1943, just at the time of the Soviet offensive, and assigned to the Eastern Hungarian Occupation Group.

The arrival of the two divisions brought the total of security forces in the Soviet Union to 39,000 troops. The other security divisions had meanwhile been withdrawn from the front. Some battalions had even been rotated home on different dates in July and August 1942, being brought back in principle after a year’s service at the front.

The security divisions continued to move east, gradually following the progress of the front. The bulk of them, under General Károly Olgyay, were now stationed along the southern fringes of the Briansk Woods, while the smaller group, under General Imre Széchy, was further west. The headquarters of the Eastern Hungarian Occupation Group (General Szipárd Bakay) was in Kiev. The main duty of these forces continued to be to combat the partisans in the forests and protect the lines of communications. The task was never really mastered, although it is recorded that they established friendly relations with the local inhabitants, and with the Ukrainian volunteer bands who helped them in their task.

The Second Army and the Occupation Forces

After the disaster on the Don in January 1943, the Second Army had been relieved of its combat mission. On 17.02.43, it was put in command of all Hungarian occupation forces in the Soviet Union.

Hungarian leaders insisted, (much to the relief of some Germans), that the remaining Hungarian units be employed only in the rear, and not be allowed to come into contact with regular Soviet forces. Also, Hitler, not particularly interested in the further use of Hungarian troops for combat purposes, was not willing to reequip Hungary’s Army.

Hence, the major contribution that the Hungarian Armed Forces made to the Axis war effort after February 1943 was the maintenance of security units in the occupied Soviet territories.

The initial number of seven security divisions (1.01.43: 1, 102, 105, 108, 121, 124, 201 Security Divisions); was soon increased to eleven, (4.03.43: 1, 102, 105, 108, 121, 124, 201 Security Divisions); and then to thirteen, (7.07.43: 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 12, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 201 Light Divisions); with the total manpower growing to 121,000 men. These units were still inadequately equipped, and what equipment they did have was usually antiquated. The lack of heavy weapons and artillery was also particularly evident. After the new Szabolcs Plan began to take effect starting in late 1943, about half of these divisions were dissolved, the men and equipment being used to strengthen other divisions on the East Front.

Composed as it was of elderly and not very robust reservists, as well as demoralized Second Army veterans, the H.O.F.C. was not a very significant fighting force. For the Hungarians, having lost its field army, the symbolic value of the occupation forces stood virtually in direct inverse proportion to its military efficiency.

The Germans felt that the Hungarians were not supplying their own troops adequately, while the Hungarian troops themselves often countered with the complaint that their inadequate supply situation, (besides, of course, the lack of heavy weapons and artillery), was the reason for not getting involved in serious fighting. Naturally, what applied to the Second Army in 1942, had applied to the security forces all along. They depended totally upon the German logistical services for any supplies. The transportation link between railroad and division was often long and fraught with danger, and could only be served by horse-drawn transport columns, with the corresponding delays. The Germans naturally gave priority first to their own combat forces, then to their rear area units, and lastly to the Hungarians.

The German OKW notified General Szombathyi that the reorganization of the Hungarian forces on the East Front was to be effected under command of the Second Army. The Second Army having been relieved of field command, and having lost most of its units, (either through annihilation or movement back to Hungary), was available for this purpose. It had originally been given the mission of reforming the few forces it had left into some kind of order. Second Army headquarters was to be located at Gomel (under Heeresgruppe B), and its remnants were to be sent the area of Neshin-Chernigov, (under Heeresgruppe Mitte) as soon as possible, the intention being to raise security and labor battalions with them.

Hitler ordered that the German forces were to treat their allies on the East Front with respect and friendship, so that they could be reorganized rapidly, and also to not give the various political opposition forces in Axis-allied countries cause for ending participation in the war.

On 2.02.43, the Amt Ausländischer Abwehr (German foreign military intelligence department) received a report from its military attaché in Budapest to the effect that the Hungarian C.O.S. had indicated that the issue of the “second front” in the Balkans had reached a climax in Hungary, and that Croatia was regarded as an open door. The attaché further mentioned that conversations with various officers seemed to indicate that Hungary would consider the use of Hungarian troops in Croatia, but without any political (i.e. territorial) demands. The attaché thought that Hungarian units were particularly suited for this type of mission. He admitted, however, that those forces committed to occupation and security duties in the Balkans would not be available to counter an invasion at another point. The military attaché concluded with the observation that the Hungarians had only one other option, and that was the reconstruction of the Second Hungarian Army. This, however, would require large amounts of German material and quite some time.
The Hungarian Occupation Forces were mobilized as reduced-strength security divisions in Hungary in April 1943, arriving on the East Front in May 1943. The VII Corps, a former Second Army formation, (commanded by General István Kiss) absorbed the Western H.O.G. on 1.05.43. It had under its command the 1st Security, 102nd Security, 105th Security, and 201st Security Divisions. It also had the 9th Light, 12th Light, 23rd Light Divisions engaged in reorganization.

The other major formation assigned to the H.O.F.C., the newly-arrived VIII Corps (commanded by General Dezsö László), amalgamated with the Eastern H.O.G. on 18.05.43. It had under its command the 1st Security, 102nd Security, 105th Security, and 201st Security Divisions. It also had the 9th Light, 12th Light, 23rd Light Divisions engaged in reorganization.

The Germans thereupon officially proceeded to request that three Hungarian divisions be provided for security duties. The Hungarians replied on 24.02.43 to the effect that they did not have any combat-ready units at the time, since all those types of divisions had been sent to the East Front, and had there subsequently been destroyed, and that it would only be possible to raise new units after a considerable training period, all this, of course, provided that the Germans supply arms and equipment. It would be foolish, the Hungarians continued, to send badly trained troops to relieve veteran German units, seeing as how the effects of this sort of action had just been recently demonstrated so disastrously on the Don. On the contrary, the Hungarians asked for the return all of their remaining forces on the East Front, so that new units could be raised, refitted, and trained properly.

The C.O.S. of the OKW, advised of this report, recommended to Hitler that three Hungarian divisions be raised from the best personnel available, and that the rest be used in construction battalions. He added that the Hungarians should raise four further divisions for security duties in the Balkans, and, if possible, to provide two of them by the beginning of March 1943. Hitler approved both recommendations.

Reorganization and Consolidation

Besides the original occupation units in the Soviet Union, as mentioned, there were the remnants of the Second Army light divisions, (gathering under the 9th, 12th, 19th, and 23rd Light Divisions headquarters). These formations were reduced in strength and organization to the status of security divisions. They were armed with what was left of the Second Army’s equipment. Retraining and reequipping these divisions took four months.

To enable the Second Army to fulfill its new mission and to coordinate the units under its command, the headquarters was moved from Gomel to Kiev on 23.03.43.

In May 1943, the Hungarian occupation forces underwent a series of changes, which were to remain in effect for almost one year.

- The 18th and 25th Light Divisions were mobilized as reduced-strength security divisions in Hungary in April 1943, arriving on the East Front in May 1943.
- The VII Corps, a former Second Army formation, (commanded by General István Kiss) absorbed the Western H.O.G. on 1.05.43. It had under its command the 1st Security, 102nd Security, 105th Security, and 201st Security Divisions. It also had the 9th Light, 12th Light, 23rd Light Divisions engaged in reorganization.
- The other major formation assigned to the H.O.F.C., the newly-arrived VIII Corps (commanded by General Dezsö László), amalgamated with the Eastern H.O.G. on 18.05.43. It had the 18th Light, 121st Security, 124th Security, and 25th Light Divisions. It was also assigned the 19th Light Division, still being formed. This force was employed in containing the partisans in the Briansk Woods.
- In the latter part of May 1943, the 102nd Security Division was regrouped from Svyask to Gomel to protect the vital communications point in that city.
- In May 1943, the security divisions were redesignated as light divisions, and those with 100 added to their
The restructuring of the security forces had one major benefit for the Hungarians. For first time the Hungarian divisions and their units were assigned directly to the Hungarian corps. The corps themselves, however, continued to be attached to German commands. The H.O.F.C. functioned mostly as a training and disciplinary command. Any orders from the H.O.F.C. were subject to revision by the Germans. The Germans continued to decide what the Hungarian units were supposed to do. Hungarian units were detached to the German commands as and when the Germans deemed it necessary. General Lakatos always tried to prevent this, but was rarely successful.

The OKH informed the H.O.F.C. in July 1943 that it was planning to move the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 8th, and 201st Light Divisions to the area west of Mosyr and Bobruisk by late August 1943. German movements in reaction to Soviet attacks at the time slowed the transfer considerably, and only when the Germans had ceased moving their own forces were the security divisions able to move to their new areas of operation, mostly on foot, and in a few cases, with the last trains going west. The locations and areas of operation remained relatively stable from May through August 1943.

In preparation for a major reorganization of the Hungarian army, the headquarters of the 2nd (ex-102nd) and 8th (ex-108th) Divisions, (as well as some of the regimental headquarters), were withdrawn to Hungary in July 1943 and used to help raise new units there.

The main preoccupation of General Lakatos, commanding general of Hungarian occupation forces the during the summer and fall months of 1943, was the circumvention of repeated German attempts to throw his weak security forces into whatever emergency existed at the time. And in 1943, with the Germans stretched to the very limits, and falling back on all fronts, this was an almost weekly occurrence. Guided by this concept, General Lakatos managed to maintain the H.O.F.C. 100 – 150 kilometers behind the rapidly receding Axis front.

The security divisions were charged with keeping large areas of the Ukraine under control. Besides occasionally carrying out operations against partisans in their areas, they were mainly engaged in patrolling and guarding the railway lines. This was not as simple an operation as it seems, as we have already seen. The partisan groups counted on, and got, support from the local population. The strong partisan groups were well equipped and led, and operated in some areas almost with impunity. In August 1943, for example, there were 12,717 attacks on railway targets within the Heeresgruppe Mitte command, in the process of which 74 locomotives and 214 wagons were destroyed, some 80 trains derailed, and enormous amounts railway material destroyed.

Although the Soviet forces continued to make a distinction between Hungarian and German occupation troops, the Hungarian divisions took heavy casualties. On 15.08.43, the Hungarian Occupation Force Command headquarters was dissolved. The Second Army headquarters was raised at the same place and time, and charged with command of all Hungarian occupation forces in the Soviet Union in its stead. At the same time, the headquarters of the Second Army in Hungary was deactivated.

Towards the end of August 1943 the Soviet forces broke through the German lines around Sevesk. Once again, there were no reserves at hand. Heeresgruppe Mitte ordered the immediate deployment of the nearest units, including the 1st Security Division. Forewarned of the impending breakthrough, General Lakatos had ordered the retreat of the Second Army.

In accordance with this order, the 1st Security Division was busily making its way west when the German order to turn about and engage the enemy reached it.

General Szombathelyi, advised of the situation, refused to release the unit. Only after Feldmarschall von Kluge intervened directly from Berlin did the Hungarian C.O.S. give way. On 28.08.43, the 1st Security Division was released for front line duty, subject to the condition that the Germans would furnish anti-tank guns and, more importantly, artillery. The Germans acceded, and the 1st Security Division was attached to the 2. Armeec and moved into the yawning breach.

During the ensuing month, the 1st Security Division fought a withdrawing battle from Krodow to Shostka. Unfortunately, once again the Germans provide neither the reinforcements nor the promised equipment, and the Hungarian 1st Security Division was virtually wiped out. On 19.09.43 it was finally withdrawn from the front, but did not return to Hungarian command until November 1943.

The Occupation Forces Move West

Between 17.9.43 and 23.09.43, in a rare show of Hungarian-German cooperation, headquarters of the Second Army and its
The Order of Battle diagram shows all the units of the Hungarian Occupation Forces from the point of their first arrival in the Fall 1941 until the dissolution of the Hungarian Occupation Forces Command on 7.04.1944.

The Huba Army Expansion and Mobilization Plans I – III had allowed a mixed, piecemeal mobilization of units from the various Military Districts in Hungary in order to lessen the load on the economy. The new Szabolcs Peace-Time and Army Mobilization Plan of 1.10.1943 encompassed a different organization, ordering mobilization in depth, resulting in the unification of the various units under their parent formations, either by sending out the remaining portions of the Second Line (i.e., Reserve) units to the occupation forces, or by withdrawing the First Line (i.e., Active) units back to Hungary. The regrouping and reorganization took until well into 1944.

### KEY

A. These are the units which were mobilized with a reduced strength organization in Hungary during the Fall of 1941 for occupation duties. They consisted mainly of those units which went to the East Front under the headquarters of the 21st (121st) and 24th (124th) Light Divisions, as well as the 2nd (102nd), 5th (105th), and 6th (108th) Brigades/Light Divisions.

B. These are the improvised units which were mobilized in Hungary in the Fall of 1942 and sent to the East Front. They consisted mainly of the headquarters of the 1st and 201st Light Divisions with attached units. Also, for the first time, an artillery battalion was included, albeit with only 4 light mountain field gun batteries.

C. The remaining units of the 18th and 25th Light Divisions, including the divisional headquarters, mobilized in the Spring of 1943. They were to unite with those units already serving with the occupation forces on the East Front and form complete formations.

D. These are commands and division headquarters of the former Second Army. The regiment headquarters and various units also from the former Second Army were used to order the regiments and also to boost the strength of the occupation forces after the Second Army was dissolved.

E. Units which were sent to the East Front during the Fall of 1943 and ensuing Winter directly from Hungary, mainly to relieve those units needed to complete the First Line divisions being raised back in Hungary, but also including new units to support the existing forces.

F. Units sent back to Hungary to complete the First Line divisions being raised back in Hungary.

G. Units which were dissolved or amalgamated into other formations and used to fill up those units.

### NOTES

a. General Jány – Commanding General of the Second Army – assumed command of all Hungarian formations on the East Front on 17.02.1943, (including the occupation forces), and carried out the function of “Inspector General” until 1.05.1943. The Second Army was then relieved on 1.05.1943 by the Hungarian Occupation Forces Command. On 15.08.1943, the Second Army was once again activated on the East Front and put in command of the Hungarian Occupation Forces. On the tactical and operational levels, the Hungarian occupation forces remained assigned to German commands.

b. The VII Corps was a former Second Army command which superseded the Hungarian Occupation Group West. (The H.O.G. West had never been a real separate command. Its staff functions had been carried out by the headquarters of the senior divisional commander, who simultaneously had the title of Commanding Officer H.O.G. West).

c. The Hungarian Occupation Group East had been a real command. It was amalgamated into the headquarters of the VIII Corps.

d. The VIII Corps was sent from Hungary on 18.05.1943 to Gomel to assume command of the occupation forces in that sector.

e. In May 1943, all occupation divisions reverted back to their original designations. (i.e., the 121st Division becomes once again 21st, the 124th becomes 24th, etc.)

f. The division headquarters of the 124th (24th) Light Division is relieved by the headquarters of the 21st Light Division, a former Second Army formation and returned to Hungary.

g. The 18th and 25th Light Divisions were sent to the East Front owing to a strong desire expressed by the German OKW. These are the first units which arrived organizationally intact. The 25th Light Division was redesignated as the 19th Light Division and the 55th Infantry Regiment as the 35th Infantry Regiment on 1.10.1943. The 19th Light Division was deactivated and sent back to Hungary.

h. The headquarters of the 102nd (2nd) Light Division was relieved by the headquarters of the 23rd Light Division on 29.07.1943 and returned to Hungary.

i. The headquarters of the 108th (8th) Light Division was relieved by the headquarters of the 9th Light Division, (a former Second Army formation), on 29.07.1943 and returned to Hungary.

j. The 101st Independent Tank Company was raised in February 1943 with 3 platoons of Hotchkiss H-38 tanks and a heavy platoon with 2 Somua S-35’s. It was a reinforced company with a complement of about 350 men, including a workshop detachment. The company saw extensive action, both against Soviet partisans and Red Army regulars. The company was disbanded late July, early August 1944 because the vehicles ran out of fuel and had to be destroyed.

k. The 102nd Independent Tank Company was raised in Hungary and transferred to the occupation forces on 19.12.1943. It was formed from parts of the 1st Armored Division, (the II Battalion/1st Tank Regiment, which provided personnel to form two platoons with T-40 tanks), and the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (providing an armored car platoon).
### Chapter 13 The Hungarian Occupation Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hungarian Occupation Group West</th>
<th>Hungarian Occupation Group East</th>
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<td><img src="image" alt="Diagram" /></td>
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**A.** Units from Hungary Fall 1941 – Summer 1942  
**B.** Units from Hungary Fall 1942 – Winter 1942/43  
**C.** Units from Hungary Summer 1943  
**D.** Former units of the Second Army
army troops were rapidly moved by rail from Kiev to Kremieńec.

During September 1943, the VII Corps, (with the 18th, 19th, and 21st Light Divisions), was moved to the Priepjet Marshes, where it established headquarters at Zdolbunov (near Rovno). The 18th Light Division now guarded the railway between Mosyry and Ovrutch. Its southern neighbor, the 19th Light Division, was responsible for the railway between Ovrutch and Korosten. The 21st was split into two parts, two thirds guarding the railway connecting Lvov and Kiev, including the cities of Brody – Dubno – Rovno – Shepetovka – Polonne. While the other third occupied positions east and west of Proskurov.

The 201st Light Division was reassigned to the VII Corps. It was ordered to guard the area comprising the cities of Vinnitsa – Polonne – Koziatin – Berdichev.

The VIII Corps (1st, 5th, 9th, 12th, and 23rd Light Divisions) was moved to the vicinity of Pinsk, where it guarded the approaches to Brest-Litovsk. Its divisions occupied a fan-shaped area, anchored at Kobrin in the west, and spreading out northeast to Slutsk and Grabovo, with its southeast corner northeast of Sarny.

During the late Fall 1943, the Hungarians once again attempted to withdraw divisions engaged in occupation duties from the Ukraine but were thwarted by the Germans.

In October 1943, the Headquarters, 24th and 25th Divisions were withdrawn to Hungary and deactivated there, leaving nine divisions on the East Front (1, 5, 9, 12, 18, 19, 21, 23, 201 Reserve Divisions).

The Soviet offensive in November 1943 against Heeresgruppe Mitte stuck at the boundary between the 9. Armee and the 4. Panzer-Armee. On 6.11.43 Kiev and Fastov fell. Soviet spearheads were moving rapidly westwards, advanced elements reached Mosyry, Ovrutch, Korosten, cutting the railway line connecting these cities at Ovrutch. The 18th and 19th Light Divisions were forced retreat southwest.

The counter attack by the 4. Panzer-Armee against the Soviet southern flank on 11.11.43 prevented any further advance, and forced the Soviet forces to consolidate their positions. Korosten and Mosyry were held. Zhîtomir regained after a week of bitter fighting, but Ovrutch was lost, and with it the railway connection to the north. Henceforth, north- and southbound trains had to be rerouted via Pinsk. The pause enabled the 18th and 19th Light Divisions to regroup. The 18th Light Division occupied Stolya and Sarny. The 19th Light Division was immediately to the south, occupying the area between Sarny and Rovno.

Meanwhile, the Soviet advance had been resumed to the north in the 9. Armee area. On 17.11.43, Rjetschitsye fell. By 23.11.43, heavy fighting was reported in front of Bobruisk, Gomel, and Rogatchev. Bobruisk fell on 24.11.43, and Gomel on 26.11.43. The 9. Armee was able to hold Rogatchev, and was able to stabilize the situation by mid-December 1943.

The VIII Corps was regrouped, its headquarters moving from Pinsk to Kobrin. The 1st Light Division was moved from the easternmost area between Slutsk and Grabovo to Brest-Litovsk and the area east between Brest-Litovsk and Kobrin. The 5th Light Division was regrouped westwards in front of Brest-Litovsk, around Kobrin.

The 18th and 19th Light Divisions were again moved, the 18th to guard the railway line between Rovno and Kovel, the 19th covering the railway between Rovno and Lvov. The VII Corps headquarters, as well as the 21st Light Divisions remained in their positions. The 201st Light Division withdrew westwards, having abandoned Fastov on 6.11.43 when it was taken by advancing Soviet forces.

The Hungarian Government never ceased its attempts to get back their occupation forces from the Soviet Union.

General Szombathelyi made three separate visits within a period of two months to Hitler’s headquarters, namely in September 1943, November 1943, and again in January 1944. Each time the Hungarian C.O.S. was instructed to request the return of the security divisions. He backed his request on the fact that these units were not equipped to fight against regular Soviet forces, and that this was too often the case. The occupation forces were being decimated. In addition, the
H.O.F.C. was being moved to the north, and hence being denied the possibility of retreating in front of the advancing Soviet forces towards Hungary.

Horthy himself often personally asked Hitler for the return of the security forces to Hungary, but again to no avail.

### The Reserve Divisions

The Szabolcs Plan which came into effect on 1.10.43, (and described in detail elsewhere) also affected those forces engaged in occupation duties on the East Front. All divisions there were to be converted from the light (two regiment) to the triangular (three-regiment) form. Second echelon formations, were to be redesignated as Reserve Divisions. In the final period of reorganization from 8.04. – 1.05.44, the 1st and 9th Reserve Divisions were dissolved, and the men and equipment distributed among the remaining three divisions.

On 7.04.44, the Hungarian Occupation Forces Command was dissolved. The VII Corps (18th, 21st, and 201st Reserve Divisions), was transferred to the Field Forces, and reassigned to the First Army. The VIII Corps (1st, 5th, 9th, 12th, and 23rd Reserve Divisions) was redesignated as the Hungarian Occupation Command on 7.04.1944, and then on 1.05.1944 as the II Reserve Corps. It was in command of the remaining Hungarian occupation units.

By May 1944, the II Reserve Corps (with 5th, 12th, 23rd Reserve Divisions), was under the 2. Armee of the Heeresgruppe Mitte and had been pushed back on Brest-Litovsk.

As can be seen from the diagram on the left, the divisions in the Soviet Union did not meet the authorized organization for reserve divisions in accordance with the Szabolcs II Plan: the divisional artillery and infantry commanders were missing. The infantry regiments only had a pioneer company, one telephone and one cavalry platoon each. The rifle companies had only 3 platoons, with 9 light machine guns, and the heavy company only 9 medium machine guns. Artillery for all three divisions should have been 27 batteries with Hungarian and German equipment, but there were only a total of eight batteries, (six with Belgian 75mm field guns and two with English 87.6mm [25pdr] field guns, received from the Germans). No artillery observation batteries were on hand. The reconnaissance and combat engineer battalions were completely missing, (instead the divisions had one cavalry and one combat engineer company each), and supply services were markedly under strength. Personnel was still mostly drawn from the 2nd and 3rd Reserves and minority groups.

On 20.06.44, the II Reserve Corps headquarters and the 5th Reserve Division were at Kobrin. The 23rd Reserve Division was in Brest-Litovsk. The 12th Reserve Division was in the front line, under the VIII. Armeekorps, between the Korpsabteilung E (north) and the 211. Infanterie-Division (south).

The Soviet June 1944 offensive in White Russia against Heeresgruppe Mitte rolled right over the German positions. The II Reserve Corps was forced to withdraw further into Poland.

On 27.07.44, after a short rest for regrouping, the divisions of the II Reserve Corps were once again thrown into the fray under the XX. Armeekorps.

### Return of the II Reserve Corps

In August 1944, after the capitulation of Rumania, Horthy once again appealed to the Germans to be allowed to withdraw of the II Reserve Corps, (now under the 9. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte), from Poland. Hitler, wishing to avoid further unnecessary friction between the two nations, and the loss of another ally, finally allowed most of the Hungarian formations stationed north of the Carpathians to be sent home.

During the period of 28.08.44 through 6.09.44, the 12th Reserve Division was transported back to Hungary. The 23rd Reserve Division started back on 5.09.44, and finished its movement on 9.09.44. The II Reserve Corps Headquarters and troops departed on 25.09.44 and arrived on 12.10.44. Upon its arrival in Budapest, the II Reserve Corps was deactivated, and the VIII Corps activated, using the headquarters staff of the former.

The 5th Reserve Division stayed behind in Poland. It fought on until the end of the war under German command and surrendered to the Soviet forces at Zlin in northern Slovakia on 8.05.45.

### Order of Battle

#### IInd Reserve Corps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artillery Command, IInd Reserve Corps</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IInd Reserve Corps Corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th, 41st, 84th, and 88th Artillery Battalions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Anti-Aircraft Battalion, plus</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### IInd Reserve Corps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5th Reserve Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33rd, 46th, 52nd Infantry Regiments. 5th Signal Battalion. 5th Cavalry Company. 5th Anti-Aircraft Company. 72./1 Pioneer Company. 54th Mortar Company. 5th Reserve Division Supply Services: 1 anti-aircraft company; 3 horse-drawn supply columns; 2 motorized supply columns; 1 ammunition distribution unit; 1 rations distribution unit; 1 bakery company; 1 supply unit; 1 medical company; 1 field hospital company; 1 ambulance company (motorized); 1 postal unit; 1 band.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 12th Reserve Division

| 36th, 38th, 48th Infantry Regiments. 12th Signal Battalion. 12th Cavalry Company. 12th Anti-Aircraft Company. 74./1 Pioneer Company. 12th Reserve Division Supply Services: 1 anti-aircraft company; 3 horse-drawn supply columns; 2 motorized supply columns; 1 ammunition distribution unit; 1 rations distribution unit; 1 bakery company; 1 supply unit; 1 medical company; 1 field hospital company; 1 ambulance company (motorized); 1 postal unit; 1 band. |

#### 23rd Reserve Division

| 42nd, 51st, 54th Infantry Regiments. 3rd Signal Battalion. 3rd Cavalry Company. 23rd Anti-Aircraft Company. 78./1 Pioneer Company. 23rd Reserve Division Supply Services: 1 anti-aircraft company; 3 horse-drawn supply columns; 2 motorized supply columns; 1 ammunition distribution unit; 1 rations distribution unit; 1 bakery company; 1 supply unit; 1 medical company; 1 field hospital company; 1 ambulance company (motorized); 1 postal unit; 1 band. |
German Rear Area Commands with corresponding High Commands on the East Front 1941 – 1945

**NOTES:**

**(Hgr.) Heeresgruppe**

Army Group. The Commander-In-Chief of an Army Group was the Oberbefehlshaber.

The commanders of the rear areas – regardless of their designation – all more or less carried out the same function, namely that of being in charge of all matters in an Army Group’s rear area – also known as the line-of-communications zone – including command of all military security forces. The designations varied, but the functions did not. As the front advanced during 1941 – 1942, those areas no longer immediately behind the Army Groups were placed under civilian administration, headed by a Reichskommissar (a “Reich Commissioner”, who was the highest civilian authority in this occupied territory). However, those military forces that were in this area remained under Wehrmacht (Armed Forces, which excluded many SS formations) – as opposed to Heer (Army) – control. As the front receded in 1943 – 1944, these civilian administered areas decreased in size, and were finally dissolved. As the front receded further, even Army Group rear areas became superfluous.

**(Befh. HG) Befehlshaber rückwärtiges Heeresgebiet**

“Commander-in-Charge for Army Group Rear Area”.

**(Befh. HG) Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet**

Until 1942: “Commander-in-Charge Army Group Area”. The “Rear Area” was dropped from the title.

As of 1942: Kommandierender General der Sicherungstruppen und Befehlshaber im Heeresgebiet “Commanding General of the Security Forces and Commander-in-Charge of Army Group Area”. The same functions, but the title now definitely included the security forces within the Army Group’s line-of-communications zone.


“Commander-in-Charge for Army Group Operations Area”. Again the same thing, except that the rear area was now designated as an operational zone, to which applied slightly different rules and regulations. This designation was first applied when Eastern Hungary was designated as an Operational Zone by the Germans.

**(Befh) Befehlshaber**

“Commander-In-Charge”. The Commander responsible for Heer (Army) forces in a designated area.

**(WB) Wehrmachtbefehlshaber**

“Armed Forces Commander-In-Charge”. The commander of all Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) in an occupied territory under civilian administration behind an Army Group’s rear area. The Wehrmachtbefehlshaber was in charge of all military forces within this civilian administration. It also included all military security forces. When the front receded, the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber was dissolved, or came under Army Group control.

**(Deut.Befh.) Deutsche Befehlshaber Ostungarn / Westungarn**

“German Commander-In-Charge of East Hungary/West Hungary”. As of March 1944, the Eastern Zone was formed to include all military forces behind the front in the area east of the Tisa River. On 21.05.1944 the Western Zone was raised and included all territory west of this river. Hungary was now for all practical purposes completely militarized and under German military control, although certain face-saving functions were allowed the Hungarian Honvéd, albeit under close supervision by the Germans. The East Hungary Operations Zone was dissolved some time – probably November 1944 – after eastern Hungary was lost to the advancing Russians. The Western Zone was dissolved after the last Axis forces left Hungary in April 1944.
Raised on 15.03.1941 from Slab General z.b.V. I (Headquarters, General for Special Purposes I) as the line-of-communications zone command for Heeresgruppe Nord. Renamed as the Befh. HG Nord on 5.07.1941.

Befehlsbär Heeresgebiet Nord
Renamed on 5.07.1941 from Befh. rückwärtiges HG 101 for Army Group North. The title changed on 15.02.1942 to Kommandierender General der Sicherungstruppen und Befehlshaber im Heeresgebiet Nord. The command was dissolved on 26.03.1944. The staff was used to raise the Deut. Befh. Ost-Ungarn (German Command in-Charge in East Hungary).

Befehlsbär Heeresgebiet Ostungarn
Raised on 26.03.1944 from the Staff of the Befh. HG Nord. The command was dissolved some time – probably November 1944 – after eastern Hungary was lost to the advancing Russians.

Befehlsbär Heeresgebiet Nord 102
Renamed on 15.03.1941 from Slab General z.b.V. II for Heeresgruppe Mitte. Renamed as Befh. HG Mitte on 5.07.1941.

Befehlsbär Heeresgebiet Mitte
Renamed on 5.07.1941 from Befh. rückwärtiges HG 102 for Army Group Center. The title changed on 15.02.1942 to Kommandierender General der Sicherungstruppen and Befehlshaber im Heeresgebiet Mitte as of 15.03.1942. The command was again redesignated on 8.10.1943 to Kommandierender General der Sicherungstruppen and Befehlshaber im Heeresgebiet Weißruthenien. It was again redesignated to Befh. of Security Forces and Commander-in-Charge for the White Russian Army Rear Area. Renamed on 8.10.1943 and reassigned from Hgr. Mitte to WB Ostland, where it remained in command of Army Group Center’s in line-of-communications zone, but now also of all security forces in White Russia. It was then reassigned to Hgr. Mitte and redesignated as Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Weißruthenien on 5.04.1944 – even though it was now subordinate to Hgr. Mitte – and given command of all military forces in White Russia. Dissolved on 21.07.1944 after the Axis forces had withdrawn from White Russia.

Befehlsbär Heeresgebiet Weißruthenien
(Renamed from the Staff of the Befh. of Security Forces and Commander-in-Charge for the White Russian Army Rear Area) Raised on 15.03.1941 from Slab General z.b.V. III for Heeresgruppe Südsüdost. Renamed as Befh. HG Süd on 5.07.1941.

Befehlsbär Heeresgebiet Heeresgruppe Süd
(Renamed on 5.07.1941 from Befh. rückw. HG 103 for Army Group South. On 15.03.1942, the title was changed to Kommandierender General der Sicherungstruppen and Befehlshaber im Heeresgebiet Süd. Again redesignated as Kommandierender General der Sicherungstruppen and Befehlshaber im Heeresgebiet B (Army Group B) on 9.07.1942 after Army Group South was split into Army Groups A and B.

Befehlsbär Heeresgebiet A
Raised on 15.06.1942 for Army Group A. Assumed command over those forces in the southern sector from Army Group South. Redesignated as Befh. deutschen Truppen in Transnistrien on 18.12.1943.

Befehlsbär Heeresgebiet Transnistrien
Renamed on 18.12.1943 from Befh. HG A after Army Group A was dissolved and the command with its security forces withdrew into the Rumanian-occupied Ukraine. Became Befh. der deutschen Truppen in Nordrumanien on 1.04.1944.

Befehlsbär Heeresgebiet Nordrumanien

Befehlsbär der deutschen Truppen im rückwärtigen Operationsgebiet der Heeresgruppe Südrußlande

Armeegruppe (Agr.)
The Germans had the custom of redesignating an Army (Armee) when another – for example, foreign – army was subordinated to it, being then called Armeegruppe ("a group of armies") and given the name of the Army’s commanding general. The name changed when the commanding general changed.

Armeegruppe Raus
(First Army + 1. Panzer-Armee)
21.07.44 – 15.08.44

Armeegruppe Heinrici
(First Army + 1. Panzer-Armee)
15.08.44 – 20.10.44

Armeegruppe Wöhler
(First Army + 8. Armee)
23.10.44 – 17.12.44

Armeegruppe Heinrici
(First Army + 1. Panzer-Armee)
18.12.44 – 1.02.45

Armeegruppe Weichs
(Second Army + 2. Armee + 4. Panzer-Armee)
28.06.42 – 4.08.1942

Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico
(Second Army + 6. Armee)
17.09.44 – 28.09.44

Armeegruppe Wöhler
(Second Army + 8. Armee)
3.10.44 – 18.10.44

Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico
(Third Army + 6. Armee)
28.10.44 – 23.12.44

Armeegruppe Back
(Third Army + 6. Armee)
23.12.44 – 19.03.45

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Chapter 13

German Rear Area Commands on the East Front 1941 – 1945

Befehlsbär Heeresgebiet Süd
(1941 – 1942)
Renamed on 20.08.1944 from Befh. rückw. HG 103 for Army Group South. Dissolved on 18.04.1945.

Befehlsbär Heeresgebiet B
Renamed on 1.08.1942 from Befehlsbär Heeresgebiet Süd for Army Group B. Retaining command over those forces in the northern sector. Renamed as Befh. HG Süd on 14.02.1943.

Befehlsbär Heeresgebiet Süd
(1943)
Renamed from the Kommandierender General der Sicherungstruppen and Befehlshaber im Heeresgebiet B on 14.02.1943. Dissolved on 8.11.1943.

Befehlsbär Heeresgebiet Don
Raised on 24.11.1942 for the new Army Group Don from Korück 585 (11. Armee). Dissolved on 12.02.1943.

Deutsche Befehlsbär Westungarn
Raised 21.05.1944 from the Oberfeldkdtr. 397 (coming from Italy). The command was dissolved after the last Axis forces left Hungary in April 1945.

Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Ostland
Raised on 5.07.1941 in Riga for the Reichskommissar Ostland. Ceded the territories in White Ruthenia to Befh. Weißer-Ruthenien on 5.05.1941. Dissolved on 30.08.1944.

Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Ukraine
The 1941 Yugoslavian Campaign

The 1. Air Force Field Brigade was altered on 4.04.1941 with the 1./I., 1/II., 2./I., 2/II. Fighter Groups, the 4./II. Bomber Group, the 3/5. Bomber Squadron, as well as the 1. Long-Range Reconnaissance Group. No more units were mobilized, as there was a dearth of airfields in southern Hungary.

Although no hostilities had been declared as yet, following the pro-Axis putsch in Belgrade, the Yugoslavian Air Force engaged in a series of violations of Hungarian air space. The Royal Hungarian Air Force flew its sortie in World War II when Yugoslavian reconnaissance aircraft flew over Lake Balaton on 6.04.1941, followed again on 7.04.1941 by aircraft which bombed railway stations and airfields at Szeged, Pécs, Kiskunhalas, Siklós, Villány, Zalaegerszeg, Körmend, and Nagykanizsa, causing mainly civilian casualties. Nine Yugoslavian Blenheim S.M.79 bombers were brought down by German and Hungarian air defenses and German fighters.

To meet the threat, the 1./II Fighter Group was relocated from Mátyásföld to Szeged, and the 2./II Fighter Group was relocated from Kolozsvár to Kecskemét. The 1./3. Fighter Squadron operated independently. The 4. Bomber Regiment was dispersed in and around Tápiószentmárton. These relocations had the dual benefit of protecting Hungary and of preparing for the upcoming conflict.

On 8.04.1941, two more Yugoslavian aircraft were claimed.

On 11.04.1941, in concert with German forces, Hungary attacked Yugoslavia. During this short campaign no aerial opposition was encountered and the Hungarian Air Force suffered no combat casualties.

The 1. Fighter Regiment flew a number of sorties, and the 1. Long-Range Reconnaissance Group performed photographic missions.

The 1. Independent Parachute Transport Squadron (with five Savoia-Marchetti SM 75 trimotor transports taken over from MALÉRT), also participated. It was the paratroopers first combat mission. The commanding officer of the 1st Parachute Battalion lost his life when one of the Savoia-Marchetti transports crashed after takeoff from Veszprém airfield on 12.04.1941 owing to hydraulic system malfunction. Major Arpád Bertalan stayed put until his men managed to get out of the burning plane. While trying to save equipment and ammunition, he and the pilot, and 22 men were killed in the explosion.

The remaining three aircraft participated in the successful parachute operation. The remaining paratroopers (3 officers and 57 men) were dropped at the evening at Ujverbász, some 30 kilometers from the bridges at Szenttámás. After a night march to the target, and after some fighting, the bridges were captured, enabling the passage of the Mobile Corps the next day.

Fighting ceased on 13.04.1941. The losses were two Cr-32, two Cr-42, one WM-21, and one S.M. 75, as well as two Cr-32 and one Cr-42 damaged.

Preparations for War

On 27.06.1941, the authorized strength of the air force was 8 fighter squadrons with 96 aircraft, 10 bomber squadrons with 120 aircraft, 11 short-range reconnaissance squadrons with 88 aircraft, 2 long-range reconnaissance squadrons with 24 aircraft, and 1 transport squadron with six aircraft. In fact, the inventory comprised 162 fighters of which more than half were Cr-32s supposedly already relegated to the advanced fighter training role, 70 bombers of which only 56 were serviceable, 123 short-range reconnaissance aircraft and 13 long-range reconnaissance aircraft.

In addition the air force possessed 182 trainers, liaison, courier, and other second-line aircraft.

The bomber arm had initially consisted of two bomber regiments (with a total of 10 squadrons). However, several of these squadrons possessed only nominal strengths and serviceability was low because of ageing equipment. The 3. Bomber Regiment (3. Bombázó Ezred) was dissolved on 1.06.1941, the 3.I and 3/II becoming the 4/I and 4/II, respectively. The 4. Bomber Regiment was stationed at Debrecen, its 4/III Group (ex-4/I) having just converted to the Ca-35bis. The 4./IV Group (ex-4/II) was still equipped with Ju 86K-2s.

CHAPTER 14

THE ROYAL HUNGARIAN AIR FORCE

The ROYAL HUNGARIAN AIR FORCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Time Order of Battle</th>
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<tr>
<td>(10.04.1941)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. Fighter Regiment [Budapest]

1/1 Fighter Group [Szolnok]
- 1/1 Squadron (9+3 He 46)
- 1/2 Squadron (9+3 He 46)

1/II Fighter Group [Mátyásföld]
- 1/3 Squadron (9+3 Cr-32)
- 1/4 Squadron (9+3 Cr-32)

2. Fighter Regiment [Nyíregyháza]

2/1 Fighter Group [Nyíregyháza]
- 2/1 Squadron (9+3 Cr-32)
- 2/2 Squadron (9+3 Cr-32)

2/II Fighter Group [Kolozsvár]
- 2/3 Squadron (9+3 Ju 86K-2)
- 2/4 Squadron (9+3 Ju 42)

3. Bomber Regiment [Szeged]

3/1 Bomber Group (Budapest)
- 3/1 Squadron (9+3 Ju 86K-2)
- 3/2 Squadron (9+3 Ju 86K-2)
- 3/3 Squadron (9+3 Ju 86K-2)

3/II Bomber Group [Pápa]
- 3/4 Squadron (9+3 Ju 86K-2)
- 3/5 Squadron (9+3 Ju 86K-2)

4. Bomber Regiment [Debrecen]

4/1 Bomber Group [Debrecen]
- 4/1 Squadron (9+3 Ca 135bis)
- 4/2 Squadron (9+3 Ca 135bis)
- 4/3 Squadron (9+3 Ca 135bis)

4/II Bomber Group [Debrecen]
- 4/4 Squadron (9+3 Ju 86K-2)
- 4/5 Squadron (9+3 Ju 86K-2)

5. Short-Range Reconnaissance Regiment [Budapest]

5./I Squadron (6+2 He 46) [Mátyásföld]
- 5./II Squadron (6+2 He 46) [Székelyfehérvar]
- 5./III Squadron (6+2 WM 21) [Kaposvár]
- 5./IV Squadron (6+2 He 46) [Pécès]
- 5./V Squadron (6+2 He 46) [Szeged]
- 5./VI Squadron (6+2 WM 21) [Debrecen]
- 5./VII Squadron (6+2 WM 21) [Miskolc]
- 5./VIII Squadron (6+2 WM 21) [Kassa]
- 5./IX Squadron (6+2 WM 21) [Kolozsvár]
- 5./X Squadron (6+2 WM 21) [Üngvár]
- 5./XI Squadron (6+2 WM 21) [Szőlő]

1. Long-Range Reconnaissance Group [Budapest]

1/1 Squadron (9+3 He 170A) [Pápa]
- 1/2 Squadron (9+3 He 170A)

1. Parachute Transport Squadron [6 SM 75]
- [Pápa]
The fighter units, equipped with Cr-32 and Cr-42 and scheduled to participate in the upcoming operations were deployed at operational fields in the vicinity of the Hungarian-Soviet border some days before war was declared, as follows:

1./1 and 1/2. at Felsőábrány,
1/3. and 1/4. at Mátyásföld,
2/1. and 2/2. at Nyiregháza
2/1. Héja Flight at Szolnok
2/3. at Bustyaháza,
2/4. at Miskolc.

The 1941 Soviet Campaign

Hungary officially declared war on the Soviet Union on 27.06.1941. For the Hungarian Air Force the war against the Soviet Union actually started on the day before hostilities were officially declared, when, on 26.06.1941, the 1./1 Long-Range Reconnaissance Squadron performed its first operational mission over Soviet territory. Its aircraft took off from Budaörs and refuelled enroute at Ungvár in both directions. By committing itself to combat, the Hungarian Air Force was taking a calculated risk. Although well trained and highly motivated, it was numerically weak and, compared to world power standards, its equipment was obsolescent. During the first few months of the conflict, the Hungarian Air Force was fortunate to encounter little effective aerial opposition.

The 2. Fighter Regiment, was in process of converting to the Re 2000, which the Hungarians dubbed Héja (Hawk) I, some 50 fighters of this type having reached Hungary from Italy. The 2./1 Squadron was the first to complete conversion to the Re 2000, followed closely by the 2./3 and 2./4 Squadrons. As the new fighter still had to be tested under combat and operational conditions, a special Héja Flight was formed with personnel from the 2./1 Squadron with six Re 2000s. It was attached to the 1. Hungarian Air Force Field Brigade, which was sent into the Soviet Union in July 1941 to provide the Hungarian Mobile Corps with air support.

The 1./1 and 1/2 Fighter Squadrons equipped with Cr-32 performed their first sorties on the first official day of hostilities.

During the opening weeks of the fighting the 4./III Bomber Group attacked targets across the Carpathians based out of Debrecen. Relatively few missions were flown. In August a detachment of six Ca-135bis bombers from the 4./IV Group and a squadron from the 4./IV Group were attached to the 1. Hungarian Air Force Field Brigade in the field with the Mobile Corps in the Soviet Union.

The 1. Long-Range Reconnaissance Group continued the operations initiated on 26.06.1941 from Budaörs, two squadrons flying 20 – 25 reconnaissance missions in the Sambor – Gorodok – Lvov – Brody –
The squadrons had to land at Ungvár for refuelling during both outward and return flights, as the He 170 had insufficient range for its task, and at least one aircraft was lost as a result of a fuel shortage. Furthermore, the He 170 possessed insufficient defensive armament, and the Group’s first casualty resulting from enemy action was suffered on 1.07.1941 when an He 170 was shot down by three Soviet fighters in the Kamenets-Podolsk sector. Only a few more missions were flown before the He 170 was taken off operations.

Prior to the commencement of hostilities nine short-range reconnaissance squadrons (1. – IX.) had been attached to a Military District, their numerical designations corresponding to those of the Corps, (I. Squadron to I Corps, etc.), to which they were assigned.

Two further units (the X. and XI. Short Range Reconnaissance Squadrons, equipped with WM 21s) were attached to the Mobile Corps, performing liaison, courier, reconnaissance and strafing missions in the border areas from the first days of the fighting.

All eleven short range squadrons were nominally – at least administratively – under the command of the Headquarters, 5. Short-Range Reconnaissance Regiment, but this headquarters was disbanded on 1.11.1941. The independent squadrons were amalgamated to form two groups. The 3. Short-Range Reconnaissance Group (comprising two squadrons, 3./I and 3./2) at Kecskemét, and the 4. Short-Range Reconnaissance Group at Ungvár, which was an operational training unit (with one active and one training squadron), as well as a replacement pool for the operational squadrons.

On 29.06.1941, the 2/3. Fighter Squadron shot down 3 of 7 Soviet Tupolev SB-2 bombers which were attacking the rail-road station at Csap.

The first days of fighting between Hungarian and Soviet forces the Cr-32s of the 1./1 and 1./2 Squadrons flew offensive fighter sweeps, but no aerial opposition was encountered, and the Cr-32s confined themselves to strafing targets of opportunity and harassing the retreating Soviet forces.

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On 1.07.1941, the 1./1 Group performed its first escort mission, escorting a bomber formation in an attack on the Mikuliczyn – Stanislav sector. Soviet fighters were rarely seen, and only two Cr-32s were lost in combat (one when its pilot rammed an I-16 after exhausting his ammunition). Nevertheless attrition was heavy, including three aircraft lost in adverse weather, and after three weeks the 1./1 Group was withdrawn, the Cr-32 being relegated to training.

The 1. Hungarian Air Force Field Brigade Headquarters (commanded by Colonel Béla Orosz) was formed to command the flying units that were to accompany the Hungarian Mobile Corps in its advanced into Soviet territory.

It comprised the Cr-42s of the 1./3 and 1./4 Squadrons, the Re 2000s of the 2./1 Squadron Héja Flight, one Ju 86K-2 detachment from the 4./IV Group, a detachment of six Ca-135s from the 4./III Group, and the I. and III. Short-Range Reconnaissance Squadrions with He 46s and WM 21s respectively. The units moved from airstrip to airstrip in the wake of the ground forces, although it soon became apparent that Hungarian Air Force equipment was not up to the task.

On 13.07.1941, the 1st Air Force Field Brigade’s units began to move across the Carpathian Mountains to airfields in Galicia.

The 1./3 Squadron distinguished itself on 7.08.1941 when its Cr-42s claimed seven “kills” and one “probable” without loss over the Saporoshe bridgehead on the Dnieper River.

On this same day, the first Re 2000 of the 1/2. Fighter Squadron’s Héja Flight from Szolnok airfield began to arrive at the front.

On 12.08.1941, the Ca-135bis bombers of the 4./III Group detachment performed a highly successful attack on the bridge spanning the River Bug at Nikolayev, cutting off 60,000 Soviet troops. On this mission the bombers were escorted by the Cr-42s of 1./3 Squadron and the Re 2000s of the Héja Flight, the fighters claiming a further seven “kills” for the loss of one of their number.

On 28.081941, Colonel Orosz was relieved by Colonel Sándor Gyíressy as commander of the 1st Air Force Field Brigade.

The 1. Hungarian Air Force Field Brigade flew many missions (1./3 Squadron alone flying some 300 sorties). Actual losses in combat were low. During its stay in Russia, the 1. Hungarian Air Force Field Brigade lost eight planes. It shot down 39 enemy aircraft. (The antiaircraft troops accounted for another 43).

The 1. Short-Range Recon. Squadron returned to Mátyásföld on 6.10.1941.

The Heja Flight returned to Hungary on 20.10.1941.

The rest of the 1. Air Force Field Brigade returned to Hungary on 26.11.1941.

During its four months in action in the Soviet Union, 1. Air Force Field Brigade’s accomplishments included 1454 sorties (entailing 2192 flying hours), 217 tons of bombs dropped, 30 Soviet aircraft shot down.

On the negative side, the brigade suffered 17 men killed, 6 men missing, 28 men wounded. It lost 25 reconnaissance aircraft, 14 fighters, 11 bombers, 5 courier aircraft, and 1 transport, for a total of 56 aircraft. The losses of aircraft included some which crashed en route to an from Hungary while crossing the Carpathians, and 35 aircraft which sustained 20% to 90% damage.

An after action report dealing with the 1. Air Force Field Brigade’s four months of operations, concluded that almost all of the aircraft types being used by the Hungarian Air Force were not suitable for operations on the East Front.

The first experiences with the harsh Soviet winter amply demonstrated that the Hungarian aircraft tended to substantiate this conclusion.

In addition, the Hungarians gained little experience in the air war, as its tactical deployment under the Army, the lack of targets, the swift advance of the ground forces, and the deterioration of serviceability precluded its use as a regular air force.

When the aging Italian Cr-32 and Cr-42 fighters returned to Hungary they were relegated to the advanced fighter trainer role.

One major change as the result of the experience gained was the increase
from 9 to 12 operational aircraft per squadron.

From November 1941 until June 1942 no Hungarian air force units operated on the East Front.

The 1942/43 Soviet Campaign

The Hungarians decided that there was to be some sort of direct air cover for the Second Army, although this had not been required by the Germans. The 1st Air Force Group was formed on 15.03.42 to accompany the Second Hungarian Army on its mission to the East Front. It was commanded by Colonel (GSC) Sándor András.

As with the Second Army, the 1st Air Force Group was made up of components from all over Hungary. It remained under Hungarian Army command, the Hungarian Air Force still being considered a branch of the Army.

The first unit of the 1st Air Force Group to arrive at the East Front on 12.06.1942 was the 1st Long-Range Reconnaissance Group, with the 1./1. Long-Range Reconnaissance Squadron (two He 111P and one former Yugoslav Air Force Do 17K-2), having flown from Szolnok to Staryi Oskol. The squadron received a further five He 111P as well as three Do 215B-4 from the Germans at the front. Included in this contingent were personnel of the 1./3. Squadron, without aircraft, which had the mission of evaluating aircraft.

The 1st Air Force Group was redesignated as the 2. Hungarian Air Force Brigade on 21.06.42.

The move from Hungary proved to be a difficult one, with delays, and several aircraft lost enroute.

The 3./2. Short-Range Reconnaissance Squadron arrived on 22.06.1942, equipped with 12 He 46E-2, two of which were lost soon after following accidents. The 4./III. Bomber Group (with 7 Ca-135bis bombers) arrived on 24.06.1941 from Debrecen, followed a few days later by a further four aircraft, of which one Ca-135bis was lost on landing.

The 1./I. Fighter Group started arriving on 2.07.1941 with the 1/1. Fighter Squadron (9 Héja I). But two of their Re 2000 had to be left behind enroute at Kiev for repairs.

The 2./I. arrived on 30.07.1942 equipped with 11 Héja I and 2 Bü 131. One Re 2000 had been lost in Hungary upon take off.

The logistics and supply units were:

The 1st Air Transport Squadron, equipped with three converted Ju 86K and one Fw 58.

During the weeks following their arrival on the Soviet Front the Re 2000s encountered relatively few Soviet aircraft and lost only one fighter in action. Unfortunately, at least two others were shot down, however, as a result of Luftwaffe VIII. Fliegerkorps and Luftflotte 4 fighters mistaking the radial-engine Héja I for the Soviet I-16, and as encounters with enemy fighters increased the serviceability rate of the Re 2000 decreased.

A further eleven Héja I and two Bü 131 were dispatched from Hungary as re
placements. One Re 2000 crashed upon landing.

During the months of July, August, and September, combat, accidents, and technical difficulties resulted in heavy losses for the Hungarian flying units.

The two Ca-135bis bomber squadrons, (4./6 and 4./7), flew operational sorties on the Soviet Front from June 1942 through September 1942.

The Ca-135 suffered technical problems, and only 3 of the remaining aircraft could operate. Five replacement aircraft were dispatched to the front, one which had to turn back because of a technical defect.

The technical state of the aged Hungarian Ca-135bis bombers owed much to their vintage. Spare parts were difficult to come by. The low level of operational readiness meant that a German unit equipped with Ju 88 could make five to seven sorties per day as compared to one or two of a Hungarian unit.

The Caproni bombers were sent back to Hungary in September 1942, (to be used as trainers), and the personnel of the two squadrons placed in Ju 87 and Ju 88 courses.

In September 1942, the 1. Long-Range Reconnaissance Group began conversion to the Ju 88D while remaining operational.

In October 1942, the 1./1 and 2./1. Fighter Squadrons combined to form a provisional squadron and converted to the Bf 109F-4. It then departed from Illovskoye for the Stalingrad area to the south, where much personnel as possible were evacuated by air.

Illovskoye airfield was defended for a week by lightly armed Légierö ground personnel who then, with the help of the Hungarian and German units, broke out through the encircling Soviet forces.

**An Independent Air Force**

The 2. Hungarian Air Force Brigade was removed from direct Hungarian Army control on 1.03.1943, and redesignated as the 102. Hungarian Air Force Brigade. At the same time, it was placed under tactical command of the German Luftflotte 4. All its units, confusingly, also began to receive the number 102 over a period of time. (The number 102 indicating that they were field units, Home Defense units initially retained their old numbers. Later they were renumbered with 101).

On 25.03.1943, Colonel (GSC) Sándor Illly relieved Colonel Fráter as commander of the 2nd Air Brigade.

The 1. Long-Range Reconnaissance Group had completed conversion to the Ju 88D in February 1943. The Group headquarters was deactivated, and the 1./1 Long Range Recon. Squadron was redesignated as the 102. Long Range Reconnaissance Squadron in September 1943. (The Group had been operating in squadron strength since June 1942, and the new designation was meant to reflect its actual status). In November 1943, it was down to its last aircraft and was consequently disbanded.

The 5./1 Squadron had meanwhile converted from the Bf 109F-4 to the Bf 109G-2, of which 59 planes had been transferred to the Air Force from German production.

By May 1943, the 5./2 Squadron had also completed working up on the Bf 109G-2 and had joined the 102. Hungarian Air Force Brigade. The 5./1 Fighter Group continued operations on the East Front during 1943. Engaged primarily on escort, fighter-bomber and strafing missions, the Group claiming some 70 “kills” during this period.

The 5./1 Fighter Group was recalled to Hungary in November 1943 to become the 101. Independent Fighter Group there. The 5./2 Squadron remained behind and was redesignated 102. Independent Fighter Squadron.

Other units which also joined the 102. Hungarian Air Force Brigade.

The 3./1 Short-Range Reconnaissance Squadron, its WM 21 Sólyom replaced by Fw 189s, relieved the 3./2 Short Range Reconnaissance Squadron in March 1943, which returned to Hungary. The 3./1 Short-Range Reconnaissance Squadron played a particularly noteworthy role in the summer offensive around Kharkov. It flew reconnaissance and close-support missions continuously until March 1944.

The two squadrons of the 4./III Bomber Group had become the 102./1 Dive Bomber Squadron (102./1 equipped with Ju 87D-5s, and the 102./2 Fast Bomber Squadron equipped with ex-Luftwaffe Ju 88A-4s. The 102./1 Dive Bomber Squadron reached the Front in July 1943, performing more than 1,500 missions during nearly three months of operations. By October 1943, as only four aircrews remained, the unit was sent back to Hungary for a well-deserved rest and reconstruction. The Ju 88s of the 102./2 Fast Bomber Squadron flew 1,000 sorties before the end of 1943.

The German occupation of Hungary on 19.03.1944 did not affect the Hungarian Air Force directly, nor its efforts to increase its strength and efficiency.

In March 1944 the 102. Independent Fighter Squadron was redesignated as 102./1 Squadron. It joined together with the 102./2 Fighter Squadron (the reconstituted 2./3 Squadron) to form the 102.
Independent Fighter Group. The new group was incorporated into the command of the Fliegerführer 102 Ungarn (Air Leader 102 Hungary), which controlled all Hungarian units at the front under the VIII. Fliegerkorps.

Command of the Hungarian Air Force was assumed by Major General István Bánfalvy after the occupation of Hungary by the Germans in March 1944. The German Luftwaffe took over control of all units of the Hungarian Air Force and the Air Defense Corps on 4.04.1944.

Up to this date, there had been no Luftwaffe units stationed in Hungary at the express wish of the Hungarians.

The Hungarians and the Western Allies had signed a secret treaty on 9.09.1943 on the deck of a British ship in neutral Turkish waters. Part of the agreement was that the Anglo-Americans would refrain from bombing Hungary, while the Hungarians would refrain from attacking Anglo-American aircraft. The German occupation, and the subsequent stationing of German aircraft on Hungarian airfields cancelled the treaty.

In April 1944 the United States Army Air Force began bombing Hungarian industrial targets. The only unit available to defend Hungarian air space was the 101. Fighter Group at Veszprém. It had the 101./1 (formerly 101. Independent Fighter Squadron) and 101./2 (formerly 5./1) Squadrons, both equipped with Bf 109G. A third squadron, (101./3), was hastily formed. The group was later expanded to six squadrons to become the 101. Fighter Regiment.

The 102. Independent Fighter Group with its two squadrons continued operations on its Soviet Front.

The Hungarian Air Force Experimental Institute formed a combat unit in 1944 with 18 Me 210Ca-1s. It was to become the 102./3 Fast Bomber Squadron, and by May the 102./2 Squadron, formerly equipped with the Ju 88, converted to Me 210Ca-1s at Klemensova, and came under German command. The 102./1 Fast Bomber Squadron was also equipped with Me 210Ca-1s, and, combined with the 102./2 Squadron, formed the 102. Fast Bomber Group. By early September 102./1 and 102./2 Fast Bomber Squadrons were based at Hajduböszörmény, but had lost virtually all aircraft in a USAAF bombing attack on 20.08.1944.

The Fight for Hungarian Air Space

The “golden hour” of the RHAF began with the defence of Hungary’s air space. It should be noted that, of all the Axis allies, only Hungary put up a serious air defence.

The 101. Night Fighter Squadron was activated at Ungvár on 27.05.44 with Me 210Cs and six Bf 110Gs on loan from the Luftwaffe. It operated under the VIII. Fliegerkorps. Several references have been found indicating that this squadron might also have been equipped with Go 145’s.

In June 1944 the 102. Dive Bomber Group, restored to operational strength, was returned to the fray and was attached to the Luftflotte 4. (Known to the Luftwaffe as the 1. and 2. ungarische Stuka-Staffeln). Operating from Guniow, Sarosüatak, and then Veszprém, its squadrons were – apart from Rudel’s III/SG 2 – the last units to fly the Ju 87 on the Eastern Front. It was re-equipped with Fw 190Fs and returned to operational status in September 1944 as the 101. Assault Bomber Group, operating from Podiendik, Böegönd, and later Oels, still under Luftflotte 4 command. (Known as the 1. and 2. ungarische Schlachtstaffeln).

After the disaster at Jassy and the Rumanian capitulation in August 1944, the German I. Fliegerkorps was withdrawn from Rumania to eastern Hungary. With the exception of the fighter squadrons assigned to the Fliegerführer 102 Ungarn, all Légierő combat units in Hungary had come under the control of this formation.

It is interesting to note that there had been no German fighter units stationed in Hungary until the end of August 1944, and the Hungarian pilots carried the brunt of defending Hungarian air space alone against the overwhelming Allied air power.

The 102. Independent Fighter Group fell back on Munkács. The Fliegerführer 102 Ungarn in Hungary was also transferred to I. Fliegerkorps in October 1944. It was based at Felsőábrány, together with the resurrected 1. Independent Long-Range Reconnaissance Squadron and the 3./1 Short-Range Reconnaissance Squadron. In November 1944, the 3./1 Short-Range Reconnaissance Squadron operated from Gödöllő and then Tapolca.
101. Assault Bomber Group was based at Börgönd, the 102. Fast Bomber Group was at Várpalota, the 101. Fighter Regiment and the 1. Night Fighter Squadron were at Veszprém.

Final Battles

A new air defence structure was established in December 1944. All fighter units operating in Hungary, both those of the Légierő and the Luftwaffe, come under the Jagdabscschnittführer Ungarn (Fighter Command Hungary), which was established for this purpose. The command was subordinated to the 8. Jagddivision (8th Fighter Division) with headquarters in Vienna.

The 102. Independent Fighter Group was yet again redesignated, this time as the 101./JII Group of the 101. Fighter Regiment, with three squadrons, (101./7 ex 102./1, 101./8 ex 102./2, and 101./9 new). Command of the RHAF passed in October 1944 to Colonel E. Keks who, shortly afterwards was relieved by General Emil Juszty when the 102. RHAF Brigade was upgraded to a division-sized command.

The 102. RHAF Division, with the 101. Fighter Regiment, the 102. Fast Bomber Group, and the one surviving squadron of the 101. Assault Bomber Group, switched from interception to ground attack.

In February 1945 General Kálmán Ternegg became the last commanding officer of the Royal Hungarian Air Force.

In March 1945, when the last Hungarian territory – Western Transdanubia – fell to Soviet forces, the remaining elements of the Légierő crossed into Austria and continued operations from Austrian bases under the Luftflotte Reich.

Families belonging to RHAF personnel were more fortunate than those dependents of other branches of the armed forces. The RHAF units were somewhat better organized, and convoys were sent to the west filled with civilians who wanted to escape the Soviets. This, however, placed a additional burden on commanding officers, as they were now also responsible for hundreds of women and children of their men and other RHAF members. It is a tribute to them that almost all families under RHAF protection reached the safety of the British or American zones of occupation.

Between April 1944, when the Allies began bombing Hungary, and the end of the war in May 1945, according to official figures, the RHAF aircraft shot down 110 USAAF bombers, 56 USAAF fighters, and 218 Soviet fighters. The top Hungarian ace scored of 34 kills.

Although greatly outnumbered by the USAAF escorting fighters, the Hungarian pilots achieved impressive results and individual scores began to rise. But their losses, bearing in mind available resources, were heavy. For example, the combined losses of the 5/I. Fighter Group between May 1944 and May 1945 is estimated at about 80 men.

The end of hostilities found the remnants of the Légierő on airfields around Linz in Austria. When the surrender came, only the 101st Fighter-Bomber Group and the 102nd Fighter Regiment, with three squadrons, (101./III Group of the 101. Fighter Regiment, the 102. Fast Bomber Group, and the one surviving squadron of the 101. Assault Bomber Group,) were at Veszprém.

Hungarian Aircraft Production during World War II

The aircraft situation of the RHAF by the end of 1941 had been extremely serious. Although all 70 Re 2000 fighters purchased from Italy had been delivered by the end of the year, this aircraft proved disappointing in several respects. Its inadequate armament and the engine maintenance times were considered serious shortcomings. The latter shortcoming was to be alleviated with the new WM-Gnome-Rhône 14K-powered Héja II version, manufactured under licence by MÁVAG (Mágyar Allama Vaggon és Gépgyár, the Hungarian State Wagon and Engineering Factory), at Kőbánya, Budapest. Production was slow in starting because of shortages of machine tools and other equipment. In addition, when the Hungarian engineers designed an armoured seat for the pilot, it was found that it altered the center of gravity, necessitating further design changes. By the time MÁVAG began deliveries the fighter was already obsolete. MÁVAG also produced the Hirth HM 50A-2 engines for the Levente (Youth) II primary trainer. First deliveries were scheduled for October 1943.

In June 1941 a German-Hungarian Mutual Armament Program had been signed. It provided that German Bf 109s and Me 210s were to be produced in Hungary. Hungarian-built aircraft were to be divided between Hungary and Germany on the basis of one-third for the former and two-thirds for the latter. MWG, (Magyar Wagon és Gépgyár, the Hungarian Wagon and Machine Factory), at Győr was assigned primary responsibility for manufacturing the Bf 109, and a factory known as the Duna Repülőgépgyár (Danube Aircraft Factory) was established at Horthyliget specifically to produce the Me 210. Manfréd Weiss manufactured the power plants for both types. The Győr factory began deliveries of the Bf 109G-2 in 1943, producing 92 that year, of which went 39 to the Luftwaffe and 53 to the Légierő. Late in 1943 it was decided to increase planned Hungarian Bf 109G output to 75 per month, but this target was never achieved. The Győr factory was also to produce the Focke-Wulf Fw 58B Weihe for training and liaison roles, deliveries starting late 1942.

The Duna Repülőgépgyár factory began delivery of the DB 605 powered Me 210Ca-1 and C-1 at the beginning of 1943, the first three being accepted by the Luftwaffe in April of that year. Production was slow, and the RHAF did not operate the type until early 1944 when a combat unit was formed by pilots of the Experimental Institute.

In the meantime, Hungary’s aircraft industry had begun to make a more significant contribution to the equipment of both the Légierő and the Luftwaffe. MÁVAG delivered 85 Héja II fighters in 1943, and continued production into 1944, delivering 105 for the fighter-train-

### RHAF Strengths During World War II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Long-Range Recon</th>
<th>Short-Range Recon</th>
<th>Fighter</th>
<th>Bomber</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Combat</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Liaison &amp; Experimental</th>
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<tr>
<td>1939/40</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>3,273</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>1940/41</td>
<td>472</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941/42</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>15,121</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>1942/43</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>20,082</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>1943/44</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>24,290</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>40</td>
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Aircraft of the RHAF acquired during WWII

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<tr>
<th>Type &amp; Model</th>
<th>Service</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reggiane Re 2000 Heja I</td>
<td>1941–43</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nardi I-N 315</td>
<td>1941–44</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Messerschmitt Bf 109F-4</td>
<td>1942–43</td>
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<td>MWG Fw 58B Weihe</td>
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<td>Heinkel He 111P-6</td>
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<td>Dornier Do 215B-4</td>
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<td>Fiat G 12</td>
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<td>Siebel Si 202</td>
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<td>Junkers Ju 52/3m</td>
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<td>Fieseler Fi 156 Storch</td>
<td>1942–45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junkers Ju 87B-2</td>
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<td>Junkers Ju 88A-4/R</td>
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<td>Junkers Ju 88D-1</td>
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<td><strong>MAVAG Re 2000 Heja II</strong></td>
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<td>Junkers Ju 87D-5</td>
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<td><strong>MAVAG Levente II</strong></td>
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<td>Messerschmitt Me 210G</td>
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<td><strong>MWG Bf 109G-14</strong></td>
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<td>FAG Bf 109G-10/1K1</td>
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<td>25*</td>
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<td><strong>PIRT Ju52/3m</strong></td>
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<td>Heinkel He 111H</td>
<td>1944–</td>
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<td>Focke-Wulf Fw 190F</td>
<td>1944–45</td>
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<td>Focke-Wulf Fw 189</td>
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<td>30*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Messerschmitt Bf 111G</td>
<td>1944–45</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Approximate

# On loan from Luftwaffe

Aircraft in Bold were produced in Hungary.

AIRCRAFT CODING SYSTEM

Hungarian Légierő aircraft had codes consisting of a letter and three numbers. These codes, together with the national insignia, appeared in the mid-thirties.

| V = vadász (fighter) |
| W = vezető (leader) |
| B = bomászó (bomber) |
| Z = zuhanó-bomászó (dive bomber) |
| F = felde By (reconnaissance) |
| S = szárító (transport) |
| I = iskola (school) |
| G = gyakorló (advanced trainer) |

The first number following the letter stood for the type of aircraft, while the other two numbers were the individual aircraft number. For example: V + 201

V = fighter,
2 = indicated Cr-42
01 = was the individual aircraft number

Fighters:
- Bf 109F-4 ..................... V + 001 to V + 067
- Cr-42 ........................ V + 100 to ?
- He 112 ........................ V + 301 to V + 304
- Bf 109G-2/-4 .................. V + 310 to V + 394
- Re 2000 ........................ V + 401 to ?
- MWG Fb 109G-4/-6  .......... V + 751 to V + 899
- FAG Bf 109G-14 .......... W + 301 to W + 101
- FAG Bf 109G-10/1K1 .... W + 201 to ?

[When the Cr-32s were taken out of front-line service, their “V” (fighter) prefix was changed to “G” (advanced trainer).]

Bomber:
- Ca-101 ....................... B + 101 to ?
- Ca-135 ....................... B + 501 to ?
- Ju 87 ................................ B + 601 to ?

[The Ju 87s had “B” letters until mid-1944, then changed to the “Z” letters.]

Dive Bomber:
- Me 210 ....................... Z + 001 to ?
- Fw 190 *........................ Z + 101 to ?
- Me 210 ....................... Z + 201 to ?
- Fw 190 F-8 .................. W + 301 to ?
- Ju 87 *........................ Z + 601 to ?
- Ju 88 *........................ Z + 901 to ?

[Although included in the “W” letter series, the Fw 190F-8 was a ground attack aircraft.]

Reconnaissance:
- Sólyom F-201 ............. F + 201 to ?
- Heinkel He 46 .......... F + 301 to ?
- He 70 ........................ F + 401 to ?
- He 111 ........................ F + 701 to ?
- Do 215 ....................... F + 801 to ?
- Ju 88 ......................... F + 901 to ?

Transports:
- Junkers Ju 52 ............ S + 201 to ?

Primary Trainers:
- Fiat Cr 30 .................. I + 101 to ?
- Bücker Bu 131 ............ I + 401 to ?
- Levente II ................. I + 501 to ?

Advanced trainers and liaison aircraft:
- Me 108 ........................ G + 301 to ?
- Arado Ar 96 .................. G + 401 to ?
- Nardi FN.305 ............. G + 601 to ?

[a Junkers Ju 86 was coded G + 213, probably because it no longer was used for front-line bomber duties]

* When used as ground attack planes

ing schools. With the German occupation of Hungary, production of the Me 210C was ended; 267 aircraft had been built, of which 108 had been supplied to the Luftwaffe. The Duna Repülőgépgyár joined the Győri Vagongyár and the Wiener-Neustadter-Flugzeugwerke in a Arbeitsgemeinschaft (production cooperative) concentrating solely on Bf 109G production. It was planned that the airframe Arbeitsgemeinschaft would produce 500 – 550 Bf 109G fighters per month, but Allied bombing frustrated this program. In the summer of 1944 Bf 109G production was moved to the cellars of the Köbánya Brewery. Manfréd Weiss formed another Arbeitsgemeinschaft with Daimler-Steyr-Puch for DB 605 engine production.

In October 1944, by which time the Bf 109G-6 had been replaced by the Bf 109G-14 on the Hungarian assembly line, the first deliveries were made from the Köbánya Brewery, production attaining one fighter per day, but in mid-December the factory was evacuated, bringing Hungarian Bf 109G production to an end. Of the 516 Bf 109G-2s, 59G-6s produced in Hungary, 559 had been supplied to the Luftwaffe. During 1943, arrangements had been to assemble and manufacture parts of the Junkers Ju 52/3m transport by the PIRT organization in Budapest. These were to be delivered to Hungary and Germany in the usual ratio. The first PIRT-assembled Ju 52/3m left the Budapest line in January 1944, but only 26 were completed by the time the program was halted, four of these being delivered to the Luftwaffe and the remainder going to the Légierő.

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CHAPTER 15

The Hungarian River Forces

The Second World War

During the first years of the Second World War, the Danube Flotilla was not mobilized, and remained at a peacetime strength of 109 officers, 302 NCO, and about 1,000 men.

During the 1941 Yugoslavian Campaign, the Danube Flotilla laid several mine fields in the Danube and Tisza Rivers and accompanied the Mobile Corps as far as Belgrade.

In May 1942, Szeged, Kecskeméét, Győr, Sopron, PM-1, and Tüzér were sent to Belgrade.

When the Germans occupied Hungary in March 1944, the River Forces had no more than 1,700 men. At the time the only armed resistance offered by the Honvéd was by units of the II Battle Group stationed at Újvidék.

The armored minelayer PAM was a new development during the Second World war. Though a total of 17 units was planned, only PAM-21 and PAM-22 were finished by Summer 1944.

In April 1944, the British Royal Air Force started mining the Danube River. They dropped several thousand magnetic and induction mines specially developed for use in rivers. River traffic subsequently suffered heavy losses.

Mine clearing activities were carried out mainly by the German Kriegsmarine, who used both ships and aircraft to clear the mine fields. As they cleared only the main ship channels, the Danube Flotilla was given the mission of clearing the banks of the river.

The mines the Allied dropped were highly sophisticated, and the job of clearing them required modern equipment and proper training. Modern equipment was initially not available, and the River Flotilla was not trained in mine clearing, and the Hungarians suffered some casualties. The mine-layer Hegyalja was lost in November 1944 while carrying out this dangerous work.

After this loss, the Germans finally gave the Hungarians several induction mine-clearing sets of equipment. This equipment was towed behind the AM boats. The River Flotilla then managed to clear 700 mines by the end of December 1944 without further losses to mines.

But vessels were lost for other causes. PM-2 was hit by a bomb in 1944, PM-3 was sunk by Russian tank fire while fleeing to the West. The gunboat Gödöllő was sunk by a bomb in late 1944.

Admiral Horthy had decided on 24.09.1944 to withdraw from the war, and had prepared a plan for this event. In connection with this plan, all units of the Danube Flotilla were gathered in the vicinity of Budapest to support Horthy in case of resistance. When Horthy proclaimed an armistice on 15.10.1944, the quick – and unexpected – reaction of the Germans prevented him from taking Hungary out of the war.

Rear Admiral Kálmán Hardy, Commander of the Danube Flotilla, and his staff were taken prisoner on 16.10.1944. He was replaced by Admiral Ödön Trunkwalter. Admiral Hardy was the only Hungarian officer who was sentenced to death by the Germans. He was sent to Mauthausen, where he was liberated by the US Army just prior to the sentence being carried out.

Various River Flotilla officers and men went over to the Allies, some of which even engaged in active fighting against the Germans.

The remainder of the Flotilla sailed west before the advancing Soviet Army. The unfinished PM-4 and PM-5 successfully fled to Germany in 1945. By May 1945, almost all the vessels of the Danube Flotilla had surrendered to the US Army.

Conclusion

The Danube Flotilla was made up of First World War equipment and applied a doctrine to match. Though slowly modernized, it was vulnerable to modern, more mobile tanks and aircraft. It never engaged in ship-to-ship combat, for which it was mainly trained. It’s main task during the Second World War was mine clearing, for which it was neither trained nor equipped. The Honvéd Ministry was aware of these shortcomings, and concentrated its efforts in building up the ground and air components of the Honvéd.

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The Honvéd River Forces in 1943
CHAPTER 16

Hungary and the Waffen-SS

Background

A great number of soldiers of Hungarian nationality served in the Waffen-SS. How these men came to be incorporated into the Waffen-SS and their odyssey through Europe in the last months of World War II will be examined in this chapter.

One part of these soldiers were those Hungarians who the Germans designated as Volksdeutscher, i.e. those Hungarians who the Germans considered of German descent, who were allowed to volunteer, (or later were recruited), for the Waffen-SS, with the reluctantly permission of the Hungarian Government.

Part were Hungarian fascist (Arrow Cross) members or pro-German Magyárs who voluntarily joined the SS.

Another part consisted of Hungarian civilians and soldiers who had volunteered in late 1944 in a surge of patriotic fervor for Hungarian military service, but found themselves in the Waffen-SS.

The recruiting during 1942 and 1943 by the Waffen-SS was accomplished in two massive drives, including those areas which had Volksdeutscher in Hungary. These recruiting efforts were based on agreements between Hungary and Germany dated 12.02.42 and 1.06.43. The two drives netted some 40,000 volunteers from the Bánát. About half of these men came from Bácska (in southern Hungary), which had been under Hungarian control since 1941.

The Germans were successful in acquiring volunteers for various reasons. The Volksdeutscher were a minority in Hungary, and many believed that service in the Royal Hungarian Army would in fact mean that the Hungarians would use them instead of Magyárs (Hungarians) at the front.

The benefits offered by the Waffen-SS to soldiers and their families was much better than that of the Royal Hungarian Army.

And last, but by no means least, many Volksdeutscher did not speak Hungarian very well, if at all, having their own German language schools and speaking only German at home.

The 12.02.42 agreement stipulated that these volunteers would lose their Hungarian citizenship, although the second agreement made on 1.06.43 changed this to read that this would only happen after the war was over.

Recruiting after March 1944 was based on an further agreement coerced by Hitler from a reluctant Horthy at Klessheim Castle in Germany at that fateful confrontation on 18.03.44 (the day before the German occupation of Hungary). The agreement defined German as “anyone who demonstrates, by means of his life style and his cultural characteristics, or anyone who voluntarily acknowledges Germanism.” It stipulated that all men who fulfilled this criteria, although of Hungarian nationality, and being of military age in April 1944, were ceded to the Waffen-SS. It was a warrant to take any man who lived in the Volksdeutscher areas. The definition also included all Volksdeutscher already in the Royal Hungarian Army, although the Honvéd Ministry reserved the right of deferment for those falling under this category.

A major change to the two previous agreements was that the Hungarians called up to the colors if the Waffen-SS would retain their Hungarian nationality, and all the benefits thereof. It also nullified the loss of citizenship previously stipulated for those recruited under the prior agreements.

In addition, Waffen-SS divisions could be raised on Hungarian territory, something that had been avoided by the Hungarians prior to that date.

On the other hand, all of the Hungarians recruited before April 1944 were supposed to have been volunteers, although some indications exist that the SS was not too particular as to how it got its “volunteers”. The recruiting methods used before this date at times were more reminiscent of the press gangs used by the British Navy in the Nineteenth Century. In one documented case, the SS men were ordered to comb through all the Volksdeutscher villages in their area and induct all men of military age into the Waffen-SS.

Although the agreement had been made in April 1944, and some men were called up, most were not inducted until the fall, probably so as not to hinder the harvest.

As mentioned above, the term Volksdeutscher covered all inhabitants of those regions. The population was by no means homogenous, and fell into three main categories, namely the “Browns” (those in the national socialist camp), the “Blacks”, (the conservation Christian faction), and the “Magyarophiles”, who favored integration into the Hungarian Republic and accepting its traditions, culture and language.

These differences came to the forefront during the recruiting by the SS in the Volksdeutscher areas. All inhabitants were subject to recruitment. Some factions volunteered for the Royal Hungarian Army to avoid the SS. But the Royal Hungarian Army was not allowed to accept these men. Hungarian police had orders to catch any men who escaped the net, and turn them over to the SS.

Units recruited in Hungary by the Waffen-SS

The 8. SS-Kavallerie-Division “Florian Geyer” recruited Volksdeutscher heavily in the Bánát and Serbia on several occasions in 1942 and 1943. The 8th SS-Cavalry Division included other nationalities as well, and was not considered by the SS as a Hungarian formation.

The 18. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division “Horst Wessel”, raised at Zagreb and Ceje (Yugoslavia) and later moving to Hungary, was also largely manned by Volksdeutscher, men recruited mainly in the Bánát in July 1944. The designation “Freiwilligen” (meaning Volunteer) was applied in October 1944, although most Hungarians were conscripts, not volunteers. It was also not considered by the SS as a Hungarian formation.

The 22. SS-Freiwilligen-Kavallerie-Division (ung.) “Maria Theresia” was raised in April 1944, and consisted largely of Hungarian Volksdeutscher. It was raised in Hungary, and by this time the men were usually not volunteers. As the “(ung)” abbreviation in the name of the 22. SS-Cavalry Division indicates, this division was considered by the SS as Hungarian, (ung = ungarisch in German).

Both SS cavalry divisions participated in the defense of Budapest under the IX. SS-Gebirgskorps, and were lost when the Hungarian capital fell in February 1945.

The 31. SS-Freiwilligen-Grenadier Division was raised on 4.10.44 in the Bácska, (confusingly, at first it had number 33.), was given the designation “Batschka”, although this was not used in official correspondence. As the name indicates, it was manned by Volksdeutscher from the Bácska.
It is estimated that between 80,000 and 100,000 soldiers of all the Volksdeutscher territories served in the Waffen-SS. Certain is that 42,000 were inducted up to 25.08.44. But the SS started recruiting in earnest from September 1944. Many Volksdeutscher, especially the older men, were used in SS-Polizei (Police) units.

**SS-Regiment “Ney”**

SS-Regimentsgruppe Ney (later SS-Regiment Ney, and sometimes mentioned as SS-Brigade Ney), was raised at Sőr, (near Veszprém, south of Budapest), by Károly Ney on 20.10.1944.

Dr. Károly Ney was a first lieutenant in the reserves, but more importantly, the 1st Secretary of the Kele-Arcvonal Közössége – KABSZ (Veterans of the East Front). The KABSZ was a very militant anti-Bolshevist organization, headed by former Prime Minister Béla Imredy. The KABSZ had been openly active in supporting the German overthrow of Admiral Horthy on 15.10.1944, and replacing him with the fascist Arrow Cross government.

From this organization Ney recruited his first 300 Hungarian volunteers. The weapons and equipment were all provided by the 22. SS-Freiwilligen-Kavallerie-Division (ung.) “Maria Theresia”. The uniforms issued were those of the Waffen-SS, but affixed with Hungarian insignia, (for example, with an “H” instead of the SS runes on the collars). Ranks were of the Waffen-SS. In accordance with an agreement between made personally between Ney and Reichsführer-SS Himmler, the men were formally inducted into the Waffen-SS, and swore allegiance to Adolf Hitler. The unit was tolerated by the Hungarian government, but it was never part of the Royal Hungarian Army.

Initially, the SS thought of using the volunteers as replacements for 22. SS-Freiwilligen-Kavallerie-Division. But by the end of the month the unit had grown to battalion size, and a different use was agreed upon.

The first 300 volunteers were sent to Sőr, (located 35 kilometers northwest of Székesfehérvár), where they were trained and formed into combat units during the next two months. By 24.12.1944, further volunteers had been found, and the unit, in the meantime having reached regimental size, had finished training. In now consisted of a headquarters company, two infantry battalions, and a supply company.

On 25.12.1944, SS-Regimentsgruppe Ney was assigned to the IV. SS-Panzerkorps, recently arrived in Hungary with the 3. SS and 5. SS-Panzer-Divisions.

The IV. SS-Panzerkorps was part of the first effort to relieve Budapest, (Opera-
In the meantime more volunteers has stepped forward, and Ney has managed to raise a 3rd infantry battalion by 1.01.1945. The total strength of the regiment had now reached 2000 men, of which 1870 were infantry and 130 were supply troops.

SS-Regimentsgruppe Ney was ordered south to Székesfehérvár for Operation Konrad III, which started on 12.01.1945. Having proved its worth, the SS-Regiment Ney was no longer split up and finally fought as intact regiment with all three battalions under its command in the third unsuccessful relief attempt of Budapest under the III. Panzerkorps.

On 21.01.1945 SS-Regimentsgruppe Ney was forced to withdraw westwards, back to Székesfehérvár. Losses over the next two days' fighting were 171 KIA, 300 WIA, and 100 MIA, while destroying 17 enemy tanks. Operation Konrad III was finally called off on 27.01.1945, having failed once again to relieve Budapest.

On 23.01.1945, Adolf Hitler granted the SS-Regimentsgruppe Ney the right to wear the traditional SS cuff-band with the inscription “SS-Regiment Ney” in honor of its performance, and as a reward for the unit’s continually fighting in the hottest spots and for demonstrating great bravery.

On 27.01.1945, SS-Regiment Ney was withdrawn from the line and placed in reserve, once again at Súr under the IV. SS-Panzerkorps (6. Armee), where it was given time to reform and rest until 5.03.1945.

On 1.03.1945 the unit captured 8 USAAF men, of which 3 were turned over to the Germans, but the other 5 men were executed on 3.03 or 13.03.1945, near the village of Súr.

Early March 1945, SS-Regiment Ney was training further men while recovering from the previous fighting. On 6.03.1945 it was able to send only one infantry battalion to participate in Operation Frühlingswachen (the attempt to retake Budapest), under command of the III. Panzerkorps. The rest of the unit stayed behind at Súr.

When this operation was called off on 26.03.1945, SS-Regiment Ney was already enroute to Austria (Ostmark). During the fighting retreat, the regiment was again split up into battalions. One infantry battalion each were assigned to the III. Panzerkorps, the I. SS-Panzerkorps, and the II. SS-Panzerkorps.

The regiment was again split up amongst different German divisions while retreating from Hungary into Austria. On 1.04.1945, the II and IV Battalions were with the III. Panzerkorps near Birkenfeld in Austria, then retreating further to Pollau and Lainitztal. By 9.04.1945, the IV Battalion was reassigned to the IV. SS-Panzerkorps, and was located near St. Michael.

On 21.04.1945, the III Battalion was transferred to the J. SS-Panzerkorps, by then located near Wiener Neustadt.

On 1.04.1945, the SS-Regiment Ney had grown to a strength of 4291 men, of which 3100 to be considered fighting strength. In addition, the regiment had issued it 2260 uniforms, 1018 rifles, 342 submachine guns, 31 heavy machine-guns, 21 antitank guns (75 mm), 34 mortars (81 mm), 5 flame-throwers, 55 wagons, and 141 horses, 9 cars, 11 trucks, and 11 armored cars.

SS-Regiment Ney fought until the very end and received high praise from the Germans. It finally surrendered to US forces near the Attersee Mountain in Austria on 9.05.1945.

SS-Regiment Ney was then reactivated on 30.05.1945, at the request of the German military leadership that the Soviet military steamroller would, sooner or later, occupy parts of eastern Hungary.

Plans consequently were made to relocate all the training facilities, the schools, and all the men of military age to those rearward areas deemed safe from the upcoming Soviet occupation. The installations were to be safe from enemy interference, providing replacements for existing units, as well as for the new ones. These new units were to be consist solely of volunteers, motivated to join the colors because the immanent danger looming to the very existence of Hungary.

At this time, (Horthy was still the Regent of Hungary), there was absolutely no discussion of specially indoctrinated units or even “SS” Divisions.

Based on these thoughts, propaganda measures were introduced to recruit more volunteers, aimed specifically at the youth of the country. Members of the military forces were also informed of this plan and encouraged to volunteer for the new divisions. Indeed, orders covering the recruitment of soldiers already serving in existing units indicated that those volunteers were to given all assistance and expedited to their new units.

The measures were extremely successful. Patriotic Hungarians volunteered in droves. More than 30,000 men were inducted. Missing, as usual for the Royal Hungarian Army, were weapons and equipment. By now, the Hungarian armaments industry had been virtually destroyed by the Allied air raids. Germany could not be relied on, as it had its own problems: Paris had fallen, the Soviets stood on the Wechsel; and, needless to say, their own forces had to be supplied.

The new divisions were supposed to be purely Royal Hungarian Army combat units. The first two of these were to be the Szent László Division and the Hunyadi Division.

The Szent László Division, was duly activated in Pápa. Although made up of existing units, it was augmented by numbers of these volunteers. The military situation did not allow the division to be raised properly, and elements of the Szent László Division were used piecemeal in November and December 1944 near Budapest, and later at Ipoly.

The Hungarian Honvéd Ministry realized that it was going to be impossible to carry through any further activations or a major reorganization of the Army on Hungarian territory.
The SS-Führungsamt had begun planning for the first purely Hungarian SS divisions 19.04.44, and had intended to raise the first Hungarian Waffen-SS division on 1.06.44. These plans were thwarted by the Hungarian government.

Things changed after count Ferenc Szálasi became Prime Minister on 16.10.44. He had asked the Germans – amongst other things – to help raise divisions in Germany for the Royal Hungarian Army. He furthermore wanted the Germans to indoctrinate these new Hungarian divisions in the Arrow Cross theories, much in the manner that the Germans indoctrinated their political soldiers, (i.e. Waffen-SS).

In October 1944, it was agreed between Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler and Prime Minister Szálasi to jointly train and equip Hungarian divisions.

A meeting regarding the new units of the Hungarian forces (both Royal Hungarian Army and Waffen-SS) in Germany was therefore held in Berlin from 20–24.11.44, and was convened to resolve the difficulties and to hammer out the final details. It was represented on the one side by Major General Feketehalmy-Czeydner, for the Honvéd Minister, and on the other side by General der Infanterie Keiner and SS-Obergruppenführer Jüttner, for the B.d.E. (Befehlshaber der Ersatzheer – Commander of the German Replacement Army).

The agreement reached – confirmed by premier Szálasi on 26.11.44 – provided for the raising of four Royal Hungarian Army divisions (“Kossuth”, “Klapka”, “Görgey”, “Petőfi”) and four Waffen-SS divisions of non-Volksdeutscher (“Huyadi”, “Hungaria”, “Gömbös”, and a fourth, unnamed). A Waffen-SS and a Royal Hungarian Army division were to be raised concurrently.

The agreement explicitly described the conditions under which the Waffen-SS would be allowed to recruit, raise, train, and employ the Hungarian volunteers. Training of the troops would be done on Hungarian soil if at all possible. The training of specialist, which might required the transfer of men outside the country to the corresponding schools, was allowed.

Hungarian recruits would be kept in purely Hungarian SS units and were not
to be transferred, piecemeal or otherwise, to non-Hungarian units.

The language of the command was to be Magyár (Hungarian), but it was stipulated that all unit commanders have knowledge of German.

Employment of the Hungarian SS divisions was to be within Hungarian territory and in defense of Hungary against the Soviet and Rumanian forces.

The Hungarians indicated that the divisions were not to be deployed against the Western Allies, although it was agreed that if Hungary were invaded by these forces, the Hungarian SS units could fight them.

To act as the Hungarian coordinator for the agreement, Major General Sándor Magyarosy of the Honvéd Ministry was dispatched to Berlin. The Germans in turn sent Colonel von Zawadsky to Budapest. Representing the SS interests was SS-Obergruppenführer Winkelman, who was charged with the responsibility of raising the four Hungarian Waffen-SS divisions. He was the highest SS officer in Hungary at the time, with the position of Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer in Ungarn.

Unfortunately right from the beginning there were disagreements and uncertainties. The Hungarian General Staff felt that the Germans were handling the affair in a manner not in accordance with the basic agreement as had been accepted by the Germans.

By late 1944 the Hungarian government had already sent some 20,000 Hungarian volunteers to Germany.

The training and the outfitting of the divisions was undertaken by the Waffen-SS. The SS, besides considering the Arrow Cross as an "affiliated" political organization, was the only military organization within the Axis still able to provide equipment and training at this stage of the war. The Germans therefore assumed the responsibility for most details, going as far as to provide some of the leaders.

A further reason that Hungary was unable to equip their forces was that most of the Hungarian production facilities, (that which had not been destroyed by the Allied bombing), had been moved to Germany.

Although there had been no combat units in Germany before 1945, some Hungarian military hospitals and training units had been moved to Germany to avoid the Soviet forces advancing into Hungary.

The divisions to be raised in Germany were planned along the lines of the German 1945 Volksgrenadier divisions. There were some deviations from the standard 1945 Volksgrenadier Division organization. The divisions had more medium mortars and more motor vehicles than their German equivalents. Each division also had an extra regiment for training and replacements, deemed necessary as the Hungarians would not have their own units for this available in Germany. Each division was to have an approximate strength of 10,000 men.

The planned organization was not followed to the letter. For example, the 1st artillery battalions only received two batteries, the engineer battalions only two companies and no bridging equipment, no anti-aircraft battalions were raised, instead one company each of light anti-aircraft guns was assigned to the anti-tank battalions, only one infantry battalion per division was bicycle equipped, (at least until April 1945 when one the "Fusilier" battalion per division was activated), etc.

On the other hand, an interpreter company and a ski battalion for each division was raised. However, the two ski battalions never reached their divisions, and fought independently.

As the Second Army had been dissolved. Lieutenant General Jenő Major, the commander of the Second Army, was appointed "Inspector of Hungarian Troops in Germany", and subordinated to the B.d.E. Unfortunately, the Germans appointed General der Infanterie Ludwig Wolff as their own Inspector of Hungarian formations at the same time, which severely cut into the powers of General Jenő Major. This double, and parallel, chain of command essentially made the position of the Hungarian soldiers in Germany very difficult.

The Germans continued to handle the Hungarian troops as their own formations. On 23.01.45, B.d.E. ordered (OKH/Obd/EHA/Stbl/I/3 Nr. 5599/45 geh.) that all Hungarian forces were to be used for the "Gneisenau" alarm forces. Hungarian troops were ordered to erect fortifications and to be otherwise employed as labor forces. They were also assigned to the damage control and technical services. The Hungarians protested this misuse of their forces as labor troops, reasoning that it severely hampered training.

Owing to this dual chain of command, the Germans were able to avoid raising any Royal Hungarian Army divisions and routinely circumvented Hungarian wishes. In some cases, Hungarian soldiers and officers were even being sent away from their units to German training institutes without notification to the Hungarians. Indeed, groups of Hungarian soldiers were being formed into regiment-sized groups and then being integrated into German divisions. Prime Minister Szálasi wrote to Hitler on 27.01.45 protesting this measure.

The original plan of the SS must have been to incorporate all the divisions into the Waffen-SS. It is impossible to reconstruct what documents were signed, or for that matter, what oral agreements were made between the Hungarians and Germans. It can be presumed that the men were simply assigned to the Reichsführer-SS, (the leader of all the SS and Waffen-SS), because the Waffen-SS was by now the only organization capable of raising and equipping a division at this time. What is certain is that various staffs for liaison and officers for political education, (for example a Sergeant named Dákány, a Volksdeutscher from Transylvania), were assigned to the divisions by the Reichsführer-SS.

25. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS "Hunyadi" (ungarische Nr. 1)

As far as the surviving records allow a reconstruction of the events, the personnel for the Hunyadi Division were gathered at Kórómed, Zalaegerszeg, and Zalszentgrot in Transdanubia, west of Lake Balaton, in the 2nd Military District. The division headquarters was activated at Zalaegerszeg on 2.11.44, with Major General József Grassly appointed as commander.

General Grassly was born on 31.12.1894. He had been commander of the 15th Brigade/Light Division from 1.08.1941 till 1.04.1942, and the commander of the 13th Light Division from 1.04.1942 till 15.11.1942. After November 1942 he had been in charge of training in the Honvéd Ministry and later in the Hungarian General Staff. He was one of the officers convicted in 1944 of the Újvidék massacre perpetrated in January 1942. The German occupation of Hungary prevented his incarceration. He had been retired from the Royal Hungarian Army at 50 years of age in April 1944.

Staff officers came from the Honvéd Ministry or the General Staff. The junior officers were volunteers, released from various Royal Hungarian Army formations. Obviously, none of these soldiers wore either SS uniforms or insignia at this time.

By 18.11.44, the division had 16,700 volunteers available. On 20.11.44, the Hunyadi Division started its transfer by
train to Germany. The formation of the Hunyadi Division proper was to take place in Silesia. The first men departed from Zalaegerszeg to the area encompassed by Magdeburg, Neuhammer, Strass, and Leipzig in Silesia. The train carried 4,000 people, including family members. Upon its arrival, the division was allocated barracks at Strass and a former POW camp at Neuhammer.

On 23.11.44 a second batch of 3,700 volunteers left from Zalaegerszeg, and about 1,000 from Vaszár. On 24.11.44 a further 4,000 departed from Tuerje, and on 27.11.44 another 2,700 men. The latter train was caught enroute by American fighter-bombers between the towns of Bierbaum and Hartberg. The Hungarians suffered 800 killed and 650 wounded.

By 30.11.44, the Hunyadi Division reported a strength of 19,777 men present in Germany.

On 5.12.44, 2,000 men left from Tuerje and another 2,000 from Vaszár. The latter group included most of the cadre, training officers, translators, etc.

General Grassy with his headquarters arrived in Strass on 15.12.44. On this date, the Hunyadi Division had already reported a strength of 22,017 men carried on the roles, including those wounded enroute, (which had been taken by train to hospitals in Szombathely and Graz after the attack), men on leave, special duty, etc., leaving an actual strength of 20,567 men present in Germany. This was more than twice the number of men needed to raise the modified “Volksgrenadier” divisions as originally planned.

With the arrival of the Hungarians at Neuhammer the camp was bustling at the seams with some 50,000 men.

Besides the arriving Hungarians, there was Estonian 20. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (estn. Nr. 1) in the process of being rebuilt after having been badly decimated, Russian Cossacks of the “Vlassov” Army, German schools and units, as well as 3000 P.O.W.’s with guards. Some 8,000 Hungarians were forced to resort to the “hot bunk” method, whereby one man was on duty while the other slept, sharing the same bed turn in turn. The weather was very cold, temperatures falling to −17°C on 17.12.44. The overcrowding problem was only slowly solved.

As there were no Hungarian clothing available, the first uniforms issued on 18.12.44 were those of the Waffen-SS, with the exception that the collar was supposed to have an “H” instead of the “SS” runes. In actual fact, not many men got Waffen-SS uniforms at all, and the troops wore a mixture of Hungarian, Waffen-SS, regular German Army uniforms, or even civilian clothes. Initial weapons consisted of 12 to 15 rifles, one or two light machine guns, and a few Panzerfaust (antitank weapons) per company for training purposes.

Only the 1st/61st Regiment was fully armed, as it consisted of 700 men of the redesignated (somewhat) combat-experienced SS-Kampfgruppe Deák. The rest of the 20,000+ Hungarians were issued 2000 rifles, 1000 pistols, 100 submachine guns, and 50 light machine guns. This allowed the arming of the men of the rest of the 61st Infantry Regiment, and one battalion of the 62nd Infantry Regiment. Heavy infantry weapons were still missing.

SS-Kampfgruppe Deák

The unit was raised by László Deák at Szeged on 15.08.1944. Deák was a former Royal Hungarian officer who had been “retired” in April 1942. He was involved in the 1942 Újvidék massacre and ultimately convicted for his crimes in January 1944. He had originally fled to Germany to escape imprisonment, but following the German occupation, he returned to Hungary under the protection of Reichsführer-SS. He was commissioned as a Standartenfuehrer (colonel) in the Waffen-SS, and promoted to SS-Oberführer in November 1944.

SS-Kampfgruppe Deák was a battalion-sized unit (consisting of a headquarters company with three rifle companies) manned by about 1000 extremely pro-German volunteers from the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie and youths from the Levente movement. The Honvéd Ministry gave its tacit approval. The unit was officially inducted into the Waffen-SS on 20.08.1944.

On 21.08.1944, the unit moved to Budapest, and over the next five days was issued arms and equipment by the IX. Waffen-Gebirgs-Korps der SS there. The unit received a mere 15 days training and was then transferred to Titel in the Bacska on 10.09.1944, and assigned to Heeresgruppe F. As soon as it arrived, it began a lighting withdrawal northwards. By 10.10.1944, it had reached Újvidék/Novi Sad.

On 28.10.1944, the SS-Kampfgruppe Deák was withdrawn from the line, (after having lost some 300 men), and sent via Kapovszár to Balatonszinyogyről (near Lake Balaton).

On 3.11.1944, it was ordered to join the newly forming Hunyadi Division. On 10.11.1944, the SS-Kampfgruppe Deák was renamed as the 1st Battalion/61st Infantry Regiment.

Part of, but not physically with the division in Neuhammer, Strass, and the surrounding area (and counted as part of its strength), were:

- the 25th Engineer Battalion, comprising about 700 men, located at Passau on the Danube in Lower Bavaria. The battalion was never to join up with the division, and was ultimately employed against the advancing Soviet forces near Oberhausen from late April 1945, where it suffered 350 KIA and 71 WIA during the last days of the war.
- the cadre for the 25th Artillery Regiment (500 men) at Prague
- the men of the 25th Antitank Battalion who had been sent for training at Koblenz. It was later formed into an infantry tank hunter unit and sent by train to Szegnyögör in Hungary, where in saw combat under the 9. SS-Panzer-Division “Hohenstaufen”. It was equipped with weapons and uniforms.

On 21.12.44, the 16th Border Guard Battalion arrived, albeit without weapons. They were accommodated at Bad-Saaraow.

SS-Kampfgruppe Deák

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment of the Hunyadi Division on 29.12.44</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>171 pistols</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2787 98K rifles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 carbines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 MP-44 assault rifles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 hand grenades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3000 Panzerfaust (antitank weapons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71 light machine guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 heavy machine guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 heavy 75mm antitank guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600 bicycles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 motorcycles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 cars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 trucks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The great majority of men still did not have weapons. The replacement and training regiment had virtually no weapons at all, although it was full of untrained men who were supposed to provide the replacements for the division.

On 30.12.44, the 25th Division had a paper strength of 22,670 and an actual strength of 20,567 men, of which only 10,000 had begun training owing to a scarcity of equipment. Even these men had to be trained in two shifts, one in the morning, and one in the afternoon. Taking into account the veterans, as well as
Chapter 16 Hungary and the Waffen-SS

26. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS "Hungaria" (ungarische Nr. 2)

The Hungaria Division was raised at Rajka, (in the northwestern corner of Hungary, 15 kilometers south of Bratislava), on 30.11.1944. The commander was Colonel Zoltán Pisky. Strength on 24.12.1944 was 8,100 men, including 2,511 former Royal Hungarian Army men and 5,589 draftees.

The men were moved by train via Vienne, Ostrava, Oppeln, and Breslau to the Neuhammer-Strass region in Silesia, where the division was also to be raised alongside the Hungyadi Division.

However, upon arrival the quarters assigned to the Hungaria Division in Hammerstein proved to be incapable of supporting all the Hungarian soldiers, and the men were sent 300 kilometers eastwards, to the area around Sieradzt (near Lodz) in Poland between 1. and 5.01.1945.

On 15.01.1945, the Hungarian had 16,761 men, of which 351 were officers, 1,270 NCOs, and 15,140 enlisted men. The uniform situation was catastrophic: only 2,601 men had Royal Hungarian uniforms, whereas 3,706 had Waffen-SS uniforms. More than 10,000 wore civilian clothing with arm bands to indicate that they were members of the military.

By 21.01.1945, the leading elements had reached Kalish. Here, the division split into two groups. The first group headed for Pleschen, commanded by Colonel Zoltán Pisky. The second group of the Hungaria Division was to march to Osowie. The first group encountered more Soviet armor enroute and the badly equipped Hungarians suffered severe losses. The Hungarians were finally surrounded, and surrendered to the Soviet Army who killed 170 Hungarians on the spot. The divisional commander, Colonel Zoltán Pisky failed to survive the retreat. Some remnants escaped the massacre and proceeded to Leszno, where they joined the second group on 25.01.1945.

On 31.01.1945, the division had reached Glogau on the Oder River, where they were entrained on 2.02.1945, and sent back to Neuhammer. The Hungaria Division had suffered 317 killed, and reported 2,253 missing. (Both known to have been taken as prisoners, as well as wounded left behind and captured.) Notwithstanding the ordeal, the division had been able to withdraw in some order to Strass. About 14,000 men managed to survive the march back.

When the Soviet advance threatened Strass, the division was also ordered to move to Grafenwöhr near Nürnberg in northern Bavaria on 9.02.1945.

In the meantime, an SS-Oberführer Berthold Maack named had arrived to take command of the division, much to the surprise of the Hungarians, who considered the highly-decorated Hungarian Colonel Gerő Temesvári as their commander. The situation was cleared up, and SS-Oberführer took command of the Estonian 20. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (estn. Nr. 1), who had recently lost their commander.

In March 1945, it appears that the elements of the Hunyadi and the Hungaria Divisions were amalgamated into one unit. At least both divisions were commanded as of 21.03.1945 by the same person from that time, namely József Grassý.

On 10.03.1945 the conglomerate Hungarian SS division had 5000 rifles, 100 light machine guns, 3000 Panzerfaust, 300 submachine guns, 50 medium mortars, and 11 light field howitzers.

The Honvéd Minister’s order of 8.04.45 regarding the gathering of Hungarian forces in Bavaria did not concern the two Waffen-SS Divisions.

On the contrary, they were ordered east. General Grassý reported to the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment of the Hungaria Division on 15.01.1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>721 pistols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>711 98mm rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>842 carbines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 38-1 Italian submachine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 hand grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 Panzerfaust (antitank weapons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 Panzerschreck (antitank weapons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 light machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 heavy machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 81mm mortars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 120mm mortars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 light 75mm infantry guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 heavy 75mm antitank guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 horses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600 bicycles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 motorcycles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 cars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 trucks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again many men did not have weapons.

In 1944 and 1945 the vehicles of the 500 SS-Kraftfahr-Kompanie (motor transport company) were turned over to the supply regiment, easing the motor vehicle situation to a certain extent. Training continued with the limited means available.

As the Soviet forces advanced into Silesia, the Hunyadi Division was forced to retreat south on foot to Grafenwöhr and Hipolstein (near Nürnberg in northern Bavaria) on 8.02.1945. The bulk of the division left Neuhammer for Nürnberg on foot on 9.02.1945.

During the time the 25th Division was stationed near Nürnberg, all the Hungarian soldiers were subjected to a blood test, and many of them were subsequently tattooed by SS. This was to have unpleasant consequences after the war.
Honvéd Minister on 12.04.45 that he had initiated his march with the 25th and 26th Hungarian Waffen-SS Divisions, including the 86th “Infantry” (Replacement and Training) Regiment. The divisional headquarters would be located at Wiener-Neustadt on the Danube.

The efforts to complete the raising of the conglomerate Hungarian/Hunyadi Division in Nürnberg could not be completed, and when the Soviet advance on this area towards the end of March 1945 threatened, the Hungarian/Hunyadi Division was ordered to move to Austria in April 1945.

On 13.04.1945 orders reached the division to proceed south. At the same time, a combat group of unspecified size was detached from the conglomerate division and deployed at Menin on the road to Brno in Czechoslovakia. It never returned to the division, and surrendered to the Soviet forces on 8.05.1945.

The Hungarians marched via Braunau to Vöcklabruck and Grünau in Upper Austria, preceding via Salzburg to Salzkammergut. Interestingly enough, the most of the German SS liaison officers disappeared bit by bit enroute.

**XVII. Waffen-Armee-Korps der SS**

The headquarters of the XVII. Waffen-Armee-Korps der SS had been raised at Altdorf (near Nürnberg) to command the two Hungarian SS divisions. It was commanded by Waffen-Obergruppenführer der SS Jenő Ruszkay (Ranczenberger), a former Hungarian officer. He was born on 1.01.1887, and was who had retired in 1940 after commanding the IV Corps. In 1944, he joined the Waffen-SS. He was also the Inspector General of Hungarian SS troops.

The existence of the corps and the date of its activation is not registered in the German postal records, and few Waffen-SS sources mention this corps at all.

The headquarters had a strength of about 200 men, comprising the headquarters detachment, as well as the interpreter, motorcycle, signal, and guard units. Soon after being activated, the corps headquarters had moved south to Burghausen. Owing the confused chain of command, not to speak of the rapidly deteriorating military situation, the corps never carried out any of its intended command functions, nor was it ever featured in any orders of battle. It did carry out one recorded action, however.

**The End**

On 2.05.45, the XVII. Waffen-Armee-Korps der SS offered the surrender of the Hungarian Waffen-SS units under its command to the U.S. Forces. Before the surrender arrangements could be completed, a US armored task force of Patton’s 3rd US Army engaged the 25th Division on 4.05.45 at Timelkam in Austria. The US task force lost several tanks. At this late stage in the war having no interest in further losses, withdrew after losing several tanks.

On 5.05.45, the surrender agreements were finalized, and about one-third of the 25th Division marched into captivity at Salzkammergut, (near the Attersee in Austria). The remainder of the Hungarian soldiers had intermingled with the Hungarian refugees. Many were rounded up in the following days.

Excluding the brief rear guard stand at Neuhammer and a token show of resistance to the US forces at Timelkam, the two Hungarian Waffen-SS divisions had made no significant contribution to the Axis war effort.

The Hungarians of the two divisions, numbering some 38,000 to 40,000 men, were treated by the Allies as regular Waffen-SS members, especially in light of their SS tattoos. Some Hungarian officers managed to escape to the English and French occupation zones, but were later returned to the Hungarian government, where they were tried by the new government, some receiving death sentences, while others were imprisoned for long periods. Brigadier General József Grassy was also turned over to the new Hungarian government, which sent him to Yugoslavia, where he was tried as a war criminal for the Újvidék massacre and subsequently executed.

***
Part III

The Royal Hungarian Army
Order of Battle
CHAPTER 17
Royal Hungarian Army High Commands
1920 – 1945

NOTES:
The rank indicated is the highest rank achieved by the officer in the indicated position.

The abbreviations stand for:
(GSC) General Staff Corps
(ESC) Engineer Staff Corps
Brig. Brigadier
Col. Colonel
Cpt. Captain
Gen. General
Lt. Lieutenant
Maj. Major
(Ret.) Retired

MILITARY CHANCELLERY
[Magyarország Kormányzójának Katonai Irodája]

Chief of the Military Chancellery
1922 – 28.06.28 Brig.Gen. Gusztáv Denk
28.06.28 – 16.01.35 Brig.Gen. József Somkuthy
16.01.35 – 24.05.38 Brig.Gen. Lajos Keresztes-Fischer
24.05.38 – 29.09.38 Brig.Gen. Gusztáv Jány

Adjudant-General and Chief of the Military Chancellery
29.09.38 – 11.11.42 Lt.Gen. Lajos Keresztes-Fischer
29.07.44 – 15.10.44 Maj.Gen. Antal Vattay

Deputy Chief of the Military Chancellery
20 – 14.01.25 Col. (GSC) Lajos Keresztes-Fischer
14.01.25 – 1.02.26 Col. (GSC) Sándor Magyarossy
1.02.26 – 1928 Col. (GSC) Jenő Major
1928 – 1930 Lt. Col. (GSC) Béla Miklós
1930 – 1935 Col. (GSC) Andor Vásárhelyi
1936 – 24.12.40 Col. (GSC) Antal Vattay
24.12.40 – 05.42 Col. (GSC) Elemér Mészöly
Assigned: Lt. Col. (GSC) Vilmos Czech

ROYAL HUNGARIAN ARMY SUPREME COMMAND
[M. Kir. Honvédéség Főparancsnoka]
(until 1.05.1940)

Commander-In-Chief
02.21 – 28.10.25 Gen. Pál Nagy
28.10.25 – 5.03.30 Gen. Kocsárd Janky
5.03.30 – 16.01.35 Gen. Kamilló Kárpáthy
16.01.35 – 1936 Gen. István Shvoy
1936 – 1.03.40 Gen. Hugó Sónyi

Deputy Commander-In-Chief
1921 – 1.05.25 Gen. Károly Soós
1.05.25 – 1928 Gen. György Ludwig
1928 – 1931 Gen. Otó Ferjentsik
1931 – 16.01.35 Gen. Waldemár Vogt
1935 – 1936 Gen. Arpad Sipos
1936 – 7.05.38 Gen. Richard Raipaich
7.05.38 – 1.03.40 Gen. Gusztáv Denk

Adjudant
1921 – 1925 Lt. Col. (GSC) Jozsef Somkuthy
1925 – 1930 Col. (GSC) Vilmos Nagy
1930 – 1935 Lt. Col. (GSC) Zoltán Decléva
1935 – 1936 Col. (GSC) Ferenc Szombathelyi

HONVÉD MINISTER
Adjudant
Administrative office
Staff Group (Chancellery)
Section A Regulations and bulletins
Section B Military attaches (to 1940)
Records Section
Chaplains Section

DEPUTY HONVÉD MINISTER
Section 13 Judge Advocate General
Group VII Legal and Civilian Affairs
Section 14. Contracts and patents
Section 15. Legislation and agreements
Section 16. Citizenship and passports
Section 18. Conscription Board
Civilian Section
Military Auditor Office
Honved Welfare Fund
Royal Hungarian Topographical Institute
Royal Hungarian Military Archives
Royal Hungarian Army Museum

BUREAU OF THE GROUND FORCES
Group I Organization and Mobilization
Section 1 Ja Peacetime organization
Section 1/b Wartime organization
Section 1/0m Mobilization
Section 1/ny Replacements
Section 9 Schools and Training
Section 10. Enlisted personnel
Section 19. Border Guards
Section 21. Internes and prisoners-of-war

Group II Personnel
Section 4. Retirees, widows, orphans, etc.
Section 8/a General officer assignments
Section 8/b Officer assignments
Section 8/ny Officer records
Section 20. Royal Gendarmerie

Group VI Civil Defense
Section 35. Conscription
Section 36. Air defense

BUREAU OF THE AIR FORCE
Section 30. Legal affairs and administration

Group IV Organization and Training
Section 37. Organization
Section 38. Personnel
Section 5/rep Training
Section 7/rep Employment and operations

Group V Procurement and Administration
Staff Section General administration
Section 31. Technology
Section 32/a Flying equipment
Section 32/b Arms, equipment, and vehicles
Section 32/ue Medical services
Section 33. Airfields and installations
Section 34. Budget

BUREAU OF SUPPLY
Group III Procurement and Administration
Section 2/é Rations
Section 2/é/1 Pay
Section 2/é/1 Clothing
Section 3/a Weapons and optics
Section 3/b Motor vehicles and fuel
Section 3/c Ammunition and explosives
Section 5. Animals and vehicles
Section 6/a Budget
Section 11. Housing
Section 12. Medical

Group IX Armaments and Defense Industry
Section 3/v Government owned industry
Section 17/a Mobilization and air defense
Section 17/b Manufacture of war material
Section 17/c Procurement of raw materials
Section 17/v Aviation industry

Chief of the Administrative Office
Chief of the Engineer Corps
Chief of Remants

Inspection General of the Armaments Industry
Industrial Materials Office

BUREAU OF THE MILITARY LABOR FORCES
Group XI Military Labour Forces – Military Sector
Section 41. Administration and liaison
Section 42. Organization and training
Section 43. Operations
Section 44. Purchasing and budget

Group XII Military Labour Forces – Civilian Sector
Section 45. Work force mobilization
Section 46. Women’s Work Corps

BUREAU OF PRE-MILITARY TRAINING
Group VIII Commander of the Levante
Section 40/é Organization
Section 40/é/2 Training, etc.
National Headquarters of the Levante
ROYAL HUNGARIAN HONVÉD MINISTRY

Honvéd Minister

10.10.29 – 2.09.36 Gyula Gombos
(as of 1.10.32 also Minister President)
10.10.29 – 6.10.36 József Somkuthy
12.10.36 – 13.05.38 Vilmos Röder
14.05.36 – 15.11.38 Jenő Rázi
15.11.38 – 24.02.42 Károly Bartha
24.09.42 – 12.06.43 Vilmos Nagy
12.06.43 – 15.10.44 Lajos Csata
16.10.44 – 1.05.45 Károly Bereghy (also Commander-In-Chief)

Secretary of State / Deputy Honvéd Minister

1927 – 10.10.29 Maj. (GSC) (Ret.) Gyula Gömbös
10.10.29 – 13.05.38 Maj. Gen. Sándor Algya-Papp
13.05.38 – 15.11.38 Maj. Gen. Károly Bartha
15.11.38 – 1939 Maj. Gen. Miksa Nagyszombathy
15.09.41 – 1.11.42 Lt. Gen. András Littay
1.11.42 – 15.10.44 Lt. Gen. Imre Ruszkiczay-Rüdiger

Adjutant

1939 – 1940 Col. (GSC) Frigyes Gyimesy
1940 – 1941 Col. (GSC) Jenö Sárkány
1941 – 1942 Lt. Col. (GSC) Sándor Makray
1942 – 1943 Col. (GSC) Kálmán Kéry
1943 – 1944 Col. (GSC) Otto Hatz

Deputy: Pál Hadváry (Ground Forces) and Kázmér Jávorszky (Air Force)

Administrative Office

1939 – 1940 Councillor Dr. Ödön Zamárdy
1940 – 1944 Councillor Dr. István Oláh

Staff Group (Chancellory)

Group Chief:

1939 – 1940 Col. (GSC) Imre Németh
1940 – 1941 Col. (GSC) Béla Lengyel
1941 – 1942 Brig. Gen. Gábor Faraghó
1943 – 1944 Col. (GSC) Zoltán Zsedényi
1944 – 1945 Col. (GSC) Kálmán Kéry

Deputy:

1940 – 1941 Col. (GSC) Béla Aggteleky
1943 – 1944 Col. (GSC) Imre Pogány
1944 – 1945 Col. (GSC) Gyula Kalkó

Section A (Regulations and Bulletins)

(until 1941)

Section Chief:

1939 – 1940 Col. (GSC) Alfréd Bántay
1940 – 1941 Lt. Col. (GSC) Mihály Perlaky
1941 – 1942 Col. (GSC) Zoltán Zsedényi

Section B (Military Attache Group)

(Attached to Section 2 of the Hungarian General Staff as of 1941)

Section Chief:

1939 – 1940 Col. (GSC) Rezső Andorka
1940 – 1941 Lt. Col. (GSC) Gyula Keresztes
1941 – 1942 Col. (GSC) Aladár Csata
1942 – 1943 Col. (GSC) Imre Pogány
1943 – 1944 Col. (GSC) Kálmán Bartalits

Army Chaplains Section

Catholic Bishop of the Honvéd:

1920 – 1926 István P. Zadravecz
1927 – 1928 József Halász
1929 – 1945 Dr. István Hász

Protestant Chaplain of the Honvéd:

1945 Dr. Elemer Soltész

MILITARY-BUREAU

(1.03.41. Becomes Bureau of the Ground Forces)

Group I and Group III assigned to the Military Bureau until 1.03.41.

Chief of Bureau:

1.10.42 – 1.11.43 Maj. Gen. István Náday
1.11.43 – 10.3.44 Maj. Gen. György Rakovszky
1.05.44 – 16.10.44 position not filled
18.12.44 – 1.05.45 Maj. Gen. Miklós Nagyoszy

BUREAU OF THE GROUND FORCES

(as of 1.03.1941)

Chief of Bureau:

1.03.41 – 1.10.42 Lt. Gen. Szilárd Schindler
1.10.42 – 1.05.44 Maj. Gen. István Náday
1.11.43 – 1.03.44 Maj. Gen. György Rakovszky
1.05.44 – 16.10.44 position not filled
18.12.44 – 1.05.45 Maj. Gen. Miklós Nagyoszy

Group I

(Organization and Mobilization)

Group Chief:

1940 – 1.03.41 Maj. Gen. Szilárd Schindler
1.03.41 – 1.10.42 Maj. Gen. István Náday
1.10.42 – 1.03.43 Brig. Gen. Mihály Cseke
1.03.43 – 16.10.44 Brig. Gen. Miklós Nagyoszy

Deputy:

1943 – 1944 Col. (GSC) Agoston Gecsenyi

Section 1/a (Peace Time Organization)

Chief:

1939 – 1940 Col. (GSC) Béla Aggteleky
1940 – 1.05.44 Col. (GSC) Gyözö Jolsvay
1.05.44 – 15.10.44 Col. (GSC) Ferenc Makay-Hollósy
16.10.44 – 1945 Lt. Col. Endre Pesty

Attached General Staff Corps Officers:

1940 Cpt. (GSC) Endre Farkas
1942 – 1943 Cpt. (GSC) Béla Király
1942 – 1943 Cpt. (GSC) László Gerőberrky-Perjésy
– 1944 Cpt. (GSC) József Gergényi

Section 1/b (Wartime Organization)

Chief:

1939 – 1940 Col. (GSC) Béla Aggteleky
1940 – 1.05.44 Col. (GSC) Gyözö Jolsvay
1.05.44 – 15.10.44 Col. (GSC) Ferenc Makay-Hollósy
16.10.44 – 1945 Lt. Col. Endre Pesty

Attached General Staff Corps Officers:

1940 Cpt. (GSC) Endre Farkas
1942 – 1943 Cpt. (GSC) Béla Király
1942 – 1943 Cpt. (GSC) László Gerőberrky-Perjésy
– 1944 Cpt. (GSC) József Gergényi

Section 1/om (Mobilization)

Chief:

1942 – 1.10.43 Cpt. (GSC) Dénès Dobák
1.10.43 – 1944 Cpt. (GSC) Károly Chemez

Attached General Staff Corps Officers:

1.10.42 – 1.11.43 Cpt. (GSC) József Dobróssy

Section 1/ny (Replacements)

Chief:

1943 – 1944 Col. József Németh

Section 9 (Schools and Training)

Chief:

1942 – 1944 Col. (GSC) Ferenc Karlóczy

Section 10 (Enlisted Personnel)

Chief:

1939 – 1940 Col. Aladár Pontér
1940 – 1941 Col. Gyöző Maténa
1941 – 1942 Col. (GSC) Béla Lengyel
1943 – 1944 Col. (GSC) Lajos Vincze

Section 19 (Border Guards)

Chief:

1939 – 1940 Col. Antal Benda
1943 – 1945 Col. János Hatnay
Chapter 17 The Honvéd High Commands

ROYAL HUNGARIAN HONVÉD MINISTRY (cont.)

Section 21 (Internees and Prisoners of War)
Chief:
– 1943 Col. Zoltán Baló
1943 – 15.10.44 Col. (GSC) Lőránt Utassy

Group II
(Personnel)
Group Chief:
1941 – 1942 Col. (GSC) Ferenc Bardóczy
1943 – 1.03.44 Col. (GSC) Brig. Gen. Deszo Istóka
1.03.44 – 15.10.44 Col. (GSC) Sándor Szávay
16.10.44 – 1945 Col. (GSC) Dr. Mihály Bán

Section 22 (Retirees, Widows, Orphans, etc.)
Chief:
1943 – 1944 Col. István Soós

Section 8
(Until 1.03.41 under Group I, then split up into three sections)
Section 8/e (General Officer Attachments)
Chief:
1939 – 1.03.40 Col. (GSC) Jenő Major
1940 – 1941 Col. (GSC) Ference Bardóczy
1942 – 1943 Col. (GSC) Dr. Mihály Bán
1943 – 1944 Col. (GSC) László Csetkey
Deputy:
– 1944 Maj. (GSC) Károly Meggyes
1944 – 1945 Maj. (GSC) Endre Kalmár
Attached General Staff Corps Officers:
1942 – 1942 Cpt. (GSC) Ferenc Kovács
1942 – 1943 Cpt. (GSC) Antal Radnóczy
1943 – 1943 Cpt. (GSC) Andras Bak
1943 – 1945 Cpt. (GSC) Lajos Balikó

Section 8/b (Officer Attachments)
Chief:
1939 – 1941 Col. László Molnár
1942 – 1943 Col. Pál Szombathy
1943 – 1945 Col. Ernő Godányi

Section 8/ny (Officer Records)
Chief:
1939 – 1942 Col. Máthé
1942 – 1944 Col. János Tusa

Section 20 (Royal Gendarmerie)
(As of 1.03.41 under Group II)
Chief:
– 1942 Col. of the Gendarmerie Endre Temesvári
1943 – 1945 Col. of the Gendarmerie Ferenc Mátray

Group VI
(Civil Defense)
Group Chief:
1943 – 1944 Brig. Gen. Lajos Szurmay

Section 35 (Auslegung des Verteidigungsgesetzes 1939)
Chief:
1942 – 1944 Col. (GSC) Attila Selymesy

Section 36 (Luftverteidigung, Luftschutzdienst)
Chief:
1942 – 1944 Lt. Col. (ESC) Julián Borsány

Group X
(Casualty Administration)
until 1.03.40 Casualty Administration Section
from 1.03.40 until 1943 Section 22)
Group Chief:
1941 – 1942 Brig. Gen. Ernő Petrik
1942 – 1944 Brig. Gen. Árpád Tarnayáry

Section 22/h (Wounded, Invalids, etc.)
Chief:
1943 – 1944 Col. (Ret.) Mihály Géczy

Section 22/v (Graves)
Chief:
1943 – 1944 Col. (Ret.) Sándor Váry

BUREAU OF THE AIR FORCE
(Until 1.03.40: Air Force)
Chief of Bureau:
1.03.41 – 19.03.41 Lt. Gen. András Littay
1942 – 1944 Maj. Gen. Sándor Magyarossy
1944 – 1944 Maj. Gen. Vilmos Hellebroth

Section 30 (Legal Affairs and Administration)
(Disbanded on 15.01.45)
Chief:
– 1944 Lt. Col. Dr. Béla Csepreghy

Group IV
(Organization and Training)
(Until 1.03.40: Group I of the Air Force)
Grospat Chief:
1940 – 1942 Col. (GSC) Aladár Szirmay
1943 – 1944 Col. János Németh

Section 37 (Organization)
Chief:
1939 – 1941 Lt. Col. (GSC) Sándor Andráss
1941 – 1943 Lt. Col. (GSC) János Németh
1943 – 1944 Maj. (GSC) László Várkonyi

Section 38 (Personnel)
Chief:
– 1944 Col. Kálmán Kazay

General Staff Section 5.rep (Training)
(Assigned to the Honvéd General Staff)
Chief:
1942 – 1944 Lt. Col. (GSC) Pál Németh

General Staff Section 7.rep (Employment and Operations)
(Assigned to the Honvéd General Staff)
Chief:
1942 – 1943 Maj. (GSC) Kázmér Jávorszky
1943 – 1944 Lt. Col. (GSC) Zoltán Aszódy
Deputy:
1943 – 1.10.44 Cpt. (GSC) Jenő Rutkay
1.10.44 – 1945 Cpt. (GSC) Rády-Péntek

Group V
(Procurement and Administration)
(Until 1.03.40: Group II of the Air Force)
Group Chief:
– 1944 Brig. Gen. Vilmos Hellebroth
1944 – 1945 Col. (GSC) János Németh

Staff Section
Chief:
1941 – 1.03.44 Lt. Col. (ESC) Emil Barkász
1.03.1944 – 1945 Maj. (GSC) Miklós Balássy

Section 31 (Technology)
Chief:
– 1941 Maj. György Jakab
1942 – 1943 Maj. (GSC) Pál Németh
1943 – 1944 Maj. Viktor Frugerberger

Section 32/a (Flying Equipment)
Chief:
1943 – 1944 Col. Ernő Ojtozy
Section 32/b (Arms, Equipment, and Vehicles)

Chief:
1943 – 1944 Col. Ottó Szaiach

Section 32/eü (Medical Services)

Chief:
1943 – 1944 Lt. Col. Dr. Gusztáv Scholtz

Section 33 (Airfields and Installations)

Chief:
1941 – 1944 Col. Arpád Gálocsi

Section 34 (Budget)

Chief:
1942 – 1944 Col. Dezsö Dobay

BUREAU OF SUPPLY

(Until 1.03.41: Supply Group)

Chief of Bureau:
1940 – 1.03.41 Maj. Gen. Imre Ruszkiczay-Rüdiger
1.03.41 – 1.11.41 Brig. Gen. József Heszlényi
1.11.41 – 1944 Brig. Gen. Antal Náray

Deputy (and Quarter Master General)

1939 – 1940 Brig. Gen. Antal Náray

Group III

(Procurement and Supply)

Group Chief:
1941 – 1.11.44 Maj. Gen. Endre Schnoll
1.11.44 – 1945 Brig. Gen. (ESC) Béla Ferency

Staff Section (General Administration)

(Disbanded 1.11.44 and incorporated in Section 3 of the General Staff)

Chief:
1940 – 1941 Col. (GSC) Kázmér Kubicza
1942 – 1944 Col. (GSC) László Zsigmondi
Deputy:
1939 – 1943 Maj. (GSC) Béla Demeter
1943 – 1944 Cpt. (GSC) István Tóth

Section 2/é (Rations)

Chief:
1939 – 1941 Col. Dr. Pál Bodrogi
1942 – 1944 Col. Mihály Mózes

Section 2/i (Pay)

Chief:
– 1944 Col. János Szaladín

Section 2/r (Clothing)

Chief:
1939 – 1941 Col. József Lambert
1942 – 1944 Col. Jenő Kovalszky

Section 3/a (Weapons and Optics)

Chief:
1941 – 1.03.41 Col. (GSC) Vilmos Hellebroth
1.03.41 – 1944 Col. (ESC) Béla Ferency
1944 – 1945 Lt. Col. (ESC) Attila Noszticus

Section 3/b (Motor Vehicles and Fuel)

Chief:
1939 – 1942 Col. (GSC) Ferenc Osztovics
1942 – 1944 Col. (GSC) Oszkár Littomericzky
1944 – 1945 Lt. Col. (ESC) Károly Kádas
Deputy:
– 1943 Maj. (GSC) Ferenc Kissbank
1943 – 1944 Maj. (GSC) Zoltán Demjáni
1944 – 1945 Maj. (ESC) László Oláh

Section 3/c (Ammunition and Explosives)

Chief:
– 1944 Col. (ESC) Géza Asztalos

Section 5 (Animals and Vehicles)

Chief:
1939 – 1942 Col. (GSC) György Yuvkováry
1942 – 1944 Col. (GSC) István Badzey

Section 6/k (Budget)

Chief:
– 1944 Col.-Intendant Emil Boldvay

Section 11 (Housing)

Chief:
1939 – 1940 Col. Sándor Csiby
1941 – 1942 Col. Kálmán Vándorfi
1943 – 1944 Col. Gyula Ries

Section 12 (Medical)

Chief and Chief of the Army Medical Corps
1939 – 1942 Brig. Gen. Dr. Richard Franck
1942 – 1943 Brig. Gen. Dr. Antal Demkö
1943 – 1944 Brig. Gen. Dr. Béla Millián

[Sections 7/k, 7/m, and 7/ö of the General Staff were still subordinate to Group III of the Honvéd Ministry as of 1.03.1940 regarding matters of purchasing.]

Chief of the Administrative Office

1942 – 1944 Col. (Ret.) Alfréd Adda

Chief of the Engineer Corps

Chief of Remonts:
1942 – 1944 Col. (Ret.) Alfréd Adda

Inspector General of the Armaments Industry
(as of 1942)


OFFICER IN CHARGE OF SUB-MASCHINE GUNS AND MUNITION:
Col. (ESC) Elemér Bátor

OFFICER IN CHARGE OF RUBBER PRODUCTION:
Col. (ESC) Béla Csernetzky

OFFICER IN CHARGE OF TANKS AND MOTOR VEHICLES:
Col. (ESC) Bartholomeusz

OFFICER IN CHARGE OF FUEL:
Col. (ESC) József Kutassy

OFFICER IN CHARGE OF ARMAMENTS PRODUCTION:
Brig. Gen. Károly Bezár

MÁVAG-DIRECTOR:
Kálmán Borbély

Industrial Materials Office

Director:
Col. (ESC) Lajos Károlyi

Group IX

(Armaments and Defense Industry)
(Also assigned to the Ministry of Industry as Group XVII)

Group Chief:
1943 – 1945 Brig. Gen. (ESC) Gyula K'ézay

Section 3/v (Government Owned Industry)

Chief:
– 1944 Col. (ESC) Andor Bartha

Section 17/a (Mobilization and Air Defense)
(Also assigned to the Ministry of Industry as Group XVII/A)

Chief:
1939 – 1940 ?
1940 – 1942 Col. (GSC) Dr. Lajos Fábían
1943 – 1944 Col. (GSC) Kálman Szabó

Deputy:
1939 – 1940 Maj. (GSC) István Berkó
1940 – 1943 Maj. (GSC) Kálman Szabó
1944 – 1945 Maj. (GSC) Károly Demjén
Chapter 17

The Honvéd High Commands

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ROYAL HUNGARIAN HONVÉD MINISTRY (cont.)

Section 17/b (Manufacture of War Material)
(Also assigned to the Ministry of Industry as Group XVII/B)
Chief:
1939 – 1943 Col. (ESC) Gyula Kézay
1944 – 1945 Col. (ESC) Béla Marcell

Section 17/c (Procurement of Raw Materials)
(Also assigned to the Ministry of Industry as Group XVII/C)
Chief:
– 1944 Col. (ESC) Sándor Székely

Section 17/r (Aviation Industry)
(Also assigned to the Ministry of Industry as Group XVII/R)
Chief:
1944 – 1944 Col. (ESC) Emil Barkász
1944 – 1945 Lt. Col. (ESC) Brunó Hámory

BUREAU OF MILITARY LABOR FORCES
(Established 1.11.43)
Chief of Bureau and Chief of the Military Labor Corps:
1.11.43 – 30.08.44 Maj. Gen. Gusztáv Hennyey
INSPECTOR OF THE MILITARY LABOR FORCE:
INSPECTOR OF THE FIELD LABOR FORCE:
Brig. Gen. Béla Tanitó
INSPECTOR OF THE BORDER DEFENSES:
Col. (ESC) Torfil Hárosy
CHIEF OF THE CONSTRUCTION CORPS OF THE AIR FORCE:
Col. Elemér Póhly

XI. Group
(Military Labor Force – Military Sector)
(As of 1.11.43 under the Bureau of Military Labor Forces)
Group Chief and National Inspector of the Military Labor Forces:
1939 – 1940 Brig. Gen. Dr. Dániel Fábry
1940 – 1940 Col. László Stemmer
1941 – 1944 Brig. Gen. Ernő Horny

Section 41 (Administration and Liaison)
Chief:
1941 – 1944 Col. (ESC) Sándor Vályi

Section 42 (Organization and Training)
Chief:
– 1944 Col. Gusztáv Hibbey

Section 43 (Operations)
Chief:
– 1944 Col. (Ret.) Egen Gátföldy

Section 44 (Purchasing and Budget)
Chief:
– 1944 Col. János Heinrich

Group XII
(Military Labor Force – Civilian Sector)
Group Chief and National Inspector of the Military Labor Forces:
1943 – 1945 Brig. Gen. Dr. Lajos Fábián

Section 45 (Work Force Mobilization and Air Defense)
Chief:
– 1945 Col. (Ret.) Ernő Acs

Section 46 (Women’s Work Corps)
Chief and Landesinspekteur:
1939 – 1943 Brig. Gen. Dénes Sturm
1943 – 1945 Col. Dénes Marton

BUREAU AND NATIONAL LEADER OF PRE-MILITARY TRAINING
National Leader:
– 1943 Lt. Gen. Alajos Béldy
1943 – 1944 Cpt. (GSC) Andrássy Bak
1944 – 1945 not filled
Secretary:
1934 – 1945 Ministerialsekretár Dr. Imre Rajczi

Group VIII
(Commander of the Levente)
(Constituted on 11.08.41)
Group Chief and National Commander of the Levente:
1942 – 1944 Brig. Gen. István Kudriczy
1942 – 1944 Brig. Gen. Ulászló Solyomosy

Section 40/e (Organization)
Chief:
– 1942 Col. (GSC) István Kudriczy
1942 – 1943 Lt. Col. (GSC) László Lovass
1943 – 1944 Lt. Col. (GSC) Tibor Szurmay

Section 40/k (Training, etc.)
Chief:
1942 – 1943 Col. (GSC) János Pálossy
1944 – 1945 Lt. Col. (GSC) György Balassa

National Headquarters of the Levente
1940 – 1944 Col. József Benker

* * *

Section 13 (Judge Advocate General)
Chief and Judge Advocate General
1939 – 1942 Maj. Gen. Dr. Arpád Ambrózy
1942 – 1944 Brig. Gen. Dr. Mihály Cseh
1944 – 1945 Brig. Gen. Dr. Levente-Littomericzky

* * *

Group VII
(Civilian Affairs)
(until 1941: Civil-Group)
Political Secretary and Group Chief:
1938 – 1940 Political Secretary Dr. János Pruzsinszkzy
1941 – 1945 Political Secretary Dr. Lajos Szentgyörgyi
Deputy:
– 1942 Deputy Political Secretary Dr. László Bernáth
1943 – 1945 Deputy Political Secretary Dr. Béla Nagy

Civilian Section
Chief:
1940 – 1942 Councillor Dr. Barna Nagy
1943 – 1945 Councillor Dr. Alajos Pantz

Section 14 (Contracts and Patents)
Chief:
1940 – 1942 Councillor Dr. Dr. Arpád Rényi
1943 – 1945 Councillor Dr. József Sárkány

Section 15 (Legislation and Agreements)
Chief:
1939 – 1940 Director Dr. Szentgyörgyi
1941 – 1942 Councillor Dr. László Bernáth
1943 – 1945 Councillor Dr. Zoltán Pláner

Section 16 (Citizenship and Passports)
Chief:
1940 – 1944 Councillor István Sándor

Section 18 (Conscription Board)
Chief:
– 1942 Councillor Dr. József Sárkány
1943 – 1945 Councillor Sándor Havassy-Bayer

* * *

Military Auditor Office
Chief:

* * *
ROYAL HUNGARIAN HONVÉD MINISTRY (cont.)

Honvéd Welfare Fund
Chief:
1938 – 1941 Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Jenő Deczky-Marsik
1942 – 1945 Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Géza Kerner

The Royal Hungarian Topographical Institute
Commander:

The Royal Hungarian Military Archives
Commander:
1943 – 1944 Brig. Gen. Mihály Csöke
1944 – 1945 Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Ferenc Farkas

The Royal Hungarian Museum
Director:
ROYAL HUNGARIAN HONVÉD GENERAL STAFF
[A m. kir. honvédvezérkar főnöke]

Chief-of-Staff
26.05.30 – 12.09.36 Maj. Gen. József Somkuthy
12.10.36 – 24.05.38 Gen. Jenő Rátz
25.05.38 – 6.09.41 Gen. Henrik Werth
7.09.41 – 19.04.44 Lt. Gen. Ferenc Szombathelyi
16.10.44 – 8.05.45 Lt. Gen. Károly Beregyi
( as Commander-In-Chief
and Honvéd Minister)

Acting Commander-In-Chief:
11.44 – 8.05.45 Maj. Gen. Gyula Kovács

Deputy Chief-of-Staff
1st Deputy:
1939 – 1.03.40 Maj. Gen. István Náday
1.03.40 – 1.03.41 Brig. Gen. Zoltán Decleva
1.03.40 – 15.02.41 Lt. Gen. Andráss Littay
1.10.41 – 19.06.44 Lt. Gen. József Bajnóczy
19.06.44 – 16.10.44 Lt. Gen. Dezso László

Adjutant:
1938 – 1941 Lt. Col. (GSC) Kálmán Bartalis
1941 – 1941 Col. Dr. László Rakolcay
1941 – 1943 position not filled
1944 – 19.06.44 Maj. (GSC) Ferenc Adonyi

19.06.44 – 15.10.44 Maj. (GSC) Albin Kapitáňffy

Group I
(Executive Staff)
(As of 1.03.40)

Group Chief:
1.03.40 – 1.03.41 Maj. Gen. István Náday
1.03.41 – 1.10.41 Brig. Gen. Dezso László
1943 – 1944 Brig. Gen. Dr. Gyula Hankovszky
1944 – 1945 Brig. Gen. Elemér Sáska

1. General Staff Section
(Operations)

Chief:
1939 – 1.02.41 Col. (GSC) Dezso László
1.02.41 – 1942 Col. (GSC) Elemér Sáska
1942 – 1943 Col. (GSC) Elemér Mészöly
1943 – 23.01.45 Col. (GSC) Lajos Nádas
1945 – 1945 Maj. (GSC) Ferenc Kovács

Deputy:
1939 – 1941 Lt. Col. (GSC) Elemér Sáska
1941 – 1942 Lt. Col. (GSC) Sándor Zachár
1942 – 1943 Lt. Col. (GSC) Lajos Nádas
### ROYAL HUNGARIAN HONVÉD GENERAL STAFF (cont.)

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Maj. (GSC) János Dezseri</td>
<td>1939 – 1944</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>Maj. (GSC) György Kóbor</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Maj. (GSC) János Koth</td>
<td>1939 – 1944</td>
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<td>Maj. (GSC) János László</td>
<td>1939 – 1944</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Maj. (GSC) Károly Hájk</td>
<td>1939 – 1944</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>Maj. (GSC) Béla Szabó</td>
<td>1939 – 1944</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>Maj. (GSC) László László</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Maj. (GSC) Béla Lengyel</td>
<td>1939 – 1944</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Maj. (GSC) János Szántay</td>
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### ATTACHE GROUP

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<tr>
<td>Maj. (GSC) György Köhler</td>
<td>1939 – 1944</td>
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<td>Lt. Col. (GSC) Imre Károly</td>
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### ROYAL HUNGARIAN HONVÉD GENERAL STAFF (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Section</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SECTION SUPPLY</strong></td>
<td>Chief:</td>
<td>1939 – 1945 Col. (ESC) István Kerényi</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
5. General Staff Section
(Troop Training)

Chief:
1940 – 1942 Col. (GSC) Ferenc Horváth
1942 – 1943 Col. (GSC) Mihály Brányi
1943 – 1944 Col. (GSC) Sándor Makray
1944 – 1945 Col. (GSC) Ferenc Németh

General Staff Corps Officers:
1937 – 1940 Lt. Col. (GSC) Béla Zsombolyai
1940 – 1942 Maj. (GSC) Andor Kásás
1941 – 1943 Maj. (GSC) Albin Kapiánffy
1943 – 1944 Maj. (GSC) Ádám Podhratzky

6. General Staff Section
(Military Training outside of the Army)
(becomes Group VIII of the Honvéd Ministry in 1941)

Chief:
1940 – 1941 Lt. Col. (GSC) István Kudriczy

Deputy:
1941 – 1941 Maj. (GSC) László Lovass

* * *

Military Courts and Court of Honor

Chief:
1940 – 1942 Col. Iván Hindy
1943 – 1944 Col. (GSC) Sándor Szücs

Deputy:
1940 – 1942 ?
1943 – 1944 Col. Sándor Szűcs

* * *

Secretary General
of the Supreme Military Council

Secretary General:
1939 – 1.03.40 Brig. Gen. István Decleva
1.03.40 – 11.10.40 Brig. Gen. Dr. Dániel Fábry
11.10.40 – 5.02.42 Brig. Gen. Antal Náray
1944 – 16.10.44 Brig. Gen. Elemér Mészőly

Permanent Deputy Secretary General:
1943 – 1944 Councillor Dr. Imre Rákoczy

Chief of Staff of the Military Group:
1939 – 1940 Maj. (GSC) András Zákó
1941 – 1942 Maj. (GSC) István Szentmiklóssy
1943 – 1944 Col. (GSC) Kázmér Kubicza

* * *

Inspectorate of Artillery

Inspector of Artillery:
7.08.19 – 30.06.21 Gen. Antal Hellebronth
30.06.21 – 1923 Gen. Antal Hellebronth
1923 – 1929 Gen. Ottokár Ferjentsik
1929 – 1942 Gen. Kamilló Kárpáthy
26.05.30 – 1942 Gen. Kamilló Kárpáthy
07.30 – 1.03.35 Maj. Gen. Odilo Schönner
1.03.35 – 1942 Maj. Gen. József Németh II
11.36 – 1.10.44 Maj. Gen. László Hollóssy-Kuthy
1.05.44 – 15.07.44 Maj. Gen. Jenő Kunczfalusy
1.05.45 – 3.05.45 Maj. Gen. József Finta

* * *

Inspectorate of Engineers
/ Army Technical Inspector:
1938 – 1.03.40 Maj. Gen. Jenő Kunczfalusy

* * *

Inspectorate of Infantry

Inspector of Infantry:
1920 – 1.10.21 Gen. Rezső Willerding
1.10.21 – 1.01.26 Gen. Rezső Willerding
1.01.26 – 1928 Gen. Ottokár Ferjentsik
1928 – 1932 Gen. László Hollóssy-Kuthy
02.29 – 26.05.30 Gen. Kamilló Kárpáthy
26.05.30 – 1942 Maj. Gen. Kamilló Kárpáthy
07.30 – 1.03.35 Maj. Gen. Odilo Schönner
1.03.35 – 1942 Maj. Gen. József Németh II
11.36 – 1.10.44 Maj. Gen. László Hollóssy-Kuthy
1.05.44 – 15.07.44 Maj. Gen. Jenő Kunczfalusy
15.11.44 – 10.03.45 Maj. Gen. Jenő Kunczfalusy
1.01.45 – 3.05.45 Maj. Gen. József Finta

* * *

Inspectorate of Anti-Aircraft Artillery

Inspector of Anti-Aircraft Artillery:
1.05.35 – 1.02.36 Maj. Gen. József Németh II
1.02.36 – 1.08.39 Maj. Gen. József Németh II
1.08.39 – 15.11.44 Maj. Gen. József Németh II
15.11.44 – 1.03.45 Maj. Gen. József Németh II
1.01.45 – 3.05.45 Maj. Gen. József Németh II

* * *

Inspectorate of Gendarmerie

Inspector of Gendarmerie:
10.08.19 – 20.06.19 Brig. Gen. Árpád Bariss
21.02.21 – 31.03.23 Maj. Gen. Sándor Kontz
1.04.23 – 16.06.28 Maj. Gen. Gábor Ujfaluussy
28.06.28 – 5.10.31 Brig. Gen. Ferenc Schill
5.10.31 – 1.08.36 Maj. Gen. Gábor Ujfaluussy
1.08.36 – 1.02.38 Maj. Gen. László Falta
1.02.38 – 1.08.39 Maj. Gen. Gábor Ujfaluussy
1.08.39 – 15.11.42 Maj. Gen. Márton Nemerey
15.11.42 – 16.10.44 Lt. Gen. Gábor Faraghó
16.10.44 – 3.05.45 Maj. Gen. József Finta
ROYAL HUNGARIAN HONVÉD GENERAL STAFF (cont.)

Inspectorate of the Air Force
Inspector of the Air Force; (as of 1.03.40 also Commander-in-Chief):
05.30 – 03.38 Maj. Gen. Waldemár Kenese
03.38 – 1.02.41 Maj. Gen. József Grassy
1.02.41 – 1.03.40 Maj. Gen. Béla Rákosi
1.03.41 – 1.08.43 Maj. Gen. Béla Rákosi
1.08.43 – 1.08.44 Lt. Gen. Sándor Magyarossy
1.08.44 – 16.10.44 Brig. Gen. István Bánfalvy
16.10.44 – 1.11.44 Brig. Gen. Sándor Illy
1.11.44 – 12.44 Col. Edgar Keksz
02.45 – 3.05.45 Lt. Gen. Kálmán Ternegg

* * *

Inspectorate of River Forces
Inspector of the River Forces; (as of 1.03.40 also Commander-in-Chief):
1920 – 1.10.32 Rear Admiral Olaf Wulff
1.10.32 – 1.02.38 Rear Admiral Richárd Dietrich
1.05.33 – 30.04.34 Rear Admiral Ferenc Hild
1.05.34 – 9.05.37 Captain Gaszton Hartmann
25.06.37 – 15.01.39 Read Admiral Armin Bausznern
15.01.39 – 30.04.42 Captain Guido Tasnády
1.05.42 – 16.10.44 Rear Admiral Kálmán Hardy
16.10.44 – 15.12.44 Rear Admiral Ödön Trunkwalter

* * *

Inspectorate of Border Guard
Inspector of Border Guard:
1.05.21 – 1.08.21 Brig. Gen. Rudolf Kreybig
1.08.21 – 1.12.22 Brig. Gen. Zsolt Réthy
9.01.25 – 10.28 Gen. Gábor Thott
20.08.43 – 31.10.44 Col. (GSC) Elemér Sáska
1.11.44 – 8.05.45 Col. (GSC) László Kocsis
1.11.44 – 16.01.45 Maj. Gen. József Finta

* * *

Royal Hungarian Military Academy
Commander:
1936 – 1.10.39 Brig. Gen. István Schweitzer
1.10.39 – 1.11.41 Brig. Gen. Károly Beregfy
1.11.41 – 1.03.43 Brig. Gen. Dézső László
1.03.43 – 1.10.44 Brig. Gen. Gyula Kovács
1.10.44 – 1944 Col. (GSC) Sándor András
1944 – 1945 Maj. Gen. Ferenc Bardóczy

* * *

Royal Hungarian Ludovika Academy
Commander:
1.09.31 – 1.08.36 Lt. Gen. Gusztáv Jány
1.08.36 – 1.10.38 Lt. Gen. Ferenc Szombathelyi
20.08.43 – 31.10.44 Col. (GSC) Elemér Sánka
1.11.44 – 8.05.45 Col. (GSC) László Kocsis

* * *

Royal Hungarian Army Field Bishops
Catholic:
1920 – 1926 Brig. Gen. István Zadravetz
1926 – 1928 Dr. Bélint Arvay-Nagy
1928 – 1929 István Révész
1929 – 1945 Brig. Gen. Dr. István Házy
1945 – 1948 Brig. gen. János Folba

Protestant:

* * *

NOTES:
The Sections 7.A (Transport), 7.m (Technical Service/Engineers), and 7./ö (Air Force Operations and Organization), although assigned to the General Staff, were subordinate to the Bureau of Supply in the Honvéd Ministry regarding matters of purchasing.

Sections 5.rep (Air Force Training) and 7. rep (Air Force Operations) were part of the Bureau of the Air Force in the Honvéd Ministry, but subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff regarding organization, training, and operations.

Section 8./e (General Officer Assignments) although part of Group II of the Honvéd Ministry, the Chief of the General Staff was empowered to give it instructions.

The Inspectorates and the Military Academies were subordinate to the Commander-In-Chief of the Honvéd until 1.03.1940, when they were transferred to the Chief of the General Staff.

As of 1.03.1940, the most of the Inspectors of the individual arms also became the commanders-in-chief for those arms.

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### Terms used in the Lineage Sections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activate</td>
<td>To bring a constituted or disbanded unit or formation up to peace time strength by filling it up with personnel and equipment. (In some cases, a small cadre – possibly as little as one officer and one enlisted man – is assigned for formalities sake). It can happen at the same time as mobilization, then including reserves and supply services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign</td>
<td>To place a unit or formation in a military organization, making it an element of that organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attach</td>
<td>To place a unit of formation for administrative, operational control, logistic support, or other purposes, without making it an integral part of the organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitute</td>
<td>To designate a unit or formation and place it on the order of battle, thus making it available for activation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disband</td>
<td>To place a unit or formation to standby status. It continues to exist as a designation in the order of battle without personnel. (In some cases, a small cadre – possibly as little as one officer and one enlisted man – is maintained for formalities sake.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinue</td>
<td>To withdraw all personnel from a constituted unit or formation and terminate its designation and existence in the order of battle. It ceases to exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactivate</td>
<td>To reduce in personnel and support services and return an activated unit to its peace time status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilize</td>
<td>To bring an activated unit or formation up to full war time strength, including the call-up of all reserve personnel and support services. In some cases, even an inactivated or disbanded unit or formation is immediately mobilized when necessity dictates, bypassing the activation status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstitute</td>
<td>To return a disbanded unit to the order of battle and thus make it available for activation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redesignate</td>
<td>To change the name and/or number of a unit or formation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is formal lineage terminology. The urgency of reality meant that often different stages were bypassed, and, for example, a disbanded unit could be reconstituted, activated, and mobilized all on one and the same date.

### REMARKS:
The rank indicated is the highest rank achieved by the officer while in the indicated position.

German units and ranks are indicated in *italics*. 
FIRST ARMY

Headquarters: Szolnok; as of 09.1939: Kolozsvár; as of 07.1942: Budapest

Lineage:

Constituted: 1.03.1940
Activated: 6.01.1944 In Hungary
Mobilized: 1.03.1944
Dissbanded: 7.04.1944 On the East Front
Activates: 7.04.1944 Takes over VII Corps from the Second Army on the East Front.

Fate: 8.05.1945 Surrenders in Bohemia, Czechoslovakia

FIRST ARMY

Headquarters: Szolnok; as of 09.1939: Kolozsvár; as of 07.1942: Budapest

Commanding General

1.03.40 – 1.02.41 Lt. Gen. Vilmos Nagy
1.02.41 – 1.08.42 Lt. Gen. István Schweitzer
1.08.42 – 1.04.44 Lt. Gen. István Náday
1.04.44 – 26.05.44 Lt. Gen. Géza Lakatos
26.05.44 – 25.07.44 Lt. Gen. Károly Beregffy
25.07.44 – 1.08.44 Lt. Gen. Ferenc Parkas (*
1.08.44 – 16.10.44 Lt. Gen. Béla Miklós von Dalnoki
16.10.44 – 11.05.45 Lt. Gen. Dezső László
*) Acting CG. He was the CG of the VIth Corps.

Organization:


Attachments:

1.03.40 – 6.01.44 VKF (Inactive, Peace Time Garrisons)
6.01.44 – 7.04.44 VKF
7.04.44 – 21.07.44 Heeresgruppe Nordukraine
21.07.44 – 15.08.44 Heeresgruppe Raus (= 1. Panzerarmee + FIRST ARMY), Heeresgruppe Nordukraine
15.08.44 – 22.09.44 Heeresgruppe Heinrici (= 1. Panzerarmee + FIRST ARMY), Heeresgruppe Nordukraine
23.09.44 – 20.10.44 Heeresgruppe Heinrici (= 1. Panzerarmee + FIRST ARMY), Heeresgruppe A
23.10.44 – 17.12.44 Heeresgruppe Wöhler (= 8. Armee + FIRST ARMY), Heeresgruppe Sud
18.12.44 – 25.01.45 Heeresgruppe Heinrici (= 1. Panzerarmee + FIRST ARMY), Heeresgruppe A
25.01.45 – 1.02.45 Heeresgruppe Heinrici (= 1. Panzerarmee + FIRST ARMY), Heeresgruppe Mitte

*) Acting CG. He was the CG of the VIth Corps.
SECOND ARMY
Headquarters: Budapest

Lineage:
Constituted: 1.03.1940
Activated: 10.04.1942
9.02.1943 Relieved of command of combat units.
17.02.1943 Placed in charge of all Hungarian occupation forces on the East Front.
Redesignated: 1.05.1943 On East Front as Hungarian Occupation Forces Command (H.O.F.C.)
Redesignated: 15.08.1943 On East Front as Second Army
Disbanded: 7.04.1944 [After being relieved by H.O.C. on 1.04.1944. The Headquarters Staff was transported back to Hungary and used for other purposes]
Reconstituted: 23.08.1944 From IX Corps
Discontinued: 13.11.1944 [Becomes Headquarters of the Inspector General of Honvéd Forces in Germany]

Commanding General
1.03.40 – 1.08.43 Lt. Gen. Gustáv Jány
1.08.43 – 1.04.44 Lt. Gen. Géza Lakatos
23.08.44 – 16.10.44 Lt. Gen. Lajos Veress von Dalnoki

Organization:
Reserve: 20th Lt. Div.
Reserve: 1st Pz. Div.
Organization (cont.):

3.02.43  IV Corps: 20th Lt. Div. (Remnants)
   VII Corps: 19th Lt. Div. (Remnants)
   
   
   Reserve: 7th Lt. Div. (Remnants), 12th Lt. Div. (Remnants)


   IX Corps: in Reserve without attachments


5.11.44 IV Corps: 31st SS-Div., 1st River Brig.
### THIRD ARMY

**Headquarters:** Pécs; as of 07.1942: Budapest

#### Lineage:
- **Constituted:** 1.03.1940
- **Mobilized:** 6.04.1941
- **Demobilized:** 17.04.1941
- **Inactivated:** 12.06.1943
- **Activated:** 1.08.1943
- **Disbanded:** 05.1944
- **Reconstituted:** 10.09.1944 from IV Corps Staff
- **Fate:** 8.05.1945 Surrenders in Styria, Austria

#### Commanding General
- **1.03.40 – 1.11.41:** Lt. Gen. Elemér Gorondy-Novák
- **1.11.41 – 1.12.42:** Lt. Gen. Zoltán Decleva
- **1.12.42 – 12.06.43:** Lt. Gen. Lajos Csatay
- **12.06.43 – 1.08.43:** inactive; position not filled
- **1.08.43 – 05.44:** Lt. Gen. Károly Beregfy
- **05.44 – 10.09.44:** inactive; position not filled
- **10.09.44 – 8.05.45:** Lt. Gen. József Heszlényi

#### Attachments:
- **1.03.40 – 6.04.41:** VKF (Inactive, Peace Time Garrisons)
- **6.04.41 – 17.04.41:** VKF
- **17.04.41 – 2.01.44:** VKF (Inactive, Peace Time Garrisons)
- **2.01.44 – 5.06.44:** VKF
- **5.06.44 – 19.09.44:** VKF (Inactive, Peace Time Garrisons)
- **19.09.44 – 21.09.44:** VKF
- **21.09.44 – 23.09.44:** Heeresgruppe Südukraine
- **23.09.44 – 28.10.44:** Heeresgruppe Süd
- **28.10.44 – 12.11.44:** Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico (= 6. Armee + THIRD ARMY), Heeresgruppe Süd
- **12.11.44 – 27.11.44:** Heeresgruppe Süd
- **27.11.44 – 23.12.44:** Heeresgruppe Süd
- **23.12.44 – 19.03.45:** Heeresgruppe Balck (= 6. Armee + THIRD ARMY), Heeresgruppe Süd
- **19.03.45 – 25.04.45:** 6. SS-Panzerarmee, Heeresgruppe Süd
- **25.04.45 – 05.45:** Heeresgruppe Süd

#### Organization:
- **IV Corps:** 10th Inf. Brig., 11th Inf. Brig., 12th Inf. Brig.
- **Reserve:** 1st Parachute Battalion, 1st River Brig.
- **VII Corps:** 12th Res. Div., Lakatos Brig.
- **Reserve:** Szt. László Div.
- **LXXII. Armeekorps:** 25th Inf. Div., 76. Inf. Div.
- **Reserve:** Szt. László Div.
- **26.11.44:** II Corps: 23rd Res. Div., 1st River Brig.
- **LXII. Armeekorps:** 1st Cav. Div., 271. VG Div.
- **Reserve:** 25th Inf. Div., VII Corps, VIII Corps
- **VIII Corps:** 23rd Res. Div.
- **Reserve:** VIII Corps, 1st Cav. Div.
- **1.03.45:** II Corps: 20th Inf. Div.
### Lineage:

| Constituted: | 1.02.29 as 1st Military District |
| Redesignated: | 1.10.38 as I Corps, by amalgamating the 1st Mixed Brigade and 1st Military District |
| Activated: | 7.04.1941 (Corps Headquarters only) |
| Inactivated: | 17.04.1941 (Corps Headquarters only) |
| Mobilized: | 08.1944 (Corps Headquarters only) |
| Discontinued: | 12.02.1945 Lost in Budapest |

### Peace Time Organization to 1943:

**Garrison:**
- Corps Headquarters: Budapest (Budapest)
- Corps Artillery Command: Budapest (Budapest)
- Heavy Artillery Battalion (mot): Budapest (Budapest)
- Artillery Observation Battery: Budapest (Budapest)
- Anti-Aircraft Battalion (mot): Budapest (Budapest)
- Signal Battalion: Budapest (Budapest)
- Combat Engineer Battalion: Budapest (Budapest)
- Corps Motorized Supply Services Headquarters: Budapest (Budapest)

### Peace Time Organization from 1943:

**Garrison:**
- Corps Headquarters: Budapest (Budapest)
- Corps Supply Services Headquarters: Budapest (Budapest)
- Corps Motorized Supply Services Headquarters: Budapest (Budapest)
- Engineer Command: Budapest (Budapest)
- Signal Command: Budapest (Budapest)
- Labor Forces Command: Budapest (Budapest)
- IX Labor Forces Command: Budapest (Budapest)
- Independent Heavy Artillery Battery (mot): Budapest (Budapest)
- Independent Cavalry Battalion: Budapest (Budapest)
- Independent Combat Engineer Battalion: Budapest (Budapest)
- 1st Infantry Regiment (*): Budapest (Budapest)
- 2nd Artillery Regiment (*): Budapest (Budapest)
- “Budapest” independent Infantry Battalion: Budapest (Budapest)

### Commanding General:

| 1.02.29 – 1.07.30 | Maj. Gen. Odiló Schönner |
| 1.12.35 – 1.05.36 | Maj. Gen. András Czibur |
| 1.05.36 – 1.09.36 | Brig. Gen. Jenő Rátz |
| 1.09.36 – 1.10.36 | – position not filled – |
| 1.10.36 – 1.02.39 | Maj. Gen. Vilmos Nagy |
| 1.02.39 – 1.03.40 | Maj. Gen. Gusztáv Jány |
| 1.03.40 – 1.05.41 | Maj. Gen. Zoltán Decleva |
| 1.05.41 – 1.11.42 | Maj. Gen. Imre Ruszkiczay-Rüdiger |
| 1.11.42 – 1.11.43 | Maj. Gen. József Németh II |
| 1.11.43 – 1.08.44 | Maj. Gen. Béla Aggteleky |
| 1.08.44 – 8.10.44 | Maj. Gen. Zsillár Bakay |
| 8.10.44 – 15.10.44 | Maj. Gen. Béla Aggteleky |
| 16.10.44 – 12.02.45 | Lt. Gen. Iván Hindy |

### Attachments:

| 1.02.29 – 1.03.40 | HM (peace time garrison) |
| 1.03.40 – 7.04.41 | VKF (peace time garrison) |
| 7.04.41 – 17.04.41 | Third Army |
| 17.04.41 – 30.08.44 | VKF (peace time garrison) |
| 30.08.44 – 12.11.44 | Second Army (peace time garrison) |
| 12.11.44 – 19.03.45 | Third Army (Commandant of Budapest) |

### 1ST MILITARY DISTRICT

**Headquarters:** Budapest

**Deputy Corps Commander:**
- 08.40 – 02.41 Brig. Gen. Arthur Horvay

### NOTES:

A I Corps Bicycle Battalion was not raised.

*) To be assigned to the 25th Infantry Division.
II CORPS
Headquarters: Székesfehérvár

Lineage:

Constituted: 1.02.29 as 2nd Military District
Redesignated: 1.10.38 as II Corps, by amalgamating the 2nd mixed Brigade and 2nd Military District
Activated: 30.08.1944 (Corps Headquarters only)
Discontinued: 8.05.1945 Capitulates in Styria, Austria

Commanding General:

1.02.39 – 1.03.35 Maj. Gen. Zoltán Módlly
1.03.35 – 1.08.37 Maj. Gen. József Böckl
1.08.37 – 10.01.39 Maj. Gen. Milán Temessy
10.01.39 – 1.02.41 Maj. Gen. István Schweitzer
1.02.41 – 1.10.42 Maj. Gen. Gusztáv Hennyey
1.10.42 – 1.11.43 Maj. Gen. Belá Aggteleky
1.11.43 – 19.04.44 Maj. Gen. János Vörös
19.04.44 – 15.05.44 – position not filled –
15.05.44 – 15.11.44 Maj. Gen. István Kiss
15.11.44 – 05.45 Maj. Gen. István Kudriczy

Peace Time Organization to 1943:

Corps Headquarters
Corps Troops:
II Corps Artillery Command
II Bicycle Battalion
II Heavy Artillery Battalion (mot)
II Artillery Observation Battery
II Anti-Aircraft Battalion (mot)
II Signal Battalion
II Combat Engineer Battalion
II Corps Supply Services Headquarters

Garrison: (Székesfehérvár)

Peace Time Organization from 1943:

Corps Headquarters
Attached units:
II Corps Supply Services Headquarters
II Corps Motorized Supply Services Headquarters
II Artillery Command
II Engineer Command
II Labor Forces Command
II independent Anti-Aircraft Company (mot)
II independent Heavy Artillery Battery (mot)
52nd independent Combat Engineer Battalion

Garrison: (Székesfehérvár)

Border Defense Units:
52nd Border Police Battalion
1/52 Border Police Company (9 Patrols)
2/52 Border Police Company (7 Patrols)
3/52 Border Police Company (8 Patrols)
4/52 Border Police Company (8 Patrols)
5/52 Border Police Company (5 Patrols)

Garrison: (Komárom)

2ND MILITARY DISTRICT
Headquarters: Székesfehérvár

Deputy Corps Commander
08.40 – 10.40 Brig. Gen. Béla Madaras
08.44 – 11.44 Brig. Gen. Pál Szombathy
11.44 – 45 Maj. Gen. István Kiss

Attachments:

1.02.29 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrison)
1.10.38 – 30.08.44 VKF (peace time garrison)
30.08.44 – 17.09.44 Second Army, Heeresgruppe Südakraune
17.09.44 – 28.09.44 Second Army
28.09.44 – 3.10.44 Second Army, Heeresgruppe Süd
3.10.44 – 18.10.44 Second Army, Armeegruppe Wöhler
18.10.44 – 23.10.44 6. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
23.10.44 – 23.12.44 Third Army, Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico
12.11.44 – 19.03.45 Third Army, Armeegruppe Balck
19.03.45 – .05.45 Third Army, 6. Armee
Chapter 18  Royal Hungarian Army Commands and Formations  1922 – 1945

III CORPS

Headquarters: Szombathely

Lineage:

Constituted: 1.10.28 as 3rd Military District
Redesignated: 1.10.38 as III Corps, by amalgamating the 3rd mixed Brigade and 3rd Military District
Activated: 10.04.1942 (Corps Headquarters only)
Inactivated: 1.02.1943 (Corps Headquarters only)
Disbanded: 04.1943 (Corps Headquarters only)

Commanding General:

1.10.28 – 1.12.32 Maj. Gen. István Shivoy
1.12.32 – 1.10.36 Maj. Gen. Imre Suhay
1.10.36 – 24.05.38 Maj. Gen. Gustáv Jány
25.05.38 – 1.10.38 – position not filled –
1.10.38 – 1.08.41 Maj. Gen. László Kiss
1.08.41 – 15.06.42 Maj. Gen. Ödön Domaniczky
15.06.42 – 15.07.42 Brig. Gen. György Rakovszky
5.12.42 – 1.02.43 Brig. Gen. Marcel Stromm
1.02.43 – 15.05.43 – position not filled –
15.05.43 – 1.08.44 Maj. Gen. Szilárd Bakay
1.08.44 – 8.10.44 Maj. Gen. Béla Aggteleky
10.10.44 – 31.10.44 Maj. Gen. László Hollósy-Kathy
11.44 – 01.45 Maj. Gen. József Vasváry
01.45 – 03.45 Maj. Gen. Ferenc Horváth

Peace Time Organization to 1943:

Garrison:

Corps Headquarters (Szombathely)
Corps Troops:
III Corps Artillery Command
III Bicycle Battalion (Foreseen, but not raised)
III Heavy Artillery Battalion (mot)
III Artillery Observation Battery
III Anti-Aircraft Battalion (mot)
III Signal Battalion
III Combat Engineer Battalion
III Corps Supply Services Headquarters

Peace Time Organization from 1943:

Garrison:

Corps Headquarters (Szombathely)

Attached units:
III Corps Supply Services Headquarters
III Corps Motorized Supply Services Headquarters
III Artillery Command
III Labor Forces Command
III independent Anti-Aircraft Company (mot)
III independent Heavy Artillery Battery (mot)
53rd independent Combat Engineer Battalion

Border Defense Units:

63rd Border Guard Group
53rd Border Police Battalion
1/53 Border Police Company (12 Patrols)
2/53 Border Police Company (11 Patrols)
3/53 Border Police Company (10 Patrols)
4/53 Border Police Company (7 Patrols)
63rd Border Guard Group

3RD MILITARY DISTRICT

Headquarters: Szombathely

Deputy Corps Commander

08.40 – 02.41 Brig. Gen. Béla Pekle
1.05.42 – 10.42 Brig. Gen. Imre Széchy
10.42 – 11.42 Brig. Gen. Ödő Abt
11.42 – 1.02.43 Brig. Gen. Endre Mezö
1.02.43 – 16.05.43 Brig. Gen. Árpád Matláry
08.44 – 03.45 Brig. Gen. Árpád Matláry
03.45 – 05.45 Maj. Gen. Ferenc Horváth

NOTES:

After destruction on the East Front the III Corps Headquarters was returned to Hungary and disbanded there. However, the 3rd Military District continued to exist. A III Bicycle Battalion was foreseen, but never raised.
Lineage:

Constituted: 1.04.28 as 4th Military District
Redesignated: 1.10.38 as IV Corps, by amalgamating the 4th mixed Brigade and 4th Military District
Activated: 5.04.1941 (Corps Headquarters only)
Inactivated: 17.04.1941 (Corps Headquarters only)
Activated: 10.04.1942 (Corps Headquarters only)
Disbanded: 1.02.1943 (Corps Headquarters only)
Activated: 1.05.43 (Corps Headquarters only)
Mobilized: 4.08.1944 (Corps Headquarters only)
Discontinued: 19.09.1944 (Corps Headquarters only)
Discontinued: 1945 Military District dissolved

Commanding General:

1.04.28 – 1.09.31 Maj. Gen. József Koszmovszky
1.09.31 – 1.12.35 Maj. Gen. Henrik Werth
1.12.35 – 1.02.38 Maj. Gen. László Falta
1.02.38 – 1.02.40 Maj. Gen. Jenő Ruzsikay
1.02.40 – 1.08.41 Maj. Gen. László Horváth
1.08.41 – 3.12.42 Maj. Gen. Lajos Csatay

Attachments:

1.04.28 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrison)
1.03.40 – 5.04.41 VKF (peace time garrison)
3.04.41 – 17.04.41 Third Army
17.04.41 – 10.04.42 VKF (peace time garrison)
10.04.42 – 30.04.42 Second Army, Heeresgruppe Süd
30.04.42 – 7.07.42 Heeresgruppe Süd
7.07.42 – 9.07.42 Heeresgruppe B
9.07.42 – 05.43 Second Army, Heeresgruppe B
0.54.3 – 4.08.44 VKF (Peace time garrison)
4.08.44 – 16.09.44 Third Army, VKF
16.09.44 – 19.09.44 Third Army, VKF (being dissolved)

Peace Time Organization to 1943:

Garrison:

IV Corps Headquarters (Pécs)
IV Corps Artillery Command (Pécs)
IV Bicycle Battalion (Pécs)
IV Heavy Artillery Battalion (mot) (Pécs)
IV Artillery Observation Battery (Pécs)
IV Anti-Aircraft Battalion (mot) (Pécs)
IV Signal Battalion (Pécs)
IV Combat Engineer Battalion (Baja)
IV Corps Supply Services Headquarters (Pécs)

Peace Time Organization from 1943:

Garrison:

Corps Headquarters (Pécs)
IV Corps Supply Services Headquarters (Pécs)
IV Corps Motorized Supply Services Headquarters (Pécs)
IV Artillery Command (Pécs)
IV Labor Forces Command (Pécs)
IV independent Anti-Aircraft Company (mot) (Pécs)
IV independent Heavy Artillery Battery (mot) (Pécs)
54th independent Combat Engineer Battalion (Baja)

Border Defense Units:

54th Border Police Battalion (Pécs)
1/54 Border Police Company (4 Patrols) (Gyékényes)
2/54 Border Police Company (9 Patrols) (Széctvári)
3/54 Border Police Company (11 Patrols) (Villány)

4TH MILITARY DISTRICT

Headquarters: Pécs

Deputy Corps Commander

08.40 – 10.40 Brig. Gen. Gyöző Materna
05.42 – 10.42 Brig. Gen. Jenő Felkl
1.11.42 – 15.11.42 Brig. Gen. Kálmán Csiby
15.11.42 – 1.06.43 Brig. Gen. Dr. Béla Remesy
1.07.44 – 15.09.44 Brig. Gen. Dr. Béla Remesy
09.44 – 11.44 Brig. Gen. László Molnár
15.11.44 – 45 Maj. Gen. Imre Kálnán

NOTES:

After destruction on the East Front the IV Corps Headquarters was returned to Hungary and disbanded there. However, the 4th Military District continued to exist. A IV Bicycle Battalion was foreseen, but never raised.

On 19.09.44, the staff personnel of the Corps Headquarters was used to form the Third Army.
**V CORPS**

**Headquarters:** Szeged

**Lineage:**

- **Constituted:** 7.12.25 as 5th Military District
- **Redesignated:** 1.10.38 as V Corps, by amalgamating the 5th mixed Brigade and 5th Military District
- **Activated:** 5.04.1941 (Corps Headquarters only)
- **Inactivated:** 17.04.1941 (Corps Headquarters only)
- **Disbanded:** 1.06.1944 (Corps Headquarters only)
- **Constituted:** 4.08.1944 (Corps Headquarters only)
- **Activated:** 1.09.1944 (Corps Headquarters only)
- **Discontinued:** 05.45 surrendered in Austria

**Commanding General:**

- 7.12.25 – 1.05.30 Brig. Gen. Gyula Kubanyi
- 1.05.30 – 1.06.34 Maj. Gen. Kálmán Shvoy
- 1.06.34 – 1.11.36 Maj. Gen. Miksa Nagyszombathy
- 1.11.36 – 1.08.39 Maj. Gen. László Mérey
- 1.08.39 – 1.08.41 Maj. Gen. Antal Silley
- 1.08.41 – 20.08.42 Maj. Gen. Ferenc Feketehalmy-Czeydner
- 20.08.42 – 1.08.43 Maj. Gen. Frigyes Gyimessy
- 1.08.43 – 1.05.44 Maj. Gen. Pál Platthy
- 1.04.44 – 1.09.44 – position not filled –
- 1.09.44 – 15.11.44 Maj. Gen. Zoltán Algya-Pap
- 17.12.44 – 1.03.45 Maj. Gen. Mihály Ibrányi
- 1.03.45 – 05.45 Maj. Gen. József Vasváry

**Peace Time Organization to 1943:**

**Garrison:**

- Corps Headquarters (Szeged)
- V Corps Artillery Command (Szeged)
- V Bicycle Battalion (Ujvidék)
- V Heavy Artillery Battalion (mot) (Kecskemét)
- V Artillery Observation Battery (Kecskemét)
- V Anti-Aircraft Battalion (mot) (Szeged)
- V Signal Battalion (Szeged)
- V Combat Engineer Battalion (Szeged)
- V Corps Supply Services Headquarters (Szeged)

**Peace Time Organization from 1943:**

**Garrison:**

- Corps Headquarters (Szeged)
- V Corps Supply Services Headquarters (Szeged)
- V Corps Motorized Supply Services Headquarters (Szeged)
- V Artillery Command (Szeged)
- V Engineer Command (Szeged)
- V Labor Services Command (Szeged)
- V independent Anti-Aircraft Company (mot) (Szeged)
- V independent Heavy Artillery Battery (mot) (Szeged)
- 55th independent Combat Engineer Battalion (Szeged)

**Border Defense Units:**

**Garrison:**

- 16th Border Guard Battalion (Ujvidék)
- 1/16 Border Guard Company (Ujvidék)
- 2/16 Border Guard Company (Ujvidék)
- 3/16 Border Guard Company (Ujvidék)
- 4/16 Border Guard Company (Ujvidék)
- 16 Artillery Battery (Ujvidék)
- 1/16 Border Police Company (5 Patrols) (Bács)
- 2/16 Border Police Company (5 Patrols) (Ujvidék)
- 55th Border Police Battalion (Szeged)
- 1/55 Border Police Company (4 Patrols) (Zsablya)
- 2/55 Border Police Company (4 Patrols) (Magyarkanizsa)
- 3/55 Border Police Company (4 Patrols) (Makó)

**5TH MILITARY DISTRICT**

**Headquarters:** Szeged

**Deputy Corps Commander**

- 1.06.44 – 15.09.44 Maj. Gen. Imre Kálmán

**NOTES:**

The V Corps Headquarters was dissolved on 1.06.44. However, the 5th Military District continued to exist and, in fact, actually commanded combat units until the end.
### VI CORPS
Headquarters: Debrecen

#### Lineage:
- **Constituted:** 30.09.28 as 6th Military District
- **Redesignated:** 1.10.38 as VI Corps, by amalgamating the 6th mixed Brigade and 6th Military District
- **Activated:** 6.01.1944
- **Discontinued:** 15.11.1944 (Corps Headquarters only)
- **Discontinued:** 4.03.1945 Military District dissolved

#### Commanding General:
- 30.09.28 – 1.10.32 Maj. Gen. Árpád Sipos
- 1.10.32 – 1.05.36 Maj. Gen. Géza Demény
- 1.05.39 – 18.06.39 Maj. Gen. Géza Siegler
- 18.06.39 – 1.03.40 Maj. Gen. Árpád Sipos
- 1.03.40 – 10.08.43 Maj. Gen. József Bajnóczi
- 10.08.43 – 1.11.41 Maj. Gen. Károly Beregfy
- 1.11.41 – 1.08.43 Maj. Gen. Ferenc Parkas
- 1.08.43 – 21.08.43 Maj. Gen. Ferenc Parkas
- 21.08.43 – 16.10.44 Maj. Gen. Ferenc Parkas
- 16.10.44 – 15.11.44 Brig. Gen. Miklós Nagyőszty

#### Peace Time Organization to 1943:
- **Corps Headquarters (Debrecen)**
- **Corps Troops:**
  - VI Corps Artillery Command (Debrecen)
  - VI Bicycle Battalion (Puspokladány)
  - VI Heavy Artillery Battalion (mot) (Szolnok)
  - VI Artillery Observation Battery (Debrecen)
  - VI Anti-Aircraft Battalion (mot) (Szolnok & Debrecen)
  - VI Signal Battalion (Debrecen)
  - VI Combat Engineer Battalion (Szolnok)
  - VI Corps Supply Services (Debrecen)

#### Peace Time Organization from 1943:
- **Corps Headquarters (Debrecen)**
- **Attached units:**
  - VI Corps Supply Services Headquarters (Debrecen)
  - VI Corps Motorized Supply Services Headquarters (Debrecen)
  - VI Engineer Command (Debrecen)
  - VI Labor Services Command (Debrecen)
  - VI independent Anti-Aircraft Company (mot) (Debrecen)
  - VI independent Heavy Artillery Battery (mot) (Debrecen)
  - 56th independent Combat Engineer Battalion (Szolnok)

#### Border Defense Units:
- **66th Border Guard Group**
  - 66th Border Guard Artillery Command (Oroszláza)
  - 20th Border Guard Battalion (Gyula)
  - 1/20 Border Guard Company (Gyula)
  - 2/20 Border Guard Company (Gyula)
  - 3/20 Border Guard Company (Gyula)
  - 4/20 Border Guard Company (Gyula)
  - 20 Artillery Battery (Gyula)
  - 1/20 Border Police Company (5 Patrols) (Bács)
  - 1/20 Border Police Company (7 Patrols) (Nagyszalonta)

- **31st Border Guard Battalion**
  - 1/31 Border Guard Company (Battonya)
  - 2/31 Border Guard Company (Battonya)
  - 3/31 Border Guard Company (Kevermes)
  - 4/31 Border Guard Company (Kevermes)
  - 31 Artillery Battery (Mezőhegyes)
  - 31 Bicycle Platoon (Kevermes)
  - 1/31 Border Police Company (6 Patrols) (Battonya)
  - 1/31 Border Police Company (4 Patrols) (Kevermes)

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### 6TH MILITARY DISTRICT
Headquarters: Debrecen

#### Deputy Corps Commander
- 08.40 – 12.40 Brig. Gen. Lőránd Kiskény
- 10.06.43 – 4.03.45 Brig. Gen. Béla Tanió

#### Notes:
The VI Corps Headquarters was withdrawn from the front on 12.11.44 and discontinued on 15.11.44. The headquarters staff used for other purposes. The 6th Military District continued to exist and commanded combat units until March 1945.
### VII CORPS

**Headquarters:** Miskolc

#### Lineage:
- **Constituted:** 1.07.28 as 7th Military District
- **Redesignated:** 1.10.38 as VII Corps, by amalgamating the 7th mixed Brigade and 7th Military District
- **Activated:** 7.04.1941 (Corps Headquarters only)
- **Inactivated:** 17.04.1941 (Corps Headquarters only)
- **Activated:** 10.04.1942 (Corps Headquarters only)
- **Dissolved:** 02.1943 on the East Front
- **Activated:** 1.05.1943 on the East Front (see notes below)
- **Discontinued:** 15.11.1944 dissolved

#### Commanding General:
- **1.07.28 – 1.05.30:** Maj. Gen. Albin Lenz
- **1.05.30 – 1.05.34:** Maj. Gen. Hermann Pokorny
- **1.05.34 – 5.09.38:** Maj. Gen. Hugó Sónyi
- **5.09.38 – 1.10.38:** position not filled
- **1.10.38 – 1.03.40:** Maj. Gen. András Littay
- **1.03.40 – 1.05.42:** Maj. Gen. Gyula Nagy
- **1.05.42 – 21.05.42:** Brig. Gen. Sándor Horváth
- **21.05.42 – 12.42:** Maj. Gen. Ernő Gyimesy
- **12.42 – 02.43:** Brig. Gen. János Legeza
- **02.43 – 1.05.43:** Maj. Gen. Ernő Gyimesy
- **1.05.43 – 15.05.44:** Maj. Gen. István Kiss
- **15.05.44 – 17.10.44:** Maj. Gen. Géza Vörös
- **17.10.44 – 15.11.44:** Lt. Gen. János Markóczu

#### Peace Time Organization to 1943:

**Garrison:** Miskolc

**Corps Headquarters:** (Miskolc)

**Corps Troops:**
- VII Corps Artillery Command (Miskolc)
- VII Bicycle Battalion (Rimaszombat)
- VII Heavy Artillery Battalion (mot) (Miskolc)
- VII Artillery Observation Battery (Miskolc)
- VII Anti-Aircraft Battalion (mot) (Miskolc)
- VII Signal Battalion (Miskolc)
- VII Combat Engineer Battalion (Miskolc)
- VII Corps Supply Services (Miskolc)

#### Peace Time Organization from 1943:

**Garrison:** Miskolc

**Corps Headquarters:** (Miskolc)

**Attached units:**
- VII Corps Supply Services Headquarters (Miskolc)
- VII Corps Motorized Supply Services Headquarters (Miskolc)
- VII Artillery Command (Miskolc)
- VII Labor Services Command (Miskolc)
- XI Labor Services Command (Miskolc)
- VII independent Anti-Aircraft Company (mot) (Miskolc)
- VII independent Heavy Artillery Battery (mot) (Miskolc)
- 57th independent Combat Engineer Battalion (Miskolc)

#### Border Defense Units:

**Garrison:** Salgótarján

- 57th Border Police Battalion (Rozsnyó)
- 257th Border Police Company (6 Patrols) (Jolsva)
- 357th Border Police Company (7 Patrols) (Rimaszombat)
- 457th Border Police Company (5 Patrols) (Lesonc)
- 557th Border Police Company (6 Patrols) (Rimaszombat)
- 657th Border Police Company (5 Patrols) (Balassagyarmat)
- 1084th Border Police Company (8 Patrols) (Joposzág)

#### 7TH MILITARY DISTRICT

**Headquarters:** Miskolc

**Deputy Corps Commander**
- 08.40 – 12.40: Brig. Gen. Gyözö Beleznyay
- 05.42 – 1.08.42: Col. Károly Ertey-Leitschaft
- 1.08.42 – 08.44: Brig. Gen. József Finta

#### Attachments:
- **1.07.28 – 1.03.40:** HM (peace time garrison)
- **1.03.40 – 7.04.41:** VKF (peace time garrison)
- **7.04.41 – 17.04.41:** Third Army, VKF
- **17.04.41 – 10.04.42:** VKF (peace time garrison)
- **10.04.42 – 22.06.44:** Second Army, Heeresgruppe Süd
- **22.06.44 – 9.07.44:** Second Army, Armeegruppe von Weichs
- **10.07.42 – 12.02.44:** Second Army, Heeresgruppe B
- **12.02.43 – 1.05.43:** Second Army, Heeresgruppe Süd
- **1.05.43 – 7.07.43:** H.O.F.C., Befh. HG Süd
- **7.07.43 – 15.08.43:** H.O.F.C., Befh. HG Mitte
- **15.08.43 – 8.10.43:** Second Army, Befh. HG Mitte
- **8.10.43 – 8.11.43:** Second Army, Befh. Weisruthenien
- **8.11.43 – 1.04.44:** Second Army, WB Ukraine
- **1.04.44 – 21.07.44:** First Army, VFK
- **21.07.44 – 15.08.44:** First Army, Armeegruppe Raus
- **15.08.44 – 31.08.44:** First Army, Armeegruppe Heinrici
- **31.08.44 – 13.09.44:** 1. Panzerarmee, Heeresgruppe Nordukraine
- **13.09.44 – 18.09.44:** Reserves, Heeresgruppe Nordukraine
- **18.09.44 – 22.09.44:** Second Army, Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico
- **23.09.44 – 28.10.44:** Third Army, Heeresgruppe Südukraine
- **28.10.44 – 15.11.44:** Third Army, Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico

#### NOTES:
- Corps Headquarters was destroyed at the Don in January 1943. On 1.05.1943 a reduced-strength corps command echelon for the occupation forces on the East Front, west of the Dnieper River, was activated using the remnants of the headquarters staff. It relieved the H.O.G. West. During the winter of 1943/1944 it was rebuilt to full corps headquarters strength. It was transferred to the field troops on 7.04.1944.
- The Corps (both Corps Headquarters and Military District) was completely dissolved on 15.11.1944.
### VIII CORPS / II RESERVE CORPS

**Headquarters:** Kassa

#### Lineage:

| Constituted | 15.01.1939 | New, as VIII Corps with an 8th Military District |
| Activated | 21.06.1941 |
| Redesignated | 22.06.1941 | As the Carpathian Army Group |
| Redesignated | 9.07.1941 | As the VIII Corps (see notes below) |
| Disbanded | 6.10.1941 | Raises Hungarian Occupation Command (see notes below) |
| Activated | 1.05.1943 | On the East Front (see notes below) |
| Disbanded | 5.04.1944 |
| Activated | 1.05.1944 | As II Reserve Corps on the East Front. |
| Redesignated | 22.09.1944 | As the VIII Corps on the East Front |
| Discontinued | 05.1945 | dissolved |

#### Commanding General:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Commanding General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15.01.39 – 1.08.41</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Ferenc Szombathelyi</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.08.41 – 1.05.43</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Géza Lakatos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.05.43 – 5.04.44</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Dezső László</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.04.44 – 18.07.44</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Jenő Bör</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.07.44 – 20.08.44</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Antal Vattay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.08.44 – 1.12.44</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Béla Lengyel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.12.44 – 05.45</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Dr. Gyula Hankovszky</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Peace Time Organization to 1943:

**Garrison:** Kassa

| Corps Headquarters | Kassa |
| Corps Troops: | |
| VIII Corps Artillery Command | (Kassa) |
| VIII Bicycle Battalion | (Nagyszöllős) |
| VIII Heavy Artillery Battalion (mot) | (Kassa) |
| VIII Artillery Observation Battery | (Kassa) |
| VIII Anti-Aircraft Battalion (mot) | (Kassa) |
| VIII Signal Battalion | (Kassa) |
| VIII Combat Engineer Battalion | (Huszt) |
| VIII Corps Supply Services | (Kassa) |

#### Peace Time Organization from 1943:

**Garrison:** Kassa

| Corps Headquarters | Kassa |
| Corps Troops: | |
| VIII Corps Artillery Command | (Kassa) |
| VIII Bicycle Battalion | (Nagyszöllős) |
| VIII Heavy Artillery Battalion (mot) | (Kassa) |
| VIII Artillery Observation Battery | (Kassa) |
| VIII Anti-Aircraft Battalion (mot) | (Kassa) |
| VIII Signal Battalion | (Kassa) |
| VIII Combat Engineer Battalion | (Huszt) |
| VIII Corps Supply Services | (Kassa) |

#### Border Defense Units:

**Garrison:** Sátoraljaújhely

| 58th Border Police Battalion | Sátoraljaújhely |
| 1/58 Border Police Company (9 Patrols) | Sátoraljaújhely |
| 2/58 Border Police Company (14 Patrols) | Šobrán |

#### Attachments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1.02.39 – 1.03.40</td>
<td>HM (peace time garrison)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.03.40 – 22.06.41</td>
<td>VKF (peace time garrison)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.06.41 – 9.07.41</td>
<td>17. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.07.41 – 11.11.41</td>
<td>Befh. HG Süd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11.41 – 18.05.43</td>
<td>VKF (peace time garrison)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.05.43 – 7.07.43</td>
<td>H.O.F.C., Befh. HG Süd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.07.43 – 15.08.43</td>
<td>H.O.F.C., Befh. HG Mitte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.08.43 – 8.10.43</td>
<td>Second Army, Befh. HG Mitte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.10.43 – 1.04.44</td>
<td>Second Army, Befh. Weissruthenien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.04.44 – 5.04.44</td>
<td>en-route to Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.04.44 – 1.05.44</td>
<td>VKF (peace time garrison)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.05.44 – 5.05.44</td>
<td>Befh. Weissruthenien, WB Ostland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.05.44 – 15.05.44</td>
<td>Befh. Weissruthenien, Befh. HG Mitte</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.05.44 – 27.07.44</td>
<td>2. Arme, Heeresgruppe Mitte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.07.44 – 29.09.44</td>
<td>9. Arme, Heeresgruppe Mitte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.09.19 – 12.10.44</td>
<td>en-route to back to Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.10.44 – 28.10.44</td>
<td>Third Army, Heeresgruppe Süd</td>
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<tr>
<td>28.10.44 – 23.12.44</td>
<td>Third Army, Armeegruppe Forrer-Pico</td>
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<tr>
<td>23.12.44 – 19.03.45</td>
<td>Third Army, Armeegruppe Balck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.03.45 – 04.45</td>
<td>Third Army, Heeresgruppe Süd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### NOTES:

The VIII Corps Headquarters was designated as the “Carpathian Army Group” from 22.06.41 to 9.07.44. Then raised the Hungarian Occupation Command on 6.10.1941 and returned to Hungary. Activated on 1.05.1943 on the East Front as a reduced-strength corps command echelon for the occupation forces west of the Dnieper River, relieving the H.O.G. East. During the winter of 1943/1944 it was rebuilt to full corps headquarters strength. The Corps Headquarters raised the Hungarian Occupation Command on 1.04.44, and was transferred back to Hungary, where it was disbanded on 5.04.44.

It was again activated on 1.05.44 as the II Reserve Corps Headquarters at the East Front. The position of commanding general, VIII Corps was not filled until 29.09.44. The 8th Military District continued to exist.

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### 8TH MILITARY DISTRICT

**Headquarters:** Kassa

#### Deputy Corps Commander:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08.40 – 10.40</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Iván Szilassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.06.42 – 1.08.43</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Imre Széchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.08.43 – 4.03.45</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Béla Tantió</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IX CORPS

**Lineage:**

| Constituted:  | 4.09.1940 | New, as IX Corps with a 9th Military District |
| Activated:    | 6.01.1944 |
| Mobilized:    | 6.03.1944 |
| Disbanded:    | 28.08.44  (see notes below) |
| Constituted:  | 1.09.44    |
| Discontinued: | 05.45 dissolved |

**Commanding General:**

| 4.09.40 – 1.02.42 | Maj. Gen. László Stirling |
| 15.09.42 – 28.08.44 | Maj. Gen. Lajos Veress |
| 28.08.44 – 1.09.44 | – position not filled – |
| 1.09.44 – 11.44 | Brig. Gen. Gyula Kovács |
| 11.44 – 05.45 | Brig. Gen. Frigyes Vasváry |

**Peace Time Organization to 1943:**

**Garrison:**

| Corps Headquarters | (Kolozsvár) |
| Corps Troops:      |            |
| IX Corps Artillery Command | (Kolozsvár) |
| IX Bicycle Battalion | (Kolozsvár) |
| IX Heavy Artillery Battalion (mot) | (Szászfenes) |
| IX Artillery Observation Battery | (Kolozsvár) |
| IX Anti-Aircraft Battalion (mot) | (Kolozsvár) |
| IX Signal Battalion | (Kolozsvár/ Szamosvár) |
| IX Combat Engineer Battalion | (Szatmárnémeti) |
| IX Corps Supply Services | (Kolozsvár) |

**Peace Time Organization from 1943:**

**Garrison:**

| Corps Headquarters | (Kolozsvár) |
| Attached units:    |            |
| IX Corps Supply Services Headquarters | (Nagyváradi) |
| IX Corps Motorized Supply Services Headquarters | (Kolozsvár/Szászfenes) |
| IX Artillery Command | (Kolozsvár) |
| IX Signal Command | (Kolozsvár) |
| X Labor Services Command | ( – ? – ) |
| XII Labor Services Command | ( – ? – ) |
| IX independent Anti-Aircraft Company (mot) | (Kolozsvár) |
| IX independent Heavy Artillery Battery (mot) | (Kolozsvár) |
| 59th independent Combat Engineer Battalion | (Dés) |

**Border Defense Units:**

**Garrison:**

| Székler Command (see there) |            |
| 60th Border Police Battalion | (Kolozsvár) |
| 1/60 Border Police Company (8 Patrols) | (Banffyhunyad) |
| 2/60 Border Police Company (8 Patrols) | (Kolozsvár) |
| 3/60 Border Police Company (4 Patrols) | (Szamosvár) |
| 61st Border Police Battalion | (Nagyváradi) |
| 1/61 Border Police Company (6 Patrols) | (Nagyváradi) |
| 2/61 Border Police Company (6 Patrols) | (Rév) |

**Attachments:**

| 1.12.40 – 15.04.44 | VKF (peace time garrison) |
| 15.04.44 – 21.07.44 | First Army, Heeresgruppe Nordukraine |
| 21.07.44 – 5.09.44 | First Army, Armeegruppe Raus |
| 5.09.44 – 16.09.44 | Second Army, Heeresgruppe Südmark |
| 16.09.44 – 23.09.44 | Reserves, 8. Armee, Heeresgruppe Südmark |
| 23.09.44 – 3.10.44 | Reserves, 8. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd |
| 3.10.44 – 18.10.44 | Second Army, Armeegruppe Wöhler |
| 17.10.44 – 04.45 | 8. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd |
| 04.45 – 05.45 | 8. Armee, Heeresgruppe Ostmark |

**NOTES:**

The XI Corps Headquarters used to raise the Second Army Headquarters.

Personnel of the 9th Military District Headquarters were used to raise a new Corps Headquarters a few days later.
# MOBILE CORPS / I ARMORED CORPS

**Headquarters:** Szolnok; later Budapest

### Lineage:
- **Constituted:** 1.03.1940 As the Mobile Corps (see notes below)
- **Activated:** 5.04.1941
- **Inactivated:** 20.04.1941
- **Activated:** 27.06.1941
- **Inactivated:** 6.12.1941
- **Redesignated:** 1.10.1942 As I Armored Corps
- **Discontinued:** 11.02.45 dissolved

### Commanding General:
- 1.03.40 – 1.02.42 Maj. Gen. Béla Miklós
- 1.02.42 – 1.04.42 – position not filled -
- 1.04.42 – 1.10.42 Brig. Gen. Jérnö Major
- 1.11.44 – 11.02.45 Maj. Gen. Ferenc Bisza

### Mobile Corps Attachments:
- 1.03.40 – 5.04.41 VKF (peace time garrison)
- 5.04.41 – 13.04.41 Reserve, Third Army
- 13.04.41 – 20.04.41 Third Army, XXXXI. Mot.AK.
- 20.04.41 – 27.06.41 VKF (peace time garrison)
- 27.06.41 – 9.07.41 Carpathian Army Group, VKL
- 9.07.41 – 19.07.41 Reserve, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 19.07.41 – 12.08.41 Gruppe Kempf, 17. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 12.08.41 – 12.09.41 Gruppe Kempf, 1. Panzerguppe, Hgr. Süd
- 12.09.41 – 22.09.41 Reserve, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 22.09.41 – 8.10.41 Gruppe von Roques, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 8.10.41 – 12.10.41 Reserve, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 12.10.41 – 15.11.41 17. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 6.11.41 – 6.12.41 Returned to Hungary
- 6.12.41 – 1.10.42 VKF (peace time garrison)

### I Armored Corps Attachments:
- 1.10.42 – 11.02.45 VKF (peace time garrison)

### Peace Time Organization to 1941:
- 1st mot. Brigade (Budapest)
- 2nd mot. Brigade (Munkács)
- 1st Cavalry-Brigade (Nyiregyháza)
- 2nd Cavalry-Brigade (Budapest)
- 101 Traffic Control Company (mot) (Budapest)

### Peace Time Organization 1942 – 1943:
- 1st Armored Division (Budapest)
- 2nd Armored Division (Kecskemét)
- 1st Cavalry Division (Budapest)
- I Armored Corps Signal Battalion (Budapest)

### Peace Time Organization from 1943:
- 1st Armored Division (Budapest)
- 2nd Armored Division (Kecskemét)
- I Armored Corps Signal Battalion (Budapest)
- 101st Armored Train (Budapest)

### Garrison:
- (Budapest)
- (Munkács)
- (Nyiregyháza)
- (Budapest)

### NOTES:
The Mobile Corps was only a command echelon. It did not have a military district.

The I Armored Corps was a training and coordination command, and was not expected to take to the field.
## HUNGARIAN OCCUPATION COMMAND (H.O.C.)
(No peace time garrison or Military District)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding General:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituted: 6.10.1941 By the VIII Corps.</td>
<td>6.10.41 – 9.02.42 Brig. Gen. Károly Olgyay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activated: 6.10.1941 on the East Front</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Discontinued: 9.02.1942 [split into H.O.G. East and H.O.G. West]</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Attachments:**

- 6.10.41 – 9.02.42 Befh. HG Süd

---

## HUNGARIAN OCCUPATION GROUP EAST (H.O.G. East)
(No peace time garrison or Military District)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding General:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activated: 9.02.1942 on the East Front</td>
<td>11.08.42 – 1.05.43 Brig. Gen. Szilárd Bakay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued: 18.05.1943 [absorbed by the VII Corps]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Attachments:**

- 9.02.42 – 9.07.42 Befh. HG Süd
- 9.07.42 – 9.02.43 Befh. HG B
- 9.02.43 – 1.05.43 [Second Army], 2. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte

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## HUNGARIAN OCCUPATION GROUP WEST (H.O.G. West)
(No peace time garrison or Military District)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding General:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued: 1.05.1943 [absorbed by the VIII Corps]</td>
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</table>

**Attachments:**

- 9.02.42 – 9.02.43 WB Ukraine
- 9.02.43 – 1.05.43 [Second Army], WB Ukraine

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## HUNGARIAN OCCUPATION GROUP (H.O.G.)
(No peace time garrison or Military District)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding General:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituted: 1.04.1944 By the VIII Corps</td>
<td>1.04.44 – 5.04.44 Maj. Gen. Dezső László</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activated: 1.04.1944 on the East Front</td>
<td>5.04.44 – 1.05.44 Brig. Gen. Jénő Bor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued: 1.05.1944 [absorbed by the II Reserve Corps]</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Attachments:**

- 1.04.44 – 1.05.44 Befh. Weissruthenien, WB Ostland
SZÉKLER COMMAND
Headquarters: Marosvásárhely, later Csíkszereda (IX Corps)

**Lineage:**
- **Constituted:** 1.10.1942
- **Discontinued:** 10.1944 Dissolved

**Commanding General:**
- 1.10.42 – 1.08.44 – ? –
- 1.02.43 – 1.08.44 Brig. Gen. István Kozma
- 08.44 – 10.44 Maj. Gen. Ferenc Horváth

**Organization:**
- **Peace Time Organization 1943 – 1944:** Garrison:
  - Division Headquarters (Marosvásárhely)
  - Artillery Command (Marosvásárhely)
  - 2nd Székel Artillery Battalion Headquarters (Marosvásárhely)
  - 35th Artillery Battery (Csíkszereda)
  - 2nd Székel Mountain Cavalry Company (Csíkszereda)
  - IX Székel Anti-Aircraft Battalion (mot) (Ditrá)
  - X Székel Combat Engineer Battalion (Sepsiszentgyörgy)
  - X Székel Signal Battalion (Csíkszereda)
  - IX Corps Motorized Supply Services Headquarters (Csíkszereda)
  - 9th Border Guard Brigade (Csíkszereda)
- **Border Defense Units:** Garrison:
  - 68th Border Guard Group (Székelyudvarhely)
  - 34th Border Guard Battalion (Székelyudvarhely)
  - 1/34 Border Guard Company (Székelyudvarhely)
  - 2/34 Border Guard Company (Székelyudvarhely)
  - 3/34 Border Guard Company (Székelyudvarhely)
  - 4/34 Border Guard Company (Székelyudvarhely)
  - 34 Artillery Battery (Székelyudvarhely)
  - 34 Border Police Company (7 Patrols) (Székelyudvarhely)
  - 14th Székel Militia Battalion (Székelyudvarhely)
  - 15th Székel Militia Battalion (Oklánd)
  - 17th Székel Militia Battalion (Széketkereszthúr)
  - 18th Székel Militia Battalion (Parajd)
  - 69th Border Guard Group (Marosvásárhely)
  - 22th Border Guard Battalion (Bézterce)
  - 1/22 Border Guard Company (Bézterce)
  - 2/22 Border Guard Company (Bézterce)
  - 3/22 Border Guard Company (Bézterce)
  - 4/22 Border Guard Company (Bézterce)
  - 22 Artillery Battery (Dés)
  - 22 Border Police Company (7 Patrols) (Teke)
  - 23rd Border Guard Battalion (Marosvásárhely)
  - 1/23 Border Guard Company (Marosvásárhely)
  - 2/23 Border Guard Company (Marosvásárhely)
  - 3/23 Border Guard Company (Marosvásárhely)
  - 4/23 Border Guard Company (Marosvásárhely)
  - 23 Artillery Battery (Marosvásárhely)
  - 23 Border Police Company (13 Patrols) (Marosvásárhely)
  - 19th Székel Militia Battalion (Marosvásárhely)
  - 20th Székel Militia Battalion (Erdőszentgyörgy)
  - 21st Székel Militia Battalion (Akosfalva)
  - 22nd Székel Militia Battalion (Mezőmadaras)
  - 27th Székel Militia Battalion (Nárádszereda)

**Administrative Attachments:**
- 1.02.43 – 10.44 IX Corps
Chapter 18 Royal Hungarian Army Commands and Formations 1922 – 1945

1st MIXED BRIGADE
Headquarters: Budapest (HM direct)

Lineage:
Constituted: 11.05.1922
Discontinued: 1.10.1938 amalgamated into I Corps

Commanding Officers:
11.05.22 – 1923 Maj. Gen. Béla Balassa
1923 – 1.05.24 Brig. Gen. Odon Kossanyi
1.05.24 – 1.06.27 Maj. Gen. Károly Nagy
1.06.27 – 1.07.27 – ? –
1.07.27 – 1.02.29 Maj. Gen. Odilo Schönner
1.02.29 – 1934 Maj. Gen. Zoltán Módy
.10.35 – .07.35 – ? –
.07.37 – 1.10.38 Maj. Gen. Milán Temessy

Peace Time Organization to 1938:
Garrison:
Brigade Headquarters (Budapest)
Infantry Commander (Budapest)
Artillery Commander (Budapest)
1st Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Budapest)
I/1st Infantry Regiment (Szolnok)
II/1st Infantry Regiment (Budapest)
III/1st Infantry Regiment (Budapest)
2nd Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Budapest)
I/1st Infantry Regiment (Budapest)
II/1st Infantry Regiment (Budapest)
III/1st Infantry Regiment (Budapest)
1st Bicycle Battalion (Vác)
1st Cavalry Company (Komáromujváros)
1st Artillery Battalion (Budapest)
1st Battery (Budapest)
2nd Battery (Budapest)
3rd Battery (Budapest)
1st Artillery Observation Battery (Budapest)
1st Mortar Battery (Budapest)
1st Signal Company (Budapest)
1st Supply Company (Budapest)
1st Motor-Transport Company (Budapest)

Administrative Attachments:
11.05.22 – 1.10.38 HM (peace time garrisons)
2nd MIXED BRIGADE
Headquarters: Székesfehérvár (HM direct)

Lineage:
Constituted: 11.05.1922
Discontinued: 1.10.1938 amalgamated into II Corps

Commanding Officers:
- 11.05.22 – 1.01.26 Maj. Gen. Károly Than
- 1.01.26 – 1.02.29 Lt. Gen. Kamilló Kárpháthy
- 1.02.29 – 1.07.30 Maj. Gen. Odilo Schönner
- 1.12.35 – 1.05.36 Maj. Gen. Andor Czibur
- 5.09.36 – 1.10.36 position not filled
- 1.10.36 – 1.10.38 Gen. Vilmos Nagy

Peace Time Organization to 1938:
- Brigade Headquarters (Székesfehérvár)
- Infantry Commander (Székesfehérvár)
- Artillery Commander (Székesfehérvár)
- 3rd Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Székesfehérvár)
- I/3rd Infantry Regiment (Tafalováros)
- II/3rd Infantry Regiment (Székesfehérvár)
- III/3rd Infantry Regiment (Komáromujváros)
- 4th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Györ)
- I/4th Infantry Regiment (Györ)
- II/4th Infantry Regiment (Györ)
- III/4th Infantry Regiment (Veszprém)
- 2nd Bicycle Battalion (Hajmáskér)
- 2nd Cavalry Company (Pápa)
- 2nd Artillery Battalion (Györ)
- 1st Battery (Györ)
- 2nd Battery (Komáromujváros)
- 3rd Battery (Hajmáskér)
- 2nd Artillery Observation Battery (Hajmáskér)
- 2nd Mortar Battery (Hajmáskér)
- 2nd Signal Company (Székesfehérvár)
- 2nd Supply Company (Székesfehérvár)
- 2nd Motor-Transport Company (Székesfehérvár)

Garrison:
- Infantry Commander (Székesfehérvár)
- Artillery Commander (Székesfehérvár)
- 3rd Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Székesfehérvár)
- I/3rd Infantry Regiment (Tafalováros)
- II/3rd Infantry Regiment (Székesfehérvár)
- III/3rd Infantry Regiment (Komáromujváros)
- 4th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Györ)
- I/4th Infantry Regiment (Györ)
- II/4th Infantry Regiment (Györ)
- III/4th Infantry Regiment (Veszprém)
- 2nd Bicycle Battalion (Hajmáskér)
- 2nd Cavalry Company (Pápa)
- 2nd Artillery Battalion (Györ)
- 1st Battery (Györ)
- 2nd Battery (Komáromujváros)
- 3rd Battery (Hajmáskér)
- 2nd Artillery Observation Battery (Hajmáskér)
- 2nd Mortar Battery (Hajmáskér)
- 2nd Signal Company (Székesfehérvár)
- 2nd Supply Company (Székesfehérvár)
- 2nd Motor-Transport Company (Székesfehérvár)

Administrative Attachments:
- 11.05.22 – 1.10.38 HM (peace time garrisons)
### 3rd MIXED BRIGADE

**Headquarters:** Szombathely (HM direct)

#### Lineage:
- **Constituted:** 11.05.1922
- **Discontinued:** 1.10.1938 amalgamated into III Corps

#### Commanding Officers:
- 11.05.22 – 15.06.23: Maj. Gen. Árpád Guilleaume
- 15.06.23 – 9.01.25: Maj. Gen. Kálmán Artner
- 30.09.28 – 1.01.33: Gen. Imre Suhay
- 1.01.33 – 1.11.36: Maj. Gen. Imre Suhay
- 1.11.36 – 24.05.38: Lt. Gen. Gusztáv Jány
- 24.05.38 – 1.10.38: Maj. Gen. László Kiss

#### Peace Time Organization to 1938:

- **Brigade Headquarters** (Szombathely)
- **Infantry Commander** (Sopron)
- **Artillery Commander** (Szombathely)
- **5th Infantry Regiment Headquarters** (Sopron)
- **I/5th Infantry Regiment** (Sopron)
- **II/5th Infantry Regiment** (Szombathely)
- **III/5th Infantry Regiment** (Köszeg)
- **6th Infantry Regiment Headquarters** (Nagykanizsa)
- **I/6th Infantry Regiment** (Nagykanizsa)
- **II/6th Infantry Regiment** (Szombathely)
- **III/6th Infantry Regiment** (Nagykanizsa)
- **3rd Bicycle Battalion** (Esztergom)
- **3rd Cavalry Company** (Sopron)
- **3rd Artillery Battalion** (Nagykanizsa)
- **1st Battery** (Sopron)
- **2nd Battery** (Nagykanizsa)
- **3rd Battery** (Szombathely)
- **2nd Artillery Observation Battery** (Nagykanizsa)
- **2nd Mortar Battery** (Nagykanizsa)
- **3rd Signal Company** (Szombathely)
- **3rd Supply Company** (Szombathely)
- **3rd Motor-Transport Company** (Szombathely)

#### Administrative Attachments:
- 11.05.22 – 1.10.38: HM (peace time garrisons)
4th MIXED BRIGADE
Headquarters: Pécs (HM direct)

Lineage:
Constituted: 11.05.1922
Discontinued: 1.10.1938 amalgamated into IV Corps

Commanding Officers:
11.05.22 – 13.04.24 Maj. Gen. Lajos Maxon
1927 – .04.28 – ? –
.04.28 – 1.09.31 Maj. Gen. József Kosmovszky
1.09.31 – 1.01.36 Gen. Henrik Werth
1.01.36 – 1.02.38 Maj. Gen. László Falta
1.02.38 – 1.10.38 Gen. Jenő Ruszkay

Peace Time Organization to 1938:
Brigade Headquarters (Pécs)
Infantry Commander (Kaposvár)
Artillery Commander (Pécs)
7th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Kaposvár)
I/7th Infantry Regiment (Kaposvár)
II/7th Infantry Regiment (Baja)
III/7th Infantry Regiment (Kaposvár)
8th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Pécs)
I/8th Infantry Regiment (Pécs)
II/8th Infantry Regiment (Pécs)
III/8th Infantry Regiment (Pécs)
4th Bicycle Battalion (Kenyérmező)
4th Cavalry Company (Tolna)
4th Artillery Battalion (Pécs)
1st Battery (Pécs)
2nd Battery (Pécs)
3rd Battery (Tolna)
4th Artillery Observation Battery (Pécs)
4th Mortar Battery (Tolna)
4th Signal Company (Pécs)
4th Supply Company (Pécs)
4th Motor-Transport Company (Pécs)

Garrison:
(Kaposvár)

Administrative Attachments:
11.05.22 – 1.10.38 HM (peace time garrisons)
### 5th MIXED BRIGADE
Headquarters: Szeged (HM direct)

#### Lineage:
- **Constituted:** 11.05.1922
- **Discontinued:** 1.10.1938 amalgamated into V Corps

#### Commanding Officers:
- 1.12.24 – 1.01.26: Maj. Gen. Manó Kruchina
- 1.01.26 – 1.05.30: Maj. Gen. Gyula Kubinyi
- 1.05.30 – 1.06.34: Maj. Gen. Miklós László
- 1.06.34 – 1.11.36: Maj. Gen. Miksa Nagyszombathy
- 1.11.36 – 1.10.38: Maj. Gen. László Mérey

#### Peace Time Organization to 1938:

**Brigade Headquarters:** (Szeged)
- **Infantry Commander:** (Szeged)
- **Artillery Commander:** (Szeged)
- **9th Infantry Regiment Headquarters:** (Szeged)
- **I/9th Infantry Regiment:** (Szeged)
- **II/9th Infantry Regiment:** (Kecskemét)
- **III/9th Infantry Regiment:** (Kiskunfélegyháza)
- **10th Infantry Regiment Headquarters:** (Békescsaba)
- **I/10th Infantry Regiment:** (Békescsaba)
- **II/10th Infantry Regiment:** (Szeged)
- **III/10th Infantry Regiment:** (Gyula)
- **5th Bicycle Battalion:** (Jászberény)
- **5th Cavalry Company:** (Kecskemét)
- **5th Artillery Battalion:** (Kecskemét)
- **1st Battery:** (Szeged)
- **2nd Battery:** (Kecskemét)
- **3rd Battery:** (Kecskemét)
- **5th Artillery Observation Battery:** (Kecskemét)
- **5th Mortar Battery:** (Kecskemét)
- **5th Signal Company:** (Szeged)
- **5th Supply Company:** (Szeged)
- **5th Motor-Transport Company:** (Szeged)

#### Garrison:
- **Brigade Headquarters:** (Szeged)
- **Infantry Commander:** (Szeged)
- **Artillery Commander:** (Szeged)
- **9th Infantry Regiment Headquarters:** (Szeged)
- **I/9th Infantry Regiment:** (Szeged)
- **II/9th Infantry Regiment:** (Kecskemét)
- **III/9th Infantry Regiment:** (Kiskunfélegyháza)
- **10th Infantry Regiment Headquarters:** (Békescsaba)
- **I/10th Infantry Regiment:** (Békescsaba)
- **II/10th Infantry Regiment:** (Szeged)
- **III/10th Infantry Regiment:** (Gyula)
- **5th Bicycle Battalion:** (Jászberény)
- **5th Cavalry Company:** (Kecskemét)
- **5th Artillery Battalion:** (Kecskemét)
- **1st Battery:** (Szeged)
- **2nd Battery:** (Kecskemét)
- **3rd Battery:** (Kecskemét)
- **5th Artillery Observation Battery:** (Kecskemét)
- **5th Mortar Battery:** (Kecskemét)
- **5th Signal Company:** (Szeged)
- **5th Supply Company:** (Szeged)
- **5th Motor-Transport Company:** (Szeged)

#### Administrative Attachments:
- **11.05.22 – 1.10.38:** HM (peace time garrisons)
### 6th MIXED BRIGADE

**Headquarters:** Debrecen (HM direct)

#### Lineage:
- **Constituted:** 11.05.1922
- **Discontinued:** 1.10.1938 amalgamated into VI Corps

#### Peace Time Organization to 1938:
- **Brigade Headquarters** (Debrecen)
- **Infantry Commander** (Debrecen)
- **Artillery Commander** (Debrecen)
- **11th Infantry Regiment Headquarters** (Debrecen)
  - **I/11th Infantry Regiment** (Debrecen)
  - **II/11th Infantry Regiment** (Berettyóssjfalu)
  - **III/11th Infantry Regiment** (Debrecen)
- **12th Infantry Regiment Headquarters** (Nyiregyháza)
  - **I/12th Infantry Regiment** (Debrecen)
  - **II/12th Infantry Regiment** (Nyiregyháza)
  - **III/12th Infantry Regiment** (Nyiregyháza)
- **6th Bicycle Battalion** (Belassagyarmat)
- **6th Artillery Battalion** (Nyiregyháza)
  - **1st Battery** (Nyiregyháza)
  - **2nd Battery** (Nyiregyháza)
  - **3rd Battery** (Debrecen)
  - **6th Artillery Observation Battery** (Debrecen)
- **6th Mortar Battery** (Debrecen)
- **6th Cavalry Company** (Nyiregyháza)
- **6th Signal Company** (Debrecen)
- **6th Supply Company** (Debrecen)
- **6th Motor-Transport Company** (Debrecen)

#### Garrison:
- **Brigade Headquarters** (Debrecen)
- **Infantry Commander** (Debrecen)
- **Artillery Commander** (Debrecen)
- **11th Infantry Regiment** (Debrecen)
  - **I/11th Infantry Regiment** (Debrecen)
  - **II/11th Infantry Regiment** (Berettyóssjfalu)
  - **III/11th Infantry Regiment** (Debrecen)
- **12th Infantry Regiment** (Nyiregyháza)
  - **I/12th Infantry Regiment** (Debrecen)
  - **II/12th Infantry Regiment** (Nyiregyháza)
  - **III/12th Infantry Regiment** (Nyiregyháza)
- **6th Bicycle Battalion** (Belassagyarmat)
- **6th Artillery Battalion** (Nyiregyháza)
  - **1st Battery** (Nyiregyháza)
  - **2nd Battery** (Nyiregyháza)
  - **3rd Battery** (Debrecen)
  - **6th Artillery Observation Battery** (Debrecen)
- **6th Mortar Battery** (Debrecen)
- **6th Cavalry Company** (Nyiregyháza)
- **6th Signal Company** (Debrecen)
- **6th Supply Company** (Debrecen)
- **6th Motor-Transport Company** (Debrecen)

#### Commanding Officers:
- 7.07.23 – 1.09.23: ? –
- 1.09.23 – 1.01.26: Lt. Gen. Ottokár Ferjentsik
- 1.01.26 – 30.09.28: Maj. Gen. Miklós László
- 30.09.28 – 1.10.32: Lt. Gen. Árpád Sipos
- 1.10.32 – 1.05.36: Maj. Gen. Géza Demény
- 1.05.36 – 1.10.38: Maj. Gen. Géza Siegler

#### Administrative Attachments:
- 11.05.22 – 1.10.38: HM (peace time garrisons)
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7th MIXED BRIGADE
Headquarters: Miskolc (HM direct)

**Lineage:**
- **Constituted:** 11.05.1922
- **Discontinued:** 1.10.1938 amalgamated into VII Corps

**Commanding Officers:**
- 11.05.22 – 2.11.24 Lt. Gen. György Ludwig
- 1.06.25 – 1.11.28 Lt. Gen. Kálmán Révy
- 1.11.28 – 1.05.30 Maj. Gen. Albin Lenz
- 1.05.30 – 1.05.34 Maj. Gen. Hermann Pokorny
- 1.05.34 – 5.09.36 Gen. Hugó Sőnyi
- 5.09.36 – 1.10.36 – ? –
- 1.10.36 – 1.10.38 Lt. Gen. András Littay

**Peace Time Organization to 1938:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade Headquarters</th>
<th>Garrison:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Miskolc)</td>
<td>(Eger)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery Commander</td>
<td>(Miskolc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Miskolc)</td>
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<td>II/13th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Miskolc)</td>
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<tr>
<td>III/13th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Sátoraljaújhely)</td>
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<tr>
<td>14th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Eger)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/14th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Eger)</td>
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<tr>
<td>III/14th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Eger)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Bicycle Battalion</td>
<td>(Salgótarján)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>(Nyiregyháza)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Battery</td>
<td>(Miskolc)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Battery</td>
<td>(Miskolc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battery</td>
<td>(Miskolc)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Artillery Observation Battery</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Mortar Battery</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(Miskolc)</td>
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<td>7th Supply Company</td>
<td>(Miskolc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Motor-Transport Company</td>
<td>(Miskolc)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Administrative Attachments:**
- 11.05.22 – 1.10.38 HM (peace time garrisons)
1st CAVALRY BRIGADE  
Headquarters: Budapest (HM direct)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding Officers:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituted: 11.05.1922</td>
<td>19.01.31 – 1.05.33 Brig. Gen. Lajos Keresztes-Fischer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued: 1.10.1937 redesignated as 2nd Cavalry Brigade</td>
<td>1.05.33 – 1.02.35 Brig. Gen. Guzstáv Kistoranyi Denk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.02.35 – 1.10.37 Brig. Gen. Elemér Gorondy-Novák</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Time Organization to 1937:</th>
<th>Garrison:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigade Headquarters</td>
<td>(Budapest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>(Komáromujáváros)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/2nd Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>(Pápa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/2nd Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>(Komáromujáváros)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>(Sopron)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/3rd Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>(Sopron)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/3rd Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>(Tolna)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Attachments:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.05.22 – 1.10.37 HM (peace time garrisons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2nd CAVALRY BRIGADE
Headquarters: Nyíregyháza (HM direct)

Lineage:
- Constituted: 11.05.1922
- Discontinued: 1.10.1937 redesignated as 1st Cavalry Brigade

Commanding Officers:
- 11.05.22 – 1926 Brig. Gen. Tivadár Dienes-Oehm
- 1926 – 1.11.28 – ? –
- 1.11.28 – 1932 Maj. Gen. Benő Deschán
- 1935 – 1.05.37 Brig. Gen. Olivér Perczel
- 1.05.37 – 1.10.37 Brig. Gen. Alajos Bélyd

Peace Time Organization to 1937:
- Brigade Headquarters
- 1st Cavalry Regiment Headquarters (Nyíregyháza)
- I/1st Cavalry Regiment (Budapest)
- II/1st Cavalry Regiment (Kecskemét)
- 4th Cavalry Regiment Headquarters (Nyíregyháza)
- I/4thCavalry Regiment (Nyíregyháza)
- II/4thCavalry Regiment (Nyíregyháza)

Garrison:
- (Nyíregyháza)
- (Budapest)
- (Kecskemét)
- (Nyíregyháza)
- (Nyíregyháza)

Administrative Attachments:
- 11.05.22 – 1.10.37 HM (peace time garrisons)
**1st LIGHT DIVISION**

**Headquarters:** Budapest (I Corps)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding Officers:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 1st Infantry Brigade. [From the 1/1 Infantry Commander, 1st mixed Brigade]</td>
<td>23.01.39 – 1.02.40 Brig. Gen. József Makay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activated: 7.04.1941</td>
<td>1.02.40 – 1.11.41 Brig. Gen. Béla Aggteleky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactivated: 17.04.1941</td>
<td>1.11.41 – 1.10.42 Brig.Gen. János Legeza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 1st Light Division</td>
<td>1.10.42 – 10.08.43 Brig. Gen. Károly Ungár</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbanded: 1.10.1942 Removed from the order of battle.</td>
<td>08.43 – 10.05.44 Brig. Gen. Gusztáv Deseö</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activated: 5.11.1942 As headquarters with reduced-strength Staff, and Supply Services for the occupation forces.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued: 10.05.1944 Dissolved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Peace Time Organization to 1942:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division Headquarters</th>
<th>Garrison:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Commander</td>
<td>(Budapest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Commander</td>
<td>(Budapest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Infantry Regiment Headquarters</td>
<td>(Budapest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/1st Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Budapest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III/1st Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Aszód)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(MOBILIZATION UNIT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/1st Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>(Budapest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cavalry Company</td>
<td>(Budapest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Anti-Aircraft Company</td>
<td>(Budapest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Signal Company</td>
<td>(Budapest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Divisional Supply Services Heads</td>
<td>(Budapest)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mobilized Combat Organization 31.12.1942:**

Division Headquarters
Headquarters 33rd Inf. Rgt. with II/33, 31st March Bn., 41st March Bn.
Headquarters 252nd Inf. Rgt with II/40, I/41, 40 March Bn.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Attachments:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.03.40 – 7.04.41 VKF (peace time garrisons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.04.41 – 17.04.41 I Corps, Third Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.04.41 – 6.10.42 VKF (peace time garrisons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.10.42 – 31.12.42 (Headquarters only) Being activated and transported to East Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.12.43 – 9.02.43 (Headquarters only) H.O.G. East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.02.43 – 1.05.43 (Headquarters only) H.O.G. East, Second Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.05.43 – 15.08.43 (Headquarters only) VIII Corps, H.O.F.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.08.43 – 1.04.44 (Headquarters only) VIII Corps, Second Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.04.44 – 1.05.44 (Headquarters only) H.O.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.05.44 – 10.05.44 (Headquarters only) II Res. Corps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mobilized Combat Organization 1.07.1943:**

Division Headquarters
Headquarters 33rd Inf. Rgt. with II/33, II/37, 41st March Bn.
Headquarters 46thInf. Rgt. with II/40, III/46, 44th March Bn.
8th Anti-Aircraft Company
2nd Signal Company

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactical Attachments:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31.12.42 – 1.03.43 Befh. HG Süd, Heeresgruppe Süd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.03.43 – 8.10.43 Koriuck 580, 2. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.10.43 – 5.05.44 Befh. HG Weissruthenien, WB Ostland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.05.44 – 10.05.44 WM Weissruthenien, Heeresgruppe Mitte</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**

Although the division was removed from the order of battle, the dissolution of the formation itself was only partially carried out.

The 1st Infantry Regiment – the House Regiment of the Budapest – also remained in existence. It was assigned on 1.10.1943 to the 25th Infantry Division as its third infantry regiment in accordance with the Szabolcs Plan.

The reduced-strength Headquarters, 1st Division and some of its supply troops were on the East Front, and remained in existence there. During April and May 1944, the units under the division command were amalgamated into the 5th, 12th and 23rd Reserve Divisions. The headquarters was then dissolved.
### 102nd LIGHT DIVISION

**Headquarters:** Budapest (I Corps)

**Lineage:**
- **Constituted:** 23.01.1939 As 2nd Infantry Brigade. [From the 2/1 Infantry Commander, 1st mixed Brigade]
- **Activated:** 7.04.1941
- **Inactivated:** 17.04.1941
- **Activated:** 1.12.1941 As headquarters with reduced-strength Staff, and Supply Services for the occupation forces.
- **Redesignated:** 1.10.1941 As 102th Infantry Brigade
- **Redesignated:** 17.02.1942 As 102th Light Division
- **Dissolved:** 1.07.1943

**Peace Time Organization to 1942:**
- **Garrison:**
  - Division Headquarters (Budapest)
  - Infantry Commander (Budapest)
  - Artillery Commander (Budapest)
  - 2nd Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Budapest)
  - 1/2nd Infantry Regiment (Budapest)
  - II/2nd Infantry Regiment (Budapest)
  - III/2nd Infantry Regiment (Piliscaba)
  - 32nd Infantry Regiment (Mobilization Unit)
  - I/2nd Artillery Regiment (Budapest)
  - II/2nd Artillery Regiment (Budapest)
  - 2nd Cavalry Company (Budapest)
  - 2nd Anti-Aircraft Company (Budapest)
  - 2nd Signal Company (Budapest)
  - 2nd Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Budapest)

**Mobilized Combat Organization 31.12.1942:**
- Division Headquarters
- Headquarters 40th Inf. Rgt. with I/40, I/42, III/42
- Headquarters 53rd Inf. Rgt. with II/43, III/43, II/53
- 14th Cavalry Company
- 2nd Anti-Aircraft Company
- 1st Signal Company

**Commanding Officers:**
- 23.01.39 – 1.03.40 Brig. Gen. László Horváth
- 1.03.40 – 10.41 Col. Géza Heim
- 10.41 – 26.05.42 Brig. Gen. Károly Bogányi
- 26.05.42 – 1.07.43 Brig. Gen. Miklós Dépold

**Administrative Attachments:**
- 23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
- 1.03.40 – 7.04.41 VKF (peace time garrisons)
- 7.04.41 – 17.04.41 IV Corps, Third Army
- 17.04.41 – 1.12.41 VKF (peace time garrisons)
- 1.12.41 – 9.02.42 (Headquarters only) H.O.C.
- 9.02.42 – 9.02.43 (Headquarters only) H.O.G. East
- 9.02.43 – 1.05.43 (Headquarters only) H.O.G. East, Second Army
- 1.05.43 – 29.07.43 (Headquarters only) VIII Corps, H.O.F.C.

**Tactical Attachments:**
- 1.12.41 – 30.01.42 Befh. HG Süd, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 30.01.42 – 10.03.42 6. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 10.03.42 – 8.06.42 2. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 8.06.42 – 2.10.42 Gruppe von Gilsa, 2. Panzerarmee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 2.10.42 – 7.07.43 Korück 532, 2. Panzerarmee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 7.07.43 – 29.07.43 Befh. HG Mitte, Heeresgruppe Mitte

**NOTES:**
Although the 2nd Division was officially removed from the peace time order of battle on 1.10.1942, its dissolution was only partially carried out. The reduced-strength headquarters staff and some supply troops remained on the East Front, and remained in existence there until July 1943, at which time the Headquarters, 2nd Division was absorbed by 23rd Light Division, and ceased to exist.
### 3rd INFANTRY BRIGADE

**Headquarters:** Budapest (I Corps)

**Lineage:**
- **Constituted:** 23.01.1939
  - As 3rd Infantry Brigade. [From the 3/1 Infantry Commander, 1st mixed Brigade]
- **Discontinued:** 1.08.1941
  - [Some elements transferred to the IX Corps in Siebenburgen. Other elements transferred to the Mobile Corps]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Time Organization to 1941:</th>
<th>Garrison:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division Headquarters</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Commander</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Commander</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Infantry Regiment Headquarters</td>
<td>Vác</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/15th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Vác</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/15th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Balassagyarmat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III/15th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Aszód</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(MOBILIZATION UNIT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/3rd Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>Vác</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/3rd Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>Aszód</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Cavalry Company</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Anti-Aircraft Company</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Signal Company</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Divisional Supply Services Headquarters</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Commanding Officers:**
- 23.01.39 – 1.03.40: Brig. Gen. Géza Laktos
- 1.03.40 – 1.08.41: Brig. Gen. Károly Osskó

**Administrative Attachments:**
- 23.01.39 – 1.03.40: HM (peace time garrisons)
- 1.03.40 – 1.08.41: VKF (peace time garrisons)

**NOTES:**
The 3rd Infantry Brigade was removed from the peace time order of battle on 1.08.1941.
# Chapter 18 Royal Hungarian Army Commands and Formations 1922 – 1945

## 4th LIGHT DIVISION

Headquarters: Szekesfehérvár (II Corps)

### Lineage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituted</td>
<td>23.01.1939</td>
<td>As 4th Infantry Brigade. [From the 1/2 Infantry Commander, 2nd Mixted Brigade]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redesignated</td>
<td>17.02.1942</td>
<td>As 4th Light Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued</td>
<td>10.08.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Commanding Officers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.01.39 – 17.10.39</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Dezső Thold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.10.39 – 1.08.41</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Ernő Paksy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.08.41 – 10.09.42</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Gyula Vargyassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10.42 – 1.01.43</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Imre Kolossváry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.01.43 – 1.06.43</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Dezső Pötze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.06.43 – 10.08.43</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Jenő Bor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Peace Time Organization to 1943:

- Division Headquarters (Szekesfehérvár)
- Infantry Commander (Szekesfehérvár)
- Artillery Commander (Szekesfehérvár)
- 3rd Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Szekesfehérvár)
- I/3rd Infantry Regiment (Szekesfehérvár)
- II/3rd Infantry Regiment (Tata)
- III/3rd Infantry Regiment (Szekesfehérvár)
- 33rd Infantry Regiment (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
- I/4th Artillery Regiment (Szekesfehérvár)
- II/4th Artillery Regiment (Szekesfehérvár)
- 4th Cavalry Company (Szekesfehérvár)
- 4th Anti-Aircraft Company (Szekesfehérvár)
- 4th Signal Company (Szekesfehérvár)
- 4th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Szekesfehérvár)

### Garrison:

- (Szekesfehérvár)
- (Szekesfehérvár)
- (Szekesfehérvár)
- (Szekesfehérvár)
- (Tata)
- (Szekesfehérvár)
- (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
- (Szekesfehérvár)
- (Szekesfehérvár)
- (Szekesfehérvár)
- (Szekesfehérvár)

### Administrative Attachments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.01.39 – 1.03.40</td>
<td>HM (peace time garrisons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.03.40 – 10.08.43</td>
<td>VKF (peace time garrisons)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NOTES:

The 4th Division was dissolved and removed from the peace time order of battle on 10.08.1943.
### 5th RESERVE DIVISION

**Headquarters:** Győr (II Corps)

**Lineage:**
- **Constituted:** 23.01.1939
- **Activated:** 30.09.1941
- **Redesignated:** 1.10.1941
- **Redesignated:** 17.02.1942
- **Redesignated:** 1.06.1943
- **Redesignated:** 1.10.1943
- **Discontinued:** 8.05.1945

**Administrative Attachments:**
- 23.01.39 – 1.03.40: HM (peace time garrisons)
- 1.03.40 – 6.10.41: VKF (peace time garrisons)
- 6.10.41 – 1.05.42: H.O.C.
- 1.05.42 – 9.02.43: H.O.G. East
- 9.02.43 – 1.05.43: VIII Corps, H.O.F.C.
- 1.05.43 – 25.09.44: II Res. Corps
- 25.09.44 – 8.05.45: VKF

**Tactical Attachments:**
- 6.10.41 – 9.02.42: Befh. HG Süd, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 9.02.43 – 1.05.43: 2. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 1.05.43 – 7.07.43: Befh. HG Mitte, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 7.07.43 – 8.10.43: Befh. HG Weissruthenien, BW Ostland
- 5.05.44 – 15.05.44: WM Weissruthenien, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 15.05.44 – 27.07.44: XI. Armeekorps, 1. Panzerarmee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 27.07.44 – 25.09.44: 5. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 25.09.44 – 5.11.44: XXXVI. Panzerkorps, 9. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 31.12.44 – 25.01.44: XI. Armeekorps, 1. Panzerarmee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 5.11.44 – 31.12.44: LVII. Panzerkorps, 4. Panzerarmee, Heeresgruppe A

**Peace Time Organization to 1943:**

**Garrison:**
- Division Headquarters
- Infantry Commander
- Artillery Commander
- 16th Infantry Regiment Headquarters
- I/16th Infantry Regiment
- II/16th Infantry Regiment
- III/16th Infantry Regiment
- 46th Infantry Regiment (I–III)
- I/4th Artillery Regiment
- II/4th Artillery Regiment
- 4th Cavalry Company
- 4th Anti-Aircraft Company
- 4th Signal Company
- 4th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

**Mobilized Combat Organization 31.12.1941:**
- Division Headquarters
- Headquarters 32nd Infantry Regiment with II/32, III/33...
- Headquarters 46th Infantry Regiment with III/46, II/52...
- 5th Cavalry Company
- 5th Anti-Aircraft Company
- 4th Signal Company

**Peace Time Organization from 1943:**

**Garrison:**
- Division Headquarters (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
- Infantry Commander (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
- Artillery Commander (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
- 33rd Infantry Regiment (I–III)
- 46th Infantry Regiment (I–III)
- 52nd Infantry Regiment (I–III)
- 34th Artillery Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
- 35th Artillery Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
- 82nd Artillery Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
- 5th Reconnaissance Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)

**Mobilized Combat Organization 5.05.1944:**
- Division Headquarters
- Infantry Commander
- Artillery Commander
- 33rd Infantry Regiment (I–III)
- 46th Infantry Regiment (I–III)
- 5th Signal Battalion
- 54th Mortar Company
- 5th Cavalry Company
- 5th Anti-Aircraft Company
- 1st/72 Combat Engineer Company
- 5th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

**Commanding Officers:**
- 23.01.39 – 1.02.41: Brig. Gen. Gusztáv Hennyey
- 1.02.41 – 1.03.41: Col. Dezső László
- 1.03.41 – 1.10.42: Brig. Gen. Imre Kolossváry
- 1.10.43 – 05.45: Brig. Gen. László János Szábo

**Administrative Attachments:**
- 23.01.39 – 1.03.40: HM (peace time garrisons)
- 1.03.40 – 6.10.41: VKF (peace time garrisons)
- 6.10.41 – 1.05.42: H.O.C.
- 1.05.42 – 9.02.43: H.O.G. East
- 9.02.43 – 1.05.43: H.O.G. East, Second Army
- 1.05.43 – 10.08.43: VIII Corps, H.O.F.C.
- 15.08.43 – 1.04.44: VIII Corps, Second Army
- 1.04.44 – 1.05.44: H.O.C.
- 1.05.44 – 25.09.44: II Res. Corps
- 25.09.44 – 8.05.45: VKF

**Tactical Attachments:**
- 6.10.41 – 9.02.42: Befh. HG Süd, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 9.02.42 – 27.07.44: Befh. HG B, Heeresgruppe B
- 14.02.43 – 4.03.43: Befh. HG Süd, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 4.03.43 – 1.05.43: 2. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 1.05.43 – 7.07.43: Befh. HG Mitte, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 7.07.43 – 8.10.43: Befh. HG Mitte, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 8.10.43 – 5.05.44: WM Weissruthenien, BW Ostland
- 5.05.44 – 15.05.44: WM Weissruthenien, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 15.05.44 – 27.07.44: 2. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 25.09.44 – 5.11.44: XXXVI. Panzerkorps, 9. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 31.12.44 – 25.01.44: XI. Armeekorps, 1. Panzerarmee, Heeresgruppe A
- 1.03.45 – 8.05.45: XXIX. Armeekorps, 8. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
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6th INFANTRY DIVISION
Headquarters: Komárom (II Corps)

Lineage:

Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 6th Infantry Brigade. [New unit]
Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 6th Light Division
Activated: 24.03.1942
Inactivated: 06.1943
Redesignated: 10.08.1943 As 6th Infantry Division
Activated: 18.05.1944
Discontinued: 9.12.1944

Commanding Officers:

23.01.39 – 26.05.42 Brig. Gen. Ferenc Feketehalmy-Czeydner
1.03.40 – 24.12.40 Brig. Gen. Alfréd Bántay
24.12.40 – 1.08.41 Brig. Gen. Imre Németh
1.08.41 – 27.01.42 Col. Gyula Pajás
02.42 – 08.42 Col. János Gödry
08.42 – 20.08.42 Brig. Gen. László Szabó
20.08.42 – 15.11.42 Brig. Gen. Dr. Béla Temesy
15.09.42 – 7.03.44 Brig. Gen. Oszkár Ginzkey
03.44 – 07.44 Brig. Gen. Ferenc Horváth
07.44 – 9.12.44 Brig. Gen. László Karátsány

Peace Time Organization to 1943:

Division Headquarters (Komárom)
Infantry Commander (Komárom)
Artillery Commander (Komárom)
22nd Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Komárom)
I/22nd Infantry Regiment (Komárom)
II/22nd Infantry Regiment (Komárom)
III/22nd Infantry Regiment (Léva)
52nd Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
16th Artillery Regiment (Komárom)
II/6th Artillery Regiment (Komárom)
6th Cavalry Company (Komárom)
6th Anti-Aircraft Company (Komárom)
6th Signal Company (Komárom)
6th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Komárom)

Mobilized Combat Organization 24.03.1942:

Division Commander
Headquarters 22nd Infantry Regiment with II/22, III/22, III/52
Headquarters 52nd Infantry Regiment with III/3, I/46, II/46
I/6th and II/6th Artillery Battalions
6th Cavalry Company
6th Anti-Aircraft Company
6th Signal Company
6th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

Peace Time Organization from 1943:

Division Headquarters (Komárom)
Infantry Commander (Komárom)
3rd Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Székesfehérvár)
I/3rd Infantry Regiment (Székesfehérvár)
II/3rd Infantry Regiment (Táta)
III/3rd Infantry Regiment (Székesfehérvár)
16th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Győr)
I/16th Infantry Regiment (Győr)
II/16th Infantry Regiment (Somorja)
III/16th Infantry Regiment (Magyarvár recovered)
22nd Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Komárom)
I/22nd Infantry Regiment (Komárom)
II/22nd Infantry Regiment (Komárom)
III/22nd Infantry Regiment (Léva)
4th Artillery Battalion (Székesfehérvár)
5th Artillery Battalion (Győr)
6th Artillery Battalion (Komárom)
6th Reconnaissance Battalion (Érsekújvár)

Mobilized Combat Organization 13.07.1944:

Division Headquarters
Infantry Commander
Artillery Commander
3rd Infantry Regiment (I – III)
16th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
22nd Infantry Regiment (I – III)
4th Artillery Battalion
5th Artillery Battalion
6th Artillery Battalion
72nd Artillery Battalion
6th Reconnaissance Battalion
6th Anti-Aircraft Company
52th Combat Engineer Battalion
6th Signal Battalion
6th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

Administrative Attachments:

23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
1.03.40 – 24.03.42 VKF (peace time garrisons)
24.03.42 – 11.05.42 III Corps
11.05.42 – 25.05.42 III Corps, Second Army
25.05.42 – 8.06.42 Reserve, Second Army
8.06.42 – 18.06.42 III Corps, Second Army
18.06.42 – 9.07.42 VII Corps, Second Army
9.07.42 – 11.02.42 III Corps, Second Army
11.02.43 – 4.03.43 (Remnants) Reserve, Second Army
4.03.43 – 1.05.43 (Remnants) H.O.G. East, Second Army
05.43 – 06.43 Returned to Hungary
06.43 – 18.05.44 VKF (peace time garrisons)
18.05.44 – 23.06.44 Being activated, 3rd Military District
23.06.44 – 13.07.44 Being activated, 4th Military District
13.07.44 – 1.08.44 4th Military District
1.08.44 – 16.08.44 en-route to First Army
16.08.44 – 17.11.44 III Corps, First Army
17.11.44 – 9.12.44 being dissolved

Notes:

The 6th Infantry Division dissolved after transferring its remnants to the 16th Infantry Division towards the end of November 1944.
7th INFANTRY DIVISION
Headquarters: Sopron (III Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 23.01.1939 as 7th Infantry Brigade. [From the 2/2 Infantry Commander, 2nd mixed Brigade]
Redesignated: 17.02.1942 as 7th Light Division
Activated: 24.03.1942
Inactivated: 06.1943
Redesignated: 10.08.1943 as 7th Infantry Division
Activated: 3.06.1944
Discontinued: 26.08.1944

Commanding Officers:
23.01.39 – 1.01.41 Brig. Gen. Károly Zalay
1.01.41 – 7.10.42 Brig. Gen. Endre Mezö
10.42 – 06.44 Brig. Gen. László Szábo
06.44 – 26.08.44 Brig. Gen. István Kudriczy

Peace Time Organization to 1943: Garrison:
Division Headquarters (Sopron)
Infantry Commander (Sopron)
Artillery Commander (Sopron)
4th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Sopron)
I/4th Infantry Regiment (Sopron)
II/4th Infantry Regiment (Sopron)
III/4th Infantry Regiment (Veszprém)
34th Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
I/7th Artillery Regiment (Sopron)
II/7th Artillery Regiment (Sopron)
7th Cavalry Company (Sopron)
7th Anti-Aircraft Company (Sopron)
7th Signal Company (Sopron)
7th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Sopron)

Mobilized Combat Organization 1.06.1942:
Division Headquarters
Artillery Commander
4th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
35th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
17th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
7th Cavalry Company
7th Anti-Aircraft Company
7th Signal Company
7th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

Peace Time Organization from 1943: Garrison:
Division Headquarters (Nagykaniza)
Infantry Commander (Nagykaniza)
Artillery Commander (Sopron)
4th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Sopron)
I/4th Infantry Regiment (Sopron)
II/4th Infantry Regiment (Sopron)
III/4th Infantry Regiment (Veszprém)
5th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Szombathelyi)
I/5th Infantry Regiment (Szombathelyi)
II/5th Infantry Regiment (Kőrmen)
III/5th Infantry Regiment (Köszeg)
17th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Nagykaniza)
I/17th Infantry Regiment (Nagykaniza)
II/17th Infantry Regiment (Csákternya)
III/17th Infantry Regiment (Zalaegerszeg)
7th Artillery Battalion (Sopron)
8th Artillery Battalion (Szombathelyi)
9th Artillery Battalion (Nagykaniza)
7th Reconnaissance Battalion (Sopron)

Mobilized Combat Organization 3.06.1944:
Division Headquarters
Infantry Commander
Artillery Commander
4th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
5th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
17th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
7th Artillery Battalion
8th Artillery Battalion
9th Artillery Battalion
73rd Artillery Battalion
7th Reconnaissance Battalion
7th Anti-Aircraft Company
53rd Combat Engineer Battalion
7th Signal Battalion
7th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

Administrative Attachments:
1.10.38 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
1.03.40 – 24.03.42 VKF (peace time garrisons)
24.03.42 – 2.09.42 III Corps, Second Army
2.09.42 – 11.02.43 IV Corps, Second Army
11.02.43 – 4.03.43 (Remnants) Reserve, Second Army
4.03.43 – 0.54.43 (Remnants) H.O.G. East, Second Army
0.54.43 – 0.65.43 Returned to Hungary
3.06.43 – 1.05.44 VKF (peace time garrisons)
1.05.44 – 3.06.44 Being activated, 3rd Military District
3.06.44 – 13.06.44 Security duties in West Hungary
13.06.44 – 29.06.44 en-route to First Army
29.06.44 – 15.08.44 Reserve, First Army
15.08.44 – 26.08.44 being dissolved

Tactical Attachments:
2.09.42 – 22.12.42 XXIV. Panzerkorps, Second Army
23.01.43 – 3.02.43 XXXVth Italian Corps, Heersgruppe B

NOTES:
The 7th Infantry Division dissolved after remnants had been transferred to the 24th Infantry Division during the latter half of August 1944.
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108th LIGHT DIVISION
Headquarters: Szombathely (III Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 8th Infantry Brigade. [From the 1/3 Infantry Commander, 3rd Mixed Brigade]
Activated: 30.09.1941 [Headquarters with a reduced-strength Staff and Supply Services for the occupation forces]
Redesignated: 1.10.1941 As 108th Infantry Brigade Headquarters
Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 108th Light Division Headquarters
Dissolved: 29.07.1943 Division Headquarters Staff absorbed by the 9th Light Division in June 1943
Discontinued: 10.08.1943

和平时期组织到1943年:

Pacification:

- Division Headquarters (Szombathely)
- Artillery Commander (Szombathely)
- 5th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Szombathely)
- I/5th Infantry Regiment (Szombathely)
- II/5th Infantry Regiment (Kőrmend)
- III/5th Infantry Regiment (Körszeg)
- 35th Infantry Regiment (I – III) (Mobilization Unit)
- I/7th Artillery Regiment (Szombathely)
- II/7th Artillery Regiment (Szombathely)
- 8th Cavalry Company (Szombathely)
- 8th Anti-Aircraft Company (Szombathely)
- 8th Signal Company (Szombathely)
- 8th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Szombathely)

动员作战组31.12.1941:

- Division Headquarters
- Headquarters 34th Infantry Regiment with II/34, III/35, I/47
- Headquarters ?? Infantry Regiment with III/47, II/38, (II/49?)
- 8th Cavalry Company
- 21st Anti-aircraft Company
- 11th Signal Company

Commanding Officers:
23.01.39 – 1.02.41 Brig. Gen. Gyöző Weinmann
1.02.41 – 01.42 Brig. Gen. Otto Abt
01.42 – 02.42 Brig. Gen. László Stemmer
9.11.42 – 03.43 Brig. Gen. István Makay
03.43 – 06.43 Brig. Gen. Kálmán Csapó
06.43 – 10.08.43 Brig. Gen. István Makay

Administrative Attachments:
1.10.38 – 1.03.40 HM (和平时期驻军)
1.03.40 – 30.09.41 VKF (和平时期驻军)
1.03.40 – 9.02.42 (Headquarters only) H.O.C.
9.02.42 – 17.02.43 (Headquarters only) H.O.G. West
17.02.43 – 1.05.43 (Headquarters only) H.O.G. West, Second Army
1.05.43 – 10.08.43 (Headquarters only) VII Corps, H.O.F.C.

Tactical Attachments:
1.10.41 – 27.11.41 Befh. HG Süd, Heeresgruppe Süd
27.11.41 – 4.12.41 WB Ukraine, RK Ukraine
4.12.41 – 30.01.42 Befh. HG Süd, Heeresgruppe Süd
30.01.42 – 10.03.42 Reserve, 6. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
10.03.42 – 8.06.42 VIII. Armeekorps, 6. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
8.06.42 – 18.06.42 Reserve, 6. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
18.06.42 – 24.06.42 Reserve, 8. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
24.06.42 – 4.07.42 Reserve, 6. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
4.07.42 – 29.07.42 Reserve, 2. Panzerarmee, Heeresgruppe Süd
26.09.42 – 1.05.43 Korück 532, 2. Panzerarmee, Heeresgruppe Süd
1.05.43 – 29.07.43 Befh. HG Mitte, Heeresgruppe Mitte

NOTES:
The 8th Division was removed from the order of battle and dissolved in Hungary in August 1943.

A completely new 8th Infantry Division was supposed to be raised late 1944 in the 2. Panzerarmee sector, and equipped with captured weapons. It was to consist of the Bakony Regiment, a new regiment formed from two fortress battalions, as well as an artillery regiment. Events precluded this division from being completely formed, and the plan was subsequently dropped, the units being assigned to other formations.
Lineage:
Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 9th Infantry Brigade. [From the 3/3 Infantry Commander, 3rd mixed Brigade]
Activated: 6.04.1941
Deactivated: 17.04.1941
Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 9th Light Division
Activated: 6.04.1941
Redesignated: 10.08.1943 As 9th Reserve Division
Discontinued: 15.04.1944

9th RESERVE DIVISION
Headquarters: Nagykanizsa (III Corps)

Commanding Officers:
23.01.39 – 1.08.41 Brig. Gen. János Székely
1.08.41 – 1.05.42 Brig. Gen. Imre Széchy
1.05.42 – 15.11.42 Brig. Gen. Jenő Ujlaky
15.11.42 – 10.08.43 Brig. Gen. Kornél Oszlányi
10.08.43 – 15.04.44 Brig. Gen. Béla Németh

Administrative Attachments:
1.10.38 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
1.03.40 – 24.03.42 VKF (peace time garrisons)
6.04.19 – 17.04.41 Reserves, 3rd Army
24.03.42 – 27.02.43 III Corps, Second Army
27.02.43 – 4.03.43 (Remnants) Reserve, Second Army
4.03.43 – 9.04.43 (Remnants) H.O.G. East, Second Army
9.04.43 – 1.05.43 H.O.G. East, Second Army
1.05.43 – 18.05.43 H.O.G. East, H.O.F.C.
18.05.43 – 15.08.43 VIII Corps, H.O.F.C.
15.08.43 – 1.04.44 VIII Corps, Second Army
1.04.44 – 15.04.44 H.O.C.

Tactical Attachments:
3.02.43 – 4.03.43 (Remnants) Reserve, Heeresgruppe B
4.03.43 – 1.05.43 Reserve, 2. Armee, Heeresgruppe B
1.05.43 – 7.07.43 Befh. HG Süd, Heeresgruppe Süd
7.07.43 – 8.10.43 Befh. HG Mitte, Heeresgruppe Mitte
8.10.43 – 5.04.44 Befh. Weissruthenien, Heeresgruppe Mitte
5.04.44 – 7.04.44 WB Weissruthenien, Heeresgruppe Mitte

NOTES:
The 9th Reserve Division, although foreseen by the 1.10.1943 Szabolcs Plan, could not be completed – owing to a lack of heavy weapons, particularly artillery – and its continuation was cancelled early 1944.

The division was removed from the peace time order of battle and dissolved in April 1944 after its remnants had been transferred to the 5th, 12th, and 23rd Reserve Divisions earlier that month

A 9th Border Guard / Infantry Division was raised from the 9th Border Guard Brigade in early 1945. (See there.)
**10th INFANTRY DIVISION**

**Headquarters:** Kaposvár (IV Corps)

### Lineage:

- **Constituted:** 23.01.1939 As 10th Infantry Brigade. [From the 2/3 Infantry Commander, 3rd mixed Brigade]
- **Activated:** 5.04.1941
- **Inactivated:** 17.04.1942
- **Redesignated:** 17.02.1942 As 10th Light Division
- **Activated:** 24.03.1942
- **Inactivated:** 05.1943
- **Redesignated:** 10.08.1943 As 10th Infantry Division
- **Activated:** 22.07.1944
- **Discontinued:** 12.02.1945 Destroyed when Budapest fell

### Peace Time Organization to 1943:

- **Garrison:** Kaposvár
- **Artillery Commander:** Kaposvár
- **6th Infantry Regiment Headquarters:** Kaposvár
- **I/6th Infantry Regiment:** Kaposvár
- **II/6th Infantry Regiment:** Kaposvár
- **III/6th Infantry Regiment:** Nagyádát
- **36th Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT):** Kaposvár
- **I/10th and II/10th Artillery Battalion:** Kaposvár
- **10th Cavalry Company:** Kaposvár
- **10th Anti-Aircraft Company:** Kaposvár
- **10th Signal Company:** Kaposvár
- **10th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters:** Kaposvár

### Mobilized Combat Organization 1.06.1942:

- **Division Headquarters:** Kaposvár
- **Artillery Commander:** Kaposvár
- **6th Infantry Regiment (I – III):** Kaposvár
- **Headquarters Infantry Regiment 36 with I/36., III/36., II/38.:** Kaposvár
- **I/10th Artillery Regiment:** Kaposvár
- **II/10th Artillery Regiment:** Kaposvár
- **10th Cavalry Company:** Kaposvár
- **10th Anti-Aircraft Company:** Kaposvár
- **10th Signal Company:** Kaposvár
- **10th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters:** Kaposvár

### Peace Time Organization from 1943:

- **Garrison:** Kaposvár
- **Infantry Commander:** Szekszárd
- **Artillery Commander:** Kaposvár
- **6th Infantry Regiment Headquarters:** Kaposvár
- **II/6th Infantry Regiment:** Kaposvár
- **III/6th Infantry Regiment:** Nagyádát
- **8th Infantry Regiment Headquarters:** Pécs
- **II/8th Infantry Regiment:** Pécs
- **II/8th Infantry Regiment:** Pécs
- **8th Infantry Regiment Headquarters:** Pécs
- **II/8th Infantry Regiment:** Pécs
- **II/8th Infantry Regiment:** Pécs
- **10th Artillery Battalion:** Kaposvár
- **11th Artillery Battalion:** Pécs
- **12th Artillery Battalion:** Tolna
- **10th Reconnaissance Battalion:** Pécs & Gyékényes

### Mobilized Combat Organization 22.07.1944:

- **Division Headquarters:** Kaposvár
- **Infantry Commander:** Kaposvár
- **Artillery Commander:** Kaposvár
- **6th Infantry Regiment (I – III):** Pécs
- **8th Infantry Regiment (I – III):** Pécs
- **10th Artillery Battalion:** Kaposvár
- **11th Artillery Battalion:** Pécs
- **12th Artillery Battalion:** Tolna
- **10th Reconnaissance Battalion:** Pécs
- **10th Anti-Aircraft Company:** Kaposvár
- **54th Combat Engineer Battalion:** Kaposvár
- **10th Signal Battalion:** Tolna
- **10th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters:** Kaposvár

### Commanding Officers:

- 23.01.39 – 07.39 Brig. Gen. Dezső Füleky
- 08.39 – 10.40 Col. Frigyes Gyimessy
- 10.40 – 11.41 Brig. Gen. Ferenc Peterdy
- 11.41 – 05.42 Brig. Gen. Jenő Felkő
- 05.42 – 09.42 Col. Bela Tanító
- 09.42 – 10.43 Gen. László Molnár
- 10.43 – 15.06.44 Brig. Gen. István Kudriczcy
- 12.44 – 12.02.45 Col. Sándor András

### Administrative Attachments:

- 23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
- 1.03.40 – 5.04.41 VKF (peace time garrisons)
- 5.04.41 – 17.04.41 IV Corps, Third Army
- 17.04.41 – 24.03.42 (Inactive; peace time garrisons)
- 24.03.42 – 9.07.42 IV Corps
- 9.07.42 – 15.07.42 IV Corps, Second Army
- 15.07.42 – 29.07.42 VII Corps, Second Army
- 29.07.42 – 3.02.43 IV Corps, Second Army
- 3.02.43 – 05.43 (Remnants) Reserve, Second Army
- 05.43 – 0.6.43 Returned to Hungary
- 06.43 – 22.07.44 VKF (peace time garrisons)
- 22.07.44 – 16.09.44 III Corps, VKF
- 16.09.44 – 14.10.44 VI Corps, First Army
- 14.10.44 – 23.10.44 Reserve, First Army
- 23.10.44 – 31.10.44 V Corps, First Army
- 31.10.44 – 12.11.44 VII Corps, Third Army
- 12.11.44 – 13.02.45 I Corps, Third Army

### Tactical Attachments:

- 24.03.42 – 9.07.44 Heeresgruppe Süd
- 23.01.43 – 3.02.43 (Remnants) Korps Cramer, Heeresgruppe B
- 3.02.43 – 05.43 (Remnants) Reserve, Heeresgruppe B
- 05.43 – 0.6.43 Returned to Hungary
- 25.12.44 – 12.02.45 IX. SS-Gebirgs korps, Armeegruppe Balck
11th LIGHT DIVISION
Headquarters: Pécs (IV Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 11th Infantry Brigade. [From the 2/4 Infantry Commander, 4th mixed Brigade]
Activated: 5.04.1941
Inactivated: 17.04.1941
Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 11st Light Division
Discontinued: 10.08.1943

Commanding Officers:
23.01.39 – 1.02.39 Brig. Gen. Kálmán Péchy
1.02.39 – 1.02.42 Brig. Gen. János Dömötör
1.02.42 – 15.10.42 Brig. Gen. Zoltán Álgya-Pap
15.10.42 – 1.11.42 Brig. Gen. György Sziklay
15.11.42 – 1.06.43 Brig. Gen. Kálmán Csiby
1.06.43 – 10.08.43 Brig. Gen. Dr. Béla Temesy

Peace Time Organization to 1943:
Garrison:
Division Headquarters (Pécs)
Artillery Command (Pécs)
8th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Pécs)
I/8th Infantry Regiment (Pécs)
II/8th Infantry Regiment (Pécs)
III/8th Infantry Regiment (Pécs)
38th Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
I/11th Artillery Regiment (Pécs)
II/11th Artillery Regiment (Pécs)
11th Cavalry Company (Pécs)
11th Anti-Aircraft Company (Pécs)
11th Signal Company (Pécs)
11th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Pécs)

Administrative Attachments:
23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
1.03.40 – 5.04.41 VKF (peace time garrisons)
5.04.41 – 17.04.41 Reserve, Third Army
17.04.41 – 10.08.43 VKF (peace time garrisons)

NOTES:
The 11th Division was removed from the peace time order of battle on 10.08.1943.
12th INFANTRY DIVISION
Headquarters: Szekszárd (IV Corps)

**Lineage:**
- Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 12th Infantry Brigade. [From the 3/4 Infantry Commander, 4th mixed Brigade]
- Activated: 5.04.1941
- Inactivated: 17.04.1941
- Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 12th Light Division
- Activated: 24.03.1942
- Redesignated: 10.08.1943 As 12th Reserve Division
- Redesignated: 23.10.1944 As 12th Infantry Division
- Discontinued: 12.02.1945 Destroyed when Budapest fell

**Peace Time Organization to 1943:**
- Garrison:
  - Division Headquarters (Szekszárd)
  - Artillery Commander (Tolna)
  - 18th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Szekszárd)
  - I/18th Infantry Regiment (Szekszárd)
  - II/18th Infantry Regiment (Sárbogárd)
  - III/18th Infantry Regiment (Tolna)
  - 48th Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
  - I/12th Artillery Regiment (Tolna)
  - II/12th Artillery Regiment (Tolna)
  - 12th Cavalry Company (Szekszárd)
  - 12th Anti-Aircraft Company (Szekszárd)
  - 12th Signal Company (Szekszárd)
  - 12th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Szekszárd)

**Mobilized Combat Organization 1.06.1942:**
- Division Headquarters
- Infantry Commander
- 18th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
- Headquarters 48th Infantry Regiment with I/48, III/48, I/38
- I/12th Artillery Regiment
- II/12th Artillery Regiment
- 12th Cavalry Company
- 12th Anti-Aircraft Company
- 12th Signal Company
- 12th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

**Peace Time Organization from 1943:**
- Garrison:
  - Division Headquarters (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
  - Infantry Commander (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
  - Artillery Commander (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
  - 36th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
  - 38th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
  - 48th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
  - 40th Artillery Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
  - 41th Artillery Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
  - 84th Artillery Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
  - 12th Reconnaissance Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)

**Mobilized Combat Organization 5.05.1944:**
- Division Headquarters
- Infantry Commander
- Artillery Commander
- 36th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
- 38th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
- 48th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
- 12th Signal Battalion
- 12th Cavalry Company
- 12th Anti-Aircraft Company
- 1/74th Combat Engineer Company
- 12th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

**Commanding Officers:**
- 23.01.39 – 1.02.40 Brig. Gen. József Benke
- 1.02.40 – 1.08.41 Brig. Gen. Kalmán Török
- 1.08.41 – 8.08.42 Brig. Gen. Gábor Illésházy
- 8.08.42 – 23.09.42 Col. Elemér Sáska
- 1.10.42 – 10.08.43 Brig. Gen. Ulászlo Solymossy
- 10.08.43 – 5.04.44 Brig. Gen. Jéno Bor
- 5.04.44 – 05.44 Brig. Gen. Dézö Pötze
- 29.09.44 – 26.10.44 Col. Jenő Tomóry
- 6.12.44 – 12.02.45 Brig. Gen. István Baumann

**Administrative Attachments:**
- 23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
- 1.03.40 – 5.04.41 VKF (peace time garrisons)
- 5.04.41 – 17.04.41 IV Corps, Third Army
- 17.04.41 – 24.03.42 (Inactive; peace time garrisons)
- 24.03.42 – 9.07.42 IV Corps
- 9.07.42 – 17.09.42 IV Corps, Second Army
- 17.09.42 – 8.10.42 VII Corps, Second Army
- 8.10.42 – 22.12.42 IV Corps, Second Army
- 22.12.42 – 11.02.43 VII Corps, Second Army
- 11.02.43 – 4.03.43 (Remnants), Second Army
- 4.03.43 – 1.05.43 H.O.G. East, Second Army
- 1.05.43 – 18.05.43 H.O.G. East, H.O.F.C.
- 18.05.43 – 15.08.43 VIII Corps, H.O.F.C.
- 15.08.43 – 1.04.44 VIII Corps, Second Army
- 1.04.44 – 1.05.44 H.O.C., VKF
- 1.05.44 – 28.08.44 II Reserve Corps
- 28.08.44 – 6.09.44 Returned to Hungary
- 31.08.44 – 28.10.44 VII Corps, Second Army
- 28.10.44 – 12.11.44 VI Corps, Third Army
- 27.11.44 – 12.02.45 I Corps, Third Army

**Tactical Attachments:**
- 24.03.42 – 9.07.42 Heeresgruppe Süd
- 1.05.43 – 7.07.43 Befh. HG Süd, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 7.07.43 – 8.10.43 Befh. HG Mitte, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 8.10.43 – 5.05.44 Befh. HG Weisstruthien, WB Ostland
- 5.05.44 – 15.05.44 WM Weisstruthien, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 17.04.44 – 15.07.44 2. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 15.07.44 – 28.08.44 4. Panzerarmee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 28.10.44 – 17.11.44 LXII. Armeekorps, 6. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 17.11.44 – 25.12.44 Gruppe Breith, Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico, Heeresgruppe Südrum
13th INFANTRY DIVISION
Headquarters: Kecskemét; later Szabadka (V Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 13th Infantry Brigade. [From the 1/4 Infantry Commander, 4th mixed Brigade]
Activated: 5.04.1941
Inactivated: 17.04.1941
Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 13th Light Division
Activated: 24.03.1942 In Hungary
Inactivated: 1.02.43 [After destruction on the East Front]
Activated: 05.04.1943 In Hungary
Redesignated: 10.08.1943 As 13th Infantry Division
Mobilized: 22.07.1944
Discontinued: 27.11.1944

Garrison:

Peace Time Organization to 1943:

- Division Headquarters (Kecskemét)
- Artillery Commander (Kecskemét)
- 7th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Kecskemét)
- I/7th Infantry Regiment (Kecskemét)
- II/7th Infantry Regiment (Cegléd)
- III/7th Infantry Regiment (Kiskunfélegyháza)
- 37th Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
- I/37th Infantry Regiment (Kecskemét)
- II/37th Infantry Regiment (Kecskemét)
- 13th Cavalry Company (Bácskopolya)
- 13th Anti-Aircraft Company (Szeged)
- 13th Signal Company (Kecskemét)
- 13th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Kecskemét)

Mobilized Combat Organization 1.06.1942:

- Division Headquarters
- Artillery Commander
- 7th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
- Headquarters 31st Infantry Regiment with II/31, I/37, III/37
- I/37th Infantry Regiment
- II/37th Infantry Regiment
- 13th Cavalry Company
- 13th Anti-Aircraft Company
- 13th Signal Company
- 13th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

Peace Time Organization from 1943:

- Division Headquarters (Szabadka)
- Infantry Commander (Szabadka)
- Artillery Commander (Ujvidék)
- 7th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Kecskemét)
- I/7th Infantry Regiment (Kecskemét)
- II/7th Infantry Regiment (Cegléd)
- III/7th Infantry Regiment (Kiskunfélegyháza)
- 9th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Szeged)
- I/9th Infantry Regiment (Szeged)
- II/9th Infantry Regiment (Szabadka)
- III/9th Infantry Regiment (Hódmezövásárhely)
- 20th Infantry Regiment Headquarters (Zombor)
- I/20th Infantry Regiment (Ujvidék)
- II/20th Infantry Regiment (Kalocsa)
- III/20th Infantry Regiment (Zombor)
- 13th Artillery Battalion (Kecskemét)
- 14th Artillery Battalion (Szeged)
- 15th Artillery Battalion (Zombor)
- 13th Reconnaissance Battalion (Ujvidék)

Mobilized Combat Organization 22.07.1944:

- Division Headquarters
- Infantry Commander
- Artillery Commander
- 7th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
- 9th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
- 20th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
- 13th Infantry Battalion
- 14th Infantry Battalion
- 15th Infantry Battalion
- 76th Infantry Battalion
- 13th Reconnaissance Battalion
- 13th Anti-Aircraft Company
- 55th Combat Engineer Battalion
- 13th Signal Battalion
- 13th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

Commanding Officers:
23.02.39 – 1.03.40 Brig. Gen. Gyula Nagy
1.03.40 – 1.04.42 Brig. Gen. Pál Platthy
15.11.42 – 1.02.43 Brig. Gen. László Hollósy-Kunthy
1.02.43 – 15.05.43 – position not filled –
15.05.43 – 10.08.43 Brig. Gen. Frigyes Vasváry
10.08.43 – 03.44 Brig. Gen. Károly Ungár
30.03.44 – 01.44 Col. János Mrakóczy
1.08.44 – 16.10.44 Brig. Gen. Dr. Gyula Hankovszky
20.12.44 – 27.11.44 Col. Sándor Vályi

Administrative Attachments:
23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
1.03.40 – 5.04.41 VKF (peace time garrisons)
5.04.41 – 17.04.41 V Corps, Third Army
17.04.41 – 24.03.42 (Inactive; peace time garrisons)
24.03.42 – 9.07.42 I Corps
9.07.42 – 4.03.43 (Remnants) IV Corps, Second Army
4.03.43 – 0.53 (Remnants) H.O.G. East, Second Army
0.53 – 06.43 Returned to Hungary
0.63 – 22.07.44 VKF (peace time garrisons)
22.07.44 – 31.08.44 III Corps, First Army
31.08.44 – 28.09.44 Reserve, First Army
28.09.44 – 27.11.44 V Corps, First Army

NOTES:
The 13th Infantry Division was removed from the order of battle and dissolved towards the end of November 1944, after its remnants had been transferred to the 24th Infantry Division.
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14th LIGHT DIVISION
Headquarters: Szeged (V Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 14th Infantry Brigade. [From the 1/5 Infantry Commander, 5th mixed Brigade]
Activated: 5.04.1941
Inactivated: 17.04.1941
Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 14th Light Division
Discontinued: 10.08.1943

Commanding Officers:
23.01.39 – 1.08.39 Brig. Gen. Antal Silley
1.08.39 – 10.42 Brig. Gen. Marcell Stomm
10.42 – 10.08.43 Brig. Gen. Zoltán Kozma

Peace Time Organization to 1943:
Garrison:
Division Headquarters (Szeged)
Artillery Commander (Szeged)
9th Infantry Regiment (Szeged)
I/9th Infantry Regiment (Szeged)
II/9th Infantry Regiment (Szabadká)
III/9th Infantry Regiment (Hódmezövásárhely)
39th Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
I/14th Artillery Regiment (Szeged)
II/14th Artillery Regiment (Szabadka)
14th Cavalry Company (Szeged)
14th Anti-Aircraft Company (Szeged)
14th Signal Company (Szeged)
14th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Szeged)

Administrative Attachments:
23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
1.03.40 – 5.04.41 VKF (peace time garrisons)
5.04.41 – 17.04.41 V Corps, Third Army
17.04.41 – 10.08.43 VKF (peace time garrisons)

NOTES:
The 14th Division was removed from the order of battle on 10.08.1943.
15th LIGHT DIVISION

Headquarters: Kiskunhalas; later Ujridék (V Corps)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding Officers:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 15th Infantry Brigade. [From the 3/6 Infantry Commander, 6th mixed Brigade]</td>
<td>23.01.39 – 1.03.40 Brig. Gen. Lajos Veress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activated: 5.04.1941</td>
<td>1.03.40 – 1.08.41 Brig. Gen. Alajos Lemberkovits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactivated: 17.04.1941</td>
<td>1.08.41 – 1.04.42 Col. József Grassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 15th Light Division</td>
<td>1.04.42 – 1.08.43 Maj. Gen. Pál Plathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbanded: 10.08.1943 (see remarks below)</td>
<td>1.08.43 – 10.08.43 Brig. Gen. József Vasváry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued: 1.03.1944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Time Organization to 1943:</th>
<th>Garrison:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division Headquarters</td>
<td>(Szabadka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Commander</td>
<td>(Zombor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Zombor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/20th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Újvidék)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/20th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Kalocsa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III/20th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Zombor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th Infantry Regiment (I – III)</td>
<td>(MOBILIZATION UNIT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/15th Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>(Zombor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/15th Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>(Zombor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Cavalry Company</td>
<td>(Zombor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Anti-Aircraft Company</td>
<td>(Szabadka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Signal Company</td>
<td>(Szabadka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters</td>
<td>(Szabadka)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Attachments:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.03.40 – 5.04.41 VKF (peace time garrisons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.04.41 – 17.04.41 I Corps, Third Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.04.41 – 10.08.43 VKF (peace time garrisons)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**
As foreseen by the 1.10.1943 Szabolcs Plan peace time organization, personnel – although without equipment – for a 15th Reserve Division were prepared in case of mobilization. However, the equipment never became available, and the second wave of the V Corps was consequently never raised.
# 16th INFANTRY DIVISION

**Headquarters:** Szolnok (VI Corps)

## Lineage:
- **Constituted:** 23.01.1939 As 16th Infantry Brigade. [From the 2/5 Infantry Commander, 5th mixed Brigade]
- **Redesignated:** 17.02.1942 As 16th Light Division
- **Redesignated:** 10.08.1943 As 16th Infantry Division
- **Activated:** 6.01.1944
- **Mobilized:** 6.03.1944
- **Discontinued:** 05.1944 Surrendered to Soviet forces at Olmütz, Czechoslovakia

## Commanding Officers:
- 23.01.39 – 1.03.40: Brig. Gen. Alfréd Friedrich
- 1.03.40 – 1.02.42: Brig. Gen. Elemér Hunfalvy
- 1.02.42 – 1.05.42: Col. Béla Tantó
- 1.05.42 – 1.08.42: Brig. Gen. Gyöző Beleznay
- 1.08.42 – 1.08.44: Brig. Gen. Béla Lengyel
- 1.08.44 – 1.11.44: Brig. Gen. József Vasváry
- 1.11.44 – 9.12.44: Brig. Gen. Elemér Mészöly
- 03.45 – 04.45: Col. Gyula Keresztes
- 04.45 – 05.45: Col. Alajos Pápay

## Peace Time Organization to 1943:
**Garrison:**
- Division Headquarters (Szolnok)
- Artillery Commander (Szolnok)
- 10th Infantry Regiment (Szolnok)
- I/10th Infantry Regiment (Berettyóújfalu)
- II/10th Infantry Regiment (Szolnok)
- III/10th Infantry Regiment (Szolnok)
- 40th Infantry Regiment (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
- I/16th Artillery Regiment (Szolnok)
- II/16th Artillery Regiment (Szolnok)
- 16th Cavalry Company (Debrecen)
- 16th Anti-Aircraft Company (Debrecen)
- 16th Signal Company (Debrecen)
- 16. Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Debrecen)

## Peace Time Organization from 1943:
**Garrison:**
- Division Headquarters (Szolnok)
- Infantry Commander (Békéscsaba)
- Artillery Commander (Szolnok)
- 10th Infantry Regiment (Szolnok)
- I/10th Infantry Regiment (Berettyóújfalu)
- II/10th Infantry Regiment (Karcag)
- III/10th Infantry Regiment (Debrecen)
- 11th Infantry Regiment (Debrecen)
- I/11th Infantry Regiment (Debrecen)
- II/11th Infantry Regiment (Debrecen)
- III/11th Infantry Regiment (Debrecen)
- 19th Infantry Regiment (Békéscsaba)
- I/19th Infantry Regiment (Békéscsaba)
- II/19th Infantry Regiment (Mórottár)
- III/19th Infantry Regiment (Orosháza)
- 16th Artillery Battalion (Szolnok)
- 17th Artillery Battalion (Debrecen)
- 18th Artillery Battalion (Orosháza)
- 15th Reconnaissance Battalion (Debrecen)

## Mobilized Combat Organization 6.01.1944:
- Division Headquarters
- Infantry Commander
- Artillery Commander
- 10th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
- 11th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
- 19th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
- 16th Artillery Battalion
- 17th Artillery Battalion
- 18th Artillery Battalion
- 15th Reconnaissance Battalion
- 16th Signal Battalion
- 16th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

*) as of 30.01.1944

## Administrative Attachments:
- 23.01.39 – 1.03.40: VKF (peace time garrisons)
- 1.03.40 – 6.01.44: VKF (peace time garrisons)
- 6.01.44 – 15.04.44: First Army
- 15.04.44 – 20.08.44: VII Corps, First Army
- 20.08.44 – 30.08.44: Reserves, First Army
- 30.08.44 – 19.09.44: VII Corps, First Army
- 19.09.44 – 28.09.44: III Corps, First Army
- 28.09.44 – 5.10.44: Reserve, First Army
- 5.10.44 – 13.10.44: VI Corps, First Army
- 14.10.44 – 26.11.44: Reserve, First Army
- 26.11.44 – 04.45: V Corps, First Army

## Tactical Attachments:
- 23.10.44 – 26.11.44: XVII. Armeekorps, 8. Armee
- 02.01.45 – 21.01.45: Reserve, 1. Panzerarmee
- 21.01.45 – 04.45: XXXIX. Gebirgskorps, 1. Panzerarmee

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**Note:** The document appears to be a historical record of the Royal Hungarian Army commands and formations from 1922 to 1945, detailing various organizations, commands, and formations during different periods of time. The text includes command officer listings, organizational structures, and administrative details. The document is structured with clear headings and lists, making it easy to follow the historical progression of the army during the specified period.
17th LIGHT DIVISION
Headquarters: Debrecen (VI Corps)

Lineage:
- Constituted: 23.01.1939
  As 17th Infantry Brigade. [From the 1/6 Infantry Commander, 6th mixed Brigade]
- Redesignated: 17.02.1942
  As 17th Light Division
- Discontinued: 10.08.1943

Commanding Officers:
- 23.01.39 – 1.08.39 Col. Dezső Bittó
- 1.08.39 – 1.08.42 Brig. Gen. Szilárd Bakay
- 1.08.42 – 10.08.43 Brig. Mihály Ibrányi

Peace Time Organization to 1943:
- Garrison:
  Division Headquarters (Debrecen)
  Artillery Commander (Debrecen)
  11th Infantry Regiment (Debrecen)
  I/11th Infantry Regiment (Debrecen)
  II/11th Infantry Regiment (Debrecen)
  III/11th Infantry Regiment (Debrecen)
  41st Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
  I/17th Artillery Regiment (Debrecen)
  II/17th Artillery Regiment (Debrecen)
  17th Cavalry Company (Debrecen)
  17th Anti-Aircraft Company (Debrecen)
  17th Signal Company (Debrecen)
  17th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Debrecen)

Administrative Attachments:
- 23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
- 1.03.40 – 10.08.43 VKF (peace time garrisons)

NOTES:
The 17th Division was removed from the order of battle on 10.08.1943.
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18th RESERVE DIVISION
Headquarters: Békéscsaba (VI Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 18th Infantry Brigade. [From the 3/5 Infantry Commander, 5th mixed Brigade]
Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 18th Light Division
Activated: 4.04.1943
Redesignated: 10.08.1943 As 18th Reserve Division
Discontinued: 1.08.1944

Peace Time Organization to 1943: Garrison:
Division Headquarters (Békéscsaba)
Artillery Commander (Orosháza)
19th Infantry Regiment (Békécsaba)
I/19th Infantry Regiment (Békécsaba)
II/19th Infantry Regiment (Mezőtúr)
III/19th Infantry Regiment (Orosháza)
49th Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
I/49th Infantry Regiment (Mezőtúr)
II/49th Infantry Regiment (Orosháza)
18th Cavalry Company (Békécsaba)
18th Anti-Aircraft Company (Mezőtúr)
18th Signal Company (Békécsaba)
18th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Békécsaba)

Mobilized Combat Organization 7.07.1943
Division Headquarters
Artillery Commander
19th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
47th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
49th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
I/18th Artillery Battalion
18th Cavalry Company
18th Anti-Aircraft Company
18th Signal Company
18th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

Peace Time Organization from 1943: Garrison:
Division Headquarters (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
Infantry Commander (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
Artillery Commander (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
40th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
41st Infantry Regiment (I – III)
49th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
46th Artillery Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
47th Artillery Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
86th Artillery Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
18th Reconnaissance Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)

Mobilized Combat Organization 1.06.1944:
Division Headquarters
Infantry Commander
Artillery Commander
40th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
41th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
49th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
46th Artillery Battalion
47th Artillery Battalion
86th Artillery Battalion
18th Cavalry Company
18th Anti-Aircraft Company
76th Combat Engineer Company
18th Signal Company
18th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

Commanding Officers:
23.01.39 – 1.04.42 Brig. Gen. Károly Olgyay
1.04.42 – 1.08.42 Brig. Gen. Alajos Lemberkovits
1.08.42 – 1.10.42 Col. Ulászló Solyomossy
15.10.42 – 10.08.43 Brig. Gen. Jenő Ujlaky
10.08.43 – 1.01.44 Brig. Gen. Mihály Ibrányi
1.01.44 – 1.08.44 Brig. Gen. József Vasváry

Administrative Attachments:
23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
1.03.40 – 4.04.43 VKF (peace time garrisons)
4.04.43 – 1.06.43 VII Corps, Second Army
1.06.43 – 15.08.43 VII Corps, H.O.F.C.
15.08.43 – 15.10.43 VIII Corps, Second Army
15.10.43 – 1.04.44 VII Corps, Second Army
1.04.44 – 10.05.44 VII Corps, First Army
10.05.44 – 1.08.44 VI Corps, First Army

Tactical Attachments:
4.04.43 – 8.11.43 WB Ukraine
8.11.43 – 2.01.44 Reserve, 2. Arme, Heeresgruppe Mitte
2.01.44 – 5.05.44 Befh. HG Weisstruhenien
5.05.44 – 15.06.44 WB Weisstruhenien
21.07.44 – 8.08.44 XI. Armeekorps, Heeresgruppe Nordukraine

NOTES:
The 18th Reserve Division was removed from the order of battle and dissolved at the beginning of August 1944, after its remnants had been transferred to the 16th Infantry Division.
19th RESERVE DIVISION
Headquarters: Miskolc (VII Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 19th Infantry Brigade. [From the 1/7 Infantry Commander, 7. mixed Brigade]
Activated: 7.04.1941
Inactivated: 17.04.1941
Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 19th Light Division
Activated: 24.03.1942
Redesignated: 10.08.1943 As 19th Reserve Division (Headquarters Staff from 25th Light Division)
Discontinued: 08.1944

Commanding Officers:
23.01.39 – 1.08.41 Brig. Gen. József Csatáry
1.08.41 – 1.05.42 Brig. Gen. Győző Beleznay
1.05.42 – 08.42 Col. László Deák
08.42 – 09.42 Col. Ferenc Szász
1.10.42 – 10.08.43 Brig. Gen. Aladár Asztalossy
10.08.43 – 05.44 Col. Imre Kálmán
05.44 – 08.44 Brig. Gen. László Miskey

Peace Time Organization to 1943:
Garrison:
Division Headquarters (Miskolc)
Artillery Commander (Miskolc)
13th Infantry Regiment (Miskolc)
I/13th Infantry Regiment (Rozsnyó)
II/13th Infantry Regiment (Miskolc)
III/13th Infantry Regiment (Tornalja)
43th Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
I/919th Artillery Regiment (Miskolc)
II/19th Artillery Regiment (Miskolc)
19th Cavalry Company (Miskolc)
19th Anti-Aircraft Company (Miskolc)
19th Signal Company (Miskolc)
19th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Miskolc)

Mobilized Combat Organization 1.06.1942:
Division Headquarters
Artillery Commander
13th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
Headquarters 43rd Infantry Regiment with I/43, I/53, III/53
I/19th Artillery Regiment
II/19th Artillery Regiment
19th Cavalry Company
19th Anti-Aircraft Company
19th Signal Company
19th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

Peace Time Organization from 1943:
Garrison:
Division Headquarters (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
Infantry Commander (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
Artillery Commander (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
43rd Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
44th Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
53th Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
49th Artillery Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
50th Artillery Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
87th Artillery Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
19th Reconnaissance Battalion (MOBILIZATION UNIT)

Mobilized Combat Organization 1.10.1943:
Division Headquarters
Artillery Commander
25th Infantry Regiment (I – III) *)
35th Infantry Regiment (I – III) **
53rd Infantry Regiment (I – III)
19th Cavalry Company
19th Anti-Aircraft Company
19th Signal Company
19th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

Administrative Attachments:
23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
1.03.40 – 7.04.43 VKF (peace time garrisons)
7.04.41 – 17.04.41 V Corps, Third Army
17.04.41 – 24.03.42 (Inactive; peace time garrisons)
24.03.42 – 4.07.42 VII Corps, Second Army
4.07.42 – 9.07.42 III Corps, Second Army
9.07.42 – 11.02.43 VII Corps, Second Army
11.02.43 – 4.03.43 (Remnants), Reserve, Second Army
4.03.43 – 1.05.43 H.O.G. West, Second Army
1.05.43 – 15.08.43 VII Corps, H.O.F.C.
15.08.43 – 1.04.44 VII Corps, Second Army
1.04.44 – 10.05.44 VII Corps, First Army
10.05.44 – 21.07.44 VI Corps, First Army
21.07.44 – 08.44 (being dissolved) Reserve, First Army

Tactical Attachments:
11.02.43 – 4.03.43 (Remnants) Reserve, 2. Armee,
Heeresgruppe Mitte
4.03.43 – 8.10.43 WB Ukraine
8.10.43 – 1.04.44 Befh. Weissruthenien

NOTES:
*) 25th Infantry Regiment only until 17.01.1944)
**) The former 55th Inf. Rgt., redesignated on 1.10.1943.

The 19th Reserve Division was removed from the official peace time order of battle and dissolved August 1944, after its remnants had been transferred to the 20th Infantry Division towards the end of July 1944.
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20th INFANTRY DIVISION
Headquarters: Eger (VII Corps)

Lineage:

Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 20th Infantry Brigade.[From the 2/7
Infantry Commander, 7th mixed Brigade]
Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 20th Light Division
Activated: 21.03.1942
Disbanded: 06.1943
Redesignated: 10.08.1943 As 20th Infantry Division
Activated: 21.03.1944

Discounted: 05.1945 Surrendered to British forces in southern
Austria and northern Croatia

Commanding Officers:

23.01.39 – 1.08.41 Brig. Gen. Ödön Domanieczky
1.08.41 – 21.08.42 Brig. Gen. Károly Kovács
10.08.42 – 3.10.42 Col. Géza Nagy
3.10.42 – 15.05.43 Brig. Gen. Frigyes Vasváry
15.05.43 – 10.08.43 Col. Béla Németh
10.08.43 – 26.10.44 Brig. Gen. Frigyes Vasváry
26.10.44 – 03.45 Brig. Gen. Jenő Tomóry
03.45 – 05.45 Brig. Gen. Ferenc Tilger

Administrative Attachments:

Peace Time Organization to 1943: Garrison:

Division Headquarters (Eger)
Artillery Commander (Eger)
1/4 Infantry Regiment (Eger)
II/4 Infantry Regiment (Eger)
III/4 Infantry Regiment (Gyöngyös)
44th Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
I/20th Artillery Regiment (Eger)
II/20th Artillery Regiment (Gyöngyös)
20th Cavalry Company (Rimaszombat)
20th Anti-Aircraft Company (Miskolc)
20th Signal Company (Eger)
20th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Eger)

Mobilized Combat Organization 1.06.1942:
Division Headquarters
Artillery Commander
1/4 Infantry Regiment (I – III)
2/4 Infantry Regiment (I – III)
I/20th Artillery Regiment
II/20th Artillery Regiment
20th Cavalry Company
20th Anti-Aircraft Company
20th Signal Company
20th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

Peace Time Organization from 1943:

Division Headquarters (Losanc)
Commanding Officers:

Division Headquarters (Eger)
Infantry Commander (Losanc)
Artillery Commander (Eger)
13th Infantry Regiment (Miskolc)
I/13th Infantry Regiment (Rozsnýó)
II/13th Infantry Regiment (Miskolc)
III/13th Infantry Regiment (Torulja)
14th Infantry Regiment (Eger)
I/14 Infantry Regiment (Eger)
II/14th Infantry Regiment (Eger)
III/14 Infantry Regiment (Gyöngyös)
23rd Infantry Regiment (Losanc)
I/23rd Infantry Regiment (Losanc)
II/23rd Infantry Regiment (Budapest)
III/23rd Infantry Regiment (Salgótarján)
19th Artillery Battalion (Miskolc)
20th Artillery Battalion (Gyöngyös)
21th Artillery Battalion (Losanc)
28th Reconnaissance Battalion (Rimaszombat)

Mobilized Combat Organization 21.03.1944:
Division Headquarters
Infantry Commander
Artillery Commander
13th Infantry Regiment (Eger)
14th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
23rd Infantry Regiment (I – III)
19th Artillery Battalion
20th Artillery Battalion
21st Artillery Battalion
77th Artillery Battalion
V Artillery Battalion
28th Reconnaissance Battalion
20th Anti-Aircraft Company
57th Combat Engineer Battalion
20th Signal Battalion
20th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

Tactical Attachments:

20.08.42 – 12.12.42 XXIV. Panzerkorps, Heeresgruppe Süd
6.05.44 – 24.07.44 LIX. Armeekorps, 1. Panzerarmee, Heeresgruppe Süd
22.12.44 – 27.12.44 III. Panzerkorps, 6. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
Lineage:

Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 21st Infantry Brigade. [New]
Activated: 1.09.1941 [Headquarters with a reduced-strength Staff and Supply Services for the occupation forces]
Redesignated: 1.10.1941 As 121st Infantry Brigade Headquarters
Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 121st Light Division Headquarters
Disbanded: 10.08.1943 (see remarks below)
Discontinued: 15.05.1944

Peace Time Organization to 1943: Garrison:

Division Headquarters (Losonc)
Artillery Commander (Losonc)
23rd Infantry Regiment (Losonc)
I/23rd Infantry Regiment (Losonc)
II/23rd Infantry Regiment (Balassagyarmat)
III/23rd Infantry Regiment (Salgótarján)
53rd Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
I/21st Artillery Regiment (Losonc)
II/21st Artillery Regiment (Losonc)
21st Cavalry Company (Rimaszombat)
21st Anti-Aircraft Company (Losonc)
21st Signal Company (Losonc)
21st Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Losonc)

Mobilized Combat Organization 1.09.1941: Commanding Officers:

41st Infantry Regiment with II/41, III/41, ...
Division Headquarters
Headquarters 44th Infantry Regiment with II/44, III/44, II/55
15th (?) Cavalry Company
22nd (?) Anti-Aircraft Company
21st (?) Signal Company

23.01.39 – 1.08.41 Brig. Gen. Jenö Röder
1.08.41 – 02.42 Brig. Gen. Ferenc Tilger
02.42 – 1.06.43 Brig. Gen. Béla Tarnay
1.05.43 – 1.08.43 Col. Géza Pusztakürthy
1.08.43 – 44 Brig. Gen. Géza Ehrlich
44 – 03.44 Brig. Gen. László Miskey
03.44 – 15.05.44 – position not filled –

Administrative Attachments:

23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
1.03.40 – 1.09.41 VKF (peace time garrisons)
1.09.41 – 9.02.42 (Headquarters only) H.O.C.
9.02.42 –17.02.43 (Headquarters only) H.O.G. West
17.02.43 – 1.05.43 (Headquarters only) H.O.G. West, Second Army
1.05.43 –15.08.43 (Headquarters only) VII Corps, H.O.F.C.
15.08.43 – 1.04.44 (Headquarters only) VII Corps, Second Army
1.04.44 –19.04.44 (Headquarters only) VII Corps, First Army
19.04.44 –15.05.44 (Headquarters only) Reserve, First Army

Tactical Attachments:

1.09.41 – 8.10.43 WB Ukraine
8.10.43 – 1.04.44 Befh. Weissruthenien

NOTES:
The 21st Division had been removed from the official peace time order of battle on 1.10.43. However, the Headquarters, 21st Division remained in being with the occupation forces on the East Front (owing the critical situation there), and was finally dissolved in May 1944. Its remnants were transferred to the 18th Reserve Division.
22th LIGHT DIVISION
Headquarters: Nyiregyháza (VIII Corps)

**Lineage:**
- **Constituted:** 23.01.1939  As 22nd Infantry Brigade. [From the 2/6 Infantry Commander, 6th Mixed Brigade]
- **Redesignated:** 17.02.1942  As 22nd Light Division
- **Discontinued:** 10.08.1943

**Peace Time Organization to 1943:**
- Division Headquarters (Nyiregyháza)
- Artillery Commander (Nyiregyháza)
- 12th Infantry Regiment (Nyiregyháza)
- I/12th Infantry Regiment (Nyiregyháza)
- II/12th Infantry Regiment (Nyiregyháza)
- III/12th Infantry Regiment (Nyírbátor)
- 42th Infantry Regiment (Mobilization Unit)
- I/22nd Artillery Regiment (Nyiregyháza)
- II/22nd Artillery Regiment (Nyírbátor)
- 22nd Cavalry Company (Kassa)
- 22nd Anti-Aircraft Company (Kassa)
- 22nd Signal Company (Nyiregyháza)
- 22nd Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Nyiregyháza)

**Garrison:**
- (Nyiregyháza)
- (Nyiregyháza)
- (Nyiregyháza)
- (Nyiregyháza)
- (Nyírbátor)
- (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
- (Nyiregyháza)
- (Nyírbátor)
- (Kassa)
- (Kassa)
- (Nyiregyháza)
- (Nyiregyháza)

**Commanding Officers:**
- 23.01.39 – 1.11.40  Brig. Gen. Sándor Eötvös
- 1.11.40 – 1.08.42  Brig. Gen. Aladár Máriay
- 1.08.42 – 15.09.42  Brig. Gen. László Hollósy-Kathy
- 15.09.42 – 15.05.43  – position not filled –
- 15.05.43 – 10.08.43  Brig. Gen. Mihály Budaházy

**Administrative Attachments:**
- 23.01.39 – 1.03.40  HM (peace time garrisons)
- 1.03.40 – 10.08.43  VKF (peace time garrisons)

**NOTES:**
The 22nd Division was removed from the peace time order of battle on 10.08.1943.
23rd RESERVE DIVISION
Headquarters: Kassa (VIII Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 23rd Infantry Brigade. [New]
Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 23rd Light Division
Activated: 24.03.1942
Redesignated: 10.08.1943 As 23rd Reserve Division
Discontinued: 6.05.1945 Surrendered to Soviet forces in Styria, Austria

Commanding Officers:
23.01.39 – 1.03.40 Col. József Heszlényi
1.03.40 – 11.02.42 Brig. Gen. Kálmán Málté
03.42 – 1.10.42 Brig. Gen. István Kiss
1.10.42 – 1.06.43 Brig. Gen. Gyula Vargyassy
1.06.43 – 1.07.43 Brig. Gen. Miklós Dépold
1.07.43 – 30.01.44 Brig. Gen. Pál Magyar
30.01.44 – 05.44 Col. Jenő Sövényházai-Herdiczky
05.44 – 10.44 Brig. Gen. Gusztáv Deseö
10.44 – 20.10.44 Brig. Gen. Ferenc Osztovics
11.44 – 04.45 Brig. Gen. Géza Fehér
04.45 – 6.05.44 Col. István Miklóssy

Administrative Attachments:
23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
1.03.40 – 24.03.42 VKF (peace time garrisons)
24.03.42 – 9.07.42 VII Corps
9.07.42 – 11.02.43 VII Corps, Second Army
11.02.43 – 4.03.43 (Remnants) Reserve, Second Army
4.03.43 – 1.05.43 H.O.G. East, Second Army
1.05.43 – 18.05.43 H.O.G. East, H.O.F.C.
18.05.43 – 15.08.43 VIII Corps, H.O.F.C.
15.08.43 – 1.04.44 VIII Corps, Second Army
1.04.44 – 1.05.44 H.O.C.
1.05.44 – 5.09.44 II Res. Corps
5.09.44 – 9.09.44 Returned to Hungary
9.09.44 – 7.11.44 VIII Corps, Third Army
7.11.44 – 2.12.44 II Corps, Third Army
7.01.45 – 2.03.45 Reserve, Third Army
2.03.45 – 6.05.44 VIII Corps, Third Army

Tactical Attachments:
23.01.43 – 11.02.43 Korps Cramer, Heeresgruppe B
11.02.43 – 4.03.43 (Remnants) Reserve, Heeresgruppe B
4.03.43 – 1.05.43 2. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
1.05.43 – 7.07.43 Befh. HG Süd
7.07.43 – 8.10.43 Befh. HG Mitte
8.10.43 – 1.04.44 Befh. HG Weisnrathenien
5.05.44 – 15.07.44 Reserve Heeresgruppe Mitte
15.07.44 – 31.08.44 Reserve, 2. Panzerarmee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
31.08.44 – 9.09.44 Reserve, 9. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
2.12.44 – 30.12.44 LVII. Panzerkorps, 6 Armee
30.12.44 – 7.01.45 IX. SS-Gebirgskorps, 6. Armee
11.01.45 – 13.01.45 III. Panzerkorps, 6. Armee
13.01.45 – 26.01.45 I. Kavalleriekorps, 6. Armee
26.01.45 – 1.02.45 IX. SS-Gebirgskorps, 6. Armee
1.02.45 – 2.03.45 I. Kavalleriekorps, 6. Armee

Peace Time Organization to 1943:
Garrison:

Peace Time Organization from 1943:
Garrison:

Mobilized Combat Organization 1.06.1942:
Division Headquarters
Headquarters 21st Infantry Regiment with II/21, I/32, III/32
Headquarters 51st Infantry Regiment with II/31, I/54, III/54
I/231st Artillery Regiment
II/231st Artillery Regiment
23rd Anti-Aircraft Company
23rd Signal Company
23rd Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

Mobilized Combat Organization 1.10.1943:
Division Headquarters
Infantry Commander
Artillery Commander
51st infantry Regiment (I – III)
54th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
52nd Artillery Battalion
88th Artillery Battalion
23rd Reconnaissance Battalion

Mobilized Combat Organization 5.05.1944:
Division Headquarters
Infantry Commander
42nd Infantry Regiment (I – III)
51st Infantry Regiment (I – III)
54th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
23rd Cavalry Company
23rd Anti-Aircraft Company
I/78th Combat Engineer Company
23rd Signal Battalion
23rd Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

Administrative Attachments:
23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
1.03.40 – 24.03.42 VKF (peace time garrisons)
24.03.42 – 9.07.42 VII Corps
9.07.42 – 11.02.43 VII Corps, Second Army
11.02.43 – 4.03.43 (Remnants) Reserve, Second Army
4.03.43 – 1.05.43 H.O.G. East, Second Army
1.05.43 – 18.05.43 H.O.G. East, H.O.F.C.
18.05.43 – 15.08.43 VIII Corps, H.O.F.C.
15.08.43 – 1.04.44 VIII Corps, Second Army
1.04.44 – 1.05.44 H.O.C.
1.05.44 – 5.09.44 II Res. Corps
5.09.44 – 9.09.44 Returned to Hungary
9.09.44 – 7.11.44 VIII Corps, Third Army
7.11.44 – 2.12.44 II Corps, Third Army
7.01.45 – 2.03.45 Reserve, Third Army
2.03.45 – 6.05.44 VIII Corps, Third Army

Tactical Attachments:
23.01.43 – 11.02.43 Korps Cramer, Heeresgruppe B
11.02.43 – 4.03.43 (Remnants) Reserve, Heeresgruppe B
4.03.43 – 1.05.43 2. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
1.05.43 – 7.07.43 Befh. HG Süd
7.07.43 – 8.10.43 Befh. HG Mitte
8.10.43 – 1.04.44 Befh. HG Weisnrathenien
5.05.44 – 15.07.44 Reserve Heeresgruppe Mitte
15.07.44 – 31.08.44 Reserve, 2. Panzerarmee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
31.08.44 – 9.09.44 Reserve, 9. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
2.12.44 – 30.12.44 LVII. Panzerkorps, 6 Armee
30.12.44 – 7.01.45 IX. SS-Gebirgskorps, 6. Armee
11.01.45 – 13.01.45 III. Panzerkorps, 6. Armee
13.01.45 – 26.01.45 I. Kavalleriekorps, 6. Armee
26.01.45 – 1.02.45 IX. SS-Gebirgskorps, 6. Armee
1.02.45 – 2.03.45 I. Kavalleriekorps, 6. Armee
Chapter 18 Royal Hungarian Army Commands and Formations 1922 – 1945

24th INFANTRY DIVISION
Headquarters: Ungvár (VIII Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 23.01.1939 As 24th Infantry Brigade. [New]
Activated: 31.08.1941 [Headquarters with a reduced-strength Staff and Supply Services for the occupation forces]
Redesignated: 1.10.1941 As 124th Infantry Brigade
Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 124th Light Division
Disbanded: 10.08.1943 (see remarks below)
Constituted: 10.08.1943 As 24th Infantry Division
Activated: 6.01.1944
Discontinued: 05.1945 Surrendered to Soviet forces in Bohemia, Czechoslovakia

Commanding Officers:
23.01.39 – 1.08.41 Brig. Gen. Andor Vásárhelyi
1.08.41 – 15.10.42 Brig. Gen. György Sziklay
15.10.42 – 1.06.43 Brig. Gen. Imre Széchy
1.06.43 – 10.08.43 Brig. Gen. Ferenc Loskay
10.08.43 – 1.06.44 Brig. Gen. János Markóczy
1.06.44 – 15.10.44 Brig. Gen. János Markóczy
15.10.44 – 11.44 Col. Ferenc Karkóczi
11.44 – 03.45 Col. Gyula Keresztes
03.45 – 05.45 Col. Lajos Rumy

Administrative Attachments:
23.01.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
1.03.40 – 30.08.41 VKF (peace time garrisons)
30.08.41 – 1.10.41 (Headquarters only) VIII Corps
1.10.41 – 9.02.42 (Headquarters only) H.O.C.
9.02.42 – 17.02.43 (Headquarters only) H.O.G. West
17.02.43 – 1.05.43 (Headquarters only) H.O.G. West, Second Army
1.05.43 – 18.05.43 (Headquarters only) H.O.G. East, H.O.F.C.
18.05.43 – 15.08.43 (Headquarters only) VIII Corps, H.O.F.C.
15.08.43 – 21.10.43 (Headquarters only) VII Corps, Second Army
21.10.43 – 6.01.44 VKF (peace time garrisons)
6.01.44 – 24.07.44 First Army
24.07.44 – 8.08.44 VII Corps, First Army
8.08.44 – 27.09.44 III Corps, First Army
27.09.44 – 20.10.44 VI Corps, First Army
20.10.44 – 31.12.44 Reserve, First Army
31.12.44 – 04.45 Suborólo Salamárd, First Army

Peace Time Organization to 1943:
Garrison:
Division Headquarters: Ungvár
Artillery Commander: Ungvár
24th Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
I/24th Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
II/24th Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
III/24th Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
4th Infantry Regiment (I – III): Ungvár
24th Cavalry Company: Ungvár
24th Anti-Aircraft Company: Ungvár
24th Signal Company: Ungvár
24th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters: Ungvár

Mobilized Combat Organization 31.12.1941
Division Headquarters
Headquarters 7th Infantry Regiment with II/48., ...
Headquarters 7th Infantry Regiment with ...
1st (?) Cavalry Company
1st (?) Anti-Aircraft Company
27th (?) Signal Company

Peace Time Organization from 1943:
Garrison:
Division Headquarters: Ungvár
Infantry Commander: Ungvár
Artillery Commander: Ungvár
12th Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
I/12th Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
II/12th Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
III/12th Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
21st Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
I/21st Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
II/21st Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
III/21st Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
24th Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
I/24th Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
II/24th Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
III/24th Infantry Regiment: Ungvár
22nd Artillery Battalion: Ungvár
23rd Artillery Battalion: Ungvár
24th Artillery Battalion: Ungvár
24th Reconnaissance Battalion: Ungvár

Mobilized Combat Organization 6.01.1944
Division Headquarters
Infantry Commander: Ungvár
Artillery Commander: Ungvár
12th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
21st Infantry Regiment (I – III)
24th Infantry Regiment (I – III)
22nd Artillery Battalion
23rd Artillery Battalion
24th Artillery Battalion
8th Artillery Battalion
VIII Artillery Battalion
24th Reconnaissance Battalion
24th Anti-Aircraft Company
24th Combat Engineer Battalion
24th Signal Battalion
24th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

NOTES:
The 124th Light Division was disbanded on 10.08.43 on the East Front. The Headquarters Staff was relieved by the Headquarters of the 12th Light Division and returned to Hungary on 21.10.1943.
The new 24th Infantry Division, which had been raised on 10.08.43 in Hungary, absorbed the staff.
### 25th INFANTRY DIVISION

**Headquarters:** Nagyvárad (IX Corps)

#### Lineage:
- **Constituted:** 15.09.1940 As 25th Infantry Brigade. [New]
- **Redesignated:** 27.02.1942 As 25th Light Division
- **Activated:** 11.04.1943
- **Disbanded:** 10.08.1943 (see remarks below)
- **Constituted:** 10.08.1943 In Hungary as 25th Infantry Division
- **Activated:** 21.03.1944
- **Discontinued:** 05.1945 Surrendered to Yugoslavian partisans towards the end of April 1945

#### Commanding Officers:
- **15.09.40 – 15.08.42** Brig. Gen. Béla Gothay
- **15.08.42 – 10.08.43** Brig. Gen. Imre Kálmán
- **10.08.43 – 1.01.44** Brig. Gen. Béla Zsombolyay
- **1.01.44 – 1.07.44** Brig. Gen. Mihály Ibrányi
- **1.07.44 – 29.07.44** Brig. Gen. István Kozma
- **29.07.44 – 09.44** Brig. Gen. Antal Benda
- **09.44 – 10.10.44** Brig. Gen. László Hollósy-Kuthy
- **10.44 – 12.44** Maj. Gen. Ferenc Horváth
- **12.44 – 05.45** Col. Gyula Kalkó

#### Administrative Attachments:
- **15.09.40 – 11.04.43** VKF (peace time garrisons)
- **11.04.43 – 1.05.43** H.O.G. East, Second Army
- **1.05.43 – 15.08.43** VIII Corps, H.O.F.C.
- **15.08.43 – 1.10.43** VIII Corps, Second Army
- **1.10.43 – 15.04.44** IX Corps, First Army
- **15.04.44 – 15.08.44** VI Corps, First Army
- **18.10.44 – 23.10.44** Reserve, Armeegruppe Wöhler
- **23.10.44 – 07.11.44** LXXII. Armeekorps, 6. Armee
- **07.11.44 – 17.11.44** IV. Panzerkorps, 6. Armee
- **05.02.45 – 1.05.45** III. Panzerkorps, 6. Armee

#### Peace Time Organization to 1943:

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<th>Troop Type</th>
<th>Garrison</th>
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<td>Division Headquarters</td>
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<td>25th Anti-Aircraft Company *)</td>
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<td>25th Signal Company</td>
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<td>25th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters</td>
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#### Mobilized Combat Organization 11.04.1943:

|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------|

#### Peace Time Organization from 1943:

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<th>Troop Type</th>
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<td>25th Reconnaissance Battalion</td>
<td>Kolozsvár</td>
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#### Mobilized Combat Organization 21.03.1944:

|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------|

#### Administrative Attachments:
- **15.09.40 – 11.04.43** VKF (peace time garrisons)
- **11.04.43 – 1.05.43** H.O.G. East, Second Army
- **1.05.43 – 15.08.43** VIII Corps, H.O.F.C.
- **15.08.43 – 1.10.43** VIII Corps, Second Army
- **1.10.43 – 21.03.44** VKF (peace time garrisons)
- **21.03.44 – 15.04.44** VI Corps, First Army
- **15.04.44 – 24.07.44** IX Corps, First Army
- **24.07.44 – 15.08.44** VI Corps, First Army
- **15.08.44 – 1.09.44** Reserve, First Army
- **1.09.44 – 5.09.44** en-route to Second Army
- **5.09.44 – 18.10.44** II Corps, Second Army
- **18.10.44 – 23.10.44** VII Corps, Second Army
- **23.10.44 – 05.45** II Corps, Third Army

### Tactical Attachments:
- **11.04.43 – 1.10.43** WB Ukraine
- **15.05.44 – 24.07.44** XI. Armeekorps, Heeresgruppe Nordukraine
- **18.10.44 – 23.10.44** Reserve, Heeresgruppe Wöhler
- **23.10.44 – 7.11.44** LXXII. Armeekorps, 6. Armee
- **7.11.44 – 17.11.44** IV. Panzerkorps, 6. Armee
- **5.02.45 – 1.05.45** III. Panzerkorps, 6. Armee

### Notes:
- *) 25th Cavalry Company only as of 1.10.1942

The 25th Light Division was renumbered as the 19th Reserve Division on 10.08.43 on the East Front.

The new 25th Infantry Division was raised in Hungary on the same day.
### 26th LIGHT DIVISION
Headquarters: Kolozsvár (IX Corps)

#### Lineage:
- **Constituted:** 15.09.1940 As 26th Infantry Brigade. [New]
- **Redesignated:** 17.02.1942 As 26th Light Division
- **Disbanded:** 10.08.1943
- **Discontinued:** 1.03.1944

#### Commanding Officers:
- 15.09.40 – 1.08.41: Brig. Gen. Béla Marschalkó
- 1.08.41 – 1.04.42: Col. Dr. Kálmán Hardy
- 1.04.42 – 10.08.43: Brig. Gen. János Mindszenty

#### Peace Time Organization 1940 – 1943:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division Headquarters</td>
<td>(Kolozsvár)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Commander</td>
<td>(Kolozsvár)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Kolozsvár)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/26th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Kolozsvár)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/26th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Dés)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III/26th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>(Beszterce)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56th Infantry Regiment (I – III)</td>
<td>(MOBILIZATION UNIT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/26 Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>(Kolozsvár)</td>
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<tr>
<td>II/26 Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>(Szászfenes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Cavalry Company *)</td>
<td>(Kolozsvár)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Anti-Aircraft Company</td>
<td>(Kolozsvár)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Signal Company</td>
<td>(Kolozsvár)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters</td>
<td>(Kolozsvár)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Garrison:
- (Kolozsvár)

#### Administrative Attachments:
- 15.09.40 – 10.08.43: VKF (peace time garrisons)

#### NOTES:
- *) 26th Cavalry Company only as of 1.10.1942

As foreseen by the Szabolcs Plan peace time organization, personnel – although without equipment – for a 26th Reserve Division were prepared in case of mobilization. However, as this equipment was never forthcoming, the second wave of the IX Corps was never raised and the division was finally dissolved in March 1944.
27th INFANTRY DIVISION
Headquarters: Marosvásárhely (IX Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 15.09.1940 As 27th Infantry Brigade. [New]
Redesignated: 17.02.1942 As 27th Light Division
Activated: 21.03.1944
Redesignated: 1.10.1944 As 27th “Székler” Division
Discontinued: 05.1945 Surrendered to Soviet forces near Vienna, Austria

Commanding Officers:
15.09.40 – 15.11.42 Brig. Gen. Ferenc Kolthay
15.11.42 – 1.02.43 Brig. Gen. István Kozma
1.02.43 – 1.10.43 Brig. Gen. Miklós Nagyöszy
1.10.43 – 16.10.44 Col. András Zákó
10.44 – 05.45 Brig. Gen. Gyöző Horváth

Peace Time Organization 1940 – 1943:
Division Headquarters (Marosvásárhely)
Artillery Commander (Marosvásárhely)
27th Infantry Regiment (Marosvásárhely)
I/27th Infantry Regiment (Sepsiszentgyörgy)
II/27th Infantry Regiment (Székelyudvarhely)
III/27th Infantry Regiment (Marosvásárhely)
57th Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
I/27th Artillery Regiment (Marosvásárhely)
II/27th Artillery Regiment (Marosvásárhely)
27th Cavalry Company *) (Marosvásárhely)
27th Anti-Aircraft Company (Marosvásárhely)
27th Signal Company (Marosvásárhely)
27th Divisional Supply Services Headquarters (Marosvásárhely)

Peace Time Organization from 1943:
Division Headquarters (Marosvásárhely)
27th Infantry Regiment (Marosvásárhely)
I/27th Infantry Regiment (Sepsiszentgyörgy)
II/27th Infantry Regiment (Székelyudvarhely)
III/27th Infantry Regiment (Marosvásárhely)
57th Infantry Regiment (I – III) (MOBILIZATION UNIT)
27th Artillery Battalion (Marosvásárhely)

Garrison:
1.10.40 –21.03.44 VKF (peace time garrisons)
21.03.44 –15.04.44 VI Corps, First Army
15.04.44 –17.04.44 IX Corps, First Army
17.04.44 –21.07.44 VI Corps, First Army
21.07.44 –15.08.44 Reserve, First Army
15.08.44 –11.09.44 VI Corps, First Army
11.09.44 –13.09.44 En-route to IX Corps
13.09.44 –17.12.45 IX Corps, First Army
17.12.44 –5.01.45 (Remnants) Third Army
5.01.45 –27.03.45 (Refurbishing) Third Army
27.03.45 – 04.45 Reserve, Third Army

Tactical Attachments:
28.09.44 – 3.10.44 III. Panzerkorps, 6. Armee
3.10.44 –23.10.44 XVII. Armeekorps, 8. Armee
12.11.44 –26.11.44 (Remnants) XXIX. Armeekorps, 8. Armee
26.11.44 – 5.01.45 (Remnants) Reserve, 8. Armee
5.01.45 –27.03.45 (Refurbishing) Reserve, Hgr. Süd
27.03.45 – 4.04.45 XXXIII. Panzerkorps, 8. Armee

NOTES:
*) 27th Cavalry Company only as of 1.10.1942

The 27th “Székler” (Infantry) Division was created on 1.10.1944 by using the 27th Light Division components and adding a third regiment (made up of Székler Militia) and a second artillery battalion.
**HEADQUARTERS, 201st LIGHT DIVISION**
(Ad-hoc unit. No peace time Corps or Military District assigned)

**Lineage:**

- **Constituted:** 5.11.1942
  - As Headquarters, 201st Light Division [improvised] in Budapest
- **Activated:** 5.11.1942
  - Headquarters with a reduced-strength Staff and Supply Services for the occupation forces
- **Discontinued:** 26.05.1944
  - Dissolved

**Mobilized Combat Organization 31.12.1942:**

- Division Headquarters
- Headquarters 54th Infantry Regiment with I/52, III/23, II/42
- Headquarters 251st Inf. Rgt. with I/44, 42 March & 44 March Bn.
- 24th Anti-Aircraft Company
- 16th Signal Company

**Commanding Officers:**

- 5.11.42 – 1.07.43: Brig. Gen. Gyorgy Vukováry
- 1.07.43 – 01.44: Col. László Miskey
- 01.44 – 26.05.44: Brig. Gen. József Kisfaludy

**Administrative Attachments:**

- 5.11.42 – 15.12.42: (Headquarters only) being activated
- 15.12.42 – 31.12.42: (Headquarters only) en-route to East Front
- 1.01.43 – 17.02.43: (Headquarters only) H.O.G. West
- 17.02.43 – 1.05.43: (Headquarters only) H.O.G. West, Second Army
- 1.05.43 – 15.08.43: (Headquarters only) VII Corps, H.O.F.C.
- 15.08.43 – 1.04.44: (Headquarters only) VII Corps, Second Army
- 1.04.44 – 15.04.44: (Headquarters only) VII Corps, First Army
- 15.04.44 – 10.06.44: (Headquarters only) Reserve, First Army

**Tactical Attachments:**

- 1.01.43 – 1.05.43: (Headquarters only) WB Ukraine
- 1.05.43 – 7.07.43: (Headquarters only) Befh. HG Süd
- 7.07.43 – 8.10.43: (Headquarters only) Befh. HG Süd
- 8.10.43 – 1.04.44: (Headquarters only) Befh. Weissruthenien

**NOTES:**

The Headquarters, 201st Division, was an ad-hoc formation, not featured in the peace time order of battle. It was raised only to be sent to the occupation forces on the East Front.

When the Headquarters, 201st Division was finally dissolved, the units under its command – including the 41st Inf. Rgt. – were amalgamated into the 18th Reserve Division. The 42nd Inf. Rgt. was turned over to the 23rd Reserve Division.
## SZT. LÁSZLÓ DIVISION
(Without a Peace Time Headquarters or Corps)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding Officers:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituted: 12.10.1944 at Pápa</td>
<td>12.10.44 – 8.05.45 Brig. Gen. Zoltán Szügyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activated: 12.10.1944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued: 8.05.1945 Surrendered to British forces at Preitenegg, (near Maribor) Austria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mobilized Combat Organization:**
- Division Headquarters
- 1st (Parachute) Regiment
- 2nd (Infantry) Regiment
- 3rd (Air Force) Regiment
- 1st Artillery Battalion
- 6th Artillery Battalion (mot)
- 9th Artillery Battalion
- 76th Artillery Battalion
- 1st Rocket Launcher Battalion
- 20th Assault Gun Battalion
- Szt. László Combat Engineer Battalion (mot)
- Szt. László Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
- Szt. László Signal Battalion (mot)
- Szt. László Divisional Supply Services Headquarters

**Tactical Attachments:**
- 12.10.44 – 19.12.44 Reserve, Third Army
- 19.12.44 – 15.03.45 LVII. Panzerkorps, 8. Armee
- 15.03.45 – 19.03.45 XXII. Armeekorps, 2. Panzerarmee
- 19.03.45 – 12.04.45 (Remnants) II Corps, 6. Armee
- 12.04.45 – 8.05.45 XXII. Armeekorps, 1. Panzerarmee

**NOTES:**
As training of the elite Szt. László Division was not finished until early December 1944, the individual units of the division fought separately. Upon reaching combat readiness on 7.12.1944, the battalions were used in large part in the front around Budapest – at the Gran River, etc. – as ad-hoc emergency troops.

The division did not see combat as a complete formation until April 1945, and only after having been filled up by the remnants of the 20th Infantry Division, the 7th Field Replacement Division, and the so-called 8th Infantry Division, as well as the Fortress Regiment. The latter was used to replace the former 3rd (Air Force) Regiment, which had been annihilated in the previous fighting.

The British kept the division under arms until some questions regarding the Yugoslavian partisans had been settled.
Chapter 18 Royal Hungarian Army Commands and Formations 1922 – 1945

2nd FIELD REPLACEMENT DIVISION
Headquarters: Székesfehérvár (II Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 1.05.1944
Mobilized: 26.08.1944
Discontinued: 01.1945

Commanding Officers:
08.44 – 13.10.44 Col. Imre Czlenner
13.10.44 – 01.45 Col. Dénes Dobák

Mobilized Combat Organization:
Division Headquarters
(1st) Replacement Infantry Regiment
(2nd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
(3rd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
Replacement Artillery Battalion
Replacement Engineer Company
Replacement Mixed Signal Company
Replacement Supply Services Company

Administrative Attachments:
1.05.44 – 26.08.44 Field Replacement Army
26.08.44 – 2.09.44 VKF
2.09.44 – 10.44 Székler Border Command
10.44 –23.10.44 IX Corps, Second Army
23.10.44 –13.11.44 Reserve, Second Army
13.11.44 –31.12.44 Reserve, Third Army
31.12.44 – 01.45 II Corps, Third Army

Tactical Attachments:
23.10.44 – 2.11.44 XXIX. Armeekorps, 8. Armee
2.11.44 – 3.12.44 XVII. Armeekorps, 8. Armee

NOTES:
The 2nd Field Replacement Division was dissolved in January 1945, after its remnants had been transferred to the 20th Infantry Division.
3rd FIELD REPLACEMENT DIVISION
Headquarters: Sopron (III Corps)

Lineage:
- Constituted: 1.05.1944
- Mobilized: 26.08.1944
- Discontinued: 04.1945

Commanding Officers:
- 1.05.44 – 04.45

Administrative Attachments:
- 1.05.44 – 26.08.44 Field Replacement Army
- 26.08.44 – 2.09.44 VKF
- 2.09.44 – 10.44 Székler Border Command
- 10.44 – 31.12.44 Reserve, Third Army
- 31.12.44 – 11.01.45 II Corps, Third Army
- 11.01.45 – 04.45 Third Army

Mobilized Combat Organization:
- Division Headquarters
- (1st) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- (2nd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- (3rd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- Replacement Artillery Battalion
- Replacement Engineer Company
- Replacement Mixed Signal Company
- Replacement Supply Services Company

Tactical Attachments:
- 5.02.45 – 17.03.45 Reserve, 6. Armee
- 17.03.45 – 04.45 Reserve, Heeresgruppe Süd

Surrenders to Soviet forces in Bohemia, Czechoslovakia.
### 4th FIELD REPLACEMENT DIVISION

**Headquarters:** Kaposvár (IV Corps)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding Officers:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituted: 1.05.1944</td>
<td>08.44 – 23.09.44 Brig. Gen. Árpád Tarnaváry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mobilized Combat Organization:**
- Division Headquarters
- (1st) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- (2nd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- (3rd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- Replacement Artillery Battalion
- Replacement Engineer Company
- Replacement Mixed Signal Company
- Replacement Supply Services Company

**Administrative Attachments:**
- 1.05.44 – 26.08.44 Field Replacement Army
- 26.08.44 – 2.09.44 VKF
- 2.09.44 – 26.10.44 II Corps, Third Army

**NOTES:**
The 4th Field Replacement Division was dissolved in October 1944, after its remnants had been transferred to the 12th Reserve Division.
5th FIELD REPLACEMENT DIVISION
Headquarters: Szeged (V Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 1.05.1944
Mobilized: 26.08.1944
Discontinued: 11.1944

Mobilized Combat Organization:
Division Headquarters
(1st) Replacement Infantry Regiment
(2nd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
(3rd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
Replacement Artillery Battalion
Replacement Engineer Company
Replacement Mixed Signal Company
Replacement Supply Services Company

Commanding Officers:
08.4 – 15.11.44 Maj. Gen. Imre Kálmán
15.11.44 – ? Brig. Gen. László Miskey

Administrative Attachments:
1.05.44 – 26.08.44 Field Replacement Army
26.08.44 – 23.10.44 VKF
23.10.44 – 11.44 VIII Corps, Third Army

NOTES:
The 5th Field Replacement Division was dissolved in November 1944, after its remnants had been transferred to the 20th Infantry Division.
### 6th FIELD REPLACEMENT DIVISION

**Headquarters:** Debrecen (VI Corps)

#### Lineage:
- **Constituted:** 1.05.1944
- **Mobilized:** 26.08.1944
- **Discontinued:** 12.10.1944

#### Mobilized Combat Organization:
- Division Headquarters
- (1st) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- (2nd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- (3rd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- Replacement Artillery Battalion
- Replacement Engineer Company
- Replacement Mixed Signal Company
- Replacement Supply Services Company

#### Commanding Officers:
- 08.44 – 12.10.44 Brig. Gen. György Vukováry

#### Administrative Attachments:
- 1.05.44 – 26.08.44 Field Replacement Army
- 26.08.44 – 31.08.44 VKF
- 31.08.44 – 16.09.44 Reserve, First Army
- 16.09.44 – 28.09.44 IV Corps, Third Army
- 28.09.44 – 12.10.44 VIII Corps, Third Army

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**NOTES:**
The 6th Field Replacement Division was dissolved in October 1944, after its remnants had been transferred to the Szt. László Division.
7th FIELD REPLACEMENT DIVISION
Headquarters: Miskolc (VII Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 1.05.1944
Mobilized: 26.08.1944
Discontinued: 03.1945

Mobilized Combat Organization:
Division Headquarters
(1st) Replacement Infantry Regiment
(2nd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
(3rd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
Replacement Artillery Battalion
Replacement Engineer Company
Replacement Mixed Signal Company
Replacement Supply Services Company

Commanding Officers:
08.44 – 16.10.44 Brig. Gen. József Finta
12.44 – 03.45 Brig. Gen. József Kisfaludy

Administrative Attachments:
1.05.44 – 26.08.44 Field Replacement Army
26.08.44 – 5.09.44 VKF
5.09.44 – 18.09.44 II Corps, Second Army
18.09.44 – 13.11.44 Finta Group, Second Army
13.11.44 – 03.45 Reserves, Third Army

Tactical Attachments:
18.09.44 – 5.10.44 III. Panzerkorps, 8. Armeef

NOTES:
The 7th Field Replacement Division was dissolved in March 1945, after its remnants had been transferred to the Szt. László Division.
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8th FIELD REPLACEMENT DIVISION
Headquarters: Kassa (VIII Corps)

Lineage:
- Constituted: 1.05.1944
- Mobilized: 26.08.1944
- Discontinued: 03.1945

Mobilized Combat Organization:
- Division Headquarters
- (1st) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- (2nd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- (3rd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- Replacement Artillery Battalion
- Replacement Engineer Company
- Replacement Mixed Signal Company
- Replacement Supply Services Company

Commanding Officers:
- 08.44 – 8.03.45 Brig. Gen. Dr. Bela Temesy
- 9.03.45 – 03.45 Col. Sándor Martsa

Administrative Attachments:
- 1.05.44 – 26.08.44 Field Replacement Army
- 26.08.44 – 31.08.44 VKF
- 31.08.44 – 31.12.44 VIII Corps, Third Army
- 31.12.44 – 03.44 II Corps, Third Army

NOTES:
The 8th Field Replacement Division was dissolved in March 1945, after its remnants had been transferred to the Szt. László Division.
### 9th FIELD REPLACEMENT DIVISION

**Headquarters: Kolozsvár (IX Corps)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding Officers:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituted: 1.05.1944</td>
<td>08.44 – 10.44 Brig. Gen. János Mindszenty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilized: 26.08.1944</td>
<td>10.44 – 11.44 Col. János Fónagy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued: 01.1945 [Dissolved]</td>
<td>11.44 – 01.45 ?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Attachments:</th>
<th>Tactical Attachments:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.05.44 – 26.08.44 Field Replacement Army</td>
<td>23.10.44 – 28.10.44 XXIX. Armeekorps, 8. Armee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.08.44 – 31.08.44 VKF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.08.44 – 18.10.44 II Corps, Second Army</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.10.44 – 29.11.44 IX Corps, First Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.11.44 – 7.01.45 II Corps, Third Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mobilized Combat Organization:**
- Division Headquarters
- (1st) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- (2nd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- (3rd) Replacement Infantry Regiment
- Replacement Artillery Battalion
- Replacement Engineer Company
- Replacement Mixed Signal Company
- Replacement Supply Services Company

**NOTES:**
The 9th Field Replacement Division was dissolved in February 1945. It has not been possible to ascertain whether this division was used to fill up other formations.
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1st MOUNTAIN BRIGADE
Headquarters: Beszterce (IX Corps)

Lineage:
- Constituted: 15.09.39 From 1st Mountain Infantry Group
- Deactivated: 6.06.1941
- Activated: 1.12.1941
- Activated: 6.01.1944
- Mobilized: 6.03.1944
- Discontinued: 05.1945 Surrendered to the US forces in Styria, Austria

Peace Time Organization to 1943:
- Garrison:
  - Brigade Headquarters (Beszterce)
  - Artillery Commander (Beszterce)
  - 1st Mountain Infantry Battalion (Perecseny)
  - 2nd Mountain Infantry Battalion (Naszód)
  - 3rd Mountain Infantry Battalion (Rahó)
  - 4th Mountain Infantry Battalion (Aknaszlatina)
  - 33rd Mountain Infantry Battalion (*) (Borgoprund)
  - 1st Mountain Artillery Battalion (Beszterce)
  - 1st Mountain Cavalry Company (Beszterce)
  - 1st Mountain Anti-Tank Company (mot) (Nagybánya)
  - 1st Mountain Anti-Aircraft Company (mot) (Beszterce)
  - 1st Mountain Combat Engineer Company (Mármarossziget)
  - 1st Mountain Signal Company (Mármarossziget)
  - 1st Mountain Supply Services Headquarters (Mármarossziget)

Peace Time Organization from 1943:
- Garrison:
  - Brigade Headquarters (Beszterce)
  - Artillery Commander (Beszterce)
  - 2nd Mountain Infantry Battalion (Naszód)
  - 3rd Mountain Infantry Battalion (Rahó)
  - 12th Mountain Infantry Battalion (Aknaszlatina)
  - 33rd Mountain Infantry Battalion (Borgoprund)
  - 1st Mountain Artillery Battalion (Beszterce)
  - 1st Mountain Cavalry Company (Beszterce)
  - 1st Mountain Anti-Tank Company (mot) (Nagybánya)
  - 1st Mountain Anti-Aircraft Company (mot) (Beszterce)
  - 1st Mountain Combat Engineer Company (Mármarossziget)
  - 1st Mountain Signal Company (Mármarossziget)
  - 1st Mountain Supply Services Headquarters (Mármarossziget)

Commanding Officers:
- 1.12.40 – 1.10.41 Brig. Gen. Jenő Felkl
- 1.10.41 – 10.08.43 Brig. Gen. Aladár Pintér
- 10.08.43 – 10.11.44 Brig. Gen. Ferenc Loskay
- 10.09.44 – 04.45 Col. Lajos Barátosy
- 04.45 – 05.45 Col. Sándor Kossuth

Administrative Attachments:
- 15.09.39 – 1.03.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
- 1.03.40 – 6.06.41 VKF (peace time garrisons)
- 6.06.41 – 9.07.41 Carpathian Army Group
- 9.07.41 – 1.12.41 VIII Corps
- 1.12.41 – 6.01.44 VKF (peace time garrisons)
- 6.01.44 – 21.04.44 IX Corps, First Army
- 21.04.44 – 14.09.44 VI Corps, First Army
- 14.09.44 – 25.01.45 V Corps, First Army
- 25.01.45 – 1.02.45 Reserve, First Army
- 1.02.45 – 21.02.45 24th Infantry Division, First Army
- 21.02.45 – .05.45 First Army

Tactical Attachments:
- 22.11.44 – 3.12.44 XVIII. Armeekorps, Armeegruppe Wöhler, Heeresgruppe Süd

Border Defense Units:
- Garrison:
  - 62nd Border Police Battalion (Kisilva)
  - 1/2 Border Police Company (2 Patrols) (Borsa)
  - 33 Border Police Company (3 Patrols) (Bárányka)
  - 1/33 Fortress Company (Marosbordogó)
  - 2/33 Fortress Company (Nagyvár)
  - 3/33 Fortress Company (Óradna)
  - 4/33 Fortress Company (Tihucsa)
  - 1/2 Fortress Company (Borsa)
  - 1st Fortress Battalion (Kisilva)
  - 1/1 Fortress Company (Kisilva)
  - 2/1 Fortress Company (Kisilva)
  - 3/1 Fortress Company (Kisilva)

NOTES:
The 33rd Mountain Infantry Battalion was raised on 1.12.1941.
Peace Time Organization from 1943:

Garrison:

Brigade Headquarters (Munkács)
Artillery Commander (Munkács)
1st Mountain Infantry Battalion (Perecseny)
10th Mountain Infantry Battalion (Ökörmező)
11th Mountain Infantry Battalion (Fenyvesvölgy)
13th Mountain Infantry Battalion (Ráho)
25th Mountain Infantry Battalion (Vezérzsállás)
3rd Mountain Artillery Battalion (Szolyna)
1st Mountain Artillery Battery (Perecseny)
6th Mountain Artillery Battery (Szolyna)
11th Mountain Artillery Battery (Fenyvesvölgy)
4th Mountain Artillery Battalion (Rahó)
10th Mountain Artillery Battalion (Ökörmező)
13th Mountain Artillery Battery (Rahó)
25th Mountain Artillery Battalion (Vezérzsállás)
2nd Mountain Anti-Tank Company (Trebusa)
2nd Mountain Anti-Aircraft Company (mot) (Szolyna)
2nd Mountain Combat Engineer Company (Munkács)
2nd Mountain Signal Company (Munkács)
2nd Mountain Supply Services Headquarters (Szolyna)

Administrative Attachments:

10.08.43 – 6.01.44 VKF (peace time garrisons)
6.01.44 – 21.04.44 IX Corps, First Army
21.04.44 – 14.09.44 VI Corps, First Army
14.09.44 – 31.10.44 III Corps, First Army
31.10.44 – 3.12.44 (Remnants), First Army
3.12.44 – 7.12.44 V Corps, First Army
7.12.44 – 31.12.44 First Army
31.12.44 – 21.01.45 VIII Corps, First Army
21.01.45 – .05.45 First Army

Tactical Attachments:

22.11.44 – 3.12.44 XVIII. Armeekorps, Armeegruppe Wöhler, Heeresgruppe Süd
1st MOUNTAIN REPLACEMENT BRIGADE
Headquarters: Beszterce (IX Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 1.05.1944
Mobilized: 26.08.1944
Discontinued: 7.11.1944

Mobilized Organization:
Brigade Headquarters
(1st) Replacement Mountain Infantry Battalion
(2nd) Replacement Mountain Infantry Battalion
(1st) Replacement Mountain Artillery Battery
(2nd) Replacement Mountain Artillery Battery
Replacement Mountain Engineer Company
Replacement Mountain Mixed Signal Company
Replacement Mountain Supply Services Company

Commanding Officers:
1.05.44 – 7.11.44 ?

Administrative Attachments:
1.05.44 – 26.08.44 Field Replacement Army
26.08.44 – 2.09.44 VKF
2.09.44 – 5.10.44 II Corps, Second Army
5.10.44 – 7.11.44 Finta Group, Second Army

Tactical Attachments:
22.09.44 – 5.10.44 III. Panzerkorps, 6. Armee

NOTES:
The 1st Mountain Replacement Brigade was dissolved in November 1944, after its remnants had been transferred to the 1st Mountain Brigade.
2nd MOUNTAIN REPLACEMENT BRIGADE
Headquarters: Munkács (VIII Corps)

**Lineage:**
- Constituted: 1.05.1944
- Mobilized: 26.08.1944
- Discontinued: 7.11.1944

**Mobilized Organization:**
- Brigade Headquarters
- (1st) Replacement Mountain Infantry Battalion
- (2nd) Replacement Mountain Infantry Battalion
- (1st) Replacement Mountain Artillery Battery
- (2nd) Replacement Mountain Artillery Battery
- Replacement Mountain Engineer Company
- Replacement Mountain Mixed Signal Company
- Replacement Mountain Supply Services Company

**Commanding Officers:**
- 1.05.44 – 7.11.44 ?

**Administrative Attachments:**
- 1.05.44 – 26.08.44 Field Replacement Army
- 26.08.44 – 2.09.44 VKF
- 2.09.44 – 5.10.44 Reserves, Second Army
- 5.10.44 – 7.11.44 Finta Group, Second Army

**Tactical Attachments:**
- 22.09.44 – 5.10.44 III. Panzerkorps, 6. Armee

**NOTES:**
The 2nd Mountain Replacement Brigade was dissolved in November 1944, after its remnants had been transferred to the 2nd Mountain Brigade.
**1st MOTORIZED BRIGADE**  
*Headquarters: Budapest (Mobile Corps)*

**Lineage:**

- **Constituted:** 1.04.1937 As 1st Mobile Brigade  
- **Redesignated:** 1.10.1938 As 1st Motorized Brigade  
- **Activated:** 5.04.1941  
- **Inactivated:** 20.04.1941  
- **Activated:** 27.06.1941  
- **Inactivated:** 6.12.1941  
- **Discontinued:** 06.1942

**Peace Time Organization until 1941:**

- **Brigade Headquarters:** (Budapest)  
- **Artillery Commander:** (Budapest)  
- **1st Motorized Regiment Headquarters:** (Budapest)  
- **1st Motorized Battalion:** (Budapest)  
- **2nd Motorized Battalion:** (Budapest)  
- **3rd Motorized Battalion:** (Aszód)  
- **9th Bicycle Battalion:** (Jászberény)  
- **10th Bicycle Battalion:** (Retság)  
- **1st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion:** (Budapest)  
- **1st Artillery Battalion (mot):** (Budapest)  
- **1st Combat Engineer Company (mot):** (Budapest)  
- **1st Bridge Column (mot):** (Budapest)  
- **1st Signal Company (mot):** (Budapest)  
- **1st Traffic Control Company (mot):** (Budapest)  
- **1st Motorized Brigade:** (Budapest)

**Garrison:**

- **Supply Services Headquarters (mot):** (Budapest)

**Commanding Officers:**

- **1.10.38 – 1.03.40** Brig. Gen. Ödön Zay  
- **1.03.40 – 1.11.41** Brig. Gen. Jenő Major  
- **1.11.41 – 1.05.42** Brig. Gen. Gyöző Ankai-Anesini  
- **1.05.42 – 06.42** Col. Elemér Sáska

**Administrative Attachments:**

- **1.04.37 – 1.03.40** HM (peace time garrisons)  
- **1.03.40 – 5.04.41** Mobile Corps, VKF (peace time garrisons)  
- **5.04.41 – 20.04.41** Mobile Corps, Third Army  
- **20.04.41 – 27.06.41** Mobile Corps, VKF (peace time garrisons)  
- **27.06.41 – 9.07.41** Mobile Corps, Carpathian Army Group  
- **9.07.41 – 15.11.41** Mobile Corps  
- **15.11.41 – 6.12.41** Mobile Corps, Returned to Hungary  
- **6.12.41 – 06.42** Mobile Corps, VKF (peace time garrisons)

**Tactical Attachments:**

- **9.07.41 – 12.08.41** Gruppe Kempf, 17. Armee,  
  *Heeresgruppe Süd*  
- **12.08.41 – 21.08.41** XXXVIII. Armeekorps (mot), 1. Panzergruppe,  
  *Heeresgruppe Süd*  
- **21.08.41 – 12.09.41** Gruppe Kempf, 1. Panzergruppe,  
  *Heeresgruppe Süd*  
- **12.09.41 – 22.09.41** Reserve, Hgr. Süd  
- **22.09.41 – 8.10.41** Gruppe von Rouque, *Heeresgruppe Süd*  
- **8.10.41 – 12.10.41** Reserve, *Heeresgruppe Süd*  
- **12.10.41 – 15.11.41** Reserve, 17. Armee, *Heeresgruppe Süd*

**NOTES:**

Elements of the 1st motorized Brigade used to form the 1st Armored Field Division in April 1942.
2nd MOTORIZED BRIGADE

Headquarters: Budapest; from 11.38: Kassa; from 03.39: Munkács (Mobile Corps)

### Lineage:

- **Constituted:** 1.02.1938 as 2nd Mobile Brigade
- **Redesignated:** 1.10.1938 in 2nd Motorized Brigade
- **Activated:** 5.04.1941
- **Inactivated:** 20.04.1941
- **Activated:** 27.06.1941
- **Inactivated:** 1.12.1941
- **Discontinued:** 1.12.1941

### Commanding Officers:

- **1.02.38 – 15.01.39** Brig. Gen. Ödön Zay
- **15.01.39 – 1.03.40** Col. Sándor Horváth
- **1.03.40 – 29.10.40** Brig. Gen. József Heszlényi
- **29.10.40 – 1.08.41** Brig. Gen. János Vörös
- **1.08.41 – 1.10.41** Col. Ferenc Bisza

### Administrative Attachments:

- **1.04.37 – 1.03.40** HM (peace time garrisons)
- **1.03.40 – 5.04.41** Mobile Corps, VKF (peace time garrisons)
- **5.04.41 – 20.04.41** Mobile Corps, Third Army
- **20.04.41 – 27.06.41** Mobile Corps, VKF (peace time garrisons)
- **27.06.41 – 9.07.41** Mobile Corps, Carpathian Army Group
- **9.07.41 – 15.11.41** Mobile Corps
- **15.11.41 – 1.12.41** Mobile Corps, Returned to Hungary

### Tactical Attachments:

- **9.07.41 – 12.08.41** Gruppe Kempf, 17. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
- **12.08.41 – 21.08.41** XXXVIII. Armeekorps (mot), 1. Panzergruppe, Heeresgruppe Süd
- **21.08.41 – 12.09.41** Gruppe Kempf, 1. Panzergruppe, Heeresgruppe Süd
- **12.09.41 – 22.09.41** Reserve, Hgr. Süd
- **22.09.41 – 8.10.41** Gruppe von Roquese, Heeresgruppe Süd
- **8.10.41 – 12.10.41** Reserve, Heeresgruppe Süd
- **12.10.41 – 15.11.41** Reserve, 17. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd

### Peace Time Organization until 1941:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigade Headquarters</td>
<td>Ungvár</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Commander</td>
<td>Ungvár</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Motorized Regiment Headquarters</td>
<td>Ungvár</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Motorized Battalion</td>
<td>Kassa</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Motorized Battalion</td>
<td>Ungvár</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Motorized Battalion</td>
<td>Munkács</td>
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<td>11th Bicycle Battalion</td>
<td>Munkács</td>
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<tr>
<td>12th Bicycle Battalion</td>
<td>Nyírbátor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion</td>
<td>Kassa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Artillery Battalion (mot)</td>
<td>Kassa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Combat Engineer Company (mot)</td>
<td>Tiszakirva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bridge Column (mot)</td>
<td>Tiszakirva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Signal Company (mot)</td>
<td>Ungvár</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Traffic Control Company (mot)</td>
<td>Ungvár</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Mot. Brigade Supply Services Headquarters (mot)</td>
<td>Ungvár</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NOTES:

Upon its arrival in Hungary, the combat and support units of the 2nd motorized Brigade were transferred to the 2nd Armored Division.
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1st ARMORED FIELD DIVISION
(Ad-hoc unit. No peace time Corps or Military District assigned)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding Officers:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituted: 24.03.1942 As 1st Armored Field Division.</td>
<td>15.04.42 – 1.10.42 Maj. Gen. Lajos Veress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilized: 9.05.1942</td>
<td>1.10.42 – 6.12.42 Col. Elemér Sáska</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mobilized Organization on 1.06.1942
Division Headquarters
Artillery Commander
30th Tank Regiment Headquarters
30/I Tank Battalion
30/II Tank Battalion
1st Motorized Regiment Headquarters
1st Motorized Battalion
2nd Motorized Battalion
3rd Motorized Battalion
1st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
1st Artillery Battalion (mot)
5th Artillery Battalion (mot)
IInd Anti-Aircraft-Battalion (mot)
51st Anti-Aircraft-Battalion (self-propelled)
1st Signal Battalion (mot)
1st Combat Engineer Battalion (mot)
1st Armored Supply Services Headquarters (mot)

Administrative Attachments:
24.03.42 – 9.05.42 Being activated, VKF
9.05.42 – 15.06.42 en-route East Front
15.06.42 – 24.06.42 Reserve, Second Army
24.06.42 – 4.07.42 IV Corps, Second Army
4.07.42 – 21.02.43 Reserve, Second Army
21.02.43 – 1.04.43 Returned to Hungary

Tactical Attachments:
4.07.42 – 4.08.42 Gruppe von Weichs, Heeresgruppe B
4.08.42 – 20.08.42 Reserve, Heeresgruppe B
2.09.42 – 18.10.42 XXIV. Panzerkorps, Heeresgruppe B
12.01.43 – 11.02.43 Korps Cramer, Heeresgruppe B

NOTES:
The 1st Field Armored Division was an ad-hoc formation, created especially for the 1942 Russian Campaign. It was not part of the standard Peace Time Order of Battle.

The remnants were returned to Hungary from the East Front and dissolved in April 1943.
Lineage:

Constituted: 1.10.1942 As 1st Armored Division
Activated: .09.1944
Discontinued: 12.02.1945 Destroyed when Budapest fell

Commanding Officers:

15.11.42 – 1.04.43 – position not filled –
1.04.43 – 03.44 Brig. Gen. Ferenc Horváth
03.44 – 23.09.44 Col. Ferenc Koszorus
23.09.44 – 10.10.44 Col. Ferenc Deák
10.10.44 – 21.10.44 Col. Béla Tiszay
21.10.44 – 12.11.44 Col. Zoltán Schell
13.11.44 – 12.44 Col. Ernő Mike
12.44 – 12.02.45 Col. Vértessy

Peace Time Organization from 1943: Garrison:

Division Headquarters (Budapest)
Artillery Commander (Budapest)
1st Tank Regiment Headquarters (Esztergom)
I/1st Tank Regiment (Esztergom)
II/1st Tank Regiment (Jászberény)
III/1st Tank Regiment (Rétság)
1st Motorized Regiment Headquarters (Budapest)
1st Motorized Battalion (Budapest)
2nd Motorized Battalion (Budapest)
3rd Motorized Battalion (Aszód)
1st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (Budapest)
1st Artillery Battalion (mot) (Budapest)
5th Artillery Battalion (mot) (Budapest)
51st Anti-Aircraft-Battalion (mot) (Budapest)
51st Anti-Aircraft-Battalion (self-propelled) (Budapest)
1st Combat Engineer Battalion (mot) (Budapest)
1st Armored Supply Services Headquarters (mot) (Esztergom)

Administrative Attachments:

1.10.42 – 1.08.44 VKF (peace time garrisons)
1.08.44 – 1.09.44 4th Military District
1.09.44 – 23.09.44 IV Corps, Third Army
23.09.44 – 5.10.44 Reserve, Third Army
5.10.44 – 23.10.44 VIII Corps, Third Army
23.10.44 – 12.11.44 VI Corps, Third Army
12.11.44 – 13.02.45 I Corps, Third Army

Tactical Attachments:

23.09.44 – 5.10.44 LVII. Panzerkorps, Heeresgruppe Süd
23.10.44 – 28.10.44 LVII. Panzerkorps, 6. Armee,
Heeresgruppe Süd
28.10.44 – 5.11.44 LVII. Panzerkorps, Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico,
Heeresgruppe Süd
5.11.44 – 12.12.44 III. Panzerkorps, Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico,
Heeresgruppe Süd
12.12.44 – 13.02.45 IX. SS-Gebirgskorps, Armeegruppe Balek,
Heeresgruppe Süd

NOTES:

The 1st Armored Division did not really come into existence until April 1943. All components had been sent to the East Front with the 1st Armored Field Division, or were used to fill up the 2nd Armored Division, which had priority in being allocated equipment.

After the destruction of the 1st Armored Field Division, the 1st Armored Division – having no equipment – was used as the personnel training and replacement unit for the 2nd Armored Division and not carried in the Order of Battle of 1.10.1943 as a combat unit. It only slowly received equipment, and was not combat-ready until mid-1944.
2nd ARMORED DIVISION
Headquarters: Munkács; later Kecskemét (Mobile Corps, later 1 Armored Corps)

Lineage:
Constituted: 1.10.1941 As 2nd Armored Division.
Activated: 27.03.1944
Discontinued: 04.1945 Surrendered to Soviet forces at the end of April 1945 in Styria, Austria.

Garrison:
Division Headquarters (Kecskemét)
Artillery Commander (Kecskemét)
3rd Tank Regiment Headquarters (Cegléd)
1/3rd Tank Regiment (Cegléd)
II/3rd Tank Regiment (Kiskunhalás)
III/3rd Tank Regiment (Kiskunhalás)
3rd Motorized Regiment Headquarters (Ungvár)
4th Motorized Battalion (Kassa)
5th Motorized Battalion (Ungvár)
6th Motorized Battalion (Munkács)
2nd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (Kassa)
2nd Artillery Battalion (mot) (Kassa)
6th Artillery Battalion (mot) (Nagykörös)
52nd Anti-Aircraft-Battalion (mot) (Ungvár)
52nd Anti-Aircraft-Battalion (self-propelled) (Cegléd)
2nd Combat Engineer Company (mot) (Tiszakirva)
3rd Combat Engineer Company (mot) (Szatmármeleti)
2nd Armored Supply Services Headquarters (mot) (Munkács)

Commanding Officers:
1.10.41 – 15.04.42 Maj. Gen. Lajos Veress
15.04.42 – 1.10.42 Brig. Gen. Aladár Asztalossy
1.10.42 – 1.10.43 Brig. Gen. Ferenc Bisza
1.10.43 – 1.06.44 Col. Ferenc Osztovics
1.06.44 – 04.45 Brig. Gen. Zoltán Zsedényi

Peace Time Organization from 1943:

Administrative Attachments:
1.11.41 – 27.03.44 VKF (peace time garrisons)
27.3.44 – 27.03.44 Reserve, First Army
27.03.44 – 31.08.44 III Corps, First Army
31.08.44 – 5.09.44 Reserve, First Army
5.09.44 – 2a3.10.44 II Corps, Second Army
23.10.44 – 5.11.44 Reserve, First Army
5.11.44 – 4.04.45 Reserve, Third Army
4.04.45 – 04.45 VIII Corps, Third Army

Tactical Attachments:
15.04.44 – 15.05.44 XI. Armeekorps, Heeregruppe Nordukraine
18.10.44 – 28.10.44 III. Panzerkorps, Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico, Heeresgruppe Süd
28.10.44 – 5.11.44 XXIX. Armeekorps, Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico, Heeresgruppe Süd
5.11.44 – 12.11.44 Gruppe Breith, Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico, Heeresgruppe Süd
12.11.44 – 26.11.44 IV. Panzerkorps, Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico, Heeresgruppe Süd
2.12.44 – 22.12.44 Reserve, Heeresgruppe Süd
22.12.44 – 11.01.45 LXXII. Armeekorps, Armeegruppe Balck, Heeresgruppe Süd
11.01.45 – 1.02.45 III. Panzerkorps, Armeegruppe Balck, Heeresgruppe Süd
1.02.45 – 19.03.45 IV. SS-Panzerkorps, Armeegruppe Balck, Heeresgruppe Süd
22.03.45 – 4.04.45 I. SS-Panzerkorps, 6. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
1st CAVALRY BRIGADE
Headquarters: Nyiregyháza (Mobile Corps)

Lineage:
Redesignated: 1.10.1937
Activated: 5.04.1941
Inactivated: 20.04.1941
Activated: 27.06.1941
Inactivated: 6.12.1941
Discontinued: 30.09.1942

Commanding Officers:
19.01.31 – 1.05.33 Brig. Gen. Lajos Keresztes-Fischer
1.05.33 – 1.02.35 Brig. Gen. Guzstáv Kistoranyi Denk
1.02.35 – 1.05.38 Brig. Gen. Elemér Gorondy Novák
1.05.38 – 1.03.40 Brig. Gen. Béla Miklós
1.03.40 – 1.10.41 Brig. Gen. Lajos Veress
1.10.41 – 30.09.42 Brig. Gen. András Király

Peace Time Organization until 1942:
Brigade Headquarters (Nyiregyháza)
Artillery Commander (Nyiregyháza)
3rd Hussar Regiment Headquarters (Nagyvárad)
1/3rd Hussar Regiment (Nagyvárad)
2/3rd Hussar Regiment (Munkács)
4th Hussar Regiment Headquarters (Nyiregyháza)
1/4th Hussar Regiment (Nyiregyháza)
2/4th Hussar Regiment (Nyiregyháza)
13th Bicycle Battalion (Kiskunhalas)
14th Bicycle Battalion (Nagyszőllős)
3rd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (Szilágyosomlyó)
3rd Artillery Battalion (Nyírbátor)
1st Horse Artillery Battalion (Nagycárad)
1st Cavalry Anti-Aircraft Company (mot) (Nyiregyháza)
1st Cavalry Combat Engineer Company (mot) (Nyiregyháza)
1st Cavalry Bridge Column (mot) (Nyiregyháza)
1st Cavalry Signal Company (mot) (Nyiregyháza)
1st Cav. Supply Services Headquarters (mot) (Nyiregyháza)

Garrison:
(Nyiregyháza)
(Nagyvárad)
(Munkács)
(Nyiregyháza)
(Nyiregyháza)
(Nyiregyháza)
(Nagyszőllős)
(Szilágyosomlyó)
(Nyírbátor)
(Nagycárad)
(Nyiregyháza)
(Nyiregyháza)
(Nyiregyháza)

Administrative Attachments:
16.06.28 – 5.04.41 VKF (peace time garrisons)
5.04.41 – 20.04.41 Mobile Corps, Third Army
20.04.41 – 27.06.41 Mobile Corps, VKF (peace time garrisons)
27.06.41 – 9.07.41 Mobile Corps, Carpathian Army Group
9.07.41 – 6.10.41 Mobile Corps
6.10.41 – 10.41 Returned to Hungary
.10.41 – 30.09.42 Mobile Corps, VKF (peace time garrisons)

Tactical Attachments:
9.07.41 – 19.07.41 Reserve, Heeresgruppe Süd
19.07.41 – 2.08.41 Gruppe Kempf, 17. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
2.08.41 – 7.08.41 Befh. HG Süd, Heeresgruppe Süd
7.08.41 – 12.08.41 Gruppe Kempf, 17. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
12.08.41 – 21.08.41 XXXVIII. Armeekorps (mot), 1. Panzergruppe, Heeresgruppe Süd
21.08.41 – 12.09.41 Gruppe Kempf, 1. Panzergruppe, Heeresgruppe Süd
12.09.41 – 22.09.41 Reserve, Heeresgruppe Süd
22.09.41 – 6.10.41 Gruppe von Roques, Heeresgruppe Süd

NOTES:
The units of the 1st Cavalry Brigade were used to form the 1st Cavalry Division.
### 2nd CAVALRY BRIGADE

**Headquarters:** Budapest (Mobile Corps)

#### Lineage:

- **Redesignated:** 1.10.1937
- **Activated:** 5.04.1941
- **Inactivated:** 1.01.1942
- **Discontinued:** 30.09.1942 (See Notes below)

#### Commanding Officers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35 – 1.05.37</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Olivér Perczel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.05.37 – 24.12.40</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Alajos Bélydy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Administrative Attachments:

- 16.06.28 – 5.04.41 VKF (peace time garrisons)
- 5.04.41 – 20.04.41 V Corps, Third Army
- 20.04.41 – 1.01.42 (Elements) V Corps
- 1.01.42 – 30.09.42 VKF (peace time garrisons)

#### Peace Time Organization until 1941:

- **Brigade Headquarters** (Budapest)
- **Artillery Commander** (Budapest)
- **1st Hussar Regiment Headquarters** (Budapest)
- **I/1st Hussar Regiment** (Budapest)
- **II/1st Hussar Regiment** (Budapest)
- **2nd Hussar Regiment Headquarters** (Szabadka)
- **I/2nd Hussar Regiment** (Szentes)
- **II/2nd Hussar Regiment** (Szabadka)
- **15th Bicycle Battalion** (Kiskunhalas)
- **16th Bicycle Battalion** (Szeged)
- **4th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion** (Budapest)
- **4th Artillery Battalion (mot)** (Budapest)
- **2nd Horse Artillery Battalion** (Budapest)
- **2nd Cavalry Anti-Aircraft Company (mot)** (Budapest)
- **2nd Cavalry Combat Engineer Company (mot)** (Budapest)
- **2nd Cavalry Bridge Column (mot)** (Budapest)
- **2nd Cavalry Signal Company (mot)** (Budapest)
- **2nd Cav. Supply Services Headquarters (mot)** (Budapest)

#### Garrison:

- **Brigade Headquarters** (Budapest)
- **Artillery Commander** (Budapest)
- **1st Hussar Regiment** (Budapest)
- **I/1st Hussar Regiment** (Budapest)
- **II/1st Hussar Regiment** (Budapest)
- **2nd Hussar Regiment** (Szabadka)
- **I/2nd Hussar Regiment** (Szentes)
- **II/2nd Hussar Regiment** (Szabadka)
- **15th Bicycle Battalion** (Kiskunhalas)
- **16th Bicycle Battalion** (Szeged)
- **4th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion** (Budapest)
- **4th Artillery Battalion (mot)** (Budapest)
- **2nd Horse Artillery Battalion** (Budapest)
- **2nd Cavalry Anti-Aircraft Company (mot)** (Budapest)
- **2nd Cavalry Combat Engineer Company (mot)** (Budapest)
- **2nd Cavalry Bridge Column (mot)** (Budapest)
- **2nd Cavalry Signal Company (mot)** (Budapest)
- **2nd Cav. Supply Services Headquarters (mot)** (Budapest)

#### NOTES:

The Brigade Headquarters and 1st Hussar Regiment remained for a time in the Bácska after the 1941 Yugoslavian Campaign.

The I/1st Hussar Regiment was used to form the independent IXth Cavalry and the 2nd Székel Cavalry Companies. The II/1st Hussar Regiment was used to form the independent 1st Cavalry Battalion in Budapest; the remaining combat and the support units used to form the 1st Cavalry Division.
Lineage:

- Constituted: 1.10.1942 As 1st Cavalry Division, from 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades
- Activated: 26.04.1944
- Redesignated: 09.1944 As 1st Huszár Division
- Discontinued: 04.1945 Remnants surrendered in part to US forces in Styria, Austria and in part to Soviet forces east of the Enn River.

Commanding Officers:

- 1.10.42 – 18.07.44 Maj. Gen. Antal Vattay
- 18.07.44 – 4.11.44 Maj. Gen. Mihály Ibrányi
- 13.11.44 – 04.45 Col. Zoltán Schell

Administrative Attachments:

- 1.10.42 – 27.04.44 VKF (peace time garrisons)
- 27.04.44 – 15.06.44 (being activated) VKF
- 10.06.44 – 18.06.44 Transported to II Reserve Corps
- 15.06.44 – 23.09.44 II Reserve Corps
- 23.09.44 – 8.10.44 Returned to Hungary
- 8.10.14 – 31.01.45 Reserve, Third Army
- 31.01.45 – 04.45 VIII Corps, Third Army

Tactical Attachments:

- 15.06.44 – 29.06.144 Reserve, 2. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 4.07.44 – 15.07.44 Gruppe Hateneck, 2. Armee Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 15.07.44 – 19.07.44 Reserve, 2. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 29.07.44 – 31.08.44 VIII. Corps, Gruppe von Roman, 2. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 31.08.44 – 23.09.44 IV. SS-Panzerkorps, 9. Armee, Heeresgruppe Mitte
- 5.11.44 – 26.11.44 III. Panzerkorps, 6. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 26.11.44 – 22.12.44 LXII. Armeekorps, 6. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 22.12.44 – 31.01.45 III. Panzerkorps, 6. Armee, Heeresgruppe Süd

NOTES:

Some elements present in Budapest were destroyed when the city fell on 13.02.1945.
1st CAVALRY FIELD REPLACEMENT BRIGADE
Headquarters: Nagyvárad

Lineage:
Constituted: 1.05.44
Mobilized: 26.08.44
Discontinued: 23.10.44

Commanding Officers:
1.05.44 – 23.10.44 Colonel von Auerhammer

Mobilized Organization as of 1.09.1944:
Headquarters
(1st) Cavalry Battalion
(2nd) Cavalry Battalion
Bicycle Company
Cavalry Reconnaissance Company
with Armored Car Platoon

Administrative Attachments:
1.05.44 – 26.08.44 VKF (peace time garrisons)
26.08.44 – 18.09.44 Reserve, Second Army
18.09.44 – 28.09.44 IV Corps, Third Army
28.09.44 – 18.10.44 VIII Corps, Third Army
18.10.44 – 23.10.44 Reserve, Third Army

NOTES:
The 1st Cavalry Replacement Brigade was used to fill up the Huszár Division after its return from Poland between 18.10.44 and 23.10.44.
1st BORDER GUARD BRIGADE
Headquarters: Salgóteszán (1st Military District)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding Officers:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued: 15.11.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Administrative Attachments:
23.01.39 – 15.11.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
## 2nd BORDER GUARD BRIGADE

**Headquarters:** Komárom (2nd Military District)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage</th>
<th>Commanding Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituted: 23.01.39 from the 2nd Border Guard District</td>
<td>23.01.39 – 1.03.40 Col. Sándor Magyarosy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued: 15.11.40</td>
<td>1.03.40 – 15.11.40 Col. Béla Góthay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Administrative Attachments:**

23.01.39 – 15.11.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
3rd BORDER GUARD BRIGADE
Headquarters: Keszthely (3rd Military District)

Lineage:
- Constituted: 23.01.39 from the 3rd Border Guard District
- Discontinued: 15.11.40

Commanding Officers:
- 23.01.39 – 15.11.40 Col. Emil Lánghy

Administrative Attachments:
- 23.01.39 – 15.11.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
4th BORDER GUARD BRIGADE
Headquarters: Pécs (4th Military District)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding Officers:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituted: 23.01.39 from the 4th Border Guard District</td>
<td>23.01.39 – 15.11.40 Col. Jénő Fekl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued: 15.11.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Administrative Attachments:
23.01.39 – 15.11.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
5th BORDER GUARD BRIGADE
Headquarters: Kiskunhalas (5th Military District)

Lineage:
Constituted: 23.01.39 from the 5th Border Guard District
Discontinued: 15.11.40

Commanding Officers:
23.01.39 – 15.11.40 Col. Ferenc Kolthay

Administrative Attachments:
23.01.39 – 15.11.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
6th BORDER GUARD BRIGADE
Headquarters: Debrecen (6th Military District)

**Lineage:**
- Constituted: 23.01.39 from the 6th Border Guard District
- Discontinued: 15.11.40

**Commanding Officers:**
- 23.01.39 – 15.11.40 Brig. Ernő Gyimesy

**Administrative Attachments:**
- 23.01.39 – 15.11.40 HM (peace time garrisons)
### 7th BORDER GUARD BRIGADE

Headquarters: Mátészalka (7th Military District); then Bergszász (8th Military District)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding Officers:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituted: 23.01.39</td>
<td>23.01.39 – 18.12.39 Col. Sándor Bodor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from the 7th Border Guard District</td>
<td>18.12.39 – 15.11.40 Col. Béla Marschalkó</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued: 15.11.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Attachments:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.01.39 – 15.11.40 HM (peace time garrisons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 8th BORDER GUARD BRIGADE

**Headquarters:** Sátoraljaújhely; later Munkács (VIII Corps)

#### Lineage:
- **Constituted:** 23.01.1939 As 8th Border Guard Brigade
- **Activated:** 6.06.1941
- **Deactivated:** 1.12.1941
- **Discontinued:** 10.08.1943

#### Commanding Officers:
- 23.01.39 – 1.02.41: Brig. Gen. Endre Szücs
- 1.02.41 – 1.08.41: Brig. Gen. György Rakovszky
- 1.08.41 – 10.42: Brig. Gen. Ferenc Farkas
- 10.42 – 10.08.43: Brig. Gen. Géza Fehér

#### Administrative Attachments:
- 23.01.39 – 1.03.40: HM (peace time garrisons)
- 1.03.40 – 6.06.41: VKF (peace time garrisons)
- 6.06.41 – 9.07.41: Carpathian Army Group
- 9.07.41 – 1.12.41: VIII Corps
- 1.12.41 – 10.08.43: VKF (peace time garrisons)

#### Tactical Attachments:
- 9.07.41 – 1.12.41: Bef. HG Süd, Heeresgruppe Süd

#### Peace Time Organization until 1943:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Time Organization until 1943</th>
<th>Garrison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brigade Headquarters</strong></td>
<td>Munkács</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Mountain Border Guard Battalion</td>
<td>(Műkörző)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Mountain Border Guard Battalion</td>
<td>(Fenyvesvölgy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Mountain Border Guard Battalion</td>
<td>(Borsa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Mountain Border Guard Battalion</td>
<td>(Rába)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Mountain Border Guard Battalion</td>
<td>(Vezérszállás)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Border Gd. Anti-Aircraft Company (mot)</td>
<td>(Szolyna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Mountain Combat Engineer Company</td>
<td>(Munkács)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Mountain Signal Company</td>
<td>(Munkács)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Border Defense Units:</th>
<th>Garrison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63rd Border Police Battalion</td>
<td>Rába</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/2 Border Police Company (3 Patrols)</td>
<td>(Felsőviső)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Border Police Company (6 Patrols)</td>
<td>(Kőrösmező)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/10 Border Police Company (4 Patrols)</td>
<td>(Királymező)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/2 Fortress Company</td>
<td>(Felsőviső)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/3 Fortress Company</td>
<td>(Kőrösmező)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/10 Fortress Company</td>
<td>(Királymező)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64th Border Police Battalion</td>
<td>(Szolyva)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/10 Border Police Company (3 Patrols)</td>
<td>(Őkörmező)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Border Police Company (7 Patrols)</td>
<td>(Vezérszállás)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/10 Fortress Company</td>
<td>(Tovcska)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/10 Fortress Company</td>
<td>(Vízköz)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/25 Fortress Company</td>
<td>(Volóc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/25 Fortress Company</td>
<td>(Vezérszállás)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65th Border Police Battalion</td>
<td>(Nagyberezná)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Border Police Company (5 Patrols)</td>
<td>(Fenyvesvölgy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/26 Border Police Company (8 Patrols)</td>
<td>(Ulcás)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/26 Border Police Company (5 Patrols)</td>
<td>(Szobránca)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/26 Fortress Company</td>
<td>(Nagyberezná)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/11 Fortress Company</td>
<td>(Málomréti)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### NOTES:
- Redesignated as the 2nd Mountain Brigade on 10.08.1943.
### 9th BORDER GUARD DIVISION

**Headquarters:** Csikszereda; later Gyergyószentmiklósló (IX Corps; as of 08.43: Székely Command)

**Lineage:**
- **Constituted:** 15.11.1940
- **Activated:** ?
- **Redesignated:** 03.05.1945 9th Border Guard Division
- **Discontinued:** 04.04.1945 Surrendered to US forces at Munich, Germany

**Commanding Officers:**
- 1.07.42 – 1.02.43 Brig. Gen. Dezso Tolnay
- 1.02.43 – 10.11.44 Brig. Gen. Ferenc Szász
- 10.11.44 – 04.45 Brig. Gen. Ferenc Lóskay

#### Peace Time Organization from 1943:

**Garrison:**
- Brigade Headquarters: (Csikszereda)
- 1st Székel Artillery Battalion Headquarters: (Csikszereda)

**65th Border Guard Group**
- 21st Mountain Border Guard Battalion: (Gyergyószentmiklósló)
- 1/21 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Gyergyószentmiklós)
- 2/21 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Gyergyószentmiklós)
- 3/21 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Gyergyószentmiklós)
- 4/21 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Gyergyószentmiklós)
- 21 Mountain Artillery Battery: (Gyergyószentmiklós)
- 21 Border Police Company (7 Patrols): (Gyergyószentmiklós)
- 1/21 Fortress Company: (Békás)
- 2/21 Fortress Company: (Maroshevíz)
- 3/21 Fortress Company: (Borszék)
- 4/21 Fortress Company: (Gyergyószentmiklós)
- 5/21 Fortress Company: (Gyergyószentmiklós)
- 6/21 Fortress Company: (Palotitva)
- 1st Székel Militia Battalion: (Gyergyószentmiklós)
- 2nd Székel Militia Battalion: (Gyergyószentmiklós)
- 3rd Székel Militia Battalion: (Dité)

**70th Border Guard Group**
- 32 Mountain Border Guard Battalion: (Gyimesfelső)
- 1/32 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Zollamt-Uzvölgy)
- 2/32 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Gyimesfelső)
- 3/32 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Gyimesfelső)
- 4/32 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Gyimesfelső)
- 32 Mountain Artillery Battery: (Gyimesfelső)
- 32 Border Police Company (7 Patrols): (Gyimesfelső)
- 1/32 Fortress Company: (Zollamt-Uzvölgy)
- 2/32 Fortress Company: (Gyimesfelső)
- 3/32 Fortress Company: (Gyimesközéplok)
- 4th Székel Militia Battalion: (Gyimesfelső)
- 5th Székel Militia Battalion: (Csikszentmádamos)
- 6th Székel Militia Battalion: (Csikszereda)

**67th Border Guard Group**
- 24th Mountain Border Guard Battalion: (Kétvidvásárhely)
- 1/24 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Bereket)
- 2/24 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Sömörei)
- 3/24 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Kézdivásárthelye)
- 4/24 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Kézdivásárthelye)
- 24 Mountain Artillery Battery: (Kézdivásárthelye)
- 24 Border Police Company (7 Patrols): (Kézdivásárthelye)
- 1/24 Fortress Company: (Ojtoz tp.)
- 2/24 Fortress Company: (Kászomajfalva)
- 26th Mountain Border Guard Battalion: (Sepsiszentgyörgy)
- 1/26 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Sepsiszentgyörgy)
- 2/26 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Sepsiszentgyörgy)
- 3/26 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Sepsiszentgyörgy)
- 4/26 Mountain Border Guard Company: (Sepsiszentgyörgy)
- 26 Mountain Artillery Battery: (Sepsiszentgyörgy)

**Administrative Attachments:**
- 15.11.40 – 1.02.43 9th Military District (peace time garrisons)
- 1.02.43 – 16.09.44 Székler Command
- 16.09.44 – 23.10.44 Reserve, Second Army
- 23.10.44 – 17.11.44 I Corps, Second Army
- 17.11.44 – 17.12.44 Reserve, First Army
- 17.12.44 – 04.45 Reserve, Third Army

**Tactical Attachments:**
- 16.09.44 – 23.10.44 XVII. Armeekorps, 8. Arme, Heeresgruppe Süd
- 17.11.44 – 31.12.44 XXIX. Armeekorps, 8. Arme, Heeresgruppe Süd
### 25th WAFFEN-GRENADIER-DIVISION DER SS “HUNYADI” (ungarische Nr. 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lineage:</th>
<th>Commanding Officers:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituted: 2.11.44 Hunyadi Division [new unit]</td>
<td>2.11.44 – 5.05.45 MG József Grassy also: Waffen-Gruppenführer der SS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassigned: 7.45 to Waffen-SS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redesignated: 7.45 25th Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS “Hunyadi” (ungarische No. 1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued: 5.05.45 surrendered to US Forces at Timelkam, Austria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Organization 1944–1945:
- Division Headquarters
- 61st Waffen-SS Infantry Regiment (I – II) 1, 2
- 62nd Waffen-SS Infantry Regiment (I – II) 1
- 63rd Waffen-SS Infantry Regiment (I – II) 1
- 25th Waffen-SS Artillery Regiment (I – IV) 3
- 25th Waffen-SS Bicycle (“Fussilier”) Battalion 4
- 25th Waffen-SS Ski Battalion 5
- 25th Waffen-SS Combat Engineer Battalion 6
- 25th Waffen-SS Anti-Tank Battalion
- 25th Waffen-SS Anti-Aircraft Battalion 7
- 25th Waffen-SS Signal Battalion
- 25th Waffen-SS Divisional Interpreter Company 8
- 25th Waffen-SS Divisional Supply Regiment
- 25th Waffen-SS Training and Replacement Regiment
- 86th Hungarian Army Replacement and Training Regiment (I – IV)

#### Administrative Attachments:
- 2.11.44 – 5.05.45 Reichsführer-SS

### NOTES:
1) In the third week of February 1945, the 26th SS Division received a large influx of Hungarian personnel originally earmarked for further Hungarian Waffen-SS divisions which were not raised. These men were used to form the IIIrd battalion of the infantry regiments.
2) The Ist Battalion was a bicycle unit.
3) Only two batteries raised in IVth Battalion.
4) Initially only company strength. Raised to battalion size in April 1945.
5) Originally not planned. Raised April 1945, but never joined the division and operated independently.
6) Only two engineer companies raised elsewhere. Never with the division.
7) The battalion headquarters was not raised, and only one anti-aircraft company was raised, which was assigned to the antitank battalion.
8) The interpreter company was originally not planned as a separate unit, as these men were supposed to be spread out amongst the division.

The rank of “Waffen-Gruppenführer der SS” indicates a Waffen-SS Major General who is not a German national.
26th WAFFEN-GRENADIER-DIVISION DER SS “HUNGARIA” (ungarische Nr. 2)

**Lineage:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituted:</th>
<th>23.12.44</th>
<th>[new unit]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reassigned:</td>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>to Waffen-SS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redesignated:</td>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>26th Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS “Hungaria” (ungarische No. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinued:</td>
<td>5.05.45</td>
<td>surrendered to US Forces at Timelkam, Austria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Commanding Officers:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.12.44 – 21.01.45</td>
<td>Waffen-Oberführer der SS Zoltan Pisky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.01.45 – 20.03.45</td>
<td>SS-Oberführer Berthold Maack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.03.45 – 9.05.45</td>
<td>Waffen-Gruppenführer der SS József Grassy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Organization 1944–1945:**

- Division Headquarters
- 64th Waffen-SS Infantry Regiment (I–II) ¹ ²
- 65th Waffen-SS Infantry Regiment (I–II) ³ ⁴
- 26th Waffen-SS Artillery Regiment (I–IV) ⁴
- 26th Waffen-SS Bicycle (“Fusiler”) Battalion ⁵
- 25th Waffen-SS Ski Battalion ⁶
- 26th Waffen-SS Combat Engineer Battalion ⁷
- 26th Waffen-SS Anti-Tank Battalion
- 26th Waffen-SS Anti-Aircraft Battalion ⁸
- 26th Waffen-SS Signal Battalion
- 26th Waffen-SS Divisional Interpreter Company ⁹
- 26th Waffen-SS Divisional Supply Regiment
- 26th Waffen-SS Training and Replacement Regiment
- 85th Hungarian Army Replacement and Training Regiment (I–IV)

**Administrative Attachments:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Administrative Attachment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.11.44 – 5.05.45</td>
<td>Reichsführer-SS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**

1) In the third week of February 1945, the 26th SS Division received a large influx of Hungarian personnel originally earmarked for further Hungarian Waffen-SS divisions which were not raised. These men were used to form the IIIrd battalion of the infantry regiments.

2) The IInd Battalion was a bicycle unit.

3) The IInd Battalion had only two companies.

4) The artillery was raised after the other units. The Ist and IInd Battalions were raised in January 1945, the III Battalion was not raised until February 1945, and the IVth Battalion was raised in April 1945, (and had only two batteries).

5) Initially only company strength. Raised to battalion size in April 1945.

6) Originally not planned. Raised April 1945, but never joined the division and operated independently.

7) Only two engineer companies raised.

8) The battalion headquarters was not raised, and only one antiaircraft company was raised, which was assigned to the antitank battalion.

9) The interpreter company was originally not planned as a separate unit, as these men were supposed to be spread out amongst the division.

The SS made a differentiation in rank designations between foreign and German members of the Waffen-SS.

- **Waffen-Oberführer der SS**
  - Foreign national Senior Colonel in the Waffen-SS

- **SS-Oberführer**
  - German national Senior Colonel in the Waffen-SS

- **Waffen-Gruppenführer der SS**
  - Foreign national Major General in the Waffen-SS
The Royal Hungarian Army
1920 – 1945

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Glossary
Index
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Kart RH2 Ost German Army daily situation maps of the East Front.

HONVÉD MINISTRY


WAR OFFICE, LONDON

WO 208/752 Handbook on Hungarian Military Forces, 1945

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## Glossary

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<td>1st Lieutant</td>
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<td>3LT</td>
<td>3rd Lieutant</td>
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>antiaircraft gun</td>
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<td>Arme-Abteilung</td>
<td>Armeekorps</td>
<td>Corps (German term)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ad-hoc grouping of corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>AA Armee-Abteilung</td>
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<td>Ad-hoc grouping of corps</td>
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<td>AFV</td>
<td>armored fighting vehicle</td>
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<td>group of armies of different nations (German term)</td>
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<td>Artillery battalion (German term)</td>
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<td>Bn</td>
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<td>C.I.C.</td>
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<td>company</td>
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<td>Col, COL</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<td>C.O.S.</td>
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<td>field</td>
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<td>Flaksturmregiment</td>
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<td>antiaircraft combat group (German term)</td>
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<td>General Headquarters (GHQ)</td>
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<td>fövezérség közvetlenek GHQ troops</td>
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<td>General Headquarters</td>
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<td>motorized, motor</td>
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<td>Gr</td>
<td>Group (German term)</td>
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<td>Infantry Inspectorate infantry (German term)</td>
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<td>GSC</td>
<td>General Staff Corps</td>
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<td>györs győrs</td>
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<td>hadtest</td>
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<td>HFP</td>
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<td>Föparancsnokság</td>
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<td>HFK</td>
<td>Commander-In-Chief</td>
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<td>HGr</td>
<td>Army Group (German term)</td>
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<td>Hgy, Hgyv</td>
<td>mountain</td>
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<td>H.M.</td>
<td>Honvéd Ministry</td>
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<td>HMG</td>
<td>heavy machine gun</td>
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<td>H.O.C.</td>
<td>Hungarian Occupation Command</td>
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<td>Hungarian Occupation Group</td>
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<td>hővéd</td>
<td>private, homeland protection, homeland guard</td>
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<td>honvédsg.</td>
<td>Hungarian army</td>
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<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>hvéd</td>
<td>border defense / guard</td>
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<td>Jäg</td>
<td>light infantry (German term)</td>
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<td>light</td>
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<td>K.u.K.</td>
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<td>Kav</td>
<td>cavalry (German term)</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>German Term</td>
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<td>KG</td>
<td>Kampfgruppe</td>
<td>ad-hoc combat group</td>
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<td>KIA</td>
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<td>killed in action</td>
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<td>kik</td>
<td>kiképzés</td>
<td>training</td>
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<td>Korps-Abteilung</td>
<td>division-sized unit</td>
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<td>L, Lov</td>
<td>lovasság</td>
<td>cavalry / rider</td>
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<td>lei</td>
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<td>LMG</td>
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<td>light machine gun</td>
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<td>Lt</td>
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<td>Lt</td>
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<td>MG</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
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<td>non-commissioned officer</td>
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<td>ö</td>
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<td>independent</td>
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<td>ÖKH</td>
<td>Oberkommando des Heeres</td>
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<td>OKW</td>
<td>Oberkommando der Wehrmacht</td>
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<td>P.O.L.</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>petrol, oil, and lubricants</td>
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<td>PzAbt</td>
<td>Panzer-Abteilung</td>
<td>tank battalion</td>
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<td>Pc</td>
<td>panceros</td>
<td>armored</td>
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<td>pc gá</td>
<td>pancelosgépágyus</td>
<td>armored, self-propelled automatic AA/AT cannon</td>
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<td>Panzergrenadier</td>
<td>motorized and armored infantry in mechanized units</td>
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<td>regiment</td>
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## Place Names

Many places indicated in this book have two (or more) names. Normally, the name used is that of the occupier at the time of the events described. However, this has not been carried through in any consequent manner, and, depending on the source used, the name and spelling of the place has sometimes been taken from that source. I have tried to indicate places on maps, so that the reader is not forced to look for old maps to locate places. Even then, a WWII map will not necessarily show the place with the name I have used, as cartographers did not necessarily use the same source for the places being depicted. In cases of transliterations of, for example, Russian and Ukrainian places, some of them were made into German, and then into English, with several possibilities for error.

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Ujverbász = Novi Vrbas
Ung River = Uz River
Ungvár = Uzhorod
Ustchorna = Königsfeld
Vác = Vács
Vág River = Vah River
Vinnica = Vinicza
Volovec = Volócz
Voröstorony = Turnu Rosu
Vrachats = Vrzac
Wiskow = Wyszkow
Zabie = Verkovyna
Zilah = Waltenburg
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